Is There Life after Saddam

IsThere Life After Saddam?
An Interview with the Iraqi
National Congress Chairman
Ahmad Chalabi
Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of an exiled Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi
NationalCongress (INC), has worn many hats. He studiedat MIT,earneda doc-
torate in mathematics from the University of Chicago, taught at the American
University in Beirut, manageda bank in Amman, andstarteda software company
in London. With the creation ofthe INC in 1992, Chalabiset up an armedbase in
the U.S.-protectedKurdishterritoryin northern Jraq--waitingforthe rightmoment
to unseatSaddamHussein. In 1995, the INC led an offensive againstthe Iraqiarmy
and, in the absence of U.S. support,suffereda disastrousdefeat with numerouscasu-
alties. Chalabiwasforced toflee the country.After the 2000presidentialelections in
America, George W Bush broughtIraq back to the top ofAmerican foreign policy
agenda, and Chalabi reemerged as a major player, consideredby some a potential
leaderofthe after-SaddamIraq.
In early October2002, as the Bush administrationcontemplated the idea of
invadingIraq, The Fletcher Forums Mariya RasnervisitedAhmad Chalabiat the
INC office in Washington, D.C
FORUM: The Iraqi opposition, and specifically the INC, has had mixed relations
with the U.S. government, the State Department, and the intelligence community.
Can you explain that? Moreover, why do some people like you, while others do not?
CHALABI: The INC was founded on the platform that was pretty straightfor-
ward: the overthrow of the dictatorship in Iraq and the establishment of a demo-
cratic, pluralistic government with federal structure. We called for a government
that respects human rights and renounces weapons of mass destruction, as well as
war as state policy in general. The INC was formed by a group of Iraqi represen-
tatives of various communities and political trends. In general, we are seen as an
Iraqi patriotic organization.
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t8 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS
These values have a natural affinity with the values espoused by the United
States. However, that is no guarantee that various departments of the United
States that deal with foreign affairs would support such an organization. We are
first and foremost created in the interests of Iraq and the Iraqi people, and some-
The attacks of9/11
showed what a state, even
a weak one, could do if
it is controlledby terrorists
anda man bent on
developing weapons of
mass destruction.
times there are conflicts and contradictions
between what we view to be in the interests
of Iraq and the Iraqi people and what agen-
cies of the U.S. government that deal with
us view to be in the interests of Iraq and the
Iraqi people.
You must remember that the U.S.
foreign policy is concerned with the inter-
ests of the United States. So, naturally, there
are differences that arise between us. I don't
think that we've ever come into conflict
with the values and positions of the United
States, but some in the U.S. do think that our interests, our timetable, and our
agenda are not satisfactory, and that this agenda is not what they want to support.
I have sometimes been accused of trying to drag the United States into a
premature war with Saddam. My position is very clear. I went to Congress in
March 1998 and stated that the Iraqi people call for open cooperation with the
U.S. in the overthrow of Saddam. And I have worked openly towards this purpose.
This position, however, did not find favor with some people in the U.S.
government. At the same time, it is difficult to attack an idea that the United
States should be supporting liberty, freedom, and democracy. So, rather than
attack that idea, they instead attacked me as the path of least resistance.
FORUM: What is the U.S. agenda in Iraq? How does it differ from your agenda?
CHALABI: The U.S. Congress has supported my agenda entirely when it passed
the Iraq Liberation Act.' The Clinton administration did not agree with this. The
administration thought that Iraq was to be contained, and that Saddam was not a
threat. The national security adviser once used a very strange analogy when he said,
"We will treat Saddam like a whackamole: any time this whackamole puts his head
up, you whack him." He thought that Saddam could not possibly be a threat to the
United States, and that interference in Iraq is not its business. However, it was in
the interests of the United States to contain Saddam-regardless of either the cost
to the Iraqi people or the long-term interests of the United States. So, in the end,
President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, but immediately deflected it.
FORUM: In other words, the money wasn't forwarded where it was supposed to go?
CHALABI: It's not the matter of the money not being forwarded. The Congress pro-
vided for training and supply of equipment from the stocks of the Department of
VOL.27:I WINTERAPRING 2003

