Module 7 Overview Ethical Nonobjectivism and Moral Realism Welcome to Module Seven.  Are there moral truths?  Is it actually wrong to lie, or do we just believe it is wrong?  Moral nonobjectivists claim that there are no objective moral truths; that is, moral truths exist apart from ourselves.  If tomorrow it suddenly became legal to leave a store without paying for an item, would you do it?  Would your friends participate?  This module assesses moral objectivism and moral nonobjectivism. Learning Objectives Upon completion of this module, you should be able to: 3D examine the reasons why moral realism might fail. 6G describe moral nonobjectivism. 6H discuss the nature of ethical nonobjectivism. 6I explain the modesty of moral realism. Module 7 Reading Assignment Waller, B. N. (2011).  Consider ethics: Theory, readings, and contemporary issues (3rd ed.).  Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson. Chapters 10 and 11. Course Login Instructions If you are a first time user: Please register your Pearson Online Solution s Student Access Code.  You can find your Student Access Code in the AAU Course Registration e-mail that came with your text. If you are a returning user: Please visit the Access Code Registration page to log in.  You must log in every time you access this course.  If you are not logged in, you will not be able to access the premium resources. NOTE: Bookmarking pages in this site, especially the resources you access with the link above, is not recommended. Please view the Online Presentation for Module 7. Ethical Nonobjectivism and Moral Realism Chapter 10 Lecture Notes: Ethical Nonobjectivism The Nature of Ethical Nonobjectivism Ethical nonobjectivists hold that there are no objective moral facts and no objectively true moral principles. It is important to emphasize that this theory does not just believe that moral facts are difficult to discover or that we might not be sure what they are; rather, it holds that there are no objective moral truths to discover. One version of ethical nonobjectivism is emotivism or noncognitivism. According to this theory, sentences that appear to state ethical facts, such as “stealing is wrong,” are instead merely expressions of emotion and not genuine statements at all. Most contemporary nonobjectivists, however, are not emotivists; they believe that such sentences are statements, but that there are no objective facts to support these statements. Arguments for Ethical Nonobjectivism from Moral Diversity The key argument for ethical nonobjectivism is the argument of moral diversity. This argument focuses on the enormous diversity of moral beliefs both within cultures and cross-culturally. Many cultures around the world hold conflicting moral beliefs that cannot both be correct. If these cultures cannot agree on what is morally true, then there cannot be any moral truths to begin with. The objectivist has two possible answers to this argument. First, the great divergence of moral opinion is more ...

1. Module 7 Overview
Ethical Nonobjectivism and Moral Realism
Welcome to Module Seven. Are there moral truths? Is it
actually wrong to lie, or do we just believe it is wrong? Moral
nonobjectivists claim that there are no objective moral truths;
that is, moral truths exist apart from ourselves. If tomorrow it
suddenly became legal to leave a store without paying for an
item, would you do it? Would your friends participate? This
module assesses moral objectivism and moral nonobjectivism.
Learning Objectives
Upon completion of this module, you should be able to:
3D
examine the reasons why moral realism might fail.
6G
describe moral nonobjectivism.
6H
discuss the nature of ethical nonobjectivism.
6I
explain the modesty of moral realism.
Module 7 Reading Assignment
Waller, B. N. (2011). Consider ethics: Theory, readings, and
contemporary issues (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, New
Jersey: Pearson. Chapters 10 and 11.
Course Login Instructions
If you are a first time user:
Please register your Pearson Online

2. Solution
s Student Access Code. You can find your Student Access Code
in the AAU Course Registration e-mail that came with your
text.
If you are a returning user:
Please visit the Access Code Registration page to log in. You
must log in every time you access this course. If you are not
logged in, you will not be able to access the premium resources.
NOTE: Bookmarking pages in this site, especially the resources
you access with the link above, is not recommended.
Please view the Online Presentation for Module 7.
Ethical Nonobjectivism and Moral Realism
Chapter 10 Lecture Notes: Ethical Nonobjectivism
The Nature of Ethical Nonobjectivism
Ethical nonobjectivists hold that there are no objective moral
facts and no objectively true moral principles. It is important to
emphasize that this theory does not just believe that moral facts
are difficult to discover or that we might not be sure what they
are; rather, it holds that there are no objective moral truths to
discover. One version of ethical nonobjectivism is emotivism or

