This document provides an overview of an introductory ethics course taught by Dr. Giuseppe Mario Saccone at Ohio University's Hong Kong Programme. It discusses the following key points in 3 sentences or less: The course will cover the major approaches to ethics including descriptive/scientific, philosophical/analytic, and normative approaches. It will examine ethical theories like relativism, egoism, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. The course will also explore applied ethics issues such as euthanasia, abortion, punishment, and environmental ethics. The origins of ethics will be traced back to ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle.

1. OHIO UNIVERSITY
HONG KONG PROGRAMME
PHIL 130: INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS
Instructor: Dr. Giuseppe Mario Saccone
LECTURE 1: Introduction to the course, ethics and its origins
Philosophy literally means love of wisdom, the Greek words philia meaning love or
friendship, and Sophia meaning wisdom. Philosophy is concerned basically with three areas:
epistemology (the study of knowledge), metaphysics (the study of the nature of reality), and
ethics (the study of morality), which is the subject of this course.
Epistemology deals with the following questions: what is knowledge? What are truth and
falsity, and to what do they apply? What is required for someone to actually know
something? What is the nature of perception, and how reliable is it? What are logic and
logical reasoning, and how can human beings attain them? What is the difference between
knowledge and belief? Is there anything as “certain knowledge”?
Metaphysics is the study of the nature of reality, asking the questions: What exists in reality
and what is the nature of what exists? Specifically, such questions as the following are asked:
Is there really cause and effect in reality, and if so, how does it work? What is the nature of
the physical world, and is there anything other than the physical such as the mental or
spiritual? What is the nature of human beings? Is there freedom in reality or is everything
predetermined?
Ethics, our concern, deals with what is right or wrong in human behaviour and conduct. It
asks such questions as what constitutes any person or action being good, bad, right, or
wrong, and how do we know (epistemology)? What part does self-interest or the interest of
others play in the making of moral decisions and judgements? What theories of conduct are
valid or invalid, and why? Should we use principles or rules or laws, or should we let each
situation decide our morality? Are killing, lying, cheating, stealing, and sexual acts right or
wrong, and why or why not?
The word itself ethics comes from the Greek ethos, meaning character. Morality comes from
the Latin moralis, meaning customs or manners. Ethics, then, seems to pertain to the
individual character of a person or persons, whereas morality seems to point to the
relationships between human beings. Nevertheless, in ordinary language, whether we call a
person ethical or moral, or an act unethical or immoral, does not really make any difference.
In philosophy, however, the term ethics also is used to refer to a specific area of study: the
area of morality, which concentrates on human conduct and human values.
When we speak of people as being moral or ethical, we usually mean that they are good
people, and when we speak of them as being immoral or unethical, we mean that they are
bad people. When we refer to certain human actions as being moral, ethical, immoral, and
unethical, we mean that they are right or wrong. The simplicity of these definitions, however,
1

2. ends here, for how do we define a right or wrong action or a good or bad person? What are
the human standards by which such decisions can be made? These are the more difficult
questions that make up the greater part of the study of morality. One important thing to
remember here is that moral, ethical, immoral, and unethical, essentially mean good, right,
bad, and wrong, often depending upon whether one is referring to people themselves or to
their actions.
Approaches to ethics and morality
Scientific, or descriptive approach
There are two major approaches to the study of ethics and morality. The first is scientific, or
descriptive. This approach most often is used in the social sciences and, like ethics, deals
with human behaviour and conduct. The emphasis here, however, is empirical; that is, social
scientists observe and collect data about human behaviour and conduct and then draw certain
conclusions. For example, some psychologists, after having observed many human beings in
many situations, have reached the conclusion that human beings act in their own self-
interest. This is a descriptive, or scientific, approach to human behaviour – the psychologists
have observed how human beings act in many situations, described what they have observed,
and drawn conclusions. However, they make no value judgements as to what is morally right
or wrong, nor do they describe how humans ought to behave.
Philosophical approach
The second major approach is called the philosophical approach, and consists of two parts.
The first part of the philosophical approach to the study of ethics is called metaethics or,
sometimes, analytic ethics. Rather than being descriptive or prescriptive, this approach is
analytic in that it analyzes ethical language (for example, what we mean when we use the
word good), the rational foundations of ethical systems and the logic and reasoning of
various ethicists. Like metaphysics, metaethics refers to areas not directly related but
somehow beyond (meta) the main subject-matter. Metaethicists do not prescribe anything,
nor do they deal directly with normative systems. This means that metaethics has little to do
with the real business of ethics, which is concerned with the ancient question “What is the
good life?, or “What is the good?” or, in more modern terms, “How should I live my life?”,
or “How should I solve this moral dilemma? Because it concerns only indirectly with
normative ethical systems by concentrating instead on reasoning, logical structures, and
language rather than content, it gives no answer to any of the above questions.
In methaethics, a different set of questions are asked: questions about the nature of ethical
thinking and ethical language; about what is meant by such things as free will, and whether
we can be said to possess it; about what is meant by term such as “relative” and “absolute;
and so on. Metaethics questions whether we can legitimately speak of objective ethical truth,
or whether ethical convictions are merely the expressions of the individual’s inner feelings.
The latter is called emotivism, which is the view that ethical convictions can only be
expressed in terms of one’s feelings or attitudes, but cannot possibly be explained or
justified. The former is called intuitionism because it holds that ethical convictions can be
directly intuited, sensed or grasped, but again not explained. However, unlike emotivism,
intuitionism at least opens the debate about what in the objective world makes us intuit
goodness and evil, right and wrong.
It should be noted here that metaethics, although always used to some extent by all ethicists,
has become the sole interest of many modern ethical philosophers. This may be due in part to
the increasing difficulty of formulating a system of ethics applicable to all or even most
human beings. Our world, our cultures, and our lives have become more and more
complicated and pluralistic, and finding an ethical system that will undergird all human
2

3. beings’ actions is a difficult if not impossible task. Therefore, these philosophers feel that
they might as well do what other specialists have done and concentrate on language and
logic rather than attempt to arrive at ethical systems that will help human beings live together
more meaningfully and ethically.
The second part of the philosophical approach to the study of ethics deals with norms (or
standards) and prescriptions. For this reason, it is called normative, or prescriptive, or
substantive ethics. Normative ethics attempts to answer the fundamental practical questions
of ethics and is the main concern of this philosophy course. The ethical theories that attempt
to answer the questions of “What we ought to do”, and “How we ought to live” and make up
the more abstract part of what is known as normative ethics – that is, the part of ethics
concerned with guiding action will be discussed in the following lectures.
The theories with which we will be dealing are:
Ethical relativism in its two versions, i.e., subjective and conventional ethical relativism;
Ethical objectivism in its many forms such as Ethical egoism, Utilitarianism, Kantian ethics,
Virtue ethics. Then, in the last lectures, we will be concerned with the application of ethical
reasoning to specific areas of practical concern, i.e. with applied ethics which can be seen as
the more practical counterpart or application of some of the theories of normative ethics. The
areas of practical concern with which we will be dealing are: Euthanasia, Abortion,
Punishment, Environmental ethics.
The origins of ethics
One further consideration about the organization of this course. Before dealing with
subjective ethical relativism, I begin with reading Plato’s dialogue called the Crito in which
two famous ancient Athenians Crito and Socrates are engaged in a moral argument about
what is the right course of action in a particular situation. In 399 B.C., Socrates was brought
to trial on a charge of corrupting the young and introducing new divinities. He was found
guilty and sentenced to death. The moral issue discussed in this dialogue is whether should
Socrates accept the help and advise of his friend Crito and escape from jail. The two friends
discuss what is the right course of action from a moral point of view.
Why to choose such a remote starting-point for an introductory course of ethics?
Because Socrates’ arguments for not escaping have inspired much of Western ethical thought
and Plato’s dialogue the Crito is a classical example of ethical thinking and one of the
earliest surviving treatises on philosophical ethics. There is a compelling reason for starting
with a Greek writer. Ethics itself, as a form of intellectual enquiry, at least in the West,
begins with the Greeks. In the thought of the Greek philosophers we can trace the beginnings
of philosophical reflection on the nature of the good life and right conduct. The core of the
ethical systems of both Plato and Aristotle is the attempt to justify the virtues in terms of
human happiness, to show that they are good qualities to possess, because a life lived in
accordance with the virtues is the happiest and most rewarding kind of life.
Questions to be answered:
(1) Identify Crito’s arguments and Socrates’ counter-arguments;
(2) Identify the major principles held by each of the two;
(3) Decide how valid their arguments are;
(4) Decide whether Socrates took the right decision;
(5) Tell what you would have done had you been in his position explaining the reasons
for your choice.
3

4. LECTURES 2 and 3: The main ethical theories
Premises. I will start today’s lecture from a general but fundamental premise: It is
important that all customs, traditions, systems of ethics, rules, and of course ethical
theories, our main concern today, should be carefully analyzed and critically evaluated
before we continue to accept or live by them. That is to say, we should not reject them
out of hand, but neither should we endorse them wholeheartedly, unless we have
subjected them to careful, logical scrutiny. For this reason, throughout this course and
most importantly on your own in your own life, you are strongly encouraged to be
reflective when dealing with morality and moral issues.
But before going on to discuss the main ethical theories, there is another matter that I
think it ought to be clarified preliminarily. It is important that we use reflection to
distinguish morality from another area of human activity and experience with which it is
often confused and of which it is often considered a part: religion.
Because normative ethics seeks to establish principles that prescribe what we ought or
ought not to do, it has in fact some similarities with another of the domains of human
existence that seek to guide behaviour, i.e., religion. And in fact, many people think that
religion and ethics not overlap but that they are inseparable. Furthermore, it is a historical
fact that religion is deeply bound up with morality. It would be hard, if not impossible, to
find an established religious tradition that does not contain extensive ethical teachings. In
fact, some of the great religions of the world, such as Buddhism and Confucianism, are
primarily ethical outlooks on life rather than doctrines about a deity.
However, many philosophers (even religious ones) think that a sound ethical theory can
be developed independently of religious assumptions. Furthermore, they argue that there
are problems with divine command theories, i.e., with theories making the rightness or
wrongness of an action intrinsically related to the fact that God either commands it or
forbids it. The first problem is the lack of agreement as to which religious text or
authority should guide our ethical deliberations: The Bible, for example, or the Koran,
The Hindu Upanishads, Buddha’s teachings, and so on. To successfully live together in
the same society, we need to arrive at some common ethical norms. But how can we do
this in pluralistic societies where there is no agreement as to which religious authority (if
any) should be followed? Furthermore, how can people be held ethically accountable for
their behaviour if many have never been exposed to whatever religious tradition is
supposed to be normative? The second problem is that even if we agree to live under the
guidance of a particular religious tradition, we may disagree as to how to interpret its
teachings. For example, Christians both defend and attack capital punishment on the
basis of the same tradition and sacred texts. Similarly, while the Bible often condemns
lying, it contains passages in which God is said to reward people for lying on his behalf
and even commands individuals to lie. [Note: For Biblical approval of specific acts of
lying, see Exodus 1:15-20 and Joshua 2:1-6 (in conjunction with Hebrews 11:31). For
divinely commanded lying, see 1 Samuel 16:1-3.] Minimally, some sort of philosophical
reflection is necessary to sort out all these discrepancies. Third, some ethical questions
cannot be answered by traditional religious teachings apart from philosophical
considerations. Is it morally acceptable to make cloned duplicates of humans? When
numerous people need an organ transplant or a kidney dialysis machine but the medical
supplies are scarce, what is the just way to allocate these resources? To what extent do
journalists have an obligation to serve the public’s right to know and to what extent do
they have an obligation to protect individual’s privacy? Most religious traditions are clear
on ethical topics such as adultery, murder, and stealing, but many ethical dilemmas in
contemporary society are not addressed by these traditions.
4

