Command Structure Of Operation Anaconda

Command Structure Of Operation Anaconda
The command structure of Operation Anaconda was multi–headed and lacked unity due to the U.S. military presence not being fully established prior
to, or during, execution which adversely effected the operation. According to College of Aerospace Doctrine, combat operations were directed by
CENTCOM under General Franks, based at MacDill AFB FL, with 2 subordinate commands, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)
and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFACC was led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Moseley & CFLCC was led by Army
LTG Paul Mikolashek. CFLCC & CFACC were both based in the Persian Gulf where they directed Afghanistan force operations. MG Franklin
Hagenbeck, commanded the 10th Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, the forward headquarters for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. MG
Hagenbeck answered to LTG Mikolashek directly, whom headed up all land forces in the theatre of operations. Combined Air Operations Center
dire was headed by LTG Michael Moseley, based at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force (TF) Dagger
headed by Col. John Mulholland, commanded Special Forces operations in Afghanistan. TF Rakkasan, 3rd Brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division
was commanded by COL Frank Wiercinski based in Kandahar. Afghan forces supporting the operation were led by Zia Loden, a local warlord. TF
–K
Bar Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) South Kandahar, Afghanistan was headed by CPT Robert H
Operation
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Sensitive Items
It is very important to secure all your sensitive equipment and items, and maintain accountability. The reason simply is to keep very important high
cost valued items and equipment accounted for so people all around you do not have to deal with the consequences of the lost item or equipment.
Also every sensitve item or equipment is high dollar valued so if you lose it you will be hurting money wise by losing a grand or more easily right
on the spot. And after that you can possibly do jail time from six months to a year and sure their will be rank taken away or something along those
lines. You might even get an article fifteen after all that or maybe when you have to pay for the lost sensitive equipment or item so these should be a...
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While this makes it a candidate for non–infantry troops (vehicle crews, clerks and staff officers), it also makes it ideal for close quarters combat
(CQC), and airborne and special operations. It has been adopted by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is the preferred
weapon of the U.S. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs. M4's have also been fielded by the Australian Special Air Service Regiment. Malaysia
purchased M4 Carbine service rifles to replace the Steyr AUG service rifles in its armed forces in 2006 and will be manufactured in Malaysia under
license by SME Ordnance Sdn Bhd.[3] It is expected that these weapons will not only be used by MAF, but also will attract other users such as
Police, Coast Guard and other enforcement agencies.[4] The M4 was developed and produced for the United States government by Colt Firearms,
which has an exclusive contract to produce the M4 family of weapons through 2009; however, a number of other manufacturers offer M4–like firearms.
The M4A1, along with the M16A4, has mostly replaced the M16A2 ; the U.S. Air Force, for example, plans to transition completely to the M4
Carbine. The M4 is similar to much earlier compact M16 versions, such as the 1960s–era XM177 family. The United States Marine Corps has ordered
its officers (up to the rank of lieutenant colonel) and (senior) Staff Non–commissioned officers to carry the M4A1 carbine instead of the M9

Operation Anaconda Failures
The Failures of Operation Anaconda The United States Army (USA) is known for having a superb command structure and it has been in use for
over 240 years. The Army exercises command at three levels, strategic, operational, and tactical. This determines who is in charge of any given
operation at any given time; whether an Army or joint operation. It also establishes a chain of command in order for information and order to reach
the intended target. However, that did not happen during the first day of Operation Anaconda as everything that should have gone well, did not. And
while the operation did achieve its goal, there were failures due to the lack of command and control, relationships, and trust. These are all necessary for
a successful... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The absence of command and control was clear from the beginning as the commander did not even have boots on the ground and was "commanding"
from afar. Not having command and control of their organizations led the CENTCOM commander to clearly communicate and establish relationships
with those involved in the operation. Additionally, while the operation did achieve its goal, there were failures due to the lack of command and control,
relationships, and trust. All necessary ingredients for a successful and effective command structure to fight and win in joint combat

Personal Narrative: A Career As An Immigrant
It all started on one sunny day on the month of July, I was done with my service to protect my country the United States of America. Man it was nice
to experience the smell of freedom once again. Due to my deployments in many countries I never had the opportunity to step forth in the land of the
free, my home, it felt nostalgic to experience it all again. During my time in the military I was twenty–one and was first a designated marksman or
Scout Sniper in the Marine Corp for a year or two, then I decided to join a special operations team and joined the 75th Ranger Regiment and
continued my role as a sniper. Then finally through months of hard work and combat deployments my skills as a sniper was finally recognized. I was
hand selected to... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Makarov was held up in an abandoned weapons factory in Ukraine. The place was heavily guarded with only two exits and from what I heard there is
a scammer in the area so I would not be able to be rely on any help. I armed myself with a suppressed MP5, one M1911, a helmet–mounted AN/AVS–6
vision goggle, standard issue parachute, C4 plastic explosives, frag grenades, a coil of rope, and a Blackhawk Tatang knife. I decided to go at the drop
of night from a AC–130 and paradrop on top of the factory. It was a cold night, but I knew I had no time to waste and jumped out. There was a
bombardement of air as I was crashing down and I had to admit the view never got old. I could see for miles and saw the stars shining above me
and the darkness of the night. As I approach the ground I pulled my chute and landed peacefully. While I descended onto the ground I quietly took
of my parachute and killed a soldier on the roof. I attached the rope to the railing up there and and attached the other end to my harness. I
descended down and I pulled out my MP5 and set the C4 explosives on the wall. I detonate the explosive and jumped in and while I situated myself
I could hear the sound of confused men around me and then a alarm went off. None of these things bothered me as I searched for the control room
since I knew that would be where he was. As I battled my way to their I quickly double tapped anyone who got in my way by shooting them twice
in the chest and one in the head or I left them in pain as I walked over them. When I got to the entrance to the control room there lay one last enemy
eyeballing me ready to fire. I wasted no time and fired, it was a perfect headshot. I could see a gush of mercury–red blood spew from his head as
echoes of men wailing and screaming went on around me. As I slammed the door open I could see Makarov in his chair

Operation Anaconda Essay
Operation Anaconda: Questionable Joint Planning Success Operation Anaconda, although a win for the US and Coalition Forces, was seen by many as
a joint planning nightmare. Throughout history, the military has closely examined engagements through case studies to improve the planning process.
Operation Anaconda's case studies displayed mistakes, power struggles, and lack of credible Intel while planning the execution of Operation Anaconda
causing question about the success of the operation. Mistakes during planning Once 911 happened and the US started gathering intel from the Middle
East, the proper authorities inside Washington saw the potential for military action; this initiated the planning step. In 2001, Central Command
(CENTCOM)... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Howard, E. 2003). CENTCOM wanted to keep as little of a footprint in Afghanistan as it could, and, therefore, tasked JSOFT DAGGER, known
through the case study as TF DAGGER, to develop a plan to clear out the Shahi Kot Valley (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003). There are several key
components necessary when planning such as "task organization, mission statement, commander's intent, concept of operations, tasks to subordinate
units, coordinating instructions and control measures" (ADRP 5–0, para 2–69). During COA development, the mistakes in planning became apparent.
In the case study there are missing elements "Initially Task Force Mountain was not designated a joint task force which led to joint planning problems"
(Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003). Some commands were not communicating with other commands they should have been communicating with, while some
commands were leaving commands out of the communication; therefore, information was not going up or coming back down the proper channels,
which led to confusion and a struggle for

An Analysis of the Current Business Environment in Thailand
An Analysis of the Current Business Environment in Thailand
Executive Summary Trade relations between Thailand and Australia have steadily increased over the years, and the two countries recently celebrated
60 years of bilateral trade. The strong ties that exist between Australia and Thailand have been further strengthened in recent years through a series of
free trade initiatives, reduced or eliminated tariffs and, prior to 2003, through the provision of Australian economic development advisors to Thailand.
Despite the positive trends in commerce, Thailand has been rocked by political turmoil from time to time over the years, and student uprisings in
Bangkok in particular have threatened the political stability of the country's ruling parties in ways that had short–term implications for Australians doing
business in Thailand. Moreover, because it has become increasingly integrated into the global economy, Thailand has not been immune from the Great
Recession of 2008. Nevertheless, the business climate in Thailand remains highly favorable in general and especially favorable for Australian
companies of all types and sizes as described further below.
Profile of Thailand As the only country in Southeast Asia to avoid being colonized by Western powers, the Thai people do not have any particular chip
on their national shoulders concerning doing business with foreigners, especially Australians. In fact, Australia and Thailand have long enjoyed
excellent diplomatic and trade

Operation Anaconda By Reviewing The Setting
Important battles in a war are the ones that not only define the campaign but also the men who take part in them. An important battle often shapes the
conditions for the rest of the war and enables future success. The purpose of this paper is to provide a thorough battle analysis of Operation Anaconda
by reviewing the setting, describing the actions of friendly and enemy forces, and then assessing the significance of those actions. Additionally, this
paper will identify an alternate ending based on the use of available intelligence assets. Had military intelligence effectively employed measures and
signatures intelligence assets and correctly analyzed the information those assets provided before the start of Operation Anaconda, estimates of enemy
composition, disposition, capabilities, and intentions would have been known and could have drastically reduced the amount of casualties Coalition
Forces incurred. Second and third order effects of realizing this intelligence would have shattered the enemy's ability to conduct major combat
operations and set the conditions for stability operations to take place.
Operation Anaconda was a joint effort between elements of the 10th Mountain Division, 101st Airborne Division, Special Operations Forces from
multiple nations, and local Afghan fighters to drive out al–Qaeda and Taliban fighters from the Shahikot Valley in order to set the conditions for
successful stability operations in Afghanistan. The battle took place in late February

Operation Anaconda Battle Analysis
John Doe
Colonel Mustard
MIL Battle Analysis
March 2010
Operation Anaconda Battle Analysis In the mountainous Shah–i–Khot region south of the city of Gardez in Eastern Afghanistan, Operation Anaconda
took place early March 2002. Operation Anaconda, to this day, stands as the largest reported ground action in the Afghan war. This 17
–day battle led to
eight U.S. casualties and over 50 wounded. Operation Anaconda is viewed as a success due to coalition forces being able to kill and root out several
hundred Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, which left U.S. and coalition forces in control of the Shah–i–Khot Valley. Originally intended to be a three
–day
battle with light resistance, a seven–day battle ensued with intense fighting and was finally ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Air support had planned to bombard enemy positions for 55 minutes; however, miscommunication between Texas 14 and higher led to a short
bombardment and a total of six bombs being dropped. TF HAMMER was unsuccessful in entering the valley due to a heavy amount of small arms
fire and mortar attacks. The lack of air support triggered by bad communication frustrated Afghan and Special Forces alike and led to Afghan trucks
being hit heavily by pre–registered mortar fire on known choke points by Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. Unity of command is crucial in conducting a
successful military operation: communication flows smoothly through a unified command, but unfortunately for a non–unified command, the reverse
effect holds true. Another principle of war that was violated several times was the element of surprise. This had to do, however, with a direct
correlation to communication and unity of command. In the late hours of 3 March 2002, the SEAL team, MAKO 30 was picked up by a MH–47
heading east of the peak of Takur Ghar, which is the tallest point in the Shah–i–Khot region. A problem was encountered with the MH–47 and the team
had to change aircraft. This placed them off of their suspected timeline and did not allow MAKO 30 with enough time to reach the

