The Humanitarian Illusion Carr; , Caleb . New York Times , Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]16 Sep 1993: A.23. ProQuest document link ABSTRACT (ABSTRACT) The U.N. troops, faced with a physical threat that overrode complex moral considerations, fired back, killing perhaps 100 civilians and moving the troubled U.N. intervention in Somalia to the brink of disaster. And yesterday Somali gunmen shot and killed two Italian soldiers. Should the U.N. troops leave Somalia now, we can expect man-made disasters to return in full force. Retreat would be a practical choice. But we ought to acknowledge honestly where retreat would lead. U.S. and U.N. leaders seem unwilling to abandon Somalia to such a fate. The military seems to be increasing its efforts to disarm the gangs and to jail leaders who, like General Aidid, obstruct the path to an effective solution to Somalia's troubles. The U.N. leadership is not swayed by their accusations of imperialism. If the multinational force moves with heightened vigor, Somalia could be a U.N. protectorate within the year. Freed from the fighting, U.N. officials could see whether there are leaders who care more about Somalis than personal power. If not, the protectorate status would have to be extended until such leaders emerged. That might take months -- or years. Are all the countries in the U.N. force ready for such a delay and commitment? Domestic signals indicate that they may not be -- and the conclusion of these debates, most importantly the one getting under way in Washington, will be crucial. FULL TEXT AuthorAffiliation Caleb Carr is author of "The Devil Soldier." This is adapted from an article that appears in the fall issue of the World Policy Journal. Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid again showed he would stop at nothing when he sent women and children amid his henchmen into Mogadishu streets to attack members of the United Nations force last week. The U.N. troops, faced with a physical threat that overrode complex moral considerations, fired back, killing perhaps 100 civilians and moving the troubled U.N. intervention in Somalia to the brink of disaster. And yesterday Somali gunmen shot and killed two Italian soldiers. Only two routes offer hope of changing the deplorable status quo: increased control by the military forces or speedy withdrawal. As always, the United States will lead the way in making this choice; its decision will have enormous implications for U.S. policy in other parts of the world. The U.S. and U.N. entered Somalia believing they could direct the combat troops to ignore the political situation and pursue an extra-military -- that is, extra-political -- end: the distribution of humanitarian aid. The U.N. forces established famine as the enemy, not the gangs of such warlords as General Aidid and Gen. Mohammed Said Hersi, who is also known as General Morgan. The coalition was unwilling or unable to recognize ...

1. The Humanitarian Illusion
Carr; , Caleb . New York Times , Late Edition (East Coast);
New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]16 Sep 1993:
A.23.
ProQuest document link
ABSTRACT (ABSTRACT)
The U.N. troops, faced with a physical threat that overrode
complex moral considerations, fired back, killing
perhaps 100 civilians and moving the troubled U.N. intervention
in Somalia to the brink of disaster. And yesterday
Somali gunmen shot and killed two Italian soldiers.
Should the U.N. troops leave Somalia now, we can expect man-
made disasters to return in full force. Retreat would
be a practical choice. But we ought to acknowledge honestly
where retreat would lead. U.S. and U.N. leaders seem
unwilling to abandon Somalia to such a fate. The military seems
to be increasing its efforts to disarm the gangs
and to jail leaders who, like General Aidid, obstruct the path to
an effective solution to Somalia's troubles.

2. The U.N. leadership is not swayed by their accusations of
imperialism. If the multinational force moves with
heightened vigor, Somalia could be a U.N. protectorate within
the year. Freed from the fighting, U.N. officials could
see whether there are leaders who care more about Somalis than
personal power. If not, the protectorate status
would have to be extended until such leaders emerged. That
might take months -- or years. Are all the countries in
the U.N. force ready for such a delay and commitment?
Domestic signals indicate that they may not be -- and the
conclusion of these debates, most importantly the one getting
under way in Washington, will be crucial.
FULL TEXT
AuthorAffiliation
Caleb Carr is author of "The Devil Soldier." This is adapted
from an article that appears in the fall issue of the World
Policy Journal.
Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid again showed he would stop at
nothing when he sent women and children amid his
henchmen into Mogadishu streets to attack members of the
United Nations force last week.