5. These considerations suggest that whatever ethical guidance someone may find in a
particular religious tradition, everyone need to engage in philosophical reflection on
ethics based on human experience and reason and not merely on authority or tradition.
The main ethical theories
I. Ethical relativism is the position that there are no objective or universally valid moral
principles, for all moral judgments are simply a matter of human opinion. This position
comes in two versions:
(a) Subjective ethical relativism the doctrine that what is right or wrong is solely a
matter of each individual’s personal opinion. Just as some people like the colour purple
and some detest it, and each person’s judgement on this matter is simply a matter if his
individual taste, so there is no standard other than each person’s own opinion when it
comes to right or wrong. This doctrine implies that it is impossible for an individual to be
mistaken about what is right or wrong.
(b) Conventional ethical relativism (conventionalism) refers to the claims that morality
is relative to each particular society or culture. For example, whether it is moral for
women to wear shorts is a question of whether you are talking about mainstream
American society or the Iranian culture. In other words, there are no universal objective
moral standards that can be used to evaluate the ethical opinions and practices of a
particular culture. This doctrine implies that it is impossible for a society to be mistaken
about what is right or wrong.
Questions:
- Do you believe that the fact that people disagree about what is good or right is a good
reason to support ethical relativism?
- In what ways do you think that science is different from ethics? Are they alike in any
ways? For example, do they both involve being impartial and nonbiased?
- Is there an objective good, do you think that it is likely to be unitary or plural? For
example, is it likely that all morality will be a function of the promotion of one ultimate
good, such as happiness? Or is it more likely that there are many moral values, such as
happiness, autonomy, privacy, and fidelity, which are each equally good and not
reducible to the others?
- Suppose that no matter how long reasonable people continued their deliberations, they
would converge only on some principles, but not all. What would follow about the nature
of moral objectivity, defined in terms of reasonableness? Does what follows constitute a
problem for the account of objectivity? Can you propose a better account?
II. Ethical objectivism is the view that there are universal and objectively valid moral
principles that are relative neither to the individual nor to society. Because objectivism is
a very general doctrine that covers a wide range of more specific ethical theories, various
objectivists will differ as to what the correct moral principles are and how we can know
them. Nevertheless, they all agree that in every concrete situation there are morally
correct and morally wrong ways to act. Furthermore, they would agree that if a certain
action in a given situation is morally right or wrong for a particular person, then it will be
the same for anyone who is relevantly similar and facing relevantly similar
circumstances. Ethical objectivism implies that it is possible for an individual or an entire
5

6. society to sincerely believe that their actions are morally right at the same time that they
are deeply mistaken about this assumption.
The next eight theories all fall under the heading of ethical objectivism. Although these
theories disagree about what ethical principles should be followed, they all agree that
there are one or more non-arbitrary, non-subjective, universal moral principles that
determine whether an action is right or wrong.
(a) Ethical egoism
It is necessary to distinguish between psychological egoism, i.e. the descriptive theory
that holds that people are basically self-centred or egoist, and ethical egoism as a
normative ethical theory about how people ought to behave. The former was most
comprehensively set forth in the writings of the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes.
The latter was advocated, for instance, by the German philosopher Nietzsche and by the
Hollywood screenwriter and novelist Ayn Rand (1905-1982). So Ayn Rand advocated
ethical egoism by saying:
“The moral purpose of a man’s life is the achievement of his own happiness. This does
not mean that he is indifferent to all men, that human life is no value to him and that he
has no reason to help others in an emergency. But this does mean that he does not
subordinate his life to the welfare of others, that he does not sacrifice himself to their
needs, that the relief of their suffering is not his primary concern, that any help he gives
is an exception, not a rule, an act of generosity not of moral duty, that it is marginal and
incidental – as disasters are marginal and incidental in the course of human existence –
and that values, not disasters, are the goal, the first concern and the motive power of his
life.” (Ayn Rand, “The Ethics of Emergencies”, in The Virtue of Selfishness: A New
Concept of Egoism, New York: Signet Books, 1964, p.49)
Ethical egoism is the theory that people always and only have a moral obligation to do
what is in their own self-interest. According to this position, the locus of value is the
individual and there can be no higher value for me than my own life and its well-being
and no higher value for you than your own life. This theory is a version of ethical
objectivism and should not be mistaken for subjective ethical relativism, for the egoist
would say that my moral judgements can be wrong if I put another person’s interests
before my own. Of course, the egoist’s principle will dictate different, and sometimes
competing, courses of action. For example, it is in my best interests to promote the
flourishing of the philosophy program at my university, while it is in a coach interest to
promote the flourishing of the football program. Nevertheless, the egoist would maintain
the competing interests can lead to the best outcome. In business, for example, if each
company tries to capture the market with the best product, society as a whole benefits.
Similarly, in a court of law, each lawyer promotes the best interests of his or her client,
and we presume that this procedure will help ensure that all aspects of the case will be
revealed.
Questions:
- Do you believe that people are generally selfish?
- Do people always act in their own self-interest? What leads you to believe this?
- Do you believe that people ought to act always and only in their own self-interest? Give
your reasons.
- Do you think that universal ethical egoism is inconsistent or incoherent?
- Can a selfish person be a moral person?
- Is being moral always in a person’s best interest?
6

7. (b) Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is the theory that the right action is the one that produces the greatest
amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. Accordingly, utilitarians claim
that the morality of an action cannot be divorced from its consequences. The utilitarian
would agree with the egoist that a person’s own interests need to play a role in moral
decisions. However, according to utilitarianism, a person’s own interests have to balance
against those of all others in calculating the morality of an action. This formula would
allow the same type of action to be moral in one set of circumstances and immoral in a
different situation if the consequences were different. Nevertheless, while the moral
evaluation of an action may be relative to the circumstances, an unchanging, universal,
ethical principle is still being followed, i.e., that the greatest amount of happiness for the
greatest number of people should always be sought. This unchanging, universal, ethical
principle is also called principle of utility.
Although the main themes of utilitarianism were developed in the eighteenth century by
several Scottish philosophers (including David Hume), its first explicit and systematic
formulation is credited to the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832).
Bentham was the son of a London attorney who had ambitious plans for Jeremy to
become famous in a career in law. After studying law at Oxford University and
graduating at age fifteen, however, Bentham discovered that although he had no interest
in practicing law, he was interested in changing it. Having lived through the American
Revolution, the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, and the rise of parliamentary
government in England, Bentham was convinced that the political instability of the times
was due to the irrational and chaotic foundations of the current legal systems and social
structures. Accordingly, Bentham’s philosophy of utilitarianism was an attempt to
provide a rational and scientific foundation for law and morality. The opening paragraphs
of one of his best-known books make clear what this foundation will be:
“I. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine
what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the
chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in
all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will
serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their
empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility
recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of
which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which
attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in
darkness instead of light…
II. The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work: it will be proper
therefore at the outset to give an explicit and determinate account of what is meant by it.
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or
diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same
thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action
whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of very
measure of government.
III. By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit,
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same
thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief,
7

8. pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if the party be the
community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual,
than the happiness of that individual.” (Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789, Edited by W. Harrison, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1948, chap.1.)
Since pleasure is the only thing that has value, an action that maximizes the greatest
amount of pleasure possible is the best action. In other words, the fundamental rule of
utilitarianism is: Act always to promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
But since there are so many different kinds of pleasures, the question now arises, Which
kind of pleasure is the best one to pursue? Should we simply pursue bodily pleasures or
should we, instead, pursue the “higher”, more cultivated pleasures such as reading great
books and enjoying significant art and music?
Bentham consistently points out that there is no sensible meaning to the notion of
“higher” or “lower” pleasures. Pleasures can only differ in their quantity. Bentham holds
that even a trivial children’s game can be more valuable than arts, music and poetry if it
can produce more pleasure.
Bentham provides a method to scientifically quantify and calculate the value of different
pleasures. This method is commonly referred to as Bentham’s “hedonic calculus.” When
considering any action, we should evaluate the amount of pleasure or pain it will produce
according to the following seven dimensions:
1. Intensity. How strong is the pleasure?
2. Duration. How long will the pleasure last?
3. Certainty or Uncertainty. How likely or unlikely is it that the pleasure will occur?
4. Propinquity or Remoteness. How soon will the pleasure occur?
5. Fecundity. How likely is it that the proposed action will produce more sensations of
the same kind (either pleasure or pain)?
6. Purity. Will the sensations be followed by sensations of the opposite kind? (Will the
pain be followed by pleasure, or the pleasure by pain?)
7. Extent. How many other people will be affected.
Even when we are faced with complicated moral dilemmas, Bentham claims that the
process of calculation is simple:
1. For each person affected by a proposed action, add up the total amount of units of
pleasure (or desirable consequences) produced and subtract from that figure the
amount of pain (or undesirable consequences) produced.
2. Merge the calculations for each individual into the sum total of pleasure and pain
produced for the community.
3. Do this calculation for alternative courses of action.
4. The morally right action is the one that produces the greatest sum total of pleasure.
Thus, on Bentham’s analysis, moral dilemmas are turned into problems of addition and
subtraction in which decisions are made by looking at the final balance, much as we
would look at an accountant’s ledger of credits and debits. While the process looks
awkward and even bizarre, Bentham thinks it formalizes what we actually do in practice,
for we are constantly making assessments of the pluses and minuses of the consequences
of any course of action. Indeed, he believed that we are fundamentally motivated by our
own pleasures and pains, i.e., he was a psychological hedonist.
8

9. However, in Bentham’s day his philosophy was labelled the “pig philosophy” because he
emphasized simply the quantity of pleasure and did not give sufficient priority to the type
of pleasures that are worthy of human beings alone. For this reason, his disciple and
godchild John Stuart Mill sought to develop a more refined version of utilitarianism by
adding a qualitative hedonism to it. Accordingly, he insisted that pleasures can differ in
their quality and not just in their amount and maintained that those pleasures that are the
product of our intellectual and more refined capacities are higher and better than physical
pleasures. It is easier for a pig or a fool to be satisfied than a Socrates is, but the life of
Socrates is far superior. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment
are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed
being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is
constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all
bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the
imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections
qualify. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different
opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to
the comparison knows both sides.
In saying that we strive to realize our potential as human beings as an end in itself, Mill
seems to have moved away from the utilitarian doctrine of psychological hedonism and
has substituted for it an elevated view of human nature that emphasizes the need to fulfil
our unique dignity and potential as human beings rather than to simply maximize our
own or other’s happiness.
A slightly different version of utilitarianism has been developed in the decades after Mill.
Some find evidence for it in Mill’s own writings. This version is usually called rule
utilitarianism and is contrasted with what we have so far described, which is called act
utilitarianism.
They are both forms of utilitarianism. They are alike in requiring us to produce the
greatest amount of happiness or pleasure for the greatest number of people. They differ
in what they believe we ought to consider in estimating the consequences. Act
utilitarianism states that we ought to consider the consequences of each act separately.
Rule utilitarianism states that we ought to consider the consequences of the act
performed as a general practice. For example, act utilitarianism tells us to consider the
consequences of a specific act of promise keeping/breaking, whereas rule utilitarianism
to consider the consequences of the practice of promise keeping/breaking.
Which form of utilitarianism is better is a matter of dispute. Act utilitarians can claim
that we ought to consider only what will or is likely to happen if we act in certain ways,
not what would happen if we acted in certain ways but is not going to happen we are not
going to so act. Rule utilitarians can claim that acts are similar to one another and so can
be thought of as practises. My lying in one case to get myself out of a difficulty is similar
to others’ lying in other cases to get themselves out of difficulties. Since we should make
the same judgments about similar cases (for consistency’s sake), we should judge this act
by comparing it with the results of the actions of everyone in similar circumstances. We
can thus evaluate the general practice of “lying to get oneself out of a difficulty.”
Objections to utilitarianism
Utilitarianism has been criticised because many people find disturbing its implication
that traditional moral rules can be broken “on occasion” to maximize public good.
Furthermore, Utilitarianism claims that the concept of “good” means “the greatest
happiness of the greatest number” even though, in fact, what the majority want is not
9

