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IDF operation in gaza strip - day 3 (29.12)
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This is the daily update for 29.12 regarding the IDF operation in gaza strip
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CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed. 2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda. 3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
2017 01-31 ctp update and assessment
2017 01-31 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
2017 05-02 ctp update and assessment
2017 05-02 ctp update and assessment
2017 05-02 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia. 2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya. 3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
2017 06-06 ctp update and assessment (1)
2017 06-06 ctp update and assessment (1)
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement. 2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however. 3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
2017 01-10 ctp update and assessment
2017 01-10 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians. 2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war. 3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
2017-05-23 CTP Update and Assessment
2017-05-23 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
No154 newslettr daily e-24_6_2013
No154 newslettr daily e-24_6_2013
e-syrianews
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it. 2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain. 3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
2016 11-15 ctp update and assessment
2016 11-15 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership seeks to shape the Syrian battlefield by broadening the scope of the conflict. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri admonished fighters in Syria to avoid nationalism and prepare for a protracted guerrilla war supported by the entire Sunni community. The “Imam Shamil Battalion,” likely a Central Asian group, claimed that Zawahiri ordered it to conduct the April 3 metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia, signaling that al Qaeda leadership may seek to shape Russia’s posture in Syria with external attacks. 2. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar’s military expansion may undermine hopes for political reconciliation in Libya. A LNA-aligned political body signaled that it may be willing to participate in the UN-brokered political process and end a boycott of more than a year. Haftar’s forces are preparing to attack a base held by militias aligned with the UN-backed government, however. Haftar’s pursuit of a military solution may interrupt the long-awaited political dialogue. 3. Al Shabaab seeks to gain popular support by establishing itself as a humanitarian aid provider in rural Somalia. The group ambushed two convoys carrying Emirati Red Crescent and World Food Programme personnel near Mogadishu in April in an effort to deter international aid. Al Shabaab simultaneously facilitates aid delivery to vulnerable populations in southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab aims to exploit Somalia’s catastrophic drought and famine conditions to challenge the authority of the Somali Federal Government, which will struggle to respond to the population’s needs.
2017 04-25 ctp update and assessment
2017 04-25 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
Recommended
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed. 2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda. 3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
2017 01-31 ctp update and assessment
2017 01-31 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
2017 05-02 ctp update and assessment
2017 05-02 ctp update and assessment
2017 05-02 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia. 2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya. 3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
2017 06-06 ctp update and assessment (1)
2017 06-06 ctp update and assessment (1)
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement. 2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however. 3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
2017 01-10 ctp update and assessment
2017 01-10 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians. 2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war. 3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
2017-05-23 CTP Update and Assessment
2017-05-23 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
No154 newslettr daily e-24_6_2013
No154 newslettr daily e-24_6_2013
e-syrianews
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it. 2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain. 3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
2016 11-15 ctp update and assessment
2016 11-15 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership seeks to shape the Syrian battlefield by broadening the scope of the conflict. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri admonished fighters in Syria to avoid nationalism and prepare for a protracted guerrilla war supported by the entire Sunni community. The “Imam Shamil Battalion,” likely a Central Asian group, claimed that Zawahiri ordered it to conduct the April 3 metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia, signaling that al Qaeda leadership may seek to shape Russia’s posture in Syria with external attacks. 2. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar’s military expansion may undermine hopes for political reconciliation in Libya. A LNA-aligned political body signaled that it may be willing to participate in the UN-brokered political process and end a boycott of more than a year. Haftar’s forces are preparing to attack a base held by militias aligned with the UN-backed government, however. Haftar’s pursuit of a military solution may interrupt the long-awaited political dialogue. 3. Al Shabaab seeks to gain popular support by establishing itself as a humanitarian aid provider in rural Somalia. The group ambushed two convoys carrying Emirati Red Crescent and World Food Programme personnel near Mogadishu in April in an effort to deter international aid. Al Shabaab simultaneously facilitates aid delivery to vulnerable populations in southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab aims to exploit Somalia’s catastrophic drought and famine conditions to challenge the authority of the Somali Federal Government, which will struggle to respond to the population’s needs.
2017 04-25 ctp update and assessment
2017 04-25 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates. 2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them. 3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.
2017 07-05 ctp update and assessment
2017 07-05 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues. 2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region. 3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
2017 01-24 ctp update and assessment
2017 01-24 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya. 2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire. 3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
2017 05-31 ctp update and assessment
2017 05-31 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West. 2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS. 3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017-11-07 CTP Update and Assessment
2017-11-07 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason. 2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya. 3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.] 2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.] 3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
2016 12-13 ctp update and assessment
2016 12-13 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. A coordinated release of strategic guidance across al Qaeda’s affiliates indicates continued centralized direction from al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri to the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent issued a detailed statement outlining how its followers should interact with other Salafi-jihadi groups and treat Muslim civilians in order to cultivate the support of the masses. The document also listed and prioritized legitimate targets for attacks. Al Shabaab emir Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubaidah) issued guidance for Muslims in East Africa, couching the local objectives in terms of the global fight. 2. Ongoing negotiations between members of the Saudi-led coalition and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s block are occurring outside of the UN-led process. An elite-brokered deal is unlikely to address the core underlying grievances that feed conflict in Yemen’s civil war and therefore may not stabilize the country. Current reports indicate that former Yemeni prime minister Khaled Bahah could replace Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and Saleh’s son, Ahmed Saleh, would take the office of the vice president. 3. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attacking oil infrastructure in Libya. ISIS in Libya has reconstituted sufficiently to launch a counter-counter-offensive to destabilize Libya further and create space for its forces to regroup. The Misratan counter-ISIS offensive in Libya degraded ISIS significantly, but did not defeat the group.
2017 06-28 ctp update and assessment
2017 06-28 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The Trump administration is weighing increased involvement in Libya that may tip the scale further in favor of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the dominant militia force in eastern Libya. The administration might be considering a diplomatic presence of an intelligence coordination center in Benghazi. The reported policy discussion emerged after Haftar declared victory in Benghazi on July 5, ending a three-year effort to clear the city of Islamist militias and Salafi-jihadi groups. Haftar, backed by Egypt and the UAE, seeks to parlay his growing power into a leading role in a national political settlement. The U.S. must tread carefully when engaging with Haftar, whose quest to stabilize eastern Libya and eradicate political Islam has harmed democratic institutions and played in to extremist narratives. 2. Al Shabaab escalated attacks in northeastern Kenya in an attempt to turn Kenyan voters against the military intervention in Somalia before general elections in August. Militants beheaded nine civilians in Lamu County on the northern Kenyan coast July 9, four days after nearly 200 al Shabaab militants clashed with police forces in the same region. Kenyan warplanes conducted strikes targeting al Shabaab strongholds in the Boni Forest along the Somali border in response to the attacks. 3. The fracturing of the Yemeni state undermines U.S. policy in Yemen, which relies on the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s already weak administration is losing control of southern Yemen. The Transitional Political Council of the South, a rival body that seeks to form an independent governing entity for southern Yemