The document discusses the Six Party Talks between the US, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear program. It provides a timeline of developments from 1994 to 2010, including North Korean nuclear and missile tests and agreements made. The US stance is outlined, favoring bilateral talks over returning to stalled multilateral Six Party Talks until North Korea shows responsibility. Three options are presented: not returning to talks, leaving the option open, or an immediate return. The decision is to not push for an immediate return but leave future talks possible depending on North Korea's actions.

1. Should the U.S. press for a return to the Six Party Talks? Meredith Lamberti

3. United States

4. Russia

5. Japan

6. China

7. North Korea

8. South Korea

10. North Korea pledges to freeze and eventually dismantle nuclear weapons in return for 2 power-producing nuclear reactors

11. 1998: North Korea fires a missile over Japan, into the Pacific Ocean

12. 1999: North Korea pledges to freeze long-range missile tests

13. 2000: North Korea threatens to restart nuclear program

14. June 2001: North Korea warns it will reconsider lifting the freeze on missile testing

15. July 2001: US State Department reports that North Korea is developing long-range missiles.

17. Oct. 2002: North Korea tells US delegation it has a second covert nuclear program

18. Jan. 2003: North Korea says it will withdraw from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

19. April 2003: US, China, and North Korea announce talks in Beijing

20. April 2003: North Korea announces it has nuclear weapons and may test, export, or use them depending upon US actions

21. Aug. 2003: North Korea joins the first round of Six Party Talks

22. Feb. 2004: Second round of Six Party Talks

24. Sept. 2004: North Korea threatens not to attend the fourth round of talks

25. Feb. 2005: North Korea announces it has nuclear weapons

26. May 2005: North Korea fires short-range missile into Sea of Japan

27. July – Aug. 2005: Fourth round of Six Party Talks. North Korea was in attendance

28. Sept. 2005: North Korea pledges to dismantle nuclear programs in return for pledges of energy assistance.

30. Oct. 2006: North Korea declares that it conducted first nuclear test

31. Feb. 2007: Sixth round of Six Party Talks

32. July 2007: North Korea closes down a nuclear reactor after the US returns the transfer of previously frozen funds

33. July 2007: Seventh round of Six Party Talks

34. Sept. 2007: North Korea pledges to disclose all nuclear activities and disable nuclear programs by end of 2007

36. July 2008: Eighth round of Six Party Talks

37. Sept 2008: North Korea announces plans to restart nuclear programs and bans international inspectors from Yongbyon

38. Oct 2008: President Bush removes North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism

39. Oct. 2008: North Korea resumes tearing down Yongbyon and removes ban on international inspectors

41. May 2009: North Korea explodes nuclear device underground

42. Jan. 2010: North Korea calls for end to hostile relations with the US and vows to strive for a nuclear-free peninsula

43. Feb. 2010: North Korea declares 4 areas near disputed sea border with South Korea to be naval firing zones

44. March 2010: Sinking of South Korean warship

46. Sept. 2010: President Obama signs new sanctions against North Korea into law.

47. Nov. 2010: North Korea shows visiting American nuclear scientist a new, secretly-built uranium enriching facility

48. Nov. 2010: Cross-border clash between North and South Korea

49. South: North fired on border island; resulted in death of 2 marines

50. North: South began firing first

52. North Korea pledges to eventually abandon quest to become nuclear power

53. Denuclearization Plan

54. Feb. 2007

55. Yongbyon plant

56. 2008: release of documents

57. North Korea has continued to fire missiles over/near Japan

58. Stop-and-go negotiations; unpredictability of North Korea

59. Multiple missile tests

60. Document left out details

61. Warship sinking

63. Doubts that multi-lateral talks will produce results; bilateral talks between the US and North Korea may produce the best/quickest results

64. Dec. 1: “We are not interested in talks, and talks are no substitute for having North Korea fulfills its international obligations, meet its commitments and cease provocations…As North Korea demonstrates a willingness to do that, then we will act accordingly” (State Department spokesman Philip Crowley)

66. Country has a past of aggressive action prompting negotiations; this isn’t a trend we should continue

68. Kim Jong-il is already unpredictable; no guarantee that not negotiating with him make the country take responsibility or change their actions

70. Leave open the option for bi-lateral as well as multi-lateral talks

73. There is no guarantee that North Korea will change their behavior without a negotiation process

75. South Korea has no interest in returning to Six Party Talks this early

77. North Korea can be unpredictable; gives us the option to pursue multi or bi-lateral talks depending on how the climate changes

78. Puts some pressure on North Korea to change their behavior without either seeming like we are bending to their will or refusing to negotiate