10. always “good”. However, there are many forms of utilitarianism and some of them still
retain considerable appeal for their concern not only with the material but also with the
spiritual well-being of mankind.
Questions
1. Do you think that utilitarianism is a workable moral theory? Why or why not? Can
we do what promotes the greatest amount of happiness as well as what makes the
greatest number of people happy?
2. What do you think of the argument that happiness or pleasure is the only intrinsic
good because it is the only thing that we desire for its own sake?
3. What do you think of Mill’s “pig and Socrates” argument for the difference between
sensual and intellectual pleasures? Would you prefer to be the pig or Socrates? Why?
4. Bentham’s hedonistic utilitarianism holds that living at the level of an animal and
only pursuing the pleasures of the body is just as good as developing the life of the
mind. Mill claims that developing the life of the mind is better than pursuing the
pleasures of the body. However, if pleasure were to be the only criterion of value
there would be no way to rank pleasures except in terms of their quantity and this
conclusion would send Mill’s version of utilitarianism right back to Bentham’s. So
Mill needs to have some criterion other than pleasure itself to judge the value of
competing pleasures. Comment.
Another version of consequentialism: Buddhist ethics
Within a consequentialist orientation, Buddhist ethics lays very great emphasis on
working towards the material and spiritual welfare of people. The Buddha himself was
described as a person concerned with the well-being and happiness of mankind. In
general Buddhist ethics has a utilitarian stance, but the Buddhist utilitarianism is not a
hedonistic utilitarianism. Certainly the Buddha would be critical of the pursuit of pure
sensuality and also of any attempt to reduce human pleasures to a hedonistic calculus. As
one proceeds on the path of meditation, the jhanas (states of deep meditative absorption)
are associated with states of pleasure and happiness, not of mundane nature but rather
states of joy, zest and rapture. There are certain refinements in these states which go
beyond the pleasures we normally associate with hedonism (the view that pleasure is or
ought to be the goal of all our actions). Against the background of these jhanic states,
concept like hedonism and eudaimonism (in which “happiness” plays the role that
pleasure does in the hedonistic doctrine) used in the context of Western ethics may lose
clear application.
Buddhism may be described as a consequentialist ethic embodying the ideal of ultimate
happiness for the individual, as well as a social ethic with a utilitarian stance concerned
with the material and spiritual well-being of mankind. In keeping with this stance,
Buddhism also has a strong altruistic component, specially embodied in the four sublime
virtue of loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity.
Buddhist ethics does not generally use terms for good or bad, right or wrong, but it
speaks of thoughts and actions being either: Kushala (skilful) – if based on compassion,
generosity and wisdom, or akushala (unskilful) – if based on hatred, craving and
delusion.
The reason for this is that an action, if analyzed, objectively, may have quite different
interpretations depending on the circumstances within which it is performed. Skilful
actions are those that are able to bring about an increase in happiness and are conducive
to following the Buddhist path. Unskilful actions are those that do not lead to happiness
and make it more difficult to follow the Buddhist path.
10

11. Buddhist ethics therefore takes into account the context of each action and the motivation
of those involved. Notice that this is another implication of the fundamental principle of
interconnectedness. Things are not good or bad in themselves, but are only deemed so
because of the way in which they relate to those involved. Actions have consequences
and the principle of karma can be relevant. Equally, action take place because of existing
conditions. An action cannot exist in isolation from its conditions or consequences.
Once again then, we that Buddhist philosophy has no fixed building blocks, but only a
fluid pattern of connections in assessing anything from a moral point of view. Having
said that, it is also true that there is a substantial body of precepts and rules that are
available to guide Buddhists.
Precepts are not fixed rules, but principles of training. They illustrate the qualities that
would be expected of a person who was enlightened, and are therefore a guide for those
seeking enlightenment. They are most commonly set out in their negative form – as
things to be avoided:
1 I undertake not to take life;
2 undertake not to take the not-given;
3 I undertake to abstain from misuse of the senses;
4 I undertake not to speak falsely;
5 I undertake to avoid those things that cloud the mind.
Each of these principles of training gives rise to a positive counterpart:
1 To develop loving-kindness and compassion towards all living things;
2 To develop generosity;
3 To cultivate stillness, simplicity and contentment.
4 To seek to speak truthfully, gently, positively and with purpose;
5 To develop mindfulness.
Buddhism aims to balance morality, meditation and wisdom (sila, samadhi and prajna) in
its spiritual path. Buddhist do not present morality as a means to an end, making it a
necessary requirement if one is to achieve enlightenment. Rather, since everything arises
in dependence upon conditions, Buddhist claim that the basic morality is a condition
which enables other features of the Buddhist path to arise.
It is important to note that these are not commandments, given by some external deity,
with the threat of punishment if they are broken. They are simply the Buddha’s summary
of the kind of life that allows wisdom and compassion to arise. Buddhist have these
guidelines, but are free to decide how best to apply them to individual situations,
recognizing that every moment and event is unique.
Of course, Buddhist ethics need to be seen in the light of the theory of karma. Volitional
intentions determine future states, and it is the intention that counts, not just the carrying
out of the deed – although the karmic consequences are likely to be more serious if the
deed is subsequently carried out.
There is a parallel here with Jesus’ moral teachings, for He argues that the attitudes of
lust or hatred, as well as the subsequent deeds of adultery and murder, are to be punished.
The reason for this would seem that both Jesus and the Buddha were approaching the
matter of morality primarily from a soteriological (i.e., concerned with the salvation of
the person) point of view. In other words, they were primarily concerned with the effect
that the action would have on the spiritual life of those concerned. Neither was
considering it solely from the point of view of the right ordering of society, from which
perspective it is the action that is crucial and the intention is of secondary importance.
However, whether we accept Buddhist ethics or not adopting a negative notion of
happiness, according to which our happiness is little more than the absence of
unhappiness, raises some fundamental questions. If we give up all concerns that lead us
11

12. to think that dying is bad, we find ourselves with no reason for thinking that living is
good. Living well cannot require ridding ourselves of our reasons to exist. Can it?
Certainly the Buddhist is correct to point out that we would be happier and more content
if we let go of some of our self-obsessive cravings and desires. But throughout history
there have been creative geniuses who where driven by the thirst to achieve success or to
accomplish some sort of personal goal. Many of these people have had enormous egos at
the same time they made enormous contributions to humanity. From these personal
desires and strivings, for example, have come great inventions or advances in medicine
and science that have reduced human suffering, enriched our lives, and advanced
civilization. Wouldn’t the world and the quality of human life have been poorer if these
history-changing people had done nothing but led contemplative lives and abandoned
their strivings and thirst to achieve their individual goals? Is desire the problem in human
life (as Buddhism claims) or only wrongly directed desires as for instance Christianity
and Islam claim?
However, if not taken to an extreme, it is good advice to reappraise our expectations and
ask if they are realistic. There is nothing wrong with having unattainable dreams, of
course. But insofar as the notion of happiness is malleable, we should define it so that it
is within our reach, even if our wishes and dreams are beyond us, enticing us to do still
more with our lives than is required of simple happiness.
Questions
Is Buddha giving us good advice when he tells us to abandon the notion of the self?
Must we give up all desires if we give up the notion of the self?
Can we abandon the desires that are incompatible with our achieving enlightenment
without giving up the notion of the self?
Is it possible to hold that death is insignificant while also holding that life is worth
living?
12

13. LECTURE 4: The main ethical theories
(c) Kantian ethics
Suppose that an utilitarian doctor is asked by a hospitalized patient how he is doing.
Knowing that his health is rapidly deteriorating and fearful that the shock of hearing the truth
will worsen his condition, the physician decides that he could achieve the best consequences
by lying to him and waiting to tell him the truth at a better time. However, can you think of
some unintended bad consequences that might result from this benevolent lie? What if the
physician lied by saying, “You are doing great,” and the patient died without making out a
will because he thought there was no urgency? Could the physician be held morally
responsible for the bad consequences of the lie? On the other hand, what if he told the truth
and it so depressed the patient that he gave up his will to live? Could he then be held
responsible for the bad consequences of telling the truth? Could it be that the best policy in
such a situation is to avoid the known evil (lying) and let the consequences happen as they
will?
These questions draw attention to one of the leading themes in Immanuel Kant’s ethics of
duty, i.e. the irrelevance of consequences in determining our obligations or the moral
rightness and wrongness of actions. The other leading themes of Kant’s ethical theory are:
the importance of consistency for living the moral life and choosing our moral rules; the
irreducible dignity and worth of every person; the necessity of having moral absolutes that
are not qualified by any exceptions.
Immanuel Kant
Writing in the late eighteenth century, Kant (1724-1804) was not attempting to refute the
nineteenth century utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Nevertheless,
because Kant was responding to the British empiricists (Locke, Hume and others) who
would later influence the utilitarians, his writings read like an argument directed against
Bentham and Mill. For this reason, I have presented these thinkers in reverse chronological
order. Rather than being a historical museum piece, Kant’s moral philosophy remains one of
the most influential theories today. While many philosophers enthusiastically defend and
apply his theory, and others harshly criticize it, no one who wants to think seriously about
ethics can afford to ignore his ideas.
We could take as the model of Kant’s entire philosophy his statement that “two things fill the
mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe…the starry heavens above me and
the moral law within me.” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis
White Beck, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949, pt.2, conclusion.)
The good will
Kant’s moral theory begins with the claim that the only thing in the world that has absolute,
unqualified moral value is a good will. A person who has a good will is one who acts from
no motive other than the motive of doing what is right. In other words, such a person acts out
of respect for the moral law and for the sake of duty, and no other considerations enter into
the decision.
“Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived
which could be called good without qualification except a good will. Intelligence, wit,
judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage,
resoluteness, and perseverance as qualities of temperament, are doubtless in many respect
good and desirable. But they can become extremely bad and harmful if the will, which is to
make use of these gift of nature and which in its special constitution is called character, is not
good…The good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its
13

14. adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good because of its willing, i.e., it is good of
itself.” (Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White
Beck, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Library of Liberal Arts, 1959, pp.9-10)
So after establishing the good will as the most important human attribute, the next step is to
establish what is the moral law and what are our duties. Kant tells us that we have absolute
moral duties that are determined by reason and that are not affected by the consequences. So
Kant argued that reason was the second most important human attribute and that it therefore
was possible to set up valid absolute moral rules on a basis of reason alone, not by reference
to any supernatural being or by empirical evidence but by the same kind of logical reasoning
that establishes such indisputable truth in mathematics and logic as 2+2=4, “No circles are
squares, and “All triangles are three-sided.”
Establishing Morality by Reasoning Alone
Kant’s first requirement for an absolute moral truth is that it must be logically consistent;
that is, it cannot be self-contradictory as the statement “A circle is a square” would be.
Second, the truth must be universalizable; that is, it must be able to be stated so as to apply to
everything without exception, not just to some or perhaps even most things. This is
exemplified by the statement “All triangles are three-sided,” for which there are no
exceptions. Triangles may be of different sizes and shapes, but they are by definition
indisputably and universally three-sided. If moral rules could indeed be established in this
same manner, as Kant thought, then they too would be indisputable and therefore logically
and morally binding upon all human beings. Of course, some people might disobey these
rules, but we could clearly brand such people as immoral.
In some ways, Kant’s ideas were brilliant. For example, he could establish the fact that living
parasitically would be immoral because it also would be illogical. He could say that the
commandment “Always be a parasite, living off someone else” is illogical because if all
people lived like parasites, then off whom could they live? It is easy to see that it is conflict
with the principle of universalizability that causes the inconsistency here. Obviously some
people can be parasites, but not all. Now, if one could find such moral absolutes, then a
completely irrefutable system of ethics could be established, and the obeying of the rules of
this system would be what is moral, regardless of the consequences to oneself or to others.
The major way that Kant gave us to discover these moral absolutes was by means of his
Categorical Imperative.
The Categorical Imperative
So Kant called the principle of morality the Categorical Imperative. Where this this term
came from can be shown by contrasting it with hypothetical imperatives. Both terms come
the study of logic in Kant’s day. A hypothetical statement was one with the form “If - then.”
The words that follow the if are the conditions that must be fulfilled to bring about the
consequences. “If (you want to make good grades) then you should study.” “If (you want to
have friends) then be friendly.” The word imperative means “command,” so a hypothetical
imperative is an “if - then” sort of command which is based on the acceptance of a set of
conditions (the conditions that follow the term if).
From Kant’s point of view, utilitarianism would be based on hypothetical imperatives: “If
you want to do the greatest good for the greatest number, then -.” But for reasons we have
already looked at, Kant did not think morality could be based on an assessment of
consequences. The kind of command Kant thought proper for morality was the categorical
imperative. A categorical imperative is unconditioned (it is not iffy), and it alone is the
principle of moral duty. A categorical command would say, “Tell the truth regardless of the
consequences.”
14

