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iPhone Forensics, sans iPhone
    Adam Crosby (adam@uptill3.com)

    March 14, 2010


Saturday, March 20, 2010
Background Info




Saturday, March 20, 2010
iTunes Sync
    What happens when you plug in...




Saturday, March 20, 2010
OS Image

    ✤    The OS image for an iPhone is
         NOT backed up on each sync

    ✤    The image is only backed up
         when the phone software is
         upgrade

    ✤    The image only changes
         between major versions - no
         ‘patches’ for iPhone OS.

    ✤    Does not contain ANY user
         apps or data

Saturday, March 20, 2010
Apps / User Data
    ✤    Initial sync with iTunes creates an
         archive on the computer of all of the
         user apps/data from the phone

          ✤    The files contained in the archive
               are all obfuscated

    ✤    Virtually none of the files or data are
         encrypted (!)

    ✤    Files are updated in place with every
         sync of the phone

    ✤    This archive is used to recover the
         phone if needed

Saturday, March 20, 2010
Obfuscated Information




Saturday, March 20, 2010
That’s a lot of files...
    And none of those names are meaningful.

              The Archive Is Located At: ~/Library/Application Support/MobileSync/Backup/<phone Id>/


Saturday, March 20, 2010
What kind of Data?




    A whole bunch of different kinds




Saturday, March 20, 2010
‘plist’ --> Apple Property List
    •    iPhone uses 3 main ‘standard’ plist files

          •    Info.plist, Manifest.plist, and Status.plist

          •    Info.plist is by far the most interesting (more later)

    •    These are plaintext XML documents

    •    Easily read, not always easy to decipher

    •    May contain substantial Base64 encoded <data> chunks

    •    Open with text editor, or plistlib in Python 2.5+ (yay!)




        Info.plist
        example


Saturday, March 20, 2010
‘mdinfo’ --> Apple bplist files

    •    Special kind of plist - ‘binary packed’

    •    Luckily, Apple provides an easy to use OS X utility called plutil

          •    plutil -convert xml1 <filename>

    •    Converts the bplist file into a standard plist in place (so copy it out of the live
         archive folder before digging in.

    •    Many of the bplist files have Base64 encoded <data> property values that are
         themselves bplists

          •    The SMS db bplist file is like this.

          •    Just unencode it and run it through plutil again to get the embedded plist data
               out

Saturday, March 20, 2010
‘mddata’ --> The goods

    ✤    The mddata files are simply renamed copies of whatever the original
         source file described by the mdinfo file was. There are images,
         databases, text chunks, and application specific stuff (such as MOBI
         ebooks).

    ✤    No formatting changes - you can open the PNGs/JPGs as-is and look
         at the pictures

    ✤    Any other tools (such as sqlite3) can open files of the correct type in
         place as well

    ✤    ‘file *.mddata’ in the archive will give a great listing of each file and it’s
         actual data type

Saturday, March 20, 2010
File Names




Saturday, March 20, 2010
Crazy file names (learn to love SHA1)

    ✤    iPhone OS storage is broken into something called ‘Domains’

    ✤    Each file has a file name, path, and a particular storage domain

          ✤    Two primary domains are ‘HomeDomain’ and ‘MediaDomain’

    ✤    The filenames of the mddata and mdinfo files are a SHA1 hash of the
         full path of the files on-handset location and the domain it is located
         in.

    ✤    Filenames do not appear to change, but worst case scenario is
         iterating over mdinfo files to find the actual file name you need

Saturday, March 20, 2010
Embedded b64
                                                  bplist



                                                Decoded <data>


                                                      Domain

                                                         Path



  printf(‘MediaDomain-Library/SMS/Parts/98/02/15874-4.jpg’) | shasum
               39cf2a2aaa3dd7d72243e3d638217ccc15ad2575

Saturday, March 20, 2010
So what’s in there?




Saturday, March 20, 2010
Info.plist - All about the phone

    ✤    This is an unencoded, standard Apple Property List file (XML text)

    ✤    It contains a wealth of useful information about the phone:

          ✤    ICC-ID - “Integrated Circuit Card ID”, the hardware serial number of the installed SIM card

          ✤    IMEI - “International Mobile Equiment Identity”, the hardware serial number of the handset’s baseband proc [*]

          ✤    Phone Number - Duh.

