This document summarizes key points from a lecture on technology strategy. It discusses how technology strategy influences corporate strategy by addressing what business a company should be in. It notes that technology strategy is highly dynamic in new industries and involves forecasting new technologies and deciding how and when to respond. Technology strategists must balance the risks of being first to market with waiting to respond to developments. Complementary assets, timing, and positions as first-movers or laggards also impact technology strategy choices. Strategies should consider trends like demographics, networks, and enabling technologies. Effective strategies focus offerings for early adopters separately from pragmatists and cross the chasm between them.
2. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Technology strategy at work
Influences corporate strategy because it addresses the question:
What business should we be in?
In a new industry, technology strategy is highly dynamic and there is
always a risk
Technology strategists must attempt to forecast new technologies
and choose how and when to respond to unpredictable
developments.
Nathan Rosenberg
3. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Technology strategy at work
Influences corporate strategy because it addresses the question:
What business should we be in?
In a new industry, technology strategy is highly dynamic and there is
always a risk
Technology strategists must attempt to forecast new technologies
and choose how and when to respond to unpredictable
developments.
Nathan Rosenberg
4. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Technology strategy at work
Influences corporate strategy because it addresses the question:
What business should we be in?
In a new industry, technology strategy is highly dynamic and there is
always a risk
Technology strategists must attempt to forecast new technologies
and choose how and when to respond to unpredictable
developments.
Nathan Rosenberg
5. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Technology strategy at work
Influences corporate strategy because it addresses the question:
What business should we be in?
In a new industry, technology strategy is highly dynamic and there is
always a risk
Technology strategists must attempt to forecast new technologies
and choose how and when to respond to unpredictable
developments.
Nathan Rosenberg
6. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Technology strategy at work
Influences corporate strategy because it addresses the question:
What business should we be in?
In a new industry, technology strategy is highly dynamic and there is
always a risk
Technology strategists must attempt to forecast new technologies
and choose how and when to respond to unpredictable
developments.
Nathan Rosenberg
8. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Complementary assets
the value of a
telecommunications
network is
proportional to the
square of the
number of
connected users of
the system (n2).
9. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Complementary assets
To gain access to valuable complementary
assets, a firm with a new technology may
need to create or cooperate with an
ecosystem—a set of mutually dependent
suppliers, customers, and complementors
that work together to create value.
PRS-T3 de Sony | PRS-T3
Amazon Kindle
10. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Timing
Economies of scale and network effects are two sources of
increasing returns , and both can create first-mover advantages.
When combined with switching costs—the cost to switch from one
product to another—network effects can make customers reluctant to
adopt a new technology until a standard product design emerges.
Technology strategy involves (also) choosing how to fight and win a
standards war.
14. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Influenced by Megatrends
• Demographics.
• The emergence of the individual
• Networked economy
• Public debt
• Changing economic power
• Climate change
• Tension over resources
• Urbanization
• Enabling technology Fuente: Future State 2030: The global megatrends shaping
governments. KPMG International. November 2013
16. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
So… what to do?, Rule 2
Early adopters are quick to see the potential benefits of a new
technology. The early majority, by contrast, “are content to see how
other people are making out before they buy in themselves.”
The key is “making the transition from an early market dominated by
a few visionary customers to a mainstream market dominated by a
large block of customers who are predominantly pragmatists in
orientation”.
The product offering must evolve to meet the differing needs of
those market segments.
Crossing the Chasm, Geoffrey Moore
17. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
2 Rules one target
The fundamental principles of competitive strategy are the same:
The value captured depends on the value you create, your
competitive advantage, and your bargaining power.
18. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
One target, one strategy
An innovator is a firm that introduces a new
technology into a market.
An innovator’s technology strategy is influenced
by two types of change: the evolution of the
technology’s performance and the development
of the market for the new technology.
19. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Technology Life-cycle
S-curve from Richard Foster
Dissemination of technology
20. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Technology Life-cycle
S-curve from Richard Foster
Dissemination of technology
26. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
The Amazon Case
At the time, I made the observation that books was one of the few—maybe the
only—category where computers have already been very helpful in selling the
product. For a long time, bookstores have had information desks, where you walk
up and somebody uses a computer to help you find what you’re looking for. . . .