15. Kant’s usual formulation of the categorical imperative is to “Act on that maxim that you can
will to be a universal law.” However, the categorical imperative may be stated in several
ways always meaning that whenever someone is about to make a moral decision, he or she
must make a two-stage process of self-analysis: First, he must ask, “What is the rule
authorizing this act I am about to perform?” and, second, “Can it become a universal rule for
all human beings to follow?” If the answer is no, then the action is immoral. For example, if
a lazy person is thinking, “Why should I work hard in order to live; why don’t I just steal
from everyone else? And if this person is aware of Kant’s requirement, he or she will have to
ask him- or herself what the rule is for this contemplated action. The rule would have to be,
“I shall never work, but steal what I need from other human beings.” If the person then
attempts to universalize this statement, it will read: “No human being should ever work, but
all human beings should steal what they need from each other.” But if no one worked, there
would be nothing to steal. How then would human beings live? Who would there be to steal
from? It is obvious that some human beings can steal from others but that not all human can
do so. According to Kant stealing must therefore be immoral because it cannot be applied to
all human beings.
But there is more to be said about the categorical imperative. Kant also said that that the
categorical imperative is a rule that is freely imposed on us by ourselves, hence it is
autonomous. And a third way he characterized the categorical imperative was with reference
to the goal of action. Every action is aimed at some end (though the calculation of
consequences forms no part of morality). If we could discover something that is always a
moral end, we could perhaps better see what the categorical imperative is. The final moral
end of an action cannot be our own happiness, for if happiness were the goal of life, then the
robber baron would be the most moral of persons. There is one thing, and one thing only,
Kant thought, that is the proper end of actions, and that is to treat humanity – whether your
own or that of another person – always as an end in itself. We should never use another
person merely as a means but should treat everyone as worthy of respect and dignity. This
principle sometimes is referred to as Kant’s “Practical Imperative.”
In sum, though Kant claimed there was one and only one categorical imperative he did
suggest three dimensions to it:
1. An action is moral if and only if the maxim on which it is based can be universalized.
2. An action is moral if and only if it is carried out based on a freely imposed rule
(autonomy).
3. An action is moral if and only if it treats persons as ends in themselves.
Conclusions: Kantian ethics, duty rather than inclination
Because it sees the ethical enterprise in terms of law and duty Kantian ethics is called
deontological (from the Greek deon, duty). Obviously, its approach to morality is radically
different from that of the utilitarians. For Kantian ethics, the rightness or wrongness of an
action is intrinsic to the type of action it is. The Kantian, for example, would say that we
have a moral obligation to tell the truth, even if it produces harm. On the other hand, lying is
considered wrong, even if it produces a good outcome. Doing our duty means always
obeying certain compulsory moral laws or “imperatives”, even if these laws may often seem
tiresome or inconvenient to us personally. Kant explains how we can find out what these
compulsory moral rules are. We work them out, not by asking ourselves what we would like
to do, but by using our reason. He asks us to imagine what would happen is we
“universalized” what we wanted to do, always making sure that we treated people as ends
and never as means. By using our reason and the “Universability Test”, we have indirectly
discovered a compulsory rule or “categorical imperative”. Don’t steal! This test is like a
“moral compass”, always revealing the correct “moral north” to us. This test also works
against lying. If everybody lied all the time, then truth and meaning would both disappear.
15

16. So, lying is irrational and not allowed. This is how Kant tries to show us moral rules are
compulsory.
One criticism of Kantian ethics is that it sounds too perfect for most human beings. Moral
rules, rather, are like useful generalizations: in general we think it is best not to lie, but there
are occasionally circumstances where it is obviously morally correct to do so. Kant’s system
of compulsory rules seems monolithic and incredible because it does not allow for
exceptions. It also does not help us choose between moral rules. Sometimes it is not just
possible to keep a promise and tell the truth at the same time.
Questions
1. In the ongoing quarrel between those who say the morality of an action depends on
motives and those who say it depends on consequences, which side do you find yourself
on? Why?
2. What is the basic difference between a categorical and a hypothetical imperative? In the
following examples, which are the hypothetical and which are categorical imperatives?
Explain your answers.
If you want others to be honest to you, then you ought to be honest with them.
Whether or not you want to pay your share, you ought to do so.
I ought not to cheat on this test if I do not want to get caught.
Since everyone want to be happy, we ought to consider everyone’s interest equally.
3. Do you agree with Kant that a moral imperative must be categorical? Give reasons for
your answer.
4. According to the second form of Kant’s categorical imperative, would it be morally
permissible for me to agree to be someone’s slave. Explain.
5. What do you consider to be the major strong points and major weakness of Kant’s
ethical view?
16

17. LECTURE 5: The main ethical theories
(d) Ross’s Prima Facie Duties
Sir William David Ross (1877-1971, Provost of Oriel College, Oxford University) agreed
with Kant that morality basically should not rest on consequences, but he disagreed with
the unyielding absolutism of Kant’s theories. As we have seen, Kant, perhaps the most
well-known deontologist (i.e., theorist of duty), was both an absolutist and a rationalist. He
believed that we could use reason to work out a consistent set of moral principles that
cannot be overridden. One might place Ross somewhere in between Kant and the rule
utilitarians, in that he felt that we have certain objective prima facie duties that we must
always adhere to unless serious circumstances or reasons tell us to do otherwise. In other
words, he did not believe that consequences make an action right or wrong, but he did
think that it is necessary to consider consequences when we are making our moral choices.
So in accordance with these principles, Ross distinguishes between two kinds of duties:
a prima facie duty is one that is morally binding unless it conflicts with a more
important duty (the term prima facie literally means “at first glance” or “on the surface of
things.”); an actual duty is one that we are morally obligated to perform in a
particular situation after we have taken all the circumstances into account. In this
way, Prima facie duties are always in effect, but any particular one can be superseded by a
higher duty. This rule is analogous to the law of gravity, which is always in effect but can
be superseded by the more powerful force of a rocket engine. Of course, even though we
may be justified in violating one prima facie duty to fulfil another one, we still have an
obligation to make amends to anyone who was harmed by our doing so.
Selecting Prima Facie Duties
Ross, unlike Kant, was an intuitionist, not a rationalist. In fact, he believed that prima facie
principles can be discovered by intuition, not by demonstrative reason, and that intuition
instructs us in how to judge between them. So when confronted with questions as to how
we should select prima facie duties, Ross said that he was “claiming that we know them to
be true” as in the following example:
“To me it seems as self-evident as anything could be, that to make a promise, for instance,
is to create a moral claim on us in someone else. Many readers will perhaps say that they
do not know this to be true. If so I certainly cannot prove it to them. I can only ask them to
reflect again, in the hope that they will ultimately agree that they also know it to be true.”
(William D. Ross, The Right and the Good, New York: Oxford University Press, 1930,
p.24)
What Ross was basing the selection of prima facie duties on, then, is intuition; that is to
say, there is no logic or evidence to justify his choices, but we are to accept what he says
on the basis of intuition. If we do not have the same intuitions as he, then he suggests that
we are to keep trying until we do!
Prima Facie Duties. A prima facie duty, then is one that all human beings must obey in a
general way before any other consideration enters into the picture. Without claiming that
this list is complete, Ross sets out seven Prima Facie Duties:
1. Fidelity (or faithfulness), i.e., telling the truth, keeping actual and implied promises, and
meeting contractual agreements;
2. Reparation, i.e., making up for the wrongs we have done to others – in other words,
making reparation for wrongful acts;
3. Gratitude, i.e., recognizing what others have done for us and extending our gratitude to
them.
17

18. 4. Justice, i.e., preventing the improper distribution of good and bad that is not in keeping
with what people merit or deserve;
5. Beneficence, i.e., helping to improve the condition of others in the areas of virtue,
intelligence, and happiness;
6. Self-improvement, i.e., the obligation we have to improve our own virtue, intelligence,
and happiness;
7. Non-maleficence (non-injury), i.e., not injuring others and preventing injury to others.
(See: Ibid, pp.21-22.)
Thus, Ross, like Kant, thought that there are rules all human beings should adhere to
because it is their moral obligation to do so. But, as we will see next, he also improved on
Kant a great deal in the area of what to do when duties (especially Prima Facie Duties)
conflict.
Principles to resolve conflicting duties
Ross established two principles that we may call upon when attempting to deal with the
conflict of Prima Facie Duties: (1) Always do that act in accord with the stronger prima
facie duty; and (2) always do that act that has the greatest degree of prima facie rightness
over prima facie wrongness. (See: Ibid, pp.41-42.) This means that Ross does not believe
in any formula for ranking these duties in some sort of absolute hierarchy. To decide
which of the prima facie is the actual duty we should act on in a given situation
requires a morally sensitive and wise assessment of the circumstances. For example,
my actual duty may be to stop and help a stranded motorist even though it may require me
to break a promise (such as an appointment). However, if that promise impacts an
international treaty on which world peace depends then the actual duty of that promise may
be more important than preventing a minor harm. Furthermore, Ross stresses the highly
personal character of duty. For example, my general duty to help others is normally more
pressing when it comes to my family members than it is for strangers.
Critical evaluation
Although Ross does not provide us with a clear-cut procedure for determining which duty
is our actual in a given situation, he has captured Kant’s concern for universally binding
duties while giving us some intuitive means to resolve conflicts between them. In this way,
Ross presents a significant example of the more moderate position of ethical objectivism.
Although he did believe that there were universal, objective moral principles, he did not
believe that any of them were absolute and without exceptions, for when two or more of
these principles conflict, one would have to be subordinated to the other. No doubt this
would seem to be agreeable to many of us. However, Ross does not take us any further
than this. He seems to provide no clear criteria either for choosing which duties are prima
facie or for deciding how we are to distinguish among them after they have been
established. That is to say, he does not really tell us how we are to determine when one
obligation is stronger than the other. In sum, his method is both highly speculative and
vague in its application.
Questions
1. What are Prima Facie Duties? What problems do they raise? Can you think of any
moral duties that might be prima facie? What are they?
2. To what extent do you think it is important to rank moral rules in order of importance?
3. Show how you would rank your own ethical rules, or those of any other system of which
you are aware.
18

19. LECTURE 6: The main ethical theories
(e) The Divine Command Theory
The Divine Command Theory states that morality is based not upon the consequences of
actions or rules, not upon self-interest or other-interestedness, but rather upon something
“higher” than these mere mundane events of the imperfect human or natural worlds. It is
based upon the existence of an all-good being or beings who are supernatural and who
have communicated to human beings what they should and should not do in a moral sense.
It says God makes things good or bad, right or wrong; God’s wanting something makes it
right and good, and God’s opposing something makes it wrong and bad. Furthermore,
it implies that morality would be a tissue of errors if God did not exist. In order to be
moral, then, human beings must follow God’s commands and prohibitions to the letter
without concerning themselves with consequences, self-interest, or anything else.
In its strongest form the Divine Command Theory is about the very meaning of the words.
The idea would be not merely that God’s will and the good happily coincide, which would
typically be taken for granted (in as much as God is good), but rather, that they are one and
the same, that to be morally good is, by definition, to be as God wills. This strongest form
of the Divine Command Theory is often called linguistic version.
One problem with the strong or linguistic version of the theory, where the expression
“good” means the same (roughly) as the expression “as God wills”, is that it then becomes
a seemingly empty tautology that God is good. (A tautology is a statement which uses
different words to say two times the same thing.) God’s great goodness would be no more
remarkable than, say, a circle’s roundness. Though some theologians might embrace this
result, it would not be acceptable to theists (theists means believers in God) who take the
assertion that God is good as more significant and informative than the assertion that
circles are round.
We can better understand the reason why this result is not acceptable to many if we
consider the fundamental claim on which it rests, i.e., that God and his will are good.
Within this claim “good” is defined as that which God wills. Now if we substitute this
definition of good into the other claim, God’s will is good, the result is:
God’s will is that which God wills.
This is an empty claim. That is to say, what we have here is a classical case of the content
fallacy of “begging the question.” (The fallacy of “begging the question” is committed
when arguers, in one way or another, assume what they have to prove.) This illustrates the
fact that defining “good” in terms of God’s will makes it impossible to say anything
meaningful about the goodness of God or his will, for we end up with the empty statement
“God’s will is that which God wills.” What is missing is some prior conception of moral
goodness that is understood independently of God and his will. (This prior conception
cannot be found in the Divine Command Theory, but only as we will see in the next lecture
in the Theory of Natural Law).
What is most troubling on practical grounds here, is the implication that if God does not
exist, then ethics is a waste of time. In one famous passage from Dostoevsky’s novel The
Brothers Karamazov, a character cries, “All is permitted if God does not exist.” This
lament captures one of the troubling implications of the Divine Command Theory, i.e. that
it does not provide a rational foundation for the existence of a supernatural being and
therefore not for morality either.
19