          ✤    Serial Number - The iPhone’s serial number (this shows in iTunes)

          ✤    Product Type - What kind of iPhone (‘iPhone2,1’ = 8GB 3GS, ‘iPhone1,2’ = 8GB 3G, etc.)

          ✤    Product Version - What iPhone OS revision (3.1.3, 3.1.2, etc.)

          ✤    Data of Last backup - Duh.

          ✤    iPhone preferences plist (base64 encoded embedded plist)

          ✤    Misc. other stuff (encoded / binary application specific data)


Saturday, March 20, 2010
A note about IMEI and ICC-ID

    ✤    ICC-ID is burned into the SIM

    ✤    IMEI is burned into the phone

    ✤    It is illegal (and technically difficult) to change either the ICC-ID or the IMEI

    ✤    The ICC-ID identifies which network/carrier sold the SIM

    ✤    The IMEI can be used to uniquely identify a given handset, and is used by carriers to
         disable stolen handsets, even if a new SIM is swapped in.

    ✤    Neither the IMEI nor the ICC-ID is tied to the subscriber account at the GSM protocol
         level (that would be the IMSI, which is NOT recorded anywhere but in the SIM)

    ✤    ATT or other carriers and Apple may be able to collaborate with LE to determine a
         subscribers identity via ICC-ID, IMEI and Apple ID, as the information does exist

Saturday, March 20, 2010
Delicious Databases




Saturday, March 20, 2010
SQLite - Apple loves it, so should you

    ✤    Open Source, file-based database engine

    ✤    Apple uses it extensively across their platforms and application
         ranges - most iPhone devs know it as ‘CoreData’

    ✤    Simple relational database, supports most of SQL-92

    ✤    sqlite3 is the OS X built in CLI to access SQLite database files

    ✤    In the CLI, the ‘.schema’ command shows database and table schemas




Saturday, March 20, 2010
3d0d7e5fb2ce288813306e4d4636395e047a3d28.mddata
                   (also known as HomeDomain-Library/SMS/sms.db)



    ✤    SQLite database

    ✤    Contains full SMS records (including full text) for phone, since owner
         originally created an iPhone account (my DB goes back to 2007)

    ✤    Updated in place during sync - deleted messages are removed, new
         messages are inserted

    ✤    Does NOT contain MMS info (although receipt of an MMS is
         indicated)

    ✤    Simple data structure for messages table

Saturday, March 20, 2010
Important
     fields




    SMS message table schema

Saturday, March 20, 2010
SMS Message DB Notes

    ✤    Address is either source or destination phone number, in 11-digit intl. format (18885551212)

    ✤    Time is in UNIX epoch format (# of seconds since 1/1/70 0:00 UTC)

          ✤    Easy to convert - ‘date -r 1268603160’ yields “Sun Mar 14 17:46:00 EDT 2010”

    ✤    Flags field is used to indicate a number of things (these are all trial/error, not documented):

          ✤    ‘2’ = Message recieved from ‘address’

          ✤    ‘3’ = Message sent from handset to ‘address’

          ✤    ’33’ = Message send failure (SMS never sent)

          ✤    ’35’ = Message send failure (SMS never sent) (I think this also indicates a retry)

          ✤    ‘129’ = Message deleted (but still appears as a row - no contents though)

          ✤    ‘131’ = Unknown - no address / etc.

    ✤    ‘Text’ field is sometimes a plist - this typically indicates an MMS was recieved. MMS text/image information is stored separately
         (in mddata files outside of the SQLite db).

    ✤    The other fields appear unused or static (or not of great interest...)



Saturday, March 20, 2010
6639cb6a02f32e0203851f25465ffb89ca8ae3fa.mddata
        (also known as AppDomain-com.facebook.Facebook-Documents/friends.db)


    ✤    3rd Party Application example

    ✤    SQLite database (hey, everybody uses it - thanks CoreData!)