Operation Anaconda Command Structure
Command Structure of Operation Anaconda In the simplest of terms, command structures utilized during combat operations are commanded by one
commander with the resources and authority to plan and execute operations. Prior to Operation Anaconda multiple dislocated command structures
oversaw operations within the same area of responsibility (AOR). During Operation Anaconda the lack of one command structure with the authority
over all assets and participants resulted in fratricide, competition over assets, and other areas of inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. Command Structure
and locations before Operation Anaconda In the infancy of Operation Enduring Freedom the command structure was dislocated, lacked complete
oversight, and had other responsibilities that stacked the deck against them to be able to properly prepare for Operation Anaconda. General Franks
Commanded Operations in Afghanistan as the CENTCOM Commander from MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. CENTCOM directed Operations
through the Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) via its Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in the Persian Gulf, and the
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) which was located at Camp Doha Kuwait (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Thomas, 2003).
Furthermore, in addition to the conventional and special operations forces (SOF) units and assets operating under CENTCON control, other
government agencies and SOF operating directly under the Secretary of Defense (Black SOF) operated concurrently in the AOR.... Show more content
on Helpwriting.net ...
TF Mountain, Commanded by MG Hagenbeck, the 10th Mountain Commanding General was established to provide assistance to subordinate units in
the (AOR) (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk,

The Challenges Of Command Structure In Operation Anaconda
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern
Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the
Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign
the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG
Hagenbeck's command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control
authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command
structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation
Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the
execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In
this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.
Multiple

Battle Analysis Paper Takur Ghar
Mission Command Analysis
The Battle of Takur Ghar
"Roberts Ridge"
Operation Anaconda, 03 – 04 March 2002
CPT Michael A. Broussard PA–C
SG 11, CCC
30 October 2014
1
Abstract
In the late evening of March 3rd 2002, through to the evening of March 4th 2002, Special
Operation Forces were engaged in an intense fire fight with al Qaeda forces on a mountain top known as Takur Ghar. This battle was the product of a
botched reconnaissance insertion and ultimately resulted in a 24 hour fire fight and the deaths of 7 U.S. service members and over 200 al Qaeda
fighters. Navy SEAL, Neil C. Roberts is believed to be the first U.S. casualty of this battle and thus, the battle also became unofficially known as
"Roberts Ridge" (1).
This paper will give ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The ramp gunner was tethered to the aircraft and was retrieved back inside by the remaining passengers. Roberts fell from the aircraft and was
believed to still be alive as the aircraft was only 10 feet off of the ground at the time it came under fire.
The helicopter was forced to crash land in the valley and now was 7 kilometers away from the mountain top. Roberts was now completely alone
amongst an overwhelming enemy force and it is believed that he fought in place until he was eventually over run by the enemy (3).
The downed SEALs were picked up by RAZOR 04 and at 0500, again attempted to reinsert at Roberts' last known position. Now they were only a team
of 5 with the addition of Air
Force CCT Chapman. The aircraft was able to insert the team but again came under heavy fire and was also rendered mission incapable and had to fly
back to its origin due to the damage that it sustained. The team moved to the high ground of the mountain engaging and killing 2 combatants, they then

realized that they were standing in the middle of multiple bunkers as they came under heavy cross fire from only 20 meters away. Acoording to the
official report,
Chapman was fatally wounded almost immediately and 2 others would also become wounded as they attempted to break contact. An AC–130 was able
to provide covering fire and enabled the
SEALS to disengage. Wounded and

Operation Anaconda Research Paper
Operation Anaconda Command Structure Many Americans make a choice to serve in the military, knowing they could have to make the ultimate
sacrifice for our country. During Operation Anaconda, many great Soldiers paid this ultimate sacrifice. Further review many experts have deemed this
as an unnecessary loss of life due to a multitude of factors we will explore. This Operation has been viewed as a great success in times of uncertainty
and challenges. Ultimately, the enemy was defeated but what could have been done differently? The higher headquarters command structure for
Operation Anaconda faced challenges planning, making timely decisions, and communicating which lead to mission gaps while developing lessons
learned for future joint operations.... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) did not align under CENTCOM and the Combined Air Operations Center
(CAOC). Initially, JFSOCC was detached from the theater command structure. JFSOCC operated on specific mission for the theater Commander,
rather than included in the Command Structure. JFSOCC's delay caused issues in the development of the command structure. Furthermore, the mission
requirements changed by the time the CFLCC and JFSOCC took control of their respected requirements, unity of command was still developing.
External to the JFOCC structure, additional SOF units were operating across Afghanistan conducting their own individual missions with no JFOCC
over sight. When SOF units request air support, it was send directly to CFACC and then forwarded to the CAOC dislocated from the ground force
headquarters. Command Structure during Operation Anaconda As stated earlier, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was subordinate to CFLCC.
The CJTF was the senior Commander for Operation Anaconda and the Shahikot Valley Area of Operations (AO). The senior command, CFTF had
critical gaps. CJTF only had one infantry battalion, and half of the normal division