20. However (and luckily enough, one may add), in any case, the linguistic version of the
Divine Command Theory runs into trouble with the apparent fact that many people have
beliefs about what is morally good without having the corresponding beliefs about what
God has willed. That is to say, these people come to the same moral conclusions as
religious people without appealing to a religious basis for their ethical stance. Of course,
defenders of the linguistic Divine Command Theory may deny that there really are such
people by arguing that those who believe there is an order in the universe, or who believe
in their own conscience, or hold any belief at all they cannot rationally justify – therefore
believe in God, even though they, themselves, would be disinclined to put it that way. But
clearly there is also an ordinary everyday sense in which they do not believe in God as it
appears from their pronouncements. Construing belief in God differently could only make
the Divine Command Theory trivially true, merely by definition, void of any significant
content. One solution to this is to admit that this theory cannot be a correct account of what
we all mean by moral terms, but that it could still count as an account of what a group of
like-minded theists mean by moral terms and that within this group of people can still fulfil
some meaningful practical task, like for instance in preaching.
An easier route for Divine Command Theorists might be to abandon the linguistic version
of the theory in favour of a more modest extensional version. One solution could be to hold
that although “the good” and “God’s will” do not mean the same thing, they amount to the
same thing – that is, God wills whatever is good, and whatever God wills is good. This
yields the intended equivalence without requiring the troublesome semantic claims.
But even in this weakened form, the Divine Command Theory still arouses many
objections. For one thing, much of what God is often taken as commanding, from ritual
practices to Sabbath observance, does not seem to be a matter of is most commonly
thought of as morality. (Of course, what is commonly thought is not necessarily right.) In
so far as it is possible to distinguish a conception of morality properly pertaining only to
some of God’s commands, such as those about murder and theft, but not to other divine
commands, such as those requiring the performance of rituals, the Divine Command theory
founders.
But this theory faces other powerful criticisms. One of these criticisms was first suggested
in Plato’s famous dialogue Euthyphro where Socrates raised the question, “Do the gods
approve of certain actions because these actions are good, or are certain actions good
because the gods approve of them?” The first alternative is Plato’s (Socrates’) answer and
the second is that of the Divine Command Theory. However, if we accept the latter view
according to which “good” and “bad” are simply arbitrary labels that God attaches to
actions based on his sovereign will, then it seems that God could have declared that hatred,
adultery, stealing, and murder are morally good. In other words, God could change the
moral truth without altering the world. Simply by fiat and without changing the nature or
consequences of our actions, he could make it right for us to do things that are
unreasonable and harmful as things stand.
Some philosophers have bitten the bullet and accepted this position. So seems to have done
William of Ockham, a fourteenth-century Christian philosopher. On the other hand, most
philosophers have found this conclusion abhorrent. The philosopher Gottfried Leibniz
(1646-1716) explains why:
“In saying, therefore, that things are not good according to any standard of goodness, but
simply by the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys, without realizing it, all the love
of God and all his glory; for why praise him for what he has done, if he would be equally
20

21. praiseworthy in doing the contrary?” (Gottfried Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, sec.2,
trans. George R. Montgomery, 1902.)
Here what Leibniz points out is that, even taking as already proven the existence of a
supernatural being, the Divine Command Theory fails to answer satisfactorily to the
problem of how we could prove that this being was morally trustworthy.
In contrast, the first alternative’s claim that “God approves of certain actions because they
are good” suggests that God has a reason for approving certain actions – the reason being
that they are good. But if so, then we should be able to evaluate the goodness (or badness)
of the actions themselves and approve or disapprove of them for the same reason that God
does, which implies that we can have a conception of ethics that is independent of God’s
will (although it might be consistent with it). This is Plato’s view and significantly also the
standard natural law view, according to which God could not change the moral truth
without altering the world itself. That the other alternative seems unpalatable to most is
also one of the reasons why historically the view that has commanded the allegiance of
most intellectual theists is not the Divine Command Theory but rather the Natural Law
Theory.
God and the moral knowledge
The discussion of how ethics might depend on religion according to the Divine Command
Theory has concentrated so far on links that might be thought to obtain between God and
the good. But since it is (alas!) one thing for an act to be good and quite another for us to
know that it is good, it may be that only the latter depends on God (or religion). That is,
while an act’s being good or not may have nothing to do with God, our knowing whether it
is good or not might depend on God. To whatever extent moral knowledge depends on
God, ethics could be said to depend on religion epistemologically. (Here
“epistemologically” means as far as the actual possibilities of knowing are concerned;
remember: epistemology is the area of philosophy that deals with questions concerning
knowledge).
The most straightforward way to view moral knowledge as depending on God would
probably be by holding that it is impossible to have any moral knowledge without having
some knowledge of or about God. Although such a view does not require the Divine
Command Theory, they would obviously go well together. In any case, the prevalence of
moral non-theists once again seems to pose a problem. For there seem to be plenty of
people who know, for instance, that murder is wrong, without knowing (without even
merely believing) anything about God at all.
Moreover, in denying the possibility of justifying moral beliefs without appeal to God, the
position in question entails the rejection of every single rational non-theistic theory of
ethics. Kant, for example (like so many others), argued that moral knowledge can be
obtained by reason alone. Those who would refuse to recognize as adequately justified any
moral beliefs not derived from knowledge of or about God, would have to refute the whole
vast range of arguments put by Kant and all others who ever proposed a rational basis for
ethics! (Indeed, on Kant’s view one’s reasons for acting morally must be the right –
rational – reasons; moral actions cannot be prompted by any ulterior motives, such as the
desire to obey God, but must be done simply on account of their intrinsic accord with
unconditional moral principles.)
21

22. God and moral motivation
Conceding that knowledge of or about God may not be necessary as a reason for moral
knowledge, one may claim that it is necessary nevertheless as a reason for moral
behaviour. That is to say, whatever reasons there might be in support of various moral
principles, the only reason to behave morally is that God rewards the good and punishes
the evil, whether in this life or in some other. One way of construing this claim would be
to maintain that human beings, as a sad but simple matter of fact, are just not moved to
refrain from wrongdoing and to do what is right, unless they fear God’s wrath and seek His
favour. But then despite the many people of whom this claim is true, there are perhaps as
just as many who behave morally with no regard whatsoever to divine reward and
punishment. One may protest that moral behaviour not inspired by thoughts of divine
reward and punishment is not rational, but this runs against the very fact that when people
justify a moral principle (as in this course we have already seen many thinkers doing),
giving reasons for following it, in most cases is exactly what they mean to do.
Questions
1. Does God approve of certain actions because these actions are good, or are certain
actions good because God approves of them? What is the answer that Socrates gives to
Euthyphro? (Explain.) What is the answer according to the Divine Command Theory?
What should be the answer in your opinion? (Explain.)
2. Describe and critically analyze the Divine Command Theory.
3. Must we believe in God to live morally?
22

23. LECTURE 7: The main ethical theories
(f) The Natural law theory
The natural law theory is the view that historically has commanded the allegiance of most
intellectual believers in God. Nevertheless, secular and occasionally down-right atheistic
versions have existed and still exist, even though are somehow a bit out of fashion at
present. One central tenet of natural law theory is that the moral law is accessible to human
reason. Another is that the moral law is universally applicable. A third is that the this moral
law is based on human nature. So to summarize briefly, natural law theory holds that
natural law is knowable by human reason, applies to all human beings, and is
grounded in human nature.
In order to understand the theory of natural law it is necessary a preliminary explanation.
The natural law should not be confused with those other “laws of nature” that are the
generalizations of natural science. The laws of natural science are descriptive laws. They
tell us how scientists believe that nature does, in fact, behave, but not how it ought to
behave. In fact, if nature were found to behave differently from what we had so far
observed, then the laws would be changed to match this new information. Scientific laws
are, simply put, descriptive generalizations of fact aimed at predicting and controlling
phenomena.
Moral laws, on the other hand, are prescriptive laws. They tell us how we ought to behave.
The natural law is the moral law. However, natural law is not unrelated to nature, for what
we ought to do according to natural law theory is determined by considering some aspects
of nature, in particular, our nature as human beings. We look to certain aspects of our
nature in order to know what is our good and what we ought to do.
Civil law is also prescriptive. As the moral law, however, natural law is supposed to be
more basic or higher that the laws of any particular society. While laws of particular
societies vary and change over time, the natural law is universal and stable. On this ground,
people today often appeal to the moral law in order to argue which civil laws ought to be
instituted or changed.
The historical background of the natural law theory: The Stoics, Aristotle an Aquinas
The natural law theory has its origins in ancient Greek and Roman thought. A core element
of the theory – the idea of a divine law that is built into the structure of the universe – was
conceived by ancient Stoics, who believed that the parts of the word function like
parts of a body and together form an organism animated by divine reason. This
organism is fated by divine law to develop in a preset way and then to be consumed in a
cosmic conflagration, at which point the whole process is repeated from the beginning,
over and over, in exact detail.
However, the general tradition of natural law theory had its primary source in the moral
philosophy of Aristotle. Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. in Stagira, in Northern Greece. His
father was a physician for King Philip of Macedonia. At about the age of seventeen, he
went to study at Plato’s Academy in Athens. Historians of philosophy have traced the
influence of Plato’s philosophy in Aristotle, but have also noted significant differences
between the two philosophers. Putting one difference somewhat simply, Plato’s philosophy
stresses the reality of the general and abstract, this reality being his famous forms or ideas
that exist apart from the things that imitate them or in which they participate. Aristotle was
more interested in the individual and the concrete manifestations of the forms. After
Plato’s death, Aristotle travelled a number of years and then for two or three years was the
23

24. tutor to the young son of King Philip, Alexander, later known as Alexander the Great. In
335 B.C. Aristotle returned to Athens and organized his own school called the Lyceum.
There he taught and wrote almost until his death thirteen years later in 322 B.C.
Aristotle is known not only for his moral theory but also for writings in logic, biology,
physics, metaphysics, art, and politics. The basic notions of his moral theory can be found
in his Nicomachean Ethics, named according to some after his son Nicomachus, or
according to others Nicomachean because it was edited by Nicomachus. These notions are
based on his more general views about nature. Aristotle himself was a great observer of
nature. In fact, in his writings he mentions some five hundred different kinds of animals.
He noticed that seeds of the same sort always grew to the same mature form. He opened
developing eggs of various species and noticed that these organism manifested a pattern in
their development even before birth. He concluded that there was an order in nature. It
was as if natural beings such as plants and animals had a principle of order within them
that directed them toward their goal, their mature final form. This view can be called a
teleological view from the Greek word for “goal” or end, telos, because of its emphasis
on a goal embedded in natural things.
Aristotle believed that human beings are also natural beings with a specific nature and that
they have certain specific characteristics that they share as human. He believed that just as
a good horse is a well-functioning horse, one that is healthy and able to run and do what
horses do, the same principle should be true for the human being. For human beings to
function well or flourish, they should perfect their human capacities. If they do this, they
will be functioning well as human beings. They will also be happy, for a being is happy to
the extent that it is functioning well. Aristotle believed that the ultimate good of humans
is happiness, blessedness, or prosperity, Eudaimonia. So in order to know what happiness
is we need to know what is the function of the human being. Even though human beings
have much in common with lower forms of beings, Aristotle believed that it was our
“rational element” that was peculiar to us. The good for humans, then, should consist in
their functioning in a way consistent with and guided by this rational element. Our rational
element has two different functions; one is to know and the other is to guide choice and
action. We must develop our ability to know the world and the truth. We must also choose
wisely. In doing this we will be functioning well specifically as humans.
Later, Christian theorists such as Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) refined the natural law
theory. Aquinas’s ethics was an attempt to combine Aristotelianism with Christianity.
Aristotle had pictured the universe as an orderly whole in which most things have a
function or purpose. To identify a thing’s function, we must examine what it needs to
develop fully and what it contributes to the overall pattern of the world. The good for each
thing is to perform its function. But while Aristotle thought that most things have a
purpose, he did not assume that they were ascribed their purpose by themselves or by any
conscious being. Aristotle pictured the world as orderly and purposive, but did not claim
that the world was designed by an intelligent being. In particular, no one gave human
beings their function. For Aristotle the universe was eternal; it always existed and was not
created by God. His concept of God was that of a most perfect being toward which the
universe was in some way directed. According to Aristotle, there is an order in nature, but
it did not come from the mind of God. For Thomas Aquinas, however, the reason why
nature had the order it did was because God, so to speak, had put it there. Because the
universe was created after a divine plan, nature was not only intelligible, but also existed
for a purpose that was built into it. In other word, Aquinas adopted Aristotle’s teleological
conception of the universe wholesale and added two key ideas. First, God made the world
as it is; and in ordering the world and its inhabitants, God gave each thing the function that
24