3. The U.N. troops, faced with a physical threat that overrode
complex moral considerations, fired back, killing
perhaps 100 civilians and moving the troubled U.N. intervention
in Somalia to the brink of disaster. And yesterday
Somali gunmen shot and killed two Italian soldiers.
Only two routes offer hope of changing the deplorable status
quo: increased control by the military forces or
speedy withdrawal. As always, the United States will lead the
way in making this choice; its decision will have
enormous implications for U.S. policy in other parts of the
world.
The U.S. and U.N. entered Somalia believing they could direct
the combat troops to ignore the political situation
and pursue an extra-military -- that is, extra-political -- end: the
distribution of humanitarian aid.
The U.N. forces established famine as the enemy, not the gangs
of such warlords as General Aidid and Gen.
Mohammed Said Hersi, who is also known as General Morgan.
The coalition was unwilling or unable to recognize
that famine in Somalia is not a natural disaster; it is a policy
orchestrated by the clan leaders to preserve their
power and to destroy Somalis who will not join their sides.

4. Recognition of this fact came too late in the international effort,
and acknowledgment of its implications is proving
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just as tardy. We now hunt General Aidid like the criminal he
has always been; yet our delay in beginning that hunt,
and our willingness to seat him and the other gang leaders at an
internationally sanctioned peace conference in
Addis Ababa earlier this year, have given him the time, media
attention and the setting in which to portray himself
as a legitimate leader.
Seizing Generals Aidid and Morgan and other gang leaders and
disarming their followers should have been the first
order of business. If our troops are to stay, we should pursue
that goal more aggressively. If famine remains the
enemy, its agents must be quickly and severely stopped.
Many in the West are uncomfortable with such an approach,
echoing General Aidid's inevitable claim that it
amounts to colonialism. That may be so, but it is also the only
cure for Somalia's ills. Proof is evident all over the

5. country, notably in towns like Baardheere, where marines
quickly established a weapons-free zone, neutralized the
gangs and helped the citizens rebuild their lives. This is
colonialism, no doubt -- but, after all, the local leaders were
the agents of famine and disease.
Should the U.N. troops leave Somalia now, we can expect man-
made disasters to return in full force. Retreat would
be a practical choice. But we ought to acknowledge honestly
where retreat would lead. U.S. and U.N. leaders seem
unwilling to abandon Somalia to such a fate. The military seems
to be increasing its efforts to disarm the gangs
and to jail leaders who, like General Aidid, obstruct the path to
an effective solution to Somalia's troubles.
The U.N. leadership is not swayed by their accusations of
imperialism. If the multinational force moves with
heightened vigor, Somalia could be a U.N. protectorate within
the year. Freed from the fighting, U.N. officials could
see whether there are leaders who care more about Somalis than
personal power. If not, the protectorate status
would have to be extended until such leaders emerged. That
might take months -- or years. Are all the countries in
the U.N. force ready for such a delay and commitment?
Domestic signals indicate that they may not be -- and the

6. conclusion of these debates, most importantly the one getting
under way in Washington, will be crucial.
For the consequences of Somalia extend far beyond the fate of
that nation and beyond troubled Africa. In U.S.
foreign policy, they encompass the long overdue recognition
that military intervention cannot be nonpolitical.
If we send U.S. and U.N. forces abroad because of a
humanitarian crisis, we will come into conflict with political
leaders who are not capably addressing that crisis or are
abetting it. Before going in, we must determine the
legitimacy of those leaders and whether we are prepared to
remove them.
Such a policy shift would have regional implications, not only
in the developing world but more importantly in the
former Yugoslavia. The Bosnian-Serb-Croat conflict is not a
natural disaster or a humanitarian crisis. It is a crude
display of power politics that drags on because the factional
leaders and their followers care more about winning
than showing mercy to innocent civilians.
In deciding whether or not to intervene in any way in that
conflict, we must ask ourselves questions we did not
grapple with before the start of the Somali expedition: Do we
accept the legitimacy of the leaders of the conflict?