Anaacond Unity Of Command During Operation Anaconda
Unity of Command during Operation Anaconda "Unity of command is defined as all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite
authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a common purpose." (Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2013, p. V–1). Combined Joint
Task Force (CJTF) Mountain only had tactical control of some of the organizations involved and due to United States Central Command (CENTCOM)
not being centrally located this caused delays in decision making. Even though lessons learned from Operation Anaconda has help facilitate unity of
command for future operations; unity of command was a newer concept that the Armed Forces had not fully operated under.
Leading up to Operation Anaconda Prior to the building up of forces for Operation Anaconda, the command structure was set up that CENTCOM was
working with two subordinate commands. Those commands were Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air
Component Command (CFACC). CFLCC and CFACC were both staged in the Persian Gulf and were set to offer support to any operation in
Afghanistan from there. Task Force (TF) Dagger was the only ground force located in Afghanistan. (TF) Dagger consisted of 5th Special Operation
Forces (SOF) and Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) operations. During the build–up and planning of Operation Anaconda, elements of the 10th
Mountain Division Staff were deployed into the CENTCOM's area of responsibility. While doing their

One Significant Change That Has Occurred in the World...
E SSAYS ON TWENTIETH–C ENTURY H ISTORY In the series Critical Perspectives on the Past, edited by Susan Porter Benson, Stephen Brier,
and Roy Rosenzweig Also in this series: Paula Hamilton and Linda Shopes, eds., Oral History and Public Memories Tiffany Ruby Patterson, Zora
Neale Hurston and a History of Southern Life Lisa M. Fine, The Story of Reo Joe: Work, Kin, and Community in Autotown, U.S.A. Van Gosse and
Richard Moser, eds., The World the Sixties Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America Joanne Meyerowitz, ed., History and September 11th John
McMillian and Paul Buhle, eds., The New Left Revisited David M. Scobey, Empire City: The Making and Meaning of the New York City Landscape
Gerda Lerner, Fireweed: A... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The beginnings and ends of what we choose to call centuries are almost invariably years of little significance. But there is little agreement over when
the twentieth century c.e. arrived, and there were several points both before the year 2000 (the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reunification of
Germany, the surge of globalization from the mid–1990s) and afterward (9/11, or the global recession of 2008) when one could quite plausibly argue
that a new era had begun. A compelling case can be made for viewing the decades of the global scramble for colonies after 1870 as a predictable
culmination of the long nineteenth century, which was ushered in by the industrial and political revolutions of the late 1700s. But at the same time,
without serious attention to the processes and misguided policies that led to decades of agrarian and industrial depression from the late 1860s to the
1890s, as well as the social tensions and political rivalries that generated and were in turn fed by imperialist expansionism, one cannot begin to
comprehend the causes and consequences of the Great War that began in 1914. That conflict determined the contours of the twentieth century in
myriad ways. On the one hand, the war set in motion transformative processes that were clearly major departures from those that defined the
nineteenth–century world order. On the other, it perversely unleashed forces

OPERATION ANACONDA AND THE ARMY PROFESSION
USAACE
NCOA
SSG Casey J. Vauthier
15PSLC
15–00
SFC ANDERSON
Operation Anaconda was a major U.S. and Afghan combined offensive that took place in March of 2002. Named after the snake that would coil
around its victim and squeeze the life out of them before devouring them, this was the intent of the offensive. This offensive would lead us into further
development as a fighting force that would need to adjust, so that our decisions bring our Soldiers home. The Army Profession adamantly displayed
itself throughout the battle and this paper will explain a few of these instances. Major combat operations began for Operation Enduring Freedom on
October 7, 2001. After initial combat and air strikes, the CIA began to learn that theTaliban and al Qaeda forces were beginning to regroup in the White
Mountains of Eastern Afghanistan. Large numbers had been assembling in the Tora Bora region and the CIA... Show more content on Helpwriting.net
...
The battle plan consisted of many moving parts and based itself on the "Hammer and Anvil" approach, and the CIA estimated the enemy to be about
200 strong. On March 2, they executed the plan. The friendly Afghans, led by US SOF and known as TF Hammer, moved into place by a mixture of
light trucks and vehicles that were not a formidable adversary for the Taliban. CH–47 helicopters were the mode of transportation for the 10th
Mountain Division soldiers along with help from the Rakkasans of the 101st Airborne Division. The CH–47s would drop the troops and make multiple
turns for resupply. Six US AH–64 Apaches were to begin patrols into the valley at around 0530 that morning and once troops were on the ground,
provide air support. Finally, the Air Force was to support with bombings prior to the offensive and air support with AC
–130 gunships. The plan seemed
well thought out and was ready to