    ✤    Contains Facebook Friends List and a tiny bit of extra info

          ✤    Facebook UID

                ✤    www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=<fbid>

          ✤    Direct URL to facebook profile picture (no login needed!)

          ✤    Friends phone numbers, as listed in their profile

Saturday, March 20, 2010
Facebook App table schema

Saturday, March 20, 2010
What else is there?




Saturday, March 20, 2010
Other identified databases

                           Filename                          Purpose
    992df473bbb9e132f4b3b6e4d33f72171e97bc7a.mddata
                                                          Voicemail List
    ff1324e6b949111b2fb449ecddb50c89c3699a78.mddata
                                                             Call log
    3d0d7e5fb2ce288813306e4d4636395e047a3d28.mddata
                                                            SMS Data
    740b7eaf93d6ea5d305e88bb349c8e9643f48c3b.mddata
                                                         Notes’ App data
    31bb7ba8914766d4ba40d6dfb6113c8b614be442.mddata
                                                      Sync’d Address book
    6639cb6a02f32e0203851f25465ffb89ca8ae3fa.mddata
                                                       Facebook App data
    970922f2258c5a5a6d449f85b186315a1b9614e9.mddata
                                                         Flightstats Info
    5ad81c93601ac423bc635c7936963ae13177147b.mddata
                                                      Daily Burn food logger
Saturday, March 20, 2010
Other items to look for

    ✤    App developers assume these files are on the phone, away from
         prying eyes (or interested users...)

    ✤    Passwords and other account details stored in plaintext

          ✤    At least Tweetie and Dailyburn store passwords in plaintext

                ✤    (See 87f665a66ead44fd5592fa427c4def228098fdda.mddata for
                     Tweetie’s twitter account information in bplist format)

    ✤    Cookies for some apps embedded browsers (see: Facebook) are stored
         in bplist files (for easier session hijacking, yay!)

Saturday, March 20, 2010
What’s next?

    ✤    Time to start trolling through the app store for ‘service’ apps - GMail,
         GReader, MySpace, etc. to look for more apps that store their user
         creds in plaintext

    ✤    Scripting out data extraction for interesting stuff (like finding out hot
         numbers - who is called / calls the most, and do they have a Facebook
         picture?)

    ✤    Integrating a scrape of the address book with the other data tables to
         give ‘friendly names’ to each phone number

    ✤    Release existing tools open source via 757Labs

Saturday, March 20, 2010
Thanks / Credits


    ✤    757 Labs for hosting!

    ✤    ‘dsp’ on LiveJournal for finally figuring out how the sha1’s are
         generated for file names

    ✤    Apple, for making CoreData so attractive for developers. SQLite
         makes trolling through data easy :)

    ✤    Damon Durand, for some initial work on the meaning of SMS flags



Saturday, March 20, 2010
¿Preguntas?



Saturday, March 20, 2010

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iPhone forensics, without the iPhone