7. Do we believe that the ethnic and religious basis of their
dispute is valid grounds for war and slaughter?
If not, we must be prepared, should we choose military
intervention, to arrest all such leaders, disarm their
followers and create a U.N. protectorate whose term may be far
longer than that in Somalia.
For there may be no leaders who truly believe in peace and
compromise in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, and it may
take generations to foster such changes. The alternative, of
course, is to stay out of the fight -- a course that
dooms many civilians to violent death and the rest to an almost
medieval way of life.
Gen. Colin L. Powell was thus quite right to say that if we
withdrew from Somalia, our chances of creating any true
new world order would be severely diminished. Yet if we
backed down from the responsibility of creating a full-
scale U.N. protectorate, withdrawal would be the only sensible,
workable solution that remained.
There is no middle road in such conflicts, as we saw in the
largely symbolic airlift of medical supplies to Bosnia

8. earlier this year, and as the stalemate in Somalia continues to
demonstrate.
If we enter the fray, we become political players. Any attempt
to portray a political conflict as a humanitarian crisis
is simply sidestepping the terrible choice before us.
DETAILS
Subject: ARMAMENT, DEFENSE AND MILITARY FORCES;
FAMINE; POLITICS AND
GOVERNMENT; CIVIL WAR AND GUERRILLA WARFARE
Location: SOMALIA
People: CARR, CALEB
Company / organization: Name: United Nations; NAICS:
928120
Publication title: New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast);
New York, N.Y.
Pages: A.23
Publication year: 1993
Publication date: Sep 16, 1993

9. Section: A
Publisher: New York Times Company
Place of publication: New York, N.Y.
Country of publication: United States, New York, N.Y.
Publication subject: General Interest Periodicals--United States
ISSN: 03624331
CODEN: NYTIAO
Source type: Newspapers
Language of publication: English
Document type: Op-Ed
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Humanitarian Illusion
In this critical thinking assignment, research a healthcare
organization within Saudi Arabia in which you are currently
employed or choose one with which you are familiar (MNG-HA
http://ngha.med.sa/Arabic/Pages/default.aspx )
Respond to the following questions:
· What specific steps does the chosen healthcare organization
take to identify risk, manage risk, reduce risk, or prevent risk?
· Do they employ a dedicated risk manager? YES If so, what are
the key responsibilities of that person (training staff,
onboarding, auditing, etc.)?
· If they do not have a specific risk manager, who is responsible
for managing risk? ALL
· How do they manage risk for both the employees and the

11. patients?
· Are there separate programs or do they overlap?
· Lastly, in your opinion, are they doing enough to address risk?
Your paper should meet the following structural requirements:
· The paper should be 5 pages in length, not including the cover
sheet and reference page.
· Format the paper according to APA
· Intext citation of at least 7 recent articles.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?
Risse, Mathias
Ethics & International Affairs; 2005; 19, 1; ProQuest Central
pg. 9
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12. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
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Learning Resources
Please read and view (where applicable) the following Learning

13. Resources before you complete this week's assignments.
Readings
· Book Excerpt: Wronka, J. M. (2008). Chapter 2: Before and
beyond the universal declaration of human rights. In Human
rights and social justice: Social action and service for the
helping and health professions (pp. 65–96). Los Angeles, CA:
Sage Publications.
· Article: Carr, C. (1993, Sept 16). The humanitarian illusion.
The New York Times. A23. (See Attachment)
Use the ProQuest Central database and search using the article
title.
· Article: Duke University Libraries. (n. d.). NGO Research
Guide. Retrieved December 9, 2010, from
http://library.duke.edu/research/subject/guides/ngo_guide/ngo_d
atabase.html
· Article: Davidson, A. (29 June 2010) Haiti: The aid dilemma
(Q & A With Adam Davidson) [Optional Material]. Frontline.
Arlington, VA: PBS. Retrieved December 9, 2010, from
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haiti-aid/qa.html
· Article: Pogge, T. (2005). Symposium: World poverty and
human rights, Ethics & International Affairs, 19(1), 1–7. (See
Attachment)
Use the Academic Search Complete database and search using
the article title.
· Article: Risse, M. (2005). Do we owe the global poor
assistance or rectification? Response to world poverty and
human rights. Ethics and International Affairs, 19(1), 9–18.
(See Attachment)
Use the Academic Search Complete database and search using
the article title.
· Article: United Nations Human Rights. (n. d.). Human Rights
Bodies. Retrieved December 9, 2010, from
http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.as
px