Each response is 250 words each Response 1: Mearsheimer’s original essay is exceptionally well laid-out and logical.  In seeking to answer the question of whether or not international institutions promote peace, he examines the three most prominent international relations theories dealing with international institutions, provides detailed explanations of the theory, how it relates to realism, and its causal logic.  He then proceeds to point out flaws in the causal logic of each of the theories and explains how that refutes or negates the theory itself.  This clear and concise format is definitely a strength of his perspective, however his pessimistic realist perspective ignores a lot of the successes that international organizations have had and leads him to dismiss some of the other theories’ assumptions that may not actually be wrong.  An example of this is states’ ability to trust each other.  Mearsheimer dismisses it as impossible due to some basic assumptions of realism, that states can never know the true intentions of other states, and all are competing for relative power to ensure their survival.  Since trust is a key component in all three theories dealing with international institutions, this rushed dismissal undermines his argument against each theory.  There is a lot more evidence for the success of international institutions than there was in 1994, although there is certainly also more evidence that realist assumptions of mistrust are still accurate.  The democratic peace theory has also still proven accurate, and probably contributes to the incredibly strong alliance between democratic English-speaking nations, which provides a counter-point to Mearsheimer’s assertion that states can never trust each other. John Pevehouse and Bruce Russett’s counterargument agrees with Mearsheimer that the link between intergovernmental organizations and peace is problematic and not well developed.  They focus specifically on democratic (or predominantly democratic) institutions and how they aid conflict resolution through mediation, socialization, and commitments. (Pevehouse and Russett, 2006, 1)  Their argument seems to be an expansion of the democratic peace theory.  They point out that between two states “joint democracy alone, independent of other influences, reduces violent conflict.” (ibid, 4)  Additionally, the institutions they focus on are not those with universal membership, but those with restricted membership that may exclude states who are in conflict with an existing member.  He cites the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund as examples. (ibid, 3) This exclusionary policy prevents external conflict from coming in to the organizations, and the great mystery of democratic peace theory prevents conflict from developing within these predominantly democratic organizations.  I say “great mystery” because no one has conclusively explained why democracies are less.

1. Each response is 250 words each
Response 1:
Mearsheimer’s original essay is exceptionally well laid-out and
logical. In seeking to answer the question of whether or not
international institutions promote peace, he examines the three
most prominent international relations theories dealing with
international institutions, provides detailed explanations of the
theory, how it relates to realism, and its causal logic. He then
proceeds to point out flaws in the causal logic of each of the
theories and explains how that refutes or negates the theory
itself. This clear and concise format is definitely a strength of
his perspective, however his pessimistic realist perspective
ignores a lot of the successes that international organizations
have had and leads him to dismiss some of the other theories’
assumptions that may not actually be wrong. An example of
this is states’ ability to trust each other. Mearsheimer dismisses
it as impossible due to some basic assumptions of realism, that
states can never know the true intentions of other states, and all
are competing for relative power to ensure their survival. Since
trust is a key component in all three theories dealing with
international institutions, this rushed dismissal undermines his
argument against each theory. There is a lot more evidence for
the success of international institutions than there was in 1994,
although there is certainly also more evidence that realist
assumptions of mistrust are still accurate. The democratic
peace theory has also still proven accurate, and probably
contributes to the incredibly strong alliance between democratic
English-speaking nations, which provides a counter-point to
Mearsheimer’s assertion that states can never trust each other.
John Pevehouse and Bruce Russett’s counterargument agrees
with Mearsheimer that the link between intergovernmental
organizations and peace is problematic and not well developed.

2. They focus specifically on democratic (or predominantly
democratic) institutions and how they aid conflict resolution
through mediation, socialization, and commitments. (Pevehouse
and Russett, 2006, 1) Their argument seems to be an expansion
of the democratic peace theory. They point out that between
two states “joint democracy alone, independent of other
influences, reduces violent conflict.” (ibid, 4) Additionally, the
institutions they focus on are not those with universal
membership, but those with restricted membership that may
exclude states who are in conflict with an existing member. He
cites the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, World Trade
Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund as
examples. (ibid, 3) This exclusionary policy prevents external
conflict from coming in to the organizations, and the great
mystery of democratic peace theory prevents conflict from
developing within these predominantly democratic
organizations. I say “great mystery” because no one has
conclusively explained why democracies are less likely to go to
war with each other, but historic data irrefutably upholds the
claim. John Gerard Ruggie also focuses on the economic
intergovernmental organizations, “the regimes for money and
trade” (Ruggie, 1982, 1) as he calls them. Ruggie seems to
agree with Mearsheimer’s assertion that intergovernmental
organizations, even those with an economic focus, are
extensions of the states that make up their membership, and will
act in the interests of those states first. He claims “that the
emergence of several specific developments in transnational
economic activities can be accounted for at least in part by their
perceived first-order contribution to the regimes for trade and
money.” (ibid, 5) This would indicate that the economic
intergovernmental organizations were, at least as of 1982,
engaging in activities that benefited the organization, and in
turn the states behind it. By focusing on economic
intergovernmental organization, neither Pevehouse and Russet
or Ruggie’s arguments can be said to really counter
Mearsheimer’s. His argument focused more on the universal