The Boeing Company 2007 Annual Report
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
The Boeing Company 2007 Annual Report
Leading the Way
Vision 2016: People working together as a global enterprise for aerospace leadership
The Boeing Company
Boeing is the world's leading aerospace company and the largest manufacturer of commercial jetliners and military aircraft combined, providing
products and tailored services to airlines and U.S. and allied armed forces around the world. Our capabilities include rotorcraft, electronic and defense
systems, missiles, satellites, launch systems and advanced
information and communication systems. Our reach extends to customers in more than 90 countries around the world, and we are a leading U.S.
exporter in terms of sales. With corporate ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
On that foundation, we are pursuing one big, overarching goal. We aim to be the world's strongest, best and best–integrated aerospace company – for
today and tomorrow. Measured against that goal, 2007 stands out as a year of significant – and accelerating – progress. We achieved record financial
performance, which reflects the potent combination of good top–line growth and strong gains in productivity. Total revenues rose to an all–time high of
$66.4 billion. For the first time ever, both of our core businesses – Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Boeing Integrated Defense Systems –
simultaneously achieved double–digit operating margins. Gains in productivity and performance in existing programs contributed significantly to
earnings and helped offset additional investment in key growth programs. Our cash flow went from strong to even stronger – increasing from $7.5
billion in 2006 to $9.6 billion in 2007.
We also had our best year ever in capturing new business and adding to a backlog that now totals almost one third of a trillion dollars– or just about
five times our total revenues in 2007. Boeing Commercial Airplanes had spectacular success in landing 1,423 airplane orders during 2007, reaching
more than 1,000 orders for an unprecedented

One Hundred Victories by Linda Robinson
In the book, the author makes it clear that executing counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is a difficult task for Special Forces operators. She explains
that the commanding officers knew these operations would be a challenging feat. For instance, the author details Major General Scott Miller's efforts
to expand the Afghan Local Police initiative to the rural areas of Afghanistan. Major General Miller felt that the same approach that was taken in the
cities would not work in the rural areas. In other words, the "Afghan local policemen by themselves were not sufficient to bring peace to rural
Afghanistan, and the country had to be stabilized from the village up" (Robinson 2013, 26). In this instance, the book demonstrates the Generals
knowledge and awareness of the situation in the region. That is to say, "the only capacities for dispute resolution and law enforcement in much of the
country consist of village or tribal councils and mullahs who administer a crude interpretation of Sharia" (Rubin 2007, 76). Both the author and the
general realized the importance villages have in securing peace in Afghanistan. These rural operations of the Afghan Local Police are known as
Village Stability Operations. These operations were not intended to be a quick fix, rather a long–term investment. The author asks the question, are the
village stability operations a success? Perhaps, the answer can be found in the results of the operations. Although stability in Afghanistan has proved to
be an

Causes Of Operation Anaaconda
Lack of Planning during Operation Anaconda
It has been 16 years since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon which resulted in thousands dead, thousands
injured and millions affected across the globe. In the wake of these terrorist attacks, the Nation had been rocked at its core, as symbols of our freedom
lay in rubble and ash. These acts of terrorism aimed to tear the country apart but much to the terrorists' surprise, their acts brought the Nation together
with one common goal in mind. As Americans, there was no choice but to expeditiously act with force and make clear statement that America will not
bow, surrender or cower to terrorists. Zimmerman (2012) On March 2, 2002 Operation Anaconda, the largest battle inOperation Enduring Freedom
Afghanistan was executed. Operation Anaconda was designed from its inception with one objective in mind, destruction of Taliban and Al Qaeda
terrorist networks that had created a strong hold in the Shah–i–Kot Valley in the Paktia province, Afghanistan. Overall, Operation Anaconda was a
success, General Tommy Franks, the commander of CENTCOM in 2002 said that the operation's plan "didn't survive first contact with the enemy."
Although Operation Anaconda was successful, with its rapid planning, lack of a unified command with an established joint force command structure
over the prepositioning of air assets, ground assets, and SOF assets early in the fight it led to an ill–prepared wartime fighting

Operation Anaconda Analysis
A Battle Analysis of Operation Anaconda Operation Anaconda, which was part of Operation Enduring Freedom, was a combat operation that took
place in the Shahikot Valley of Eastern Afghanistan during March 2002. Months earlier, a large number of Taliban and al Qaeda forces fled into the
valley after the U.S. failed to achieve its objectives at Tora Bora. An operation similar in scope and intent, success at Tora Bora would have negated the
need to conduct Operation Anaconda and potentially could have had profound impacts on the enduring conflict in Afghanistan. Early on in the war,
coalition forces saw victories quickly and often. Most combat operations were carried out by U.S. SOF, air strikes, and an organized Afghanistan
militia called... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Operation Anaconda was comprised of three smaller, interrelated operations. U.S. and coalition SOF, along with Afghan Soldiers, were to take up
blocking positions surrounding the Shahikot Valley. In theory they would prevent an impenetrable coil, like a constricting snake, around the enemy
forces to prevent exfiltration. The Eastern Alliance, led by a local warlord named Zia Lodin, and some U.S. SOF would be the driving force, or
"hammer", during the operation. TF Hammer would then enter the valley at its southwestern opening. They had orders to engage and destroy or
capture any opposition within the valley and drive the enemy towards the opening on the other side. TF Rakkasans, comprised of 10th Mountain
Division and 101st Airborne Division Soldiers, would be there waiting and acting as the "anvil". In order for this operation to succeed the hammer
and anvil had to be executed exactly as planned. Any deviation could result in the enemy escaping or increased risk of friendly fire. Air support was
never seen as having a major role during any part of the operation. The Air Force was responsible for conducting strikes on 13 preplanned targets
before TF Hammer entered the valley. Outside of that, they had planned to have enough aircraft to facilitate on–call CAS, but only for the planned
three day mission. The CFACC and the CAOC were never involved in the