IS THERE LIFE AFTER SADDAM? AN INTERVIEW WITH 19
THE IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS CHAIRMAN AHMAD CHALABI
Defense. You would think that the Department of Defense stocks are mainly con-
cerned with waging war, but they immediately said that there was no lethal training
to be provided and no lethal equipment to be given. We, of course, opposed this
view, but we had to cooperate and accept whatever we were being given.
However, things have changed. The Republican platform for the 2000
election said very prominently that the Republican Party and the president, if
elected, stand for the full implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act and the
removal of Saddam Hussein.
FORUM: What role, ifany, did 9/11 play in the formation of U.S. policy towards
Iraq?
CHALABI: September 11 made it very clear to the American people what havoc
a group of supposedly stateless terrorists could bring onto the United States. It
also made the comparison and the parallel easy: it showed what a state, even a
weak one, could do if it is controlled by terrorists and a man bent on developing
weapons of mass destruction. President Bush had a great idea, and as all great
ideas, it is very simple. He said, "Saddam is a terrorist, and he has weapons of
mass destruction. If he combines his terrorist skills with his weapons, he poses a
serious threat to the United States. Therefore, Saddam must go." This happened
to be the position of the U.S. Congress, and is also what the Iraqi people have
been passionately calling for.
FORUM: There were times when Iraq was a friend-the U.S. supported Iraq in
its war against Iran in 1980-1988, and as we now know, transferred to Iraq a lot
of the same weaponry that now threatens
American lives.
CHALABI: Well, this is not a new thing in I don't think anybody in
history. First of all, I don't think anybody in the U.S. government ever
the U.S. government ever considered consideredSaddam afiend.
Saddam a friend. They always considered
him a son of a bitch, but he was your son of They always consideredhim
a bitch. That was the attitude. a son ofa bitch, but he was
Second, this argument could also be yourson ofa bitch.
applied to Stalin. The United States pro-
vided huge quantities of lend-lease equip-
ment to Russia, largely through Iraq by the way, during the Second World War.
Of course, Stalin helped win that war, and then the Soviet Union promptly went
and used this procured equipment against the United States during the Cold War.
Furthermore, during the Korean War, much of the equipment used against
the United States' forces was of American origin. However, in the case of Stalin,
it was within the United States' interests to supply him with technology because
Hitler was seen as the bigger threat. In turn, when Stalin continued to pursue an
VOL.27:I WINTER/SPRING 2003

20 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS
expansionist policy and sought to spread revolutionary communism around the
world, the U.S. had to confront him despite the fact that a few years earlier they
had supplied him with hardware.
A similar situation applies to Iraq. It is how people view danger and inter-
ests of a country that determines their behavior at a specific point in time. This
is what you learn when you take courses in international relations and history. If
you read Kissinger's book on the Treaty of Vienna, he goes on to elaborate how
[Prince Klemens von] Metternich and [Viscount Robert Stewart] Castlereagh
were urging Napoleon before the Battle of Nations to accept a settlement because
they thought that Czar Alexander was becoming a bigger threat as Napoleon was
being weakened. They went so far as to engineer a defeat of their forces in order
to demonstrate that it was in their interest to accept peace with Napoleon. States
do these things. Kissinger thought that it was a neat effort.
FORUM: And yet, it seems that in 1991, just as President Bush declared a cease-
fire, there was a great opportunity to topple Saddam by supporting an internal
revolt in Iraq, but the U.S. was afraid of Iran at the time. Do you consider that a
sign of shortsightedness in how the U.S. government sees the world and conducts
its foreign policy?
CHALABI: The U.S., in dealing with the situation in Iraq after the first GulfWar,
came to erroneous and disastrous conclusions largely due to both the ignorance
of the situation in Iraq and lack of political
The U.S., in dealingwith planning for its future following the enor-
mously successful military planning that
Iraqafter thefirst Gulf accompanied the war. This isan example of
War,came to erroneous how a great power can easily win the war
anddisastrousconclusions, and then somehow lose the peace.
The people who urged President
This is an example ofhow Bush to stop the war and pull out of Iraq,
a greatpower can easily and who argued that the U.S. forces should-
win the war and then n't get involved in further military conflict,
somehow lose thepeace, ended up embroiling the United States for
more than a decade in combat operations in
Iraq. This miscalculation, you could say,was
the root cause of the hostility that Osama bin Laden bandied about against the
United States. Bin Laden's main claim is what? It is "let America leave the holy
places of Islam." But America is there to protect Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf
countries against Saddam. So, by not finishing him off in 1991...
People said that the U.S. shouldn't get involved in military operations.
As a result, the United States ended up flying combat missions to enforce no-
flight zones in the north and south of Iraq. Now the United States finds itself