You could see how with a large number of products, the sorting and searching
could help. But that wasn’t the main thing. The main thing was that you could
build a bookstore on the Web that simply couldn’t exist any other way. The
Web is an infant technology. If you want to be successful in the shortto- medium
term, you can only do things that offer incredibly strong value propositions to
customers relative to the value of doing things in more traditional ways. This
basically means that, right now, you should do on-line only what you cannot do
any other way. The largest physical bookstores only carry 170,000 titles. There
are only three that big. We have 1.1 million titles in our catalogue. And if we
printed our catalogue, it would be the size of seven New York City phone
books.
27. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Why would Google, Apple, or IBM
ever buy a software company?
Give some examples of acquisitions of software companies carried
out by these companies and discussed in class
28. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Essentially an idea
Joshua Gans and Scott Stern;
A choice between cooperation and competition, and it depends on
two factors:
• the robustness of the “market for ideas” and
• the ownership of valuable or specialized complementary assets
29. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Market for ideas
When works well, eg there are opportunities for licensing, a joint
venture, a strategic alliance, or even an acquisition that allows the
innovator to realize a fair price
—an innovator can commercialize a new technology through
cooperative efforts without having to enter a product market.
30. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Ownership of valuable or
specialized complementary assets
An innovator that does not own those assets—and wants to avoid
costly and risky investments in them—has an incentive to cooperate
with an incumbent that does. For the incumbent, cooperation
preserves market power and avoids potential competition in the
product market
.
32. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Reputation-based ideas tranning
the incumbent’s good reputation allows
to participate in the market for Innovators
develop new technologies that enhance the
value of the incumbent’s assets.
Incumbents
provide
incentive for
the innovator to
cooperate
33. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Attacker’s advantage
If incumbent can exploit the idea, the
innovator has an incentive to enter the
market and attack the incumbent before
the incumbent can copy the idea.
no incentive for
the innovator to
cooperate
34. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Ideas factories
innovator has a technology that the
incumbent cannot exploit on its own, and
the incumbent has complementary assets
that enhance the value of the technology.
The two
parties have
every incentive
to cooperate.
35. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Greenfield competition
innovator has a technology idea that is
difficult for an incumbent to develop, and
the incumbent has no valuable
complementary assets.
there is no
incentive for
the innovator
and the
incumbent to
cooperate.
36. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Thoughts about
Gans and Stern Matrix
“Skate to Where the Money Will Be,” Clayton M. Christensen, Michael E.Raynor, and
Matthew C. Verlinden
37. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Leaders and followers
Should a firm seek to be the first to introduce a new technology to a
market, or is it wiser to wait?
“There is a big difference between being first to market and first to
the mass market”
Fast Second. Constantinos Markides and Paul Geroski
38. Dr. Jorge Ramírez Medina
Both Required to innovate
“A key characteristic of a disruptive technology is that it changes the
basis of competition.”
… offer inferior performance, at least initially,
By focusing on innovating with a technology that its customers want,
the firm may fail to invest in a disruptive technology that may
eventually dominate its market. “Blindly following the maxim that
good managers should keep close to their customers can sometimes
be a fatal mistake.”
Qué es estrategia? (What Is Strategy? By: Porter, Michael E )
Proceso de seleccionar opciones entre diferentes alternativas que compiten entre ellas como la mejor opción. Es entonces un sistema de actividades que crea un valor único y lo captura. Es planeado, perseguido y realizado.
Un conjunto de planes, realizados para el logro superior-a largo plazo-de la rentabilidad de los capitales invertidos en una empresa (es decir, un plan para obtener una ganancia en un entorno competitivo).
Technology strategy, then, differs from “conventional” competitive strategy because it requires strategists to understand the competitive implications of a new technology.
Bezos, for example, considered music and software retailing and other industries before deciding to enter the book-retailing industry
When competing in a new industry, however, the strategic challenges multiply.
Initially, positioning may be impossible because there may be no suppliers, no customers, and no clearly identified competitors.
It may not be apparent who the potential entrants are or which products customers consider to be necessary complements and acceptable substitutes.