Tactical Assault Group
One of the biggest challenges facing modern society is in the area of security, especially as it patterns to terrorism. The dynamics and severity of
attacks on innocent citizens of different countries around the world continues to change over the years. In Europe, the frequency of terrorist attacks is
also spreading to different countries. In fact, the 2017 Europol European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report concludes that more than 142
terrorist operations were reported across the European Union in 2016 alone. Also, the attacks caused the death of more than 140 people and about 378
more people were injured.
Since terrorist attacks have been on the rise while taking dynamic and extreme turns, different countries of the world have created ... Show more content
on Helpwriting.net ...
The Special Reconnaissance (SR) adopts intelligence gathering and surveillance. This is the gathering and verification of important information about
potential plans or intentions of terrorist groups and organized criminals. In addition, other relevant pieces of information such as hydrographic,
geographic and meteorological features of a location are utilized in predicting the activities of terrorists.
Another operational technique used by the TAG unit is Precision Strike. This operation utilizes sophisticated technology, mines, precision guided
munitions, standoff weapons and other munitions to capture or kill a target such as a criminal, hostage taker or terrorist. The operation is usually
accompanied with tactics such as raids or ambushes and are usually small in scale.
Special Recovery Operations (SRO) are also special operations utilized by the TAG units to rescue hostages or equipment from terrorists or
hostage–takers. This operation could be carried out overseas or within the country, and they are usually high–risk

Introduction Of The First World War
Introduction to the First World War
In the context of the First World War, we need to consider the question: 'Are we as a nation so transfixed by the Gallipoli campaign that we have
failed to look at what was happening elsewhere during the First World War?
There is a strong case to be made that Gallipoli has over the past hundred years, overshadowed the real stage on which the war was fought – the
Western Front. This does a great injustice to the many thousands of Australians who fought and died there. It is time to set the record straight– not to
diminish Gallipoli – but to raise the Western Front campaign to the same degree of significance in the Australian psyche and its historic records.
Many Australians today would point to the 1915 Gallipoli campaign as the single most defining moment in Australia 's history.
Before 1915 at the outbreak of the First World War Australia was widely considered as just a colony of the British Empire. The heroism, courage
and 'mateship' portrayed by the ANZACS at Gallipoli has since become a symbol of nationhood of Australia. From this time other countries
respected Australian soldiers as a 'force to be reckoned with'/ Politicians have frequently referred to what it means to be Australian was 'written in
blood' at ANZAC Cove. Every year special remembrance services are held at ANZAC Cove to remember the soldiers who gave their lives there.
The War on the Western Front.
In France and Belgium on the Western

Operation Anaconda Afghanistan
Michael A. Difuntorum
25W Class: 502
Abstract
Operation Anaconda was fought in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan in March of 2002 and lasted 17 days, thought it was initially planned as a 3
day battle. During the months leading up to Operation Anaconda there were many drawbacks, including lack of accurate and reliable intelligence. Due
to the lack of intelligence regarding the enemy and their weapons there was not a unity of command and instead it was multi headed by General
Hagenbeck and Task Force Mountain headquarters but did not include command of the air forces or the friendly Afghan units that were to be used as
the main axis of attack in the battle plan. Though the battle was not carried out as planned ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
General Hagenbeck receives his Intel from the U.S Official. Reports stated that enemy forces including Al Qaeda were assembling in Shahikot Valley.
U.S Official did not have a good intelligence on how many enemy forces there where and what types of equipment they have. Before the battle of
operation anaconda Genera Hagenbeck and his forces underestimated the enemy forces and defense. U.S forces lack the man power and fire power to
and air support to complete the mission due to Afghanistan forces withdrawing and requesting air support from another commander thus General
Hegenbeck and his forces did not accept the prudent risk with the

Operation Anaconda Case Study
Task Organization during Operation Anaconda
SFC Albert G. Davis
MLC 02–18
MSG Gina R. Aceves Task Organization during Operation Anaconda
The war in the Middle East was in full effect and the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) already had forces in the Afghanistan area of
responsibility (AOR). These pre–positioned troops were the result of intelligence reports that showed the Taliban and al Qaeda were hiding out in the
Shahi–Khot valley in Afghanistan. CENTCOM'S poor task organization for the multiple coalition forces on the ground and air contributed to the
breakdown of Task Force Mountain's battle plan.
Available Assets Task organization is creating an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a
unique task or mission (Department of the ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The lack of tactical control (TACON) with the amount of different forces engaged in the operation made command authority an issue. (Fleri, Howard,
Hukill, & Searle, 2013)
The Joint Task Force (JTF) did not have the TACON it should have had with the SOF. Prior to the start of the JTF Mountain, the SOF operated under
the control of the Joint Special Operations Task Force and bypassed the Joint Commander. SOF groups needed to be inserted at a time when the air
support was not bombing the valley.
Task force command and control (C2) was a major issue when key staff elements were not present. The continuing air support need for the attack on
the valley required more air controllers than CENTCOM would allow the JTF to have in the AOR. Without enough air liaisons for each group they
began to us the air control elements of the Airforce.