25. determines its good. Second, the world must conform to God’s law: “All things subject to
Divine providence are ruled and measured by [God’s] eternal law.”
God’s will is not arbitrary, since God wills what reason dictates. (Not all natural law
theorists have agreed with Aquinas, however. Some of them – called voluntarists – accept
the divine command view and maintain that natural laws are binding solely because God
wills them. We have already discussed this position in the last lecture.)
Now, just as God is able to perceive the moral truth by reasoning it out, in theory people
are able to use their own reason to work out how they must act, at least in broad outlines.
This is because any rational creature “has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a
natural inclination to its proper act and end” and “ this participation of the eternal law in
the rational creature is called the natural law.” Our reason is an accurate guide – as far as it
goes. Only in one area is blind: It cannot inform us of the existence of an after-life, nor tell
us what our comportment to the after-life ought to be. What natural reason cannot make
evident to us is that we are “ordained to an end of eternal happiness.” To mark off the
component of divine law made evident to human beings through the use of our limited
reasoning ability and powers of observation, Aquinas uses the term natural law.
In this way, reason issues a law that we must not transgress, and according to Aquinas this
law is commanded by God because it is enjoined by reason, The first precept of natural law
is that “good is to be done and ensued, and evil is to be avoided.” Aquinas adds: All other
precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever practical reason naturally
apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something
to be done or avoided.
Does Natural Law need a basis in Divine Law?
Notice that unlike the divine command theory, Aquinas’s natural law view does not imply
that ethical issues (aside from those that might concern the afterlife) depend upon
controversial religious assumptions. Aquinas did say that God created the world and that
God’s commandments are binding. But he also said that moral truth has an objective basis
independent of God’s will. The commandments of reason are binding no matter who
promulgates them, whether God or a mere mortal. Consequently, theists and atheists have a
common basis for evaluating positions taken in moral disputes, even though they will not
share a religious worldview, both will find in a position’s reasonableness the ground to
embrace it. And indeed, there were and there still are (fewer than they used to be) secular
natural law theorists either following Aristotle, or abstaining from judgments about the
source of the order (telos) in nature. However, non-theist (i.e., atheist and agnostic)
followers of natural law must answer the question of whether we can conceive of an order
in nature without an orderer. Usually, the answer is taken as depending on what it is meant
by order in nature. If it is taken in the sense of a plan, then this does give reason to believe
that it has an author. However, natural beings may simply develop in certain ways as if
they were directed there by some plan, but there is no plan. This may just be our way of
reading nature. Nowadays, theists generally interpret evolution itself as part of a divine
plan. Chance, then, would not mean without direction. In the same way, even a non-theist
can argue that “chance” does not mean “uncaused”. It means only that the causes are
unknown to us. In other words, there can be an order in nature whose underlying causes are
unknown to us. This order, whatever its origin, is also reflected by moral law in that
from our natural inclinations or species capacities flow our moral duty, which is the
basic tenet of natural law theory.
Evaluation and criticism of the natural law theory
There are many appealing characteristics of natural law theory. Among them are its belief
in the objectivity of moral values and the notion of the good as human flourishing. So
25

26. the moral theology of the Catholic Church is based on Natural Law Theory. However,
there are several questions this theory must answer. Some of these questions are: Can we
derive an “ought” from an “is”? How do we interpret nature? How is human nature
best described?
Because the answers to these questions given by natural law theorists are deemed to be
unsatisfactory for various reasons by many, nowadays the theory has few advocates outside
the Catholic Church. (Natural law theorists are often themselves in contrast one another
concerning how to answer these questions.) The theory it is often rejected for two reasons.
First it seems to involve a confusion of “is” and “ought.” In the 18th
century David Hume
pointed out that what is the case and what ought to be the case are logically different
notions, and no conclusion about one follow from the other. Facts are one thing; values
another.
Second, the Theory of Natural Law has gone out of fashion (although that does not, of
course, prove it false) because the view of the world on which it rests is out of keeping
with modern science. The world as described by Galileo, Newton, and Darwin has no place
for “facts” about right and wrong. Their explanations of natural phenomena make no
reference to values or purposes. What happens just happens, fortuitously, in consequence
of the laws of cause and effect. If the rain benefits the plants, it is only because the plants
have evolved by the laws of natural selection in a rainy climate.
Thus modern science gives us a picture of the world as realm of facts, where the only
“natural laws” are the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology, working blindly and
without purpose. Whatever values may be, they are not part of the natural order. As for the
idea that “nature has made all things specifically for the sake of man,” that is only human
vanity. To the extent that one accepts the worldview of modern science, then, one will be
sceptical of the Theory of Natural Law. It is no accident that the theory was a product, not
of modern thought, but of the Middle Ages.
Questions
1. Give a basic definition of natural law theory.
2. What is the difference between the scientific laws of nature and the natural law?
3. In what way is natural law theory teleological (concerned with “ends”)? In what way is
it deontological (concerned with duty)?
4. What is the difference between Aristotle and Aquinas on the theistic basis of natural
law?
5. According to Aquinas, we are obligated to act as reason dictates. But Aristotle said that
we are best off if we consult reason. Whose view is more accurate.
6. Do you think that nature provides any basis for knowing what we ought to do?
7. Do you think the essential characteristics of humans as human can be specified? Should
we accept the claim that it is good to function only as we are predisposed by nature to
function? If not, how should we define the human good?
8. Are there features of natural human development that are not good? It would appear
that no matter how healthy people are, they are by nature mortal. Is that good?
9. Does God approve of certain actions because these actions are good, or are certain
actions good because God approves of them? What is the answer according to the
Natural Law Theory?
10. Do you think that there can be a reasonable natural law theory without a theistic basis?
26

27. LECTURE 8: The main ethical theories
On site lesson.
- Review of the topics of the previous lectures.
- Discussion of students’ questions.
- Discussion of planning for subsequent lectures and final assessment.
Outcome
Several decisions are taken by mutual consent. It is decided that the rest of the course will
be on line, except for one more lecture on site, and that there will be one final assignment,
but no on site exam.
Final assignment:
Describe your ideal ethical theory motivating your choice.
0r
Choose 3 questions from the lectures’ notes and answer them.
(The questions concerning Plato’s Dialogue Crito of lecture 1 are excluded)
The Deadline for handing in the final assignment is June 2
The last lecture on site will be May 19.
27

28. LECTURE 9: The main ethical theories
(g) Virtue ethics
Virtue ethics refers to any theory that sees the primary focus of ethics to be the character of
the person rather than that person’s actions or duties. The previous theories are concerned
primarily with rules or principles for deciding how to act. They do not ignore the issue of
what makes a good person, but they define the goodness of persons in terms of either what
actions they perform or what principles they employ. Virtue ethics, however, reverses the
proper order. The good person is not one who performs good actions, but actions are
defined as those that person with a good moral character would do. Whereas the previous
theories ask, “What should I do?” virtue ethics asks, “What sort of person should I
be?” Plato would fall under the heading of virtue ethics, for he gave very little specific
guidance on how to make moral decisions. Instead, he talked at length on how to attain a
morally sound character.
But Aristotle has had the most influence on the development of this perspective. Aristotle
developed the theme that we acquire the moral virtues by practicing them. He thought that
the moral virtues are habits that we acquire such that moral behaviour becomes an
ingrained, natural response.
The term virtue had a broader meaning for the Greeks of Aristotle’s time than it has for us
today. For them it meant a kind of excellence. The idea was that humans should function in
excellent ways in that defines them as humans. Accordingly, a dictionary of philosophy
describes the term virtue as it is employed in Aristotle’s philosophy as being “that state of
a thing which constitutes its peculiar excellence and enables it to perform its function
well … in man [it is] the activity of reason and of rationally ordered habits.” (Dagobert
D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1968, p.332.)
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics
Virtue Ethics derives from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. Such ethics are teleological in
character (that is, aim toward some end or purpose). As Aristotle put it: “Every art and
every inquiry, every action and choice, seems to aim at some good … [and] the good has
rightly been defined as that at which all things aim.” (Richard McKeon, ed., Introduction
to Aristotle, New York: The Modern Library, 1947, p.308.) For example, a doctor’s art
aims at health, seamanship aims at a safe voyage, and economy aims at wealth. He goes on
to say that the end of human life is happiness, and the basic activity of human beings is
reason – a virtuous activity; therefore, the aim of human beings, according to Aristotle, is
to reason well for a whole or complete life.
Aristotle is concerned with action, not as being right or good in itself, but as it is conducive
to human good. In ethics he starts from the actual moral judgments of human beings, and
says that by comparing, contrasting, and sifting them, we come to the formulation of
general principles. Notice how this differ from the Divine Command theory and the theory
of Kant, as to the way in which principles are established. In the latter two theories, ethical
principles are objective to or outside of human beings and are established by the
supernatural or by abstract reason itself. Aristotle presupposes that there are natural ethical
tendencies implanted in human beings, and that to follow them with a general attitude of
consistent harmony and proportion constitutes an ethical life.
Aristotle describes his ethical system as being eminently common sense-based, for the
most part, founded as it is on the moral judgments of the ideal human being, who based
28

29. upon reason, is considered good and virtuous. He states that humans begin with a capacity
for goodness, which has to be developed by practice. He says we start by doing acts that
are objectively virtuous, without a knowledge that the acts are good and without actively
or rationally choosing them ourselves. As we practise these acts, we come to realize that
the virtue is good in and of itself. For example, a child is taught to tell the truth (objectively
a virtue) by her parents, and she does so because they have taught her she should.
Eventually, she recognizes that truth telling is a virtue in and of itself, and she continues to
tell the truth because she knows that it is virtuous to do so.
This process would seem to be circular, except that Aristotle makes a distinction between
those acts that create a good disposition (such as telling the truth without knowing this to
be a virtue) and those that flow from the good disposition once it has been created (such as
telling the truth because a person has come to know it to be a virtue). Aristotle further
states that virtue itself is a disposition that has been developed out of a capacity by the
proper exercise of that capacity.
According to Aristotle, virtue is a mean between two extremes, both of which are vices –
either excess or deficiency (or defect). The virtuous person is the one who has just the right
amount of a certain quality or trait. A virtue is considered as a balance between two
extremes or vices. This is his famous doctrine of the mean.
For instance, courage, i.e. the virtue of facing danger with confidence is defined as the
mean between rashness and cowardice. So when Aristotle in his work Nicomachean Ethics
speaks of the activity of the soul in accordance with reason or virtue, he is not talking
about something specific that we do but about the manner in which we do things in life.
Since we are rational beings as well as beings who feel, desire, and act, the road to
happiness (eudaimonia) involves two dimensions. We must rationally judge what is the
best way to live, and our appetites, feelings, and emotions must be disciplined to follow
that judgement. These two dimensions require two kinds of human excellence: intellectual
virtues (ability at mathematics, science, and philosophy) and moral virtues (courage,
generosity, truthfulness, justice, and so on). The two kind of virtues are mutually
supportive. The good life cannot be had if either of these virtues is neglected. Moreover,
when deciding what to do, how we are to know where to find the right balance point, the
decision is “determined by reason, or as a prudent man would determine it.” Hence, finding
the right balance for ourselves is a matter of experience and learning from the examples of
those virtuous person who have practical wisdom. The genius of Aristotle’s ethics is his
recognition that universal and objective principles have relative applications for different
people and within different circumstances. Hence the virtuous mean will not be the same
for every individual under all circumstances.
Contemporary Analysis of Virtue Ethics
Probably the most significant and prominent contemporary analysis of Virtue Ethics,
especially Aristotle’s version of it, may be found in Alasdair MacIntyre’s book, After
Virtue. In analyzing Aristotle’s intentions, MacIntyre states that virtues are dispositions not
only to act in particular ways but also to feel in particular ways, which obviously
emphasizes the creation of a virtuous character in oneself, not merely the following of rules
or the calculation of good consequences. One must create virtuous feelings or inclinations
within oneself, not merely act virtuously. MacIntyre stated further that to act virtuously is
not to act against inclination (as Kant thought), but rather to act from inclinations that have
been formed through the cultivation of the virtues. (See: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue,
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984, p.149.) The idea, then, is to
decide what the practically wise and virtuous human being would do in any situation
involving moral choice, and then do likewise. As MacIntyre says, human beings must
29