  • 1. iPhone Forensics, sans iPhone Adam Crosby (adam@uptill3.com) March 14, 2010 Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 3. iTunes Sync What happens when you plug in... Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 4. OS Image ✤ The OS image for an iPhone is NOT backed up on each sync ✤ The image is only backed up when the phone software is upgrade ✤ The image only changes between major versions - no ‘patches’ for iPhone OS. ✤ Does not contain ANY user apps or data Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 5. Apps / User Data ✤ Initial sync with iTunes creates an archive on the computer of all of the user apps/data from the phone ✤ The files contained in the archive are all obfuscated ✤ Virtually none of the files or data are encrypted (!) ✤ Files are updated in place with every sync of the phone ✤ This archive is used to recover the phone if needed Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 7. That’s a lot of files... And none of those names are meaningful. The Archive Is Located At: ~/Library/Application Support/MobileSync/Backup/<phone Id>/ Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 8. What kind of Data? A whole bunch of different kinds Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 9. ‘plist’ --> Apple Property List • iPhone uses 3 main ‘standard’ plist files • Info.plist, Manifest.plist, and Status.plist • Info.plist is by far the most interesting (more later) • These are plaintext XML documents • Easily read, not always easy to decipher • May contain substantial Base64 encoded <data> chunks • Open with text editor, or plistlib in Python 2.5+ (yay!) Info.plist example Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 10. ‘mdinfo’ --> Apple bplist files • Special kind of plist - ‘binary packed’ • Luckily, Apple provides an easy to use OS X utility called plutil • plutil -convert xml1 <filename> • Converts the bplist file into a standard plist in place (so copy it out of the live archive folder before digging in. • Many of the bplist files have Base64 encoded <data> property values that are themselves bplists • The SMS db bplist file is like this. • Just unencode it and run it through plutil again to get the embedded plist data out Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 11. ‘mddata’ --> The goods ✤ The mddata files are simply renamed copies of whatever the original source file described by the mdinfo file was. There are images, databases, text chunks, and application specific stuff (such as MOBI ebooks). ✤ No formatting changes - you can open the PNGs/JPGs as-is and look at the pictures ✤ Any other tools (such as sqlite3) can open files of the correct type in place as well ✤ ‘file *.mddata’ in the archive will give a great listing of each file and it’s actual data type Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 13. Crazy file names (learn to love SHA1) ✤ iPhone OS storage is broken into something called ‘Domains’ ✤ Each file has a file name, path, and a particular storage domain ✤ Two primary domains are ‘HomeDomain’ and ‘MediaDomain’ ✤ The filenames of the mddata and mdinfo files are a SHA1 hash of the full path of the files on-handset location and the domain it is located in. ✤ Filenames do not appear to change, but worst case scenario is iterating over mdinfo files to find the actual file name you need Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 14. Embedded b64 bplist Decoded <data> Domain Path printf(‘MediaDomain-Library/SMS/Parts/98/02/15874-4.jpg’) | shasum 39cf2a2aaa3dd7d72243e3d638217ccc15ad2575 Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 15. So what’s in there? Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 16. Info.plist - All about the phone ✤ This is an unencoded, standard Apple Property List file (XML text) ✤ It contains a wealth of useful information about the phone: ✤ ICC-ID - “Integrated Circuit Card ID”, the hardware serial number of the installed SIM card ✤ IMEI - “International Mobile Equiment Identity”, the hardware serial number of the handset’s baseband proc [*] ✤ Phone Number - Duh. ✤ Serial Number - The iPhone’s serial number (this shows in iTunes) ✤ Product Type - What kind of iPhone (‘iPhone2,1’ = 8GB 3GS, ‘iPhone1,2’ = 8GB 3G, etc.) ✤ Product Version - What iPhone OS revision (3.1.3, 3.1.2, etc.) ✤ Data of Last backup - Duh. ✤ iPhone preferences plist (base64 encoded embedded plist) ✤ Misc. other stuff (encoded / binary application specific data) Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 17. A note about IMEI and ICC-ID ✤ ICC-ID is burned into the SIM ✤ IMEI is burned into the phone ✤ It is illegal (and technically difficult) to change either the ICC-ID or the IMEI ✤ The ICC-ID identifies which network/carrier sold the SIM ✤ The IMEI can be used to uniquely identify a given handset, and is used by carriers to disable stolen handsets, even if a new SIM is swapped in. ✤ Neither the IMEI nor the ICC-ID is tied to the subscriber account at the GSM protocol level (that would be the IMSI, which is NOT recorded anywhere but in the SIM) ✤ ATT or other carriers and Apple may be able to collaborate with LE to determine a subscribers identity via ICC-ID, IMEI and Apple ID, as the information does exist Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 19. SQLite - Apple loves it, so should you ✤ Open Source, file-based database engine ✤ Apple uses it extensively across their platforms and application ranges - most iPhone devs know it as ‘CoreData’ ✤ Simple relational database, supports most of SQL-92 ✤ sqlite3 is the OS X built in CLI to access SQLite database files ✤ In the CLI, the ‘.schema’ command shows database and table schemas Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 20. 