Confusion Of Control And Control Of Operation Anaconda
Operation Anaconda was a joint operation. Even though it was a joint operation, this does not necessarily mean cohesive. This is especially true of
the air operations. Poorly executed joint functions, primarily air operations, resulted in diminished close air support capabilities during Operation
Anaconda due to confusion of control of aviation assets, lack of proper communication equipment, and available air coordination personnel were
overwhelmed. Confusion of control of Aviation Assets The first reason for the diminished capabilities was that there was confusion on who had
tactical control of some aviation assets. Without positive control of all available assets, problems were inevitable. Task Force Dagger, the Special
Operation Force element, was part of Combined CJTF Mountain (CJTF), the overall command element. CJTF Mountain was not granted Tactical
Control (TACON) of TF Dagger though. This also means that TF Dagger retained control of its aviation assets (Fleri, 2003). The aviation assets in
question still assigned to TF Dagger were the AC–130 gunships. These aircraft are one of the most capable close air support assets that is available to
the troops on the ground. This fixed wing aircraft is heavily armed. These armaments include a 25mm Gatlin gun, 40mm Bofors cannon, and a 105mm
howitzer cannon (af.mil, 2016). This aircraft is one of the best close air support assets in the United States inventory. This also makes this it a high
demand asset in

Modern History.Hsc.2012 Essay
MODERN HISTORY
–2012
Topic one – USA 1919–1941
Topic two – conflict in the pacific
Topic three – Douglas MacArthur
Topic Four – World War I
TOPIC ONE – USA 1919–1941
USA 1920'S * the radio age * felt like istory had turned a corner and never going back * stock market * black Thursday November 24 1929 * the jazz
age * a speakeasyyyyyyy
How significant were the Republican policies in causing the great depression?
The significance of the republic policies were great, they brought a lot of growth in the 20's allowing the market to strive over lots of trading and the
purchase of shares, but was also an unstable market, as the government had no control over what it did and was left up to the ... Show more content on
Helpwriting.net ...
more detail needed; but probably enough to write a paragraph or two in an essay on industrialisation between 1919 and 1941...
The nature of industrialisation in the 1930s
The nature of industrialisation changed in the 1930s. In the 1920s industrialisation had occurred because of free enterprise and big business. But with
the onset of the Depression, industrial output fell dramatically. (statistics needed). To combat this, the federal government adopted a role of directly
stimulating industrial growth. The Public Works Administration (PWA) instituted in began many large industrial projects with the aim of spurring the
economy and providing many jobs. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was a federal project to energise the economy through a massive industrial
scheme sponsored by the federal government. Twenty five dams were built to reshape the land and generate hydro–electricity, which could further
contribute to industrial growth. Another example of government leadership of industry was the National Recovery Administration (NRA), which
attempted to foster industrial growth through the creation of 'codes' for each industry. These federal programs fundamentally changed the nature of
industrialisation. In the 1930s, the government's approach to industrialisation was more akin to socialist–state–style industrialisation than it was to the

American capitalism–style industrialisation of the 1920s. Further, the federal government's

Operation Anaconda was a battle that occurred in Shahi Khot Valley, Afghanistan in early March 2002. It was the first major battle and the largest
operation in Afghanistan that began after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (Baran, 2015). The operation
was led by Major General F.L Hagenbeck, Commander of the 10th Mountain Division based out of Fort Drum, New York, and the mission was to
remove the remaining Taliban fighters in Shahi Khot Valley. In his memoirs, American Soldier, former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
Commander General Tommy Franks, USA, (Ret.) portrayed Operation Anaconda, as an "absolute and unqualified success," but one in which the
original U.S. military battle plan "didn't survive the first contact with the enemy." (Kelly et al, 2014) Operation Anaconda offered many lessons learned
from the operation's successes and failures through the planning process. Anaconda's "unqualified success" was due to the force's adaptability to the
operational environment, joint forces support and overcoming lack of unity of command.
Operation Anaconda O.E. Adaptability The original day for Operation Anaconda was set for 28 February. There was a final weather decision that
needed to be made by 26 February to allow the special reconnaissance (SR) teams ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
However, with the coming of the air force and eventually, the differences were ironed out making the operation to be operated smoothly. This lack of
unity was also largely contributed by the effect of terrain and mountainous region making it difficult for effective communication to take place between
among the soldiers (Kayes, Allen, & Self,

Operation Anaconda Joint Planning Failure
Joint Planning Failures of Operation Anaconda In January 2002, intelligence began reporting on a heavy concentration of Taliban and al Qaeda forces
in and around the Shahikot Valley area of Afghanistan. With the intelligence available and experience to date, the U.S. Coalition Forces began
planning Operation Anaconda. The end state of U.S. officials was to drive all enemy forces out of their strongholds within the valley, allowing
coalition forces to capture or kill the enemy (2003). Even though the original plan of three–days stretched into a seventeen–day battle and resistance
was much greater than expected, military officials hailed Operation Anaconda as a success (Andres, 2007). Although the overall mission hailed as a
success an examination of the Army's joint planning process exposed multiple shortfalls in the areas... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Generals Franks and Mikolashek made the decision to deploy the staff of the Army's 10th Mountain Division under the command of MG
Hagenbeck to Bagram Air Base (2007). In an attempt to fix, joint planning problems CENTOM designated the 10th Mountain as Coalition and Joint
Task Force (CJTF) Mountain; CJTF Mountain took command of a large portion of the ground forces. However, CJTF Mountain did not receive
tactical control (TACON) over supporting U.S elements or Afghan forces to be involved in the operation. Aviation elements supporting the area of
operation remained under control of CFACC and special operations forces remained under the command of COL Mulholland at Task Force Dagger.
Further complicating the Special Forces chain of command, Delta Force, the Navy Seals, Air Force special operations aircraft, and supporting
personnel took direction from Air Force BG Trebon at Task Force 11, located at Joint Special Operations Command in Fort Bragg North Carolina