30. know what they are doing when they judge or act virtuously, and then they should do what
is virtuous merely because it so. (See: ibid. p.154.)
Non-Western Virtue Ethics: Confucianism and the self-realization theory of the good
Many ethical systems in non-Western traditions also focus more on the virtuous character
than on rules of conduct. The sayings of Confucius are a good example of this focus.
Although there are differences between Plato’s and Aristotle’s and Confucian virtues (the
former exposed a nature based account of the good which is more akin to Confucianism’s
main rival in ancient China, namely Taoism, which is often attributed to an old man name
Laozi), there are also significant overlaps. Interestingly, one of the works in Confucian
literature is The Doctrine of the Mean, which parallels Aristotle’s advice to seek a balance
between the extremes.
However, Confucius’s ancient version of virtue ethics assumes that, fundamentally, a
human being’s good consists in developing or realizing his or her identity, and things
become good in themselves by being essential to identity. This is the self-realization
theory of the good. According to this view, we can identify goods by spelling out what is
essential to an identity. Confucius, for example, thought that we derive an identity from
certain relationships and social roles and claimed that the best life is one in which we
cultivate these as thoroughly as possible. Like the Taoists Confucius was optimistic about
human nature. If all persons could uncover their own inner potential for good, society
would right itself. Morality cannot be legislated in Confucius’ view; it must come from
within, and this is possible because human nature is moral.
The foundation of morality, according to Confucius, is ren, which is translated roughly as
good will to people, or love, and is expressed in a Chinese version of the Golden Rule: “Do
not do to others what you do not want to be done to yourself.” This principle can be
realized because it is within them if they will only recognize and accept it. Human beings
are not isolated but social creatures with an inborn concern for others. This begins in the
family and can be extended to larger and larger social units. The second most important
Confucian moral principle is yi, which holds that the ultimate justification for an action is
not expediency but inner rightness.
In the modern era, at least in the west, it is common to find theorists such as Friedrich
Nietzsche emphasizing more individualistic goods, such as creative contributions at odds
with the adherence to the fixed social order implied by Confucian values and morals.
Indeed, one common criticism to Confucian ethics is that its deeply conservative views are
resistant to change, whereas traditions sometimes need changing.
Daoism and Spontaneity: a radical nature-based account of the good
We consider now the nature based-account, which says that things become good in
themselves by being essential to (or part of) the development of human nature, and so the
key to living well is to develop our nature. Aristotle developed a moderate version of this
account. An extreme version of this account was developed in third century B.C. by
Chinese sages called Daoists or Taoists whose views are expressed in the Daodejing (or
Tao-te Ching).
As Taoist use it, the term dao or tao refers to the aspects of nature by which all things are
brought into being and organized into an orderly cosmos. It is also used normatively, for
the way things are naturally is the best way to be, according to Taoists. Human beings are
just one small part of the order created by the dao; no less than other creatures and no
more. All is well when we move in the well-worn ways carved for us by the dao; our lives
are then a splendid part of the natural order. But when we try to improve ourselves and
30

31. make our own way – formulating higher ideals and prescribing better ways to act – our
efforts backfire. The Taoists idea is to work with nature, not against it. The dao enable us
to live well, fitting us seamlessly into the fabric of nature, by making proper behaviour
instinctual. To flourish, we need only tap into these inner resources. However, we can also
turn against our instincts and act in artificial ways. Unfortunately, this is what humanity
has done. We no longer respond to the inner promptings by which our ancestors led simple
lives that kept them close to nature. Our civilization views these instincts with contempt,
calling them primitive and unrefined, and replaces them with desires that make us
anxiously self-conscious, competitive, and discontent. Our values are the artefacts of
socialization. We must have the latest fashions in clothing and housing, and more than
others have of everything others crave. We want to rise in the social hierarchy, attain
positions that carry high status, precisely because others covet those positions. Civilized
people can no longer tell what they need, because their lives are staked on satisfying whole
artificial desires: They want what they do because others want those things. Humanity has
cut itself off from its own roots.
The problem cannot be solved by developing theories about morality and the good life.
Taoists are sceptical about creating accounts of the dao to steer ourselves by. We cannot
make ourselves better through philosophizing or reading books about ethics. The very first
passage of the Daodejing warns us that “the way that can be spoken is not the way.”
Moreover, the text offers advice that sounds paradoxical: it tells us that the dao never acts,
yet nothing is left undone, implying that we are to behave in a similar way. (Daodejing,
chapter 37, trans. P.J. Ivanhoe, in Living Well, ed. Steven Luper, Forth Worth: Harcourt
Brace, 2000.) But isn’t it impossible to leave nothing undone unless we act? Not if we
understand “acting” as calculated behaviour prompted by a theory about the dao. All such
theories are bound to be misleading and simplistic, according to Taoists, and cannot
substitute for our own instincts. To be in accord with the dao is to live spontaneously,
responding to inner promptings that know how to ensure that nothing is left undone. The
Daodejing contrasts sages, who try to be virtuous (and to make others virtuous) by
devising recipes for living well. Among those criticised are advocates of the Confucian
idea that living well involves following the rites. (See: Ibid. chapter 38, p.89.)
Modern readers will be sceptical about the Taoist’s claim that we cannot improve on
nature. However, some of us will respond favourably to elements of the Taoists vision.
Perhaps we would be better off if we thought of ourselves as part of the natural order,
rather than viewing it merely as a resource to exploit. If we recognized the beauty and
mystery of our world and of the ways it has ordered itself, perhaps we would attempt to
live in harmony with that order – for example, by limiting the human population,
eliminating pollution, and conserving areas of the world containing a rich diversity of
living things. However, Taoism has an element of anti-intellectualism that makes its
proponents resist explicitly spelling out the nature-based account of the good life. For that,
as we have seen, we have to turn to Aristotle’s virtue ethics.
Evaluating Virtue Ethics
There are several advantages to the Aristotelian version of virtue ethics: it strives to create
the good human being, not merely good acts or rules; it attempts to unify reason and
emotion; it emphasizes moderation, a quality praised by many ethicists.
However, it also has the disadvantage of being based upon a number of assumptions that
are difficult to prove. These unproven assumptions are: human beings having an end or
purpose and what that purpose is; that morality is innate; and what virtue, the virtues, and
the virtuous human beings are. In fact, we seem to hold a wide variety of opinions on
31

32. which virtues are really virtues, and who is the ideal virtuous human being, and how are
we to determine or prove this.
Questions
1. Which do you think is better, an ethics of doing or of being? Explain.
2. What is the basic difference between a virtue ethics and other types of ethics we have
studied?
3. In what sense are virtues habits?
4. If there are such things as virtues or good habits, can you give a list of them? Try.
Discuss your selection or your inability to give such a list
32

33. LECTURES 10 and 11: The main ethical theories
(h) The social contract theory of morals
The social contract theory of morals is the idea that morality consists in the set of rules
governing how people are to treat one another that rational people will agree to accept, for
their mutual benefit, on the condition that others follow those rules as well. In this way,
justice and morality itself is determined by rules we would agree to (if everyone else did)
on the grounds that they are collectively advantageous To be just people must abide by
those rules. Contractarianism requires that we sometimes avoid acts that would make us
best off – namely, when the acts would violate the rules. For example, it requires that we
refrain from stealing, even on occasions when we stand to gain a great deal and some
feature of our situation ensures our anonymity. Interest-based contractarianism is a kind of
rule egoism since it says that rightful conduct is a matter of conforming to collectively
advantageous rules.
The historical background
While the basic idea of the social contract is implicit in the teachings of Socrates and other
ancient thinkers, it came to the forefront in the seventeenth century as one feature of the
long and complex intellectual journey characterizing the rise of what is commonly called
“modernity”, and which was to see its culmination in the wider context of the
Enlightenment. For the purposes of an introductory course to Ethics, I can only deal with
the complexity of the history of the ideas involved cursorily and summarily.
The social contract theory emerged in the context of the evolution/dissolution of the pre-
modern and medieval thought. In the teleological and religious systems which dominated
pre-Enlightenment thought, moral obligations were thought to derive from a larger natural
or divine order. Each person has a naturally or divinely-ordained place or function in the
world from which their duties follow. As modernity in general and particularly the
Enlightenment called into question the various elements of these older ethical systems,
philosophers turned to social contract theories to fill the vacuum.
When Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) wrote his famous book Leviathan (1651), there was a
growing scepticism about the ancient view that people naturally seek goods that bring them
into harmony with others in a mutually supportive way. Already, according to the Italian
diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) and the Dutch Lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645), by nature people pursue interests that tend to divide them, making them competitive
and contentious. In The Prince (1513) Machiavelli suggested that people are interested in
safety, in matters of relative standing, such as honour and glory, and in the means to these
ends-power. But the more people emphasize the importance of power over others, the more
competitive they become. As Machiavelli wrote, “whoever is responsible for another’s
becoming powerful ruins himself.” (Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. George Bull,
Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1961, chapter I, section III.) A century later the
Dutch Lawyer Hugo Grotius adopted a similar view. In The Law of War and Peace (1625),
Grotius suggested that individuals (and states) are preoccupied with their own preservation
and relative standing and the things that help them advance these ends, and hence they are
prone to clash with each other, even to the point of warfare. Given the hostility of our
fellow human beings, Grotius thought we must look after ourselves; to do so, it is best to
establish a framework of rights, which tell people what they may do without interference
from others, and duties, which tell them how they must accommodate others. In particular,
people have a duty to preserve themselves, and a right to acquire and keep things that are
“necessary and useful to life.” (Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, trans. A.C.
33

34. Campbell as The Rights of War and Peace, New York: M. Walter Dunne, no date, chapter
II, section I.)
Following in the wake of Machiavelli and Grotius, Hobbes argued that we need rules and a
political authority to enforce them if we are ever going to get along with one another.
Without these, we would be in a “state of nature,” which is Hobbes’s term for a state of
affairs without government or political arrangements of any sort. What Hobbes argues is
that we are able to pursue our true self-interest only in a society ruled by law, a
society resulting from a kind of social compact among members of a society in which
they individually agree to five up certain rights in exchange for protections resulting
from common laws accepted by all. How do we know what these laws are? Hobbes says
that we have the natural ability to discover such laws through the use of reason. He calls
these natural laws, and among them are the right of entering into contracts, the duty
of keeping promises, and the recognition that disputes should be submitted to
arbitrators and that punishments should be aimed at changing behaviour, not
exacting revenge.
Hobbes is one of a group of philosophers who are important for their contribution to the
modern ideas of the state. Against the prevailing view that kings ruled by divine right.
Hobbes argued that states come into being as a result of a common decision by the
governed to surrender some of their power to a sovereign in order to provide greater peace
and security to all. Known as the social contract theory, this view of the state was further
developed by such subsequent philosophers as John Locke and J.J. Rousseau. In the
process of arguing for his point of view, Hobbes describes what a society without laws,
rules, and standards of morality would be like. He concludes that only within a framework
of moral laws are individuals truly able to pursue their own self-interest.
John Locke (1632-1704) starts out as Hobbes did by describing the hypothetical “state of
nature” in which people exist prior to forming a government. However, unlike Hobbes,
Locke had an optimistic view of human nature and believed that people were basically
reasonable. Locke believed that moral law was instituted by God. Furthermore, he argued
that natural law guaranteed us basic, natural, inherent rights by virtue of the fact that
we are human. He believed that the conduct of individuals and society was governed by a
universal, objective, moral law, not a law based on human conventions. Accordingly, a
right is a justified claim to something, usually implying that others have certain duties
with respect to the possessor of the right. For example, if you have the right to free
speech, then others (including the government) have an obligation not to interfere with
your ability to express your opinions (as long as doing so does not violate someone else
rights).
For Locke, life without government is an “ill condition” and full of “inconveniences.”
People need: (1) an established and unbiased interpretation of the natural moral law
embedded in nature; (2) an impartial judge to apply the established law to settle disputes
and conflict of interest; (3) a power to support the rights of those who are victims of
injustice and to enforce the law. However, whereas Hobbes thought that people would set
up an absolute government as an act of desperation, for Locke because government is a
convenience, not a necessity, it follows that we can dictate the term of the bargain. Instead
of surrendering our rights and power to the government as Hobbes proposed, we delegate
it for the mutual preservation of our lives, property and liberties. The government is our
creation; therefore, it is our servant, not an absolute power over us. In this theory (still
influenced by Hobbes) are the foundations of what has come to be called “classical
liberalism,” the notion that the government should only have as much power as is
necessary to do for us what we cannot (or cannot conveniently and efficiently) do for
ourselves.
34