In a new industry, technology strategy is highly dynamic; it’s about moving quickly to create value, adapt to others, deal with uncertainty, influence the evolution of the industry, and shape the competitive landscape.
When strategizing using existing technologies, firms usually choose among well-understood customer segments and proven products and services.
But technology strategy must deal with the risk and uncertainty that are inescapable aspects of new technology.
There is always a risk that a new technology will not work. And there can be uncertainty about how to create value, or for whom.
As Nathan Rosenberg observes, there has been “a remarkable inability to foresee the uses to which new technologies would soon be put.” One of the problems, he suggests, is that “new technologies typically come into the world in a primitive condition.”
When the first electronic digital computer “contained no fewer than 18,000 vacuum tubes, was notoriously unreliable, measured more than 100 feet long, and
filled a huge room,” it was difficult to envisage a time when people would be carrying computers in their pockets.
Reflexión después del vídeo
New technologies can also require long gestation periods and complementary inventions. As Rosenberg puts it, “The impact of invention A will often depend on invention B—which may not yet exist.”
Ley de Moore
La Ley de Moore, aproximadamente cada dos años de duplicará el número de transistores en un circuito integrado,
Si nos mantenemos fiel al chip de 7 nanómetros que está desarrollando IBM, la Ley de Moore no tendría nada que temer y acabaría cumpliéndose por un periodo más
la siguiente generación de procesadores, que tienen el nombre código de "Kaby Lake", se construirán con el proceso de 14 nanómetros,
Brian Krzanich, CEO de Intel, anunció que los primeros productos con esa tecnología, llamados "Cannonlake" estarán disponibles hasta el 2017
n el 2007 el mismo Moore dijo que su ley tendrá una fecha de caducidad:
"Mi ley dejará de cumplirse dentro de 10 o 15 años."
Hagan cuentas, y verán que los números empiezan a cuadrar. Pero, ¿qué pasará cuando la Ley de Moore caduque? En palabras de sus creador: otra tecnología vendrá a suplir a la actual.
Ley del almacenamiento digital
Implicaciones en economía
Economías de Escala -- Anotar
Robert Metcalfe. Formado en Harvard y el MIT,
le debemos estándares populares como el Ethernet
A raíz de la invención de Ethernet dentro del centro de investigación de Xerox, fundó en 1979 la compañía 3Com.
Pese a que muchos años después abandonó la Junta Directiva de la compañía debido a desavenencias con el resto de accionistas, siempre siguió vinculado al mundo de la tecnología.
Enunciada por primera vez en 1976, explicó la ley de Metcalfe en el contexto de las redes de Ethernet.
que explica el valor potencial de su tecnología,
¿Acaso alguien duda que el valor real de WhatsApp se encuentra en su tecnología (fácilmente duplicable y mejorable) o en los millones de usuarios que tiene detrás?
Network effects -- Anotar
Network effects mean that the value a customer can get from choosing a technology depends on how many others make the same choice.
La palabra clave ECOSISTEMA
En 1995, Robert vaticinó que Internet se desmoronaría por el gran número de usuarios que tendría.
Como todos sabemos, esto no fue así y en un alarde de humildad, se comió (literalmente) sus palabras en 1997.
Many new technologies cannot reach their potential—or create value for customers—on their own. To do so, they require complementary assets.
For Sony, a lack of complementary assets (a wide range of e-books) explains why the Sony Reader was eclipsed by the Amazon Kindle, introduced a year later, even though the Kindle “was larger than the Reader, weighed more, and had an inferior screen . . . [and] was a very closed platform that was able to load content only from Amazon.
Most firms exist in an ecosystem. For example, smartphone manufacturers are part of an ecosystem that includes mobile application developers and wireless carriers, both of whom own complementary assets that are essential to delivering customer value.
This can lead to a standards war, in which firms with different product designs compete in a winner-takes-all battle to become the standard. In such situations,
Betamax v VHS
DVD v BlueRay
Explorer vs Netscape
Comentar El caso de Ricardo Guzmán & González Camarena TV en México
Standards are like network effects: the more people that adopt a standard, the more valuable it becomes
Every technology is born, grows, matures, and dies when a new technology supersedes it.