involved in further military operations because Saddam has violated every
resolution of the United Nations dealing with the initial war aims and the
ceasefire resolution.
So, the advice about Iraq that President Bush received was faulty. It pre-
sented an erroneous portrayal of Iraq as a society of violent, querulous people
who can only be kept in check by the steady, strong hand of a dictator. That por-
trayal was the order of the day, and it was a miscalculation.
Basically, what the people who argued this wanted was Saddam without
Saddam. They thought that a victory for the
people in Iraq would involve several dan-
gers. The first danger was that they thought The Shi'a ofIraq certainly
the Kurds would split off. Second, they do not want Iranians,
feared that the Shi'a would introduce Iran or Turks, orAmericans,
to control Iraq. Of course, nobody had
talked to the Kurds or the Shi'a in any sub- or British, or Russians to
stantial way. Rather, they made these rule their country. They
assumptions on the basis of impressions and are Iraqis.
largely influenced by Saddam's propaganda.
You have to remember that the bulk
of the Iraqi army that fought Iran in the eight-year war between 1980 and 1988
was composed of Shi'a. The Shi'a of Iraq certainly do not want Iranians, orTurks,
or Americans, or British, or Russians to rule their country. They are Iraqis.
The Kurds of Iraq... No Kurdish leader had called for separation, and no
Kurdish leader had called for independence. After all, the Kurds do possess some
intelligence and political sophistication-in fact, they possess a lot of intelligence
and political sophistication. If you compare the Kurdish regions on the map, the
Kurdish areas in Iraq contain the smallest part-smaller than the Kurdish areas
in Iran or Turkey-and have far less population than in Iran and Turkey. Besides,
they are landlocked. So, how can anybody in his right mind-a responsible polit-
ical leader in Kurdish areas of Iraq-call for an independent Kurdish state when
he isimmediately going to confront far stronger forces that are all hostile to him?
How could he survive? Turkey would oppose it, Iran would oppose it, Iraq would
oppose it, and Syria would oppose it. What's the point?
But, of course, this impression [of a Kurdish drive for independence] had
prevailed. The final decision was taken on erroneous grounds. There was no
political plan. Few people talked to the Kurds themselves. In fact, there was a ban
in the United States at the time against talking to the Iraqi opposition!
This time President Bush is doing things differently. Of course, the Iraq
Liberation Act outlines the entire body of relations between the Iraqi opposition
and the United States. There is the experience and the platform of the INC. And
there is much dialogue as well as a great deal of understanding of how the Iraqi
VOL.Z7:1 WINTER/SPRING 2003

2.2 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS
people will behave and react in the face of American military action against Iraq.
As a matter of fact, you do not see a single Iraqi opposition group of any signifi-
cance opposing American action in Iraq, except the Communists.
FORUM: So how will the people of Iraq react?
CHALABI: With great jubilation. The people of Iraq will be celebrating the fall
of Saddam in the hands of the United States.
FORUM: And what will happen then?
CHALABI: In our view, what should happen is that an interim coalition govern-
ment should be established as soon as the
United States forces commence operations
Saddam is afarbetter and we gain access to any Arab part of Iraq.
conspiratorthan any agency This coalition government would enjoy the
ofthe U.S. government, support of the United States and be in
charge of the military force that we expect
to be trained under the Iraq Liberation Act.
By the way, the Iraqi military units in the army will be called to join this force.
Subsequently, the coalition government would deal with the problem of
law and order in Iraqi cities and with the issue of humanitarian relief, providing
food supplies in any emergency situation that may arise.
FORUM: Who are the constituent members of this coalition?
CHALABI: The coalition is composed of the political forces in Iraq that we think
represent various constituencies in Iraqi society.
FORUM: So you are here in Washington talking to the U.S. government. Are the
Kurds here in Washington talking to the U.S. government? Are the Shi'a here in
Washington talking to the U.S. government?
CHALABI: We all came together back in August 2002 to talk to the U.S. gov-
ernment. I came here to attend the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]
meeting.
FORUM: And you have developed a joint framework of operation?
CHALABI: The opposition will work together in alliance with the United States.
FORUM: Has it happened before where all of the Iraqi opposition groups joined
forces? For instance, the Kurds broke into civil war just as there were signs of
greater cooperation.
CHALABI: Review your history. The INC was formed in June 1992 right after the
Kurdish elections. Both Kurdish parties worked together with the INC, and the
INC established its own headquarters in the north, in Kurdistan. The Kurds
worked for two years with the INC together, and started the conflict only when
they discovered that, contrary to earlier expectations, the United States government
VOL.27:1 WINTERAPRING 2003