3. noncognitivism. According to this theory, sentences that appear
to state ethical facts, such as “stealing is wrong,” are instead
merely expressions of emotion and not genuine statements at
all. Most contemporary nonobjectivists, however, are not
emotivists; they believe that such sentences are statements, but
that there are no objective facts to support these statements.
Arguments for Ethical Nonobjectivism from Moral Diversity
The key argument for ethical nonobjectivism is the argument of
moral diversity. This argument focuses on the enormous
diversity of moral beliefs both within cultures and cross-
culturally. Many cultures around the world hold conflicting
moral beliefs that cannot both be correct. If these cultures
cannot agree on what is morally true, then there cannot be any
moral truths to begin with.
The objectivist has two possible answers to this argument. First,
the great divergence of moral opinion is more apparent than
real. At a deeper level there is convergence; that is, there are
moral truths upon which we can all agree. Secondly, the
objectivist can acknowledge the diversity of views, but hold
that all that means is that some people’s opinions are false.
Some cultures may just be wrong about what is morally true and
others may have it right.
Argument from the Impossibility of Arguments about Ethics
One view held by A. J. Ayer states that no genuine argument is

4. possible on ethical issues, thus showing that there is nothing
objective to argue about. Essentially, Ayer’s view is that all
apparently ethical arguments are really arguments about other
things. Thus, arguments about abortion are really arguments
about biology, psychology, and theology; arguments about pain
are really arguments about biology and neuroscience; and
arguments about pollution are really arguments about chemistry
and meteorology. All supposed talk about ethics is really just
talk about science and other non-ethical subjects.
Here again, objectivists have two possible responses. First, they
could try and show there is room for genuine argument on even
the most basic ethical issues. Second, they could accept Ayer’s
assertion that argument on ethical issues is not possible, but
insist that ethics is objective nonetheless: some basic ethical
truths are intuitively obvious to anyone who thinks clearly and
looks objectively at the issue.
Argument from Simplicity: Ockham’s Razor
The argument from queerness and simplicity claims that ethical
nonobjectivism is more plausible than any version of ethical
objectivism because objectivism requires a much more elaborate
explanatory scheme. This elaborate scheme posits the existence
of very strange entities: moral facts. According to J. L. Mackie,
these strange moral facts would have to have two properties: 1)
they must be facts that exist independently of us, and 2) they

5. must be facts that have the very special and queer property of
commanding our approval. The problem with this view is that a
much simpler explanation is available, which accounts for moral
statements without requiring the extra theoretical baggage.
Thus, by Ockham’s Razor, which states essentially that the
simplest explanation tends to be the correct one, we should
endorse the nonobjectivist view of morality. The nonobjectivist
view of morality explains all the data that the objectivist view
can but posits fewer entities, i.e. fewer things, making it
simpler and more probable by Ockham’s Razor.
Objectivists could respond in two ways to Mackie’s argument.
First, the objectivist could claim that there are moral facts, but
that they do not necessarily motivate us to favor the moral facts.
This leads to the debate between internalists, who insist that
any real moral fact must motivate those who recognize the fact,
and externalists, who hold that the motive to act morally is
separate from the recognition of objective moral facts.
Secondly, the objectivist could argue that moral facts are simply
complicated in the same way scientific theories may be
complicated.
But do ethics require complicated explanations? The objectivist
may want to offer a defense of their position by citing a
principle that appears to have universal acceptance, namely,
“treat others as you would want to be treated.” How would the
nonobjectivist reply to this contender for moral fact? Unswayed,