3. membership organizations, such as the United Nations, who’s
primary purpose was peace, not economic organizations for
whom peace is a happy by-product of their commercial goals.
In today’s world I would argue that the realist paradigm is still
relevant for making sense of international institutions. As I
said, there is ample evidence for international organizations
preventing or ending conflicts, but there is also ample evidence
of states ignoring the supposed authority of those organizations
and moving forward into conflict when it suits them. I believe
that intergovernmental organizations do contribute to the peace
process through mediation and socialization, but that states only
use these options in pursuit of the realist principle of survival.
Smaller states rely on the larger states to enforce the
organization’s mediation or decision, which negates the mistrust
factor that Mearsheimer’s argument relies heavily on. But
larger states can only rely on themselves, which is why we more
often see larger states, such as Russia and the US, acting
unilaterally without UN consent.
Response 2:
First off, Realism is defined as a “brutal arena where states look
for opportunity to take advantage of each other, and therefore
have little reason to trust each other" (Mearsheimer, page 13).
Realism describes international relations as a state of relentless
security competition, with the possibility of war always in the
background. The next major point is that States themselves
must choose to obey the rules they created. However,
institutions, in short, call for the “decentralized cooperation of
individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of
command (Mearsheimer, page 13). Next, there is no central
authority that a threatened state can turn for help, and states
have even greater incentive to fear each other. Moreover, there
is no mechanism- other than the possible self-interest of third

4. parties- for punishing an aggressor (Mearsheimer, page 11).
Realism has 3 main patterns of behavior which are states fear
each other, states operate in a “self-help” system to guarantee
their own survival and states in the international are there to
maximize their relative power position over other states. States
are both offensively-oriented and defensively-oriented meaning
states look to take advantage of others and also work to prevent
others from taking advantage of them. Realists believe that
institutions are “arenas for acting out power relationships” so
states can benefit for their own self interests.
Three institutionalist theories
First, liberal institutionalism focuses on why economic and
environmental cooperation among states is likely and this
cooperation reduces the likelihood of war. Liberal
institutionalism seeks to create rules that constrain states. One
issue with liberal institutionalism is that it ignores another
major obstacle to cooperation, which is relative-gain concerns.
The state is worried about relative-gains concerns because the
state wants to maintain a comparative advantage over another
state in order to insure national economic prosperity. Another
issue is liberal institutionalism disconnects economic and
military issues but ones economy drives the military might of
our state. Lastly, Greco said that “Liberal institutionalism is
not relevant for global communications” which underlined that
cheating was not the concern but rather the distribution of the
gains amongst the states.
Second, collective security starts with the assumption that force
will continue to matter in world politics and states will have to
guard against potential aggressors. Under collective security,
there are 3 anti-realism norms, which are states should reject
the idea of using force to change the status quo, to deal with
states that violate that norm, responsible states must not act on

5. the basis of their own narrow self-interest and lastly, states
must trust each other to renounce aggression and to mean that
renunciation. To counter collective security, I find it
unrealistic for states to adhere to these norms. As Claude, who
liked the idea of collective security, said, “ men involved in ....
establishing a collective security system .... their devotion to
the ideal has been more a manifestation of the yearning for
peace and order as an end than as an expression of conviction
that the theory of collective security provides a workable and
acceptable means to that end” (Mearsheimer, page 27)
Response 3:
The theory of realism in international relations have a strict
discipline in regard to international politics that is absolutely
very competitive. To others realism doesn’t seem to be the
preferred first choice since we offer compromises for an
imperfect world. This theory is based on the idea that states
always act in accordance with their national interest, or the
interest of that particular state. Collecting or trying to describe
all of the relevant information of any theory is time consuming
but seemingly important. Getting further into detail with the
theory of realism we can discuss the pros and cons. This theory
offers great promises and discuss successes. Rigorously
implementing systemic methods requires more than just
theorizing about the relations of a few components of a system
and their environment. Realists and Institutionalists particularly
disagree about whether institutions markedly affect the
prospects for international security (Mearsheimer, 7). It is not
surprisingly that a broadly realist approach to foreign policy is
mostly endorsed by business conservatives and the majority of
Americans. Although Americans become more realist after their
attention is sparked when unprecedented events occur
internationally. Hard to believe that the American realists have
found it increasingly difficult to capture the American people’s

6. attention. This can be considered as a con since the realists
don’t come up with precise clear answers, yet they want to
change the world. Realism is one of many great theories used to
explain international relations. It is also a common sense
shared by practitioners when they make sense of world politics
(Guzzini, 3). Overall, we cannot avoid theory, theories help us
select what is significant and insignificant globally.
The authors Pevehouse and Russett discussed the Kantian Peace
Research Program which was developed to help the
international organizations bring peace and minimize the
violence as much as possible. This is mostly to help
international trade and basically for each nation to play nice and
get some money out of it. The Kantian view is that IGOs,
economic interdependence and democracy form a mutually
supportive triangle that promotes space (Spilker, 347). Every
solution will have disagreements like the Kantian program has
been mentioned of not been helpful and causing more problems
with violence. The authors seem to be realists and discuss how
ineffective the international relations are. The International
Organizations are compared to an anarchic world, nations who
only care to take to take care of themselves.
Realism is basically for the pessimists who are automatically
inclined to think something bad is going to occur with the
international institutions. In regard to the international regimes
the realists have at least a little bit to contribute in how they
interpret the future. International regimes consist of norms and
rules. The formation and transformation of international
regimes may be said to represent a concrete manifestation of the
internationalization of political authority (Ruggie, 380). When
it comes to the private flow with the international economic
regimes and the developments within the international economy
the realists are always going to find this problematic since they
believe there is always going to be a dominant nation taking
orders. This comes back to the balance of powers view instead

7. of looking at it as nations working together and compromising
to better themselves.