was not going to support the INC in an effort to overthrow Saddam. So at that
point local considerations and struggle for wealth became more important than
working together. But initially, the Kurds came together, everybody was in the INC,
and they all subscribed to the INC platform.
Then there is the issue of exile politics. There is a cardinal law that does
not get violated very often, and that is: the more remote the possibility of success
in the country, the more disunited various factions of an exiled opposition. Upon
seeing that prospects of achieving victory increase, opposition forces very quickly
coalesce and come together. This dynamic has worked in many places. Take, for
example, the struggle against the Nazis in France. There were 47 different resis-
tance factions that were killing each other. However, when they saw that the
Allies were going to land, they all came together.
FORUM: The U.S. has always insisted that the overthrow of Saddam had to come
from within his own circle. The alternative to that, from the U.S. standpoint, was
a "silver bullet" approach-an assassination. You, on the other hand, have advo-
cated some sort of mutiny in the army and within Iraqi society. Can you explain
your point of view?
CHALABI: The position of the INC has been that any change in Iraq could
happen only by the will of the Iraqi people gathering support from the Iraqi mil-
itary with the assistance of the United States. This position had come into con-
flict with the view of people who thought .......................................................................................
that they could generate a coup d'&at in
Baghdad using the Iraqi army officers from Any Iraqifrom military
Saddam's inner circle but who were disloyal circles who hadworked
to him. with the UnitedStates in
Anybody who thought that this could
be done had seriously misunderstood the a conspiracyagainst
nature of Saddam's regime. Saddam is a far Saddam is either deador,
better conspirator than any agency of the if he is lucky, in exile.
U.S. government. When Saddam found out
that the United States was trying to topple
him through a military coup d'6tat, he did not sit still. He began to send the so-
called conspirators to provoke military plots. The result of this tactic is a decade of
failure for the U.S. Any Iraqi from military circles who had worked with the United
States in a conspiracy against Saddam is either dead or, if he is lucky, in exile.
So our view is the correct view.The Iraq Liberation Act speaks to that, and I
hope that this will be the policy of the U.S. government. Even when Saddam's son-
in-law fled the country-and his son-in-law is no ordinary person, he is the one who
established the Republican Guards [Saddam's elite forces] and was in charge of the
weapons program-he could not generate any support for the overthrow ofSaddam.

What he did was that he asked the U.S. to provide him with two armed divisions
and have the U.S. Air Force take orders about targets in Iraq. That did not happen.
FORUM: Does the INC have any relationship with the United Nations?
CHALABI: The United Nations is a club of states. We are not a state, so we are
not admitted to the club.
The United Nations has generally had a very difficult time either opposing
or meeting with the opposition to Saddam. We sometimes meet surreptitiously
with some United Nations bureaucrats. More frequent are our encounters with
individual missions to the United Nations. The UN agency that has dealt.with us
the most is UNSCOM [United Nations Special Commission], largely due to the
courage of its two chairmen, Ambassador Ekeus and Ambassador Butler.
FORUM: What is your current opinion of the UN?
CHALABI: The UN is the body where the world resolves its differences and
agrees on a common position. But the UN is very nervous about regime change.
It works to preserve regimes, rather than change them.
FORUM: Would that not go against international law?
CHALABI: No. If so, how did they achieve regime change in Germany in 1945?
Or regime change in Japan? The United Nations was actually based on regime
....................I -...............................................................................1.........change, b ut over the years it developed into
a club of nations that became something of
The UN is very nervous a cover for a multitude of sins.
aboutregime change. It The United Nations, under the guise
works to preserve regimes, of non-interference, became a false witness
ratherthan change them. to genocide, repression, and deportation not
only in Iraq, but also all over the world. It
has had limited success resolving these types
of issues that beset tens of millions of people. And it is, of course, a tragedy to
put the concept of state sovereignty above all other affairs taking place on that
state's territory. The principle of non-interference becomes a hypocrisy when con-
fronted with totalitarian regimes that destroy the very fabric of civil society in
their own countries. Saddam is the prime example of that. Repression at home is
the other side of the coin of aggression abroad.
FORUM: But Saddam has been smart over the years, inviting the UN weapons
inspectors in to see limited resources, then throwing them out, and letting them
back in again at the height of international outcry and a threat of military action.
And then he does the same thing all over.
CHALABI: This remark is not a comment on the intelligence of Saddam. Rather,
it is a comment on the fecklessness of the United Nations.