Bulky cathode ray tube (CRT) display technology has been replaced by flat-screen liquid crystal displays (LCDs) and light-emitting diodes (LEDs).
Typewriters have largely been superseded by computer printers and word-processing software.
Incremental technology change, which usually yields small improvements, may have little or no strategic impact.
In the automobile industry, for example, cars become a little safer, more reliable, and more fuel-efficient each year, without substantially affecting the
competitive positions of the major manufacturers.
Technology discontinuities, on the other hand, can dramatically affect a firm’s competitive position. Google’s search technology, for example, represented a performance improvement large enough to enable the firm to displace incumbents and dominate the market. The widespread adoption of digital photography destroyed Kodak’s film business and drove the company into bankruptcy. But as we will see later, some firms can survive even major technology changes.
http://gizmodo.com/5879083/apple-sells-more-phones-in-a-day-than-people-make-babies
La comunicación móvil es un fenómeno disruptivo a escala
mundial.
Hace sólo tres años, el tráfico móvil representaron el 1% del tráfico de Internet.
Hoy en día es el 13%, y para 2020 se espera que alcance el 33%
Even before figuring out how to make money from a new technology, an innovator must address two key questions:
Does the new technology work?
and Who will adopt it?
Companies looks for
to meet the needs of a customer segment better or more cheaply than other players,
Use technology!!
In established industries, in which all competitors use the same proven technology, there is little technology risk and the market is understood.
The innovator’s technology strategy varies with;
the stage in the technology’s evolution and
the stage in the market’s development.
Moore refers to the gap between the needs of the early adopters and the needs of the majority as a chasm.
“Crossing this chasm,” he writes, “must be the primary focus of any long-term high-tech marketing plan.”
Whether a company is competing using a new technology or an existing one,
The difference with a new technology is that all of these are continually changing as the market grows and the technology develops.
If the new technology produces a competitive advantage, competitors will rush to exploit it.
, the challenge for the technology innovator is to capture a share of that value
***********************************NO************************************************
A successful strategy for a technology innovator will include many of the following elements:
● Seek to dominate a market segment.
● Sustain competitive advantage by improving the value proposition.
● Be prepared to adjust your offering and cannibalize your business.
● Preempt competitors.
● Establish and defend intellectual property.
● Establish a position of power in an ecosystem.
● Exploit switching costs and increasing returns to scale.
An innovator may be an existing firm or a startup, and it may target an existing market or an entirely new one.
Although the convention is confusing, both technology and market change are characterized by S-shaped curves.
Technology transforms industries
The position of an industry on this curve depends on the degree to which companies and customers within it have embraced a technology
While conceptual, the curve shows how laggard incumbents have already disappeared from industries in which digital disruption began early, such as traditional media.
In industries where digitization is less pervasive but more a gathering force, there is still time for incumbents to adapt and survive.
Moore refers to the gap between the needs of the early adopters and the needs of the majority as a chasm. “Crossing this chasm,”
Richard Foster describes the evolution of the performance of a technology using an S-curve, as shown in Figure 1. In the beginning, performance improves slowly.
Then, as problems are solved, performance improves rapidly. Finally, the technology reaches its performance limit, and additional expenditure to improve it is unproductive
Most markets experience technology transitions, as shown in Figure 4.
While one technology is in wide use, the next new technology is in development. A technology transition occurs when the performance of the new technology
surpasses the old one. In the lighting industry,
for example, the energy efficiency of incandescent bulbs was surpassed by compact fluorescent tubes, which were in turn overtaken by LED bulbs.
“Crossing this chasm,” he writes, “must be the primary focus of any long-term high-tech marketing plan.”
Not easy….
Clayton Christensen cites the example of 3.5-inch disk drive manufacturers, which targeted the new portable computer market rather than the large and well-established desktop computer market.
Netscape, the producer of the first widely used Web browser, chose instead to challenge Microsoft openly with a potential replacement for applications software (Web apps), eliciting a powerful competitive response. Michael Cusumano and David Yoffie, arguing that this may not have been the wisest strategy, offer this memorable advice:
“Don’t moon the giant.”