Structure Of Operation Anaconda
Command Structure
Command structure is the organizational hierarchy through which administrative leadership or operational authority is exercised (DOD Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, 2017). The United States' armed forces and other coalition forces encountered an estimated 1,000 enemy troops and
killed hundreds during Operation Anaconda. However, defeating these enemy forces required commanders and staff members to scramble to
coordinate and rush reinforcements into battle after the shooting begun. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain headquarters failure to
establish and maintain tactical control, operational control, or situational awareness (SA) of special operations forces and other inter–agencies led to
unity of command confusion during the execution of Operation Anaconda.
Command Structure before Operation Anaconda
The United States and its allies responded against Al Qaida members and their Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan after their 11 September 2001
(commonly referred to as 9/11) attack on New York City and Washington D.C. The initial crisis action planning, developed with limited intelligence and
without a well–defined end state, had a significant impact on the overall mission and the concept of operations in Afghanistan and the region,
specifically U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT) was located in Hawaii and maintained small support staffs in Tampa and
Bahrain. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) did not have a standing

Running head: OPERATION ANACONDA JOINT PLANNING1 OPERATION ANACONDA JOINT PLANNING7 Operation Anaconda Joint
Planning SFC Durham, Joshua B. Master Leader Course Operation Anaconda Joint Planning Enemy combatants, in familiar terrain, chose to stand and
fight from fortified positions; forcing commanders to improvise and adapt quickly to unforeseen circumstances. Support elements received the
operational order within just one week of the expected execution date. Staff elements created analysis and plans on poor intelligence estimates and
recent experience. Strategic planners also failed to establish command and control of the assault force. Lack of forethought for an integrated joint
operation, although ultimately successful, led to the death of U.S. service members. Joint planning for Operation Anaconda, with its complex variables
requiring integrated skills, failed to account for enemy variables, withheld information from support elements, and failed to establish effective
command and control. Enemy Initial planning to execute Operation Anaconda was to employ the ?hammer and anvil? technique. This technique uses a
primary assault force,... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Commanders assigned U.S. Special Forces, the 10th Mountain Division, the 101st Airborne Division, U.S. Air Force aircraft, and Afghan military
forces as significant contributors to the overall mission accomplishment. With the amount of subordinate units, information must be detailed and
specific for those involved. In early February, intelligence identified large concentrations of enemy forces in the target area. However, preparation for
the mission did not include allied forces personnel. Planning for Operation Anaconda finalized 13 February without the Combined Forces Air
Component Commander, LTG Mosley. LTG Mosley finally learned of plans on 23 February, five days before the intended start date of 28

Anaconda Command Structure
Command Structure Operation Anaconda
Introduction
The command structure in United States Military is vital to the success of missions carried out in or outside the country. The Department of Defense is
responsible for overseeing the establishment of command hierarchies that work for specific units. The commands, guidelines, and orders are passed
from the highest–ranking personnel to lowest ranking officers who must perform the directive or pass it to subordinates with the same instructions. The
principles that establish the command structure in the military evaluates the performance of each command and the officers involved in the various
missions. The key principles that affected the execution of Operation Anaconda resulting in mission deficiencies are organizational structure,
decision–making, and collaboration. Operation Anaconda The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) aimed at destroying terror groups Taliban
and al–Qaeda carried out operation Anaconda. The operation was executed in March 2002 outside the valley of Shahi–Kot in Zormat area, Afghanistan
(Fleri, Howard, Hukill, Searle, 2003). The task included forces that required direct command and instruction from their Commanders. The mission was
in direct link with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) office and CENTCOM with the General Tommy R. Franks as the officer in charge that
received, analyzed and provided real–time intelligence. Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, of the 10th

Anaconda Joint Command Structure
U.S. intelligence underestimated the enemy threat, including its size, location, and brutality. They also overestimated the reliability of friendly
Afghanistan forces no full joint command structure in the Afghanistan area of responsibility and joint coalition operations had no plan to guide force
operations. In Afghanistan, there was confusion about who was in charge with unity of command. The Army Task force 10th Mountain was the lead
organization during planning and execution of Anaconda, but it did not yet have full Combined Joint Task Force authority to plan a joint battle Many
of its integrated assets were deployed in different other countries. It had a recently established a combined Air liaison cell but no fully developed air
support... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The Army had only two infantry companies in tactical reserve in a fluid battle where the withdrawal of friendly Afghan forces compromised the
situation. The air component was not involved in joint planning far enough to be aware of the Army's branch plans and therefore did not develop
unique branch plans of its own. Essentially, on–call airstrikes against targets of opportunity were Task Force Mountain's branch plans for the air
component. Targets developed by the Task Force daily targeting board to Combined Force Air Component Commander for consideration and inclusion
in the air tasking order. The air component did not develop a more detailed understanding of the battle on its own initiative, thus resulting in the Task
Force Mountain plan becoming the in fact air campaign plan. In addition, of being assign to the upcoming operation and coordinated with the different
ground Units per standard doctrine. Time was short, and Task Force Mountain steadily focused on integrating the complex actions of ground units from
the 10th and 101st Divisions, friendly Afghanistan forces, and Special Forces, including other allied units that were to help block exit routes along the
outer circles of the battlefield. During the battle, Special Operation Forces from Australia, Canada, Germany, Denmark, France, and Norway were
expected to help

Command Structure Of Operation Anaconda

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