IS THERE LIFE AFTER SADDAM? AN INTERVIEW WITH
FORUM: Do you put the U.S. in that same category of "fecklessness"?
CHALABI: Under the Clinton administration, yes, but not now. President Bush,
in his speech on September 12, 2002, laid down what he is going to do. He very,
very adroitly said that the United Nations, if it does not meet the challenge,
would devolve into the fate of the League of Nations. It is a very important and
historic comment, and it is true. He said
that the United States would not stand for
that, and that the United States has a duty
under Article 51 [of the UN Charter] to
defend itself.
People say that the U.S. does not con-
template pre-emptive strikes. That is false.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President
Kennedy was about to launch a strike on
Cuba to destroy missiles deployed by the
Soviet Union-although no missile was
fired or contemplated of being fired at the
Theprincipleof non-
interference becomes a
hypocrisy when confronted
with totalitarianregimes
thatdestroy the very
fabricofcivilsociety in
theirown countries.
United States. But nevertheless, he invoked the right of self-defense to destroy the
strategic threat present in Cuba against the U.S. That is a pre-emptive strike! So,
the principle of pre-emptive strike is not alien to the foreign policy of the United
States. The United States will pre-empt threats to its national security.
How is the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Cuba different
from the ability of Saddam to use chemical and biological weapons, and even
nuclear weapons, on United States territory? It is not any different.
FORUM: The President's speech and the build-up of tensions with respect to Iraq
have provoked a debate in the United States, certainly in the intellectual circles,
about the nature of U.S. power. The talk is about unilateral as opposed to multi-
lateral use of power, and about U.S. hegemony in the world. There are even com-
parisons being drawn between the U.S. and the Holy Roman Empire. Empires,
it is being argued, have a historic tendency to collapse when acting unilaterally.
Therefore, the multilateral argument is that the U.S. should act in concert with
Europe and the UN. Are you a participant in this debate, do you find it useful?
CHALABI: This debate is interesting and would make a good subject for a thesis
in history. I enjoy participating in this debate, but it is not relevant to our situa-
tion. It would be very amusing to try to identify a future Caligula in the United
States, or a future Claudius, or indeed a future Nero. But it is not relevant to our
case. And I should just mention that the Roman Empire was brought down by
barbarians. In turn, September 11 attacks were carried out by barbarians.

FORUM: So what does history hold for us? Will the U.S. be faced with the same
threat that the Roman Empire faced centuries ago?
CHALABI: Marx said that when history repeats itself, it becomes a farce.
Today's challenges are different, the world is different, and the United
States is all too aware, I think, of the limitations of its power.
FORUM: Do you care whether the U.S. acts unilaterally or multilaterally?
CHALABI: Wewant to liberate our country, and we want to construct democracy
in Iraq. In our view, the more the U.S. has influence over this process, the better it
isfor us politically, economically, and in terms ofhuman rights for the people ofIraq.
FORUM: But the United States does not care about human rights for the people
of Iraq, does it?
CHALABI: The Iraq Liberation Act does-it provides for human rights, for
democracy. Also, there are two joint resolutions passed by Congress calling for the
trial of Saddam as a war criminal. Moreover, the statement of President Bush at
the United Nations on September 12 began not with weapons, but rather with
the plight of the Iraqi people. The first resolution he mentioned was Resolution
688. So I think the U.S. cares about human rights in Iraq.
That having been said, the U.S. record of supporting human rights in the
Third World has not been the most brilliant since the Cold War. But again, most
of the operations conducted by the U.S. in
Third World countries were secret intelli-
The Roman Empire gence operations that involved covert
was broughtdown by action. By its definition, covert action
restricts the universe of people available to
participate, and you generally take who you
September 11 attacks were can and deny that you knew them later.
carriedout by barbarians. This is not the situation in Iraq. When the
U.S. has acted in a public way in foreign
counties, they ended up, by and large,
embracing freedom, human rights, and decency, as they did in Germany and
Japan after the Second World War.
FORUM: But then there is an argument, say about Nuremberg, that it was "vic-
tors' justice."
CHALABI: I would take victors' justice over Nazi justice or Tojo justice. So what?
This is not an argument. This is historical revisionism by people who are living
comfortably off the consequences of victors' justice.
FORUM: The humanitarian situation in Iraq was largely caused by economic
sanctions. How do you reconcile that with what you say is the United States' con-
cern for human rights?