35. Current social contract theories of ethics
While many people do not accept Hobbes’s defence of absolute sovereignty, other
elements of his system continue to intrigue theorists today. Indeed, contract theory has
experienced a remarkable rebirth in recent years. This contemporary contract theory is
more ambitious than its historical predecessor, for it hopes provide a contractual
justification not only for political obligation, but also for the personal obligations that
classical contract theorist simply took for granted. It might seem that a contractual defence
of personal obligation is even less plausible than one of political obligation. A contractual
defence of political obligation faces many practical problem: the very considerations which
put people in doubt about the naturalness of their political obligation to obey rulers soon
put them in doubt about the naturalness of their personal obligation to keep promises. So
there is a fundamental logical problem in grounding personal obligations in contract. It
makes no sense to say that people could sign a contract agreeing to keep contractual
premises. However, the emphasis on promising is not what contemporary contract theorists
draw from the earlier tradition. They draw on two other elements: (1) obligations are
conventional, not divine, arising from the interactions of people who naturally equal; (2)
conventional obligations secure important human interests. Combining these two elements,
it is possible to (re)-interpret social contracts not primarily as promises, but as devices for
identifying social conventions that promote the interests of the members of society.
There are two basic forms of contemporary social contract theory. While both accept the
classic contract view that people are by nature equals, they have different conceptions of
our natural equality. One approach stresses a natural equality of physical power, which
makes it mutually advantageous for people to accept conventions that recognize ad protect
each other’s interests and possessions. The other approach stresses a natural equality of
moral status, which makes each person’s interests a matter of common and impartial
concern. This impartial concern in expressed in agreements that recognize each person’s
interests and moral status. I will call proponents of the mutual advantage theory “interest-
based or Hobbesian contractarians”, and proponents of the impartial theory “Kantian
contractarians”, for Hobbes inspired the former and Locke and Kant the latter.
Hobbesian contractarianism: morality as mutual advantage
Contemporary neo-Hobbesians, such as David Gauthier, think that Hobbes’s idea of
beneficial rules is useful even if we reject his defence of absolute sovereignty. Gauthier in
his 1986 book Morals by Agreement argues that the moral practices which interest
based-contractualism can justify will not be identical with, but will have much in
common with, what is thought of as commonsense morality such as honesty and
fairness, assisting one’s fellows, and keeping one’s promises. Gauthier’s contracting
individuals are utility-maximizers not in the sense that they are self-interested or egoistic in
the normal sense, but simply that it rational for them to aim at maximizing the satisfaction
of their interests, whatever those interests may happen to be. That is to say, they are to be
thought of as choosing principles with a full knowledge of their real interests and of the
actual consequences of their accepting the constraints of morality. An important part of
Gauthier’s theory is taken up with the problem of compliance to this constraints.
Gauthier distinguishes between a “straightforward maximizer” and a “constrained
maximizer”. Unlike the straightforward maximizer, the constrained maximizer will accept
the constraints which morality imposes on his pursuit of his own interests, in order to reap
the benefits of a system of mutual cooperation. He will therefore forgo the advantages
which the straightforward maximizer would gain from being prepared to cheat or steal or
break promises when it suits him to do so, but he will do so because it is in her interests to
participate in the practice of morality and accept its constraints, provided others do
35

36. likewise. Therefore, Gauthier himself thinks that the compliance problem is solved quite
easily: People who violate the rules are soon known as cheaters and are avoided by
others. Hence it rational to develop a strong habit of abiding by the rules. In this way,
his answer to the problem of compliance is that the rationality of constrained maximization
can be demonstrated by assessing it not as a policy but as a disposition. We have to ask not
just what choices it is rational for a utility-maximizer to make in particular cases, but also
what kinds of dispositions it is rational to cultivate – that is, what kind of person it is in
one’s interests to be. The answer, according to Gauthier, is that it is in one’s interests to be
a constrained maximizer. Thus, if you have the disposition of a constrained maximizer, you
will reap the benefits of co-operation. If you are a straightforward maximizer you will not
obtain those benefits, because people will not trust you.
In this way, even though David Gauthier wishes to reconcile ethical egoism with interest-
based contractarianism, the latter can be true even if the reconciliation is impossible. It
might be helpful to draw an analogy. Ethical egoism is to interest-based contractarianism
as act utilitarianism is to rule utilitarianism: Ethical egoism can be called act egoism since
it holds that the correct act to perform is the one that is (maximally) in one’s interest.
Interest-based contractiarianism is a kind of rule egoism since it says that rightful conduct
is a matter of conforming to collectively advantageous rules. Rule egoism no more implies
act egoism than rule utilitarianism implies act utilitarianism.
The response of sceptics from Plato’s Thrasymachus onwards has been: why not pretend?
Can we not conceal our real intentions, obtain all the advantages of having a reputation for
being a fair and honest co-operator, and combine these with the advantages of deception
when it will succeed? Gauthier deals with this response by introducing another important
concept, that of “translucency”. Human beings are not necessarily transparent. They can
sometimes get away with wrongdoing and not be found out. They are nevertheless
translucent – “their disposition to co-operate or not may be ascertained by others, not with
certainty, but as more than mere guesswork”. by others, not with certainty, but as more
than mere guesswork”. You may be able to cheat on others and escape detection on
particular occasions, but others will have a pretty good idea of the kind of person you are,
they will know that you are in general disposed to do such things, and so they will not
admit you to co-operative arrangements and agreements. You will be the loser.
However, this argument remains open to objections in that it oversimplifies the empirical
facts. There are ways in which people can take advantage of others, where the consequent
risk of being exclude from mutually beneficial co-operative arrangements is negligible. To
take just one simple and obvious example, people cheat on their income tax and, especially
it they can afford to pay a good accountant, they can be virtually assured of getting away
with it. Most people dispositions are neither uniformly co-operative nor uniformly non-
cooperative. They are, at a general level, liable to feel genuinely constrained by at least
some of the requirements of co-operation, but also liable to yield to at least some kinds of
temptations to cheat. It is not obvious how one can give them reasons for doing otherwise,
so long as the appeal to rationality is equated with the appeal to individual utility-
maximization. Gauthier himself appears to recognize the inadequacy of this individualistic
picture. He seems to acknowledge that “our social capacity to find value in participating is
one of the main sources of enrichment in human life, making possible as it does the
complementary realization of our varied human powers and capacities. He acknowledges
that those who initially accept the constraints of morality as a means to individual utility-
maximization may then come to value participation in co-operative and shared activities,
and the morality that goes with this social co-operation, as values in their own right, not
just as unwelcome constraints. In this way, morality may come to engage people’s
affections and not just their reason. But he still thinks that we first have to show why
36

37. morality is rational, by appealing to individual utility-maximization, before we can show
how our affections build on this rational foundation.
Kantian contractarianism: Rawls’ justice as fairness
The best-known exponent of Kantian contractarianism is the American philosopher John
Rawls. On his view, expressed in the famous book A Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971) people are “self-originating sources of valid claims” – that is
people matter, from the moral point of view, not because they cannot harm or benefit
others (as in Hobbesian theory), but because they are “end in themselves”. Implicit in this
Kantian phrase is a concept of moral equality – each person matters and matters equally,
each person is entitled to equal consideration. This notion of equal consideration gives rise
at the social level to a “natural duty of justice”. We have a duty to promote just institutions,
a duty not derived from consent or mutual advantage, but simply owed to persons as such.
Rawl’s theory is based on a thought experiment in which people (rational
contractors) separated by a “veil of ignorance” from knowledge of their particular lot
in life (wealth, social status, abilities, etc.) reflect upon the rules for social life that
they would make in advance to bind themselves, whatever their later position in life.
Like Locke, Rawls argues that they would commit themselves to basic conditions of
liberty and a qualified equality.
However, in his more recent work Rawls has suggested that his principles of justice are
simply the principles appropriate to modern liberal democratic societies. In saying this, he
abandons any strong ethical claim to be made on their behalf. In other words, Rawls
has increasingly presented his contractarian approach as an expository strategy rather than
a justificatory one. It does not provide an independent argument for why we should adopt
that conception of justice, but merely helps to bring out the nature of that conception.
Rawls is, in effect, saying: if you think of these as the conditions in which people could
agree to such principles, you can see the sense in which they can be described as “fair”
principles. This is all very well, but it leaves us without any independent justification for
the theory, any reason why we should adopt and abide by these “fair” principles.
Evaluation
Once it is disassociated from ethical (act) egoism, much can be said in favour of interest-
based contractarianism. To its credit is the fact that it requires a powerful form of
reciprocity: Rules that are in every single person’s interest will not require anyone to be
sacrificed for the sake of others. Acts of self-sacrifice will be entirely optional and
considered supererogatory (i.e., commendable but not required). Arguably, this feature
might give it an edge over utilitarianism. Interest-based contractualism has two other
virtues as well. It provides a clear motivation for morality: It is in our interest to be moral.
And it gives a clear picture of the objective basis for morality: Roughly speaking, a set of
rules is correct in virtue of being collectively advantageous.
Nonetheless, substantial difficulty confronts any form of contractualism that is treated as a
theory of morality generally, rather than as a theory of justice. The problem is that mentally
incompetent human beings and animals are not reasonable; hence they cannot take any part
in any agreement, even a hypothetical one, whereby principles of conduct are selected.
And there is no guarantee that competent people who are choosing rules to govern their
mutual interactions will worry about the interest of the incompetent. Yet the incompetent,
too, have rights. However, it may be possible to deal with this objection by stipulating that
in choosing rules of conduct, competent people deliberate on behalf of the incompetent and
ensure that their interests are accommodated in reasonable ways.
37

38. Questions
1. Do people have the right to self-determination? May our liberty to shape our lives
(insofar as doing so has no significant impact on others) be restricted? If so, when? What if
people harm themselves – say, by taking debilitating drugs or smoking or committing
suicide?
2. Suppose that John is the most informed expert about what makes life go best, and John
wants to improve everybody’s lives by telling everyone what to do. Must people obey
John? Why or why not?
3. According to Hobbes, it is in our rational self-interest to support or, along with others, to
set up a sovereign who has absolute power over us. For the absolute sovereign enforces
arrangements that are in the collective interest. Was Hobbes correct? What would you say?
4. Can morality be thought of as an implicit agreement we make with our fellow human
beings in order to gain the benefits of a co-operative social life?
5. Why not pretend? Can we not conceal our real intentions, obtain all the advantages of
having a reputation for being a fair and honest co-operator, and combine these with the
advantages of deception when it will succeed? What is your opinion? Explain.
6. While Locke defended the claim that people should be free, he, like Grotius, said that we
have a duty to preserve ourselves. Are these two claims consistent? If we have the right to
self-determination, isn’t it permissible to let ourselves die?
7. Is justice basically fairness? Are conditions fair when they are what we would choose if
we were completely rational and objective and were freed from our personal biases? What
do you think?
38

39. III Feminist ethics is a new development in recent decades that questions some of the
fundamental assumptions of traditional ethical theory. It is the attempt to correct the male
biases in traditional ethical theory by emphasizing relationships over abstract principles
and compassion over analytical reason. For this reason, it is often also called the ethics of
care. But feminist theory is still developing and full of multiple perspectives, so it is hard
to summarize it in a brief statement. For example, some feminists agree with ethical
relativism, while others are more aligned with some version of ethical objectivism.
However, in spite of their differences, most feminists agree that there are distinctively male
and female ways of viewing a situation and that these views will make a decided difference
to our ethical perspective. Feminists complain that traditional ethical theories are one-sided
because they typically represent the style, aims, concerns, questions, and theoretical
assumptions of men. Some psychological studies, for example, seem to suggest that males
tend toward a judicial model of ethical decision making where abstract principles and
reason predominate. Females, however, are more concerned with relationships and the
emotional textures of a situation. These differences play out in completely different
theoretical approaches to ethical issues. Whereas some feminists want to replace the male-
biased approaches with new perspectives, others simply want to supplement the
historically one-sided approaches with a more balanced perspective. While feminist
theorists bring a fresh new perspective to ethics, they often work within and use the
resources of the other theories as much as they critique the limitations of those theories. So
the ethics of feminist writers is more characterized by the way they bring gender issues to
bear on the traditional questions and theories in moral philosophy than by a specific
doctrine.
Questions
1. If you were a mother (perhaps you are), do you think the experience of motherhood
would affect the way you viewed ethics? If so, how?
2. From your own experience, do you think there are differences between the ways that
men and women approach ethical issues? What would be the implications of differences
that are rooted in our biological natures? What would be the implications of differences
that are caused by our social conditioning?
39

40. LECTURE 12: Review and discussion of the main ethical theories
On site lesson
40