Identifying the customers
While established industries already have customers, entirely new offerings may not. Innovators may need to produce—a customer.
In choosing which industry to enter, Bezos considered the size of the market and the power of suppliers.
In the music industry, six major companies owned most of the big labels, which Bezos saw as a concentration of power that could easily freeze out an upstart. This was much less of a risk in the book industry, given that there were over 20,000 publishers in the United States alone.
The competition was fragmented, too: Barnes and Noble and Borders, the two largest players in the United States, accounted for less than 25% of sales, which meant that a new entrant would be unlikely to encounter a coordinated response from competitors.
He believed that online retailing represented a significant opportunity, but it was important to target the market where this new technology provided the greatest competitive advantage.
Because online retailing necessitated shipping products to customers, items needed to be physically small and have a high ratio of value to weight to make shipping economical. And because customers could not inspect the goods, there had to be no doubt about their quality. The goods had to be something that the relatively affluent and well-educated early users of the Web would want. Bezos developed a list of over 20 categories of products that he thought could be sold successfully online, including software, music (sold at the time in compact disc form), and
books. As he explained, books were a particularly good match for online retailing:
An idea for a new software product is relatively easy to imitate.
All these firms have deep software expertise and valuable complementary assets.
Once they hear of a new idea, any of them could apply considerable resources to develop their own version of it.
The problem is that doing so eliminates the incentive to develop new technologies that might benefit the imitating firm.
In fact, it gives them an incentive to hide their ideas from such a firm and instead approach competitors that have a better reputation.
A new technology is essentially an idea.
All innovators face a fundamental strategic issue: How do I make money from this idea?
The answer to that question is a Technology strategy.
characterize the commercialization issue as.
Innovators can choose to
cooperate with another firm—usually an industry incumbent, a firm currently serving the market targeted by the innovator—
or they can choose to compete with incumbents by entering the product market.
For example, the inventor of a new drug can sell the idea to a large pharmaceutical company with the resources to gain clinical approval for it, manufacture it, and distribute it worldwide.
Several issues can interfere with the market for ideas, however.
If a new technology is easy to copy, an innovator may be unwilling to approach potential buyers for fear of imitation. Patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets offer some protection, but many can be invented around, and intellectual property protection is sometimes weak.
To cooperate with a firm, the innovator must disclose information about the idea, but doing so reduces the incentive for the potential partner to pay for it. This is known as the paradox of disclosure.
Cooperar con una empresa, el innovador debe revelar información acerca de la idea, pero al hacerlo reduce el incentivo para que el socio potencial que pagar por ello. Esto se conoce como la paradoja de la divulgación.
The innovator’s choice between cooperation and competition is also informed by the ownership of valuable complementary assets.
An innovator that does not own those assets—and wants to avoid costly and risky investments in them—has an incentive to cooperate with an incumbent that does. For the incumbent, cooperation preserves market power and avoids potential competition in the product market
For innovators that are existing firms, markets where the firm can use its complementary assets represent attractivemopportunities for the new technology. Apple, for example, leveraged its brand, software and hardware design capabilities, and product ecosystem to target the market for portable music players with the iPod.
Apple, for example, leveraged its brand, software and hardware design capabilities, and product ecosystem to target the market for portable music players with the iPod.
Where the incumbent does not control valuable complementary assets, there is no incentive for the innovator to cooperate.
A subtle interaction exists between the effectiveness of the market for ideas and the ownership of complementary assets.
Gans and Stern cite use these two dimensions—the existence of an efficient market for ideas and ownership of valuable complementary assets—to create a useful framework for choosing a technology strategy.
In this situation, for reputation-based ideas trading, which benefits both the innovator and the incumbent.
Intel, for example, rewards managers responsible for relationships with outside innovators on the basis of the growth of worldwide semiconductor sales.
By targeting industry growth rather than Intel’s bottom line, this policy signals a focus on creating a bigger pie rather than trying to grab the largest piece. Intel specifically commits to protect the
value capture of partners in its ecosystem in order to encourage their contribution to value creation.
Trading in ideas requires innovators to get the attention of potential acquirers. This may not be a problem for in-house research and development staff developing a new technology for the company’s use, but innovators in technology startups may have difficulty getting access to decision makers.