6. the nonobjectivist might offer an evolutionary or social-
psychological account of our acceptance of this type of
principle.
Chapter 11 Lecture Notes: Moral Realism
Contemporary Moral Realism
In its contemporary form, moral realism is the view that
objective moral facts will prove to be the best possible
explanation for our experiences of moral phenomena.
Contemporary moral realism is a relatively modest moral
realism in comparison to the versions of moral realism favored
by Plato and by Kant; contemporary moral realists are more
cautious in their claims for the truth of moral realism. Rather
than claiming certain knowledge of absolute objective moral
truths, contemporary moral realists regard moral realism as a
plausible hypothesis that might ultimately prove the simplest
and most promising explanation for observed phenomena.
Moral realists do not believe that the existence of moral facts
can be established by simple observation or intuition or by pure
reason; rather, moral facts must prove to be the most fruitful
and effective model for understanding an emerging consensus
on crucial moral questions. Although the development of moral
consensus would not prove moral realism, if moral realism
emerges as the best explanation for that consensus, then moral
realism would have as much claim to objectivity as do
contemporary scientific explanations.

7. Moral Realism and the Argument from Simplicity
One of the challenges facing the moral realist comes from the
nonobjectivist’s argument of simplicity. In response to this, the
moral realist contends that realism is compatible with good
scientific practice and that moral realism might prove the most
scientifically adequate account of ethics and ethical behavior.
As the textbook notes, the realist holds that establishing moral
fact is much like establishing scientific fact: although we
generally think of scientific facts as deriving from an orderly
process of hypothesis, experiment, and confirmation or
disconfirmation, in reality the process is far less orderly. As
Thomas Kuhn notes, scientific advances often require
“paradigm shifts” in which one comprehensive theory is
replaced by another. Such a shift may also be required to
establish moral facts. Resolving the debate between
nonobjectivists and objectivists will require looking not just at
the specific event, but at the larger question of what explanatory
account ultimately works best for a wide range of questions.
Moral Facts and Scientific Revolutions
Just as Kuhn notes the way two competing theories may exist
for extended periods of time, so, too, do the realists hold that
realism is one of the competing moral theories attempting to
establish itself. There is no “crucial experiment” that will
establish either the truth or falsity of moral realism. The
question is whether morality works better, proves itself more

8. valuable, and whether a consensus forms around our moral
judgments in such a way that moral realism emerges as the most
plausible explanation. If there is such agreement, then the most
plausible and productive theory to account for that agreement is
that there are real moral facts to agree upon.
Two Ways Moral Realism Might Fail
There are two ways moral realism may fail. First, we might
reach some general agreement concerning ethical principles, but
some other theory will prove more useful in explaining that
agreement. As mentioned in the last chapter, a social-
psychological or evolutionary account may prevail. But since
that is not yet the case, realism is at least one viable possibility
that should be given a chance to compete.
Secondly, moral realism could fail if there is no general
agreement on moral principles. Since realism is designed to
explain moral consensus, the lack of consensus could strongly
suggest that there is nothing to explain. Of course, the realist
believes that beneath the apparent disagreement over moral
facts there may lay deep moral consensus. Such a consensus
may be found if we put ourselves in a position to think calmly,
observe carefully and without prejudice, and consider
thoughtfully.
Required Audio:
Media Index. Please listen to the Audio to Go (located under
Course) listed below.Applying Ethical Systems

9. NOTE: If you are having difficulty accessing the above
material, please click on the PHI 107 Pearson Instructions.
Required Web Resource:
Please read the entry about Moral Realism in the Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. While reading, ask yourself what
role language is playing in the argument for and against moral
realism and how this relates to some of the arguments against
realism that we have read this week.
Required Presentations:
Chapter 10
Chapter 11
[INSERT TITLE HERE] 1
Running head: [INSERT TITLE HERE]
[INSERT TITLE HERE]

10. Student Name
Allied American University
Author Note
This paper was prepared for [INSERT COURSE NAME],
[INSERT COURSE ASSIGNMENT] taught by [INSERT
INSTRUCTOR’S NAME].
Directions: Please provide detailed and elaborate responses to
the following questions. Each response should be at least one
half of one page in length and utilize APA format.
1.What is Ockham's Razor and to what extent does it work for
or against the non-objectivist view?
2.What is the argument from queerness, and what roles does
Ockham's Razor play in the argument?