3d0d7e5fb2ce288813306e4d4636395e047a3d28.mddata (also known as HomeDomain-Library/SMS/sms.db) ✤ SQLite database ✤ Contains full SMS records (including full text) for phone, since owner originally created an iPhone account (my DB goes back to 2007) ✤ Updated in place during sync - deleted messages are removed, new messages are inserted ✤ Does NOT contain MMS info (although receipt of an MMS is indicated) ✤ Simple data structure for messages table Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 21. Important fields SMS message table schema Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 22. SMS Message DB Notes ✤ Address is either source or destination phone number, in 11-digit intl. format (18885551212) ✤ Time is in UNIX epoch format (# of seconds since 1/1/70 0:00 UTC) ✤ Easy to convert - ‘date -r 1268603160’ yields “Sun Mar 14 17:46:00 EDT 2010” ✤ Flags field is used to indicate a number of things (these are all trial/error, not documented): ✤ ‘2’ = Message recieved from ‘address’ ✤ ‘3’ = Message sent from handset to ‘address’ ✤ ’33’ = Message send failure (SMS never sent) ✤ ’35’ = Message send failure (SMS never sent) (I think this also indicates a retry) ✤ ‘129’ = Message deleted (but still appears as a row - no contents though) ✤ ‘131’ = Unknown - no address / etc. ✤ ‘Text’ field is sometimes a plist - this typically indicates an MMS was recieved. MMS text/image information is stored separately (in mddata files outside of the SQLite db). ✤ The other fields appear unused or static (or not of great interest...) Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 23. 6639cb6a02f32e0203851f25465ffb89ca8ae3fa.mddata (also known as AppDomain-com.facebook.Facebook-Documents/friends.db) ✤ 3rd Party Application example ✤ SQLite database (hey, everybody uses it - thanks CoreData!) ✤ Contains Facebook Friends List and a tiny bit of extra info ✤ Facebook UID ✤ www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=<fbid> ✤ Direct URL to facebook profile picture (no login needed!) ✤ Friends phone numbers, as listed in their profile Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 24. Facebook App table schema Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 25. What else is there? Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 26. Other identified databases Filename Purpose 992df473bbb9e132f4b3b6e4d33f72171e97bc7a.mddata Voicemail List ff1324e6b949111b2fb449ecddb50c89c3699a78.mddata Call log 3d0d7e5fb2ce288813306e4d4636395e047a3d28.mddata SMS Data 740b7eaf93d6ea5d305e88bb349c8e9643f48c3b.mddata Notes’ App data 31bb7ba8914766d4ba40d6dfb6113c8b614be442.mddata Sync’d Address book 6639cb6a02f32e0203851f25465ffb89ca8ae3fa.mddata Facebook App data 970922f2258c5a5a6d449f85b186315a1b9614e9.mddata Flightstats Info 5ad81c93601ac423bc635c7936963ae13177147b.mddata Daily Burn food logger Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 27. Other items to look for ✤ App developers assume these files are on the phone, away from prying eyes (or interested users...) ✤ Passwords and other account details stored in plaintext ✤ At least Tweetie and Dailyburn store passwords in plaintext ✤ (See 87f665a66ead44fd5592fa427c4def228098fdda.mddata for Tweetie’s twitter account information in bplist format) ✤ Cookies for some apps embedded browsers (see: Facebook) are stored in bplist files (for easier session hijacking, yay!) Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 28. What’s next? ✤ Time to start trolling through the app store for ‘service’ apps - GMail, GReader, MySpace, etc. to look for more apps that store their user creds in plaintext ✤ Scripting out data extraction for interesting stuff (like finding out hot numbers - who is called / calls the most, and do they have a Facebook picture?) ✤ Integrating a scrape of the address book with the other data tables to give ‘friendly names’ to each phone number ✤ Release existing tools open source via 757Labs Saturday, March 20, 2010
  • 29. Thanks / Credits ✤ 757 Labs for hosting! ✤ ‘dsp’ on LiveJournal for finally figuring out how the sha1’s are generated for file names ✤ Apple, for making CoreData so attractive for developers. SQLite makes trolling through data easy :) ✤ Damon Durand, for some initial work on the meaning of SMS flags Saturday, March 20, 2010