Venture capital firms can be useful intermediaries in those situations, adding credibility to the innovator’s idea.
The innovator can follow a stealth strategy—by targeting unserved markets—to avoid provoking a competitive response.
For example, in the US retail book market, incumbents Barnes and Noble and Borders had no assets that Jeff Bezos considered valuable for Amazon.
When innovators’ ideas have little intellectual property protection, their technology advantages may be fleeting.
Amazon’s idea, for example, was easy for other startups to imitate. Like any other innovator that enters a product market with an idea that is easy to imitate, Amazon had to develop a strategy to deal with emerging competitors. We discuss its strategy in the section on Growth
At the other extreme is ideas factories: innovators that produce ideas for incumbents to buy.
“The key to an effective cooperation strategy is to initiate cooperation at a point where technological uncertainty is sufficiently low but sunk investment costs have not yet become substantial.”
the competition is among the innovators, who may end up in a race for first-mover position.
For example, when Mark Zuckerberg developed Facebook’s technology, the main incumbent (Myspace) had no valuable complementary assets. Zuckerberg’s best option was to be a fast follower in the greenfield online social networking market.
Google’s developers, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, initially tried to sell their search technology to a leading Web portal for $1 million, reportedly because they felt it was taking too much time away from their PhD studies at Stanford University.
After that attempt failed, the two got some venture capital backing and chose to enter the market for online search services. Although there were other search engines and Web portals, Google was the first fast search engine
The technology worked already, so the risk was low, and the rapid growth in the number of users was a clear demonstration of market need. The number of potential users was vast. With limited time before an imitator appeared, entering the online search market made sense. The next question for Page and Brin was how to get people to pay for the service.
Despite the fact that the PC was IBM’s innovation, the microprocessor maker Intel and the operating system supplier Microsoft captured the majority of the
value.
The challenge, then, is to participate in an ecosystem while maintaining control of a scarce resource—such as a brand, a proprietary technology, or a specific and valuable asset (such as established customer relationships)—in order to capture a share of the value.
If there are many partners whose roles and capabilities are evolving, as is often the case with new technologies, it can be complicated to figure out who has the bargaining power and how that will change.
Horowitz refers to this kind of problem as “eight-dimensional chess.”
Steve Ballemer
Paul Allen
the firm that captures most of the value from a new technology is often not the firm that introduces it to the market.
Although the Apple iPhone currently captures the majority of the handset industry’s profit, for example, it was not the first smartphone—it was preceded by
the BlackBerry, which was preceded in Japan by smartphones from NTT DoCoMo. Or Cisco John Chambers
The early leaders in the US personal computer market included the Altair 8800, followed closely by the Commodore PET, the Apple II, and the
Tandy TRS-80 from Radio Shack, yet all of these were superseded by the IBM PC design, which came to dominate the
market.
Geoffrey Moore ;
but what happens if everyone makes calls using services like Skype? Should phone companies cannibalize their currently profitable business by offering VoIP? Or should they ignore it and risk seeing their profits disappear?
Such new technologies are disruptive because innovators can use them to enter underserved markets, gain experience, and move up the technology performance curve. Christensen argues that by the time the disruptive technology meets the needs of the majority of customers, the innovator has an unassailable technical lead and can displace the incumbent. Click on Video 1 to see how innovators can use disruptive technologies to challenge incumbent
Firms.
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the innovator’s dilemma
Richard Foster argued that innovators using these new technologies have an attacker’s advantage because of the
incumbents’ difficulty in diverting resources away from profitable and high-margin current technologies to lowermargin
and lower-performance new technologies. The problem is compounded by the fact that the threat may be
difficult to detect—innovators using disruptive technologies often target a niche market and so do not substantially
affect the financial performance of the incumbent.
Caso
Axtel-Alestra: le llegó la hora a Tomás Milmo
http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/blogs/historias-de-negoceos/axtel-alestra-le-llego-la-hora-a-tomas-milmo.html
Caso Alestra
Lectura el dilema del innovador
Estudiar qué es el dilema del prisionero
Leer el mapa de Borges