CHALABI: The economic disasters of Iraq are entirely of Saddam's making and
are not the function of the sanctions. The Iraqi people have been suffering from
shortages throughout the period of Saddam's rule even though Iraq had huge oil
revenues. Shortages of food supply in Iraq were commonplace throughout the
1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the UN sanctions specifically excluded food and
medical supplies from the list of prohibited items. Immediately upon the passage
of the resolution that imposed sanctions on Iraq, the UN passed two resolutions,
Resolutions 706 and 712, which enabled Iraq to import food and medicine.
Saddam refused to accept those resolutions.
Then the United Nations started its oil-for-food program, which is far
more adequate to meet the needs of Iraqi people than what Saddam was prepared
to accept. This is not a claim based on statistics or analysis, but it is based on the
actual fact-the experience of the Northern Kurdish region. In Kurdistan, where
people receive a specific percentage from the share of the total goods that Iraq gets
based on the populatio n propo rtion (13 .5 ..............................................................................................................
percent), the level of prosperity and well-
being of the people is unprecedented, ever. The economic disasters
Why is that the case, while it is not the case ofIraqare entirely
in the areas controlled by Saddam? ofSaddams making.
So sanctions are not the cause of the
plight of the Iraqi people and the economic
destruction. Furthermore, for six long years until today Saddam would not export
oil. When was Resolution 986 passed? Certainly a year before Saddam accepted
its implementation. In other words, it was within Saddam's power to get sanc-
tions removed within, I would say, five months. If you read Resolution 687 that
specified when sanctions were supposed to be lifted, and add that time period,
you would discover that Saddam could have had sanctions lifted in 145 days. You
see? Saddam never cared about lifting the sanctions. If you look at the memo-
randa from the Iraqi government to the United Nations, you would see that
Saddam did not call for the lifting of the sanctions. Rather, he called for the
implementation of Articles 22 and 19 of Resolution 687, which say what? They
do not say "lift the sanctions." Rather, they say, "let us sell the oil and pocket the
money." Saddam was after cash for his own purposes, not after the goods for the
Iraqi people.
But of course, as usual, the United States and the Western powers lost the
propaganda war, and Saddam won the propaganda war. And everybody in the
West and in the Arab world believes now that sanctions are the cause of the
tragedy in Iraq. No, Saddam is the cause of that tragedy. Saddam had forgone
between those two years over a hundred billion dollars in oil revenue-just
because he wanted to keep his weapons of mass destruction.

FORUM: How could Saddam, being who he is, win the propaganda war against
the West? Why were the human rights groups more likely to believe him?
CHALABI: Saddam thrives on the contradictions of his enemies. Have you seen
the movie "The Truman Show?" Saddam is the Truman Show, and the United
States and the United Nations is the man sitting in the middle. Saddam can create
an atmosphere in Iraq which is entirely theatrical-it looks real, but it is not.
Saddam is able to demonstrate to the UN and to any humanitarian orga-
nization, no matter how sophisticated it is, that there is suffering and there is
death in Iraq. He causes it, and he engineers it.
FORUM: Thank you very much. m
NOTES
I Iraq Liberation Act was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton on October 31, 1998.
In the presidential statement issued by the White House, Clinton said that "the United States should sup-
port those elements of the Iraqi opposition that advocate a very different future for Iraq than the bitter real-
ity of internal repression and external aggression that the current regime in Baghdad now offers." The Iraq
Liberation Act gave the administration authority to provide the Iraqi opposition with Pentagon supplies,
training, and other assistance worth $97 million. See Iraq Liberation Act, Statement by the President,
<http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/libera.htm> (accessed November 23, 2002).

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