11. 3.What does it mean to give an evolutionary account of moral
values?
4.Define "noncognitivism."
5.Define moral realism.
6.Compare and contrast moral realism and nonobjectivism.
Which approach is more compelling? Explain.
7.What is a paradigm shift?
8.What role does intuition or exalted powers of reason play in
contemporary realist theories?
[INSERT TITLE HERE] 1
Running head: [INSERT TITLE HERE]

12. [INSERT TITLE HERE]
Student Name
Allied American University
Author Note
This paper was prepared for [INSERT COURSE NAME],
[INSERT COURSE ASSIGNMENT] taught by [INSERT
INSTRUCTOR’S NAME].
PART I:
Directions: The following problems ask you to evaluate
hypothetical situations and/or concepts related to the reading in
this module. While there are no "correct answers" for these

13. problems, you must demonstrate a strong understanding of the
concepts and lessons from this module's reading assignment.
Please provide detailed and elaborate responses to the following
problems. Your responses should include examples from the
reading assignments and should utilize APA guidelines.
Responses that fall short of the assigned minimum page length
will not earn any points.
1.Two weeks ago, your good friend Joe spent his entire
Saturday helping you move all of your stuff into your new
apartment. This weekend, Joe is moving into his apartment.
You promised to help Joe move. Besides, even if you had not
promised, you feel that you ought to help Joe; after all, he's a
good and loyal friend, and he generously helped you just a
couple of weeks ago. Suppose you say: "I know I really ought
to keep my promise and help Joe move; but I have got a chance
to go to the beach for the weekend, and I really love the beach;
so I am afraid I am going to skip out on Joe." That is a rotten
thing to do to your friend; but still, under strong temptation we
have all failed to do the right thing on one or two occasions.
But suppose you said: "I know that I really ought to keep my
promise and help Joe; I know it is the right thing to do, and
helping Joe would certainly be good. But I have no inclination
whatsoever to help Joe. I fully understand that it is the right
thing to do and that helping Joe would be good; but although I

14. recognize that helping Joe is good, I am not at all inclined to do
the right thing." Would it make sense to say that? Suppose one
of your friends said: "Look, that is nonsense. You cannot say
you know it would be good to help Joe, and then say that you
have no inclination to help him. Either you do not really think
that helping Joe is good, or you are confused about the
meanings of the words. If you really know that helping Joe is
the right thing to do, you must have some inclination to do it."
Would your friend be right? Your response should be at least
one page in length.
2."Astronomers maintain that black holes exist in our galaxy. A
black hole results when a massive star implodes, and all its
mass is compressed into a very small volume. This produces an
object so dense, and with such powerful gravitational force, that
no light can escape. Therefore, you cannot really 'see' a black
hole; we can reasonably conclude that a black hole exists: it is
the best explanation for those motions. Likewise, you do not
really 'see' a moral fact; but by observing the convergent
conclusions and behavior of people who think calmly and
carefully about a moral issue, we can conclude that a moral fact
exists: it is the best explanation for that convergent movement."
Is that a good analogy? Your response should be at least one
half of one page in length.

15. 3.Imagine if your car was making a funny sound and you went
to two different mechanics to see what the problem was. One of
them tells you that you need to have a single part replaced. The
other tells you that you have to have several small parts
replaced. Both repairs will cost exactly the same amount and
take the same amount of time to perform. Additionally, both
mechanics are equally as reputable. Which mechanic would you
go with and why? Your response should be at least one half of
one page in length.
4.Has technology created a paradigm shift in our lifetime? Why
or why not? Your response should be at least one page in
length.
5.Suppose that it is discovered that there are no objective
morals. Could we still have laws? Why or why not? Your
response should be at least one page in length.
6.Suppose it is discovered that all cultures around the world
share a common belief about how to eat Oreos. Does this mean
that there is an objectively correct way to eat an Oreo? Why or
why not? Your response should be at least one half of one page
in length.
7.Does a moral realist have to be a transcendental moralist (p. 7

16. of in textbook)? Why or why not? Your response should be at
least one page in length.
PART II: Journal
Please describe what aspect of this week’s lesson you found
most interesting and why. What effect, if any, did it have on
your moral/ethical outlook? Your response should be at least
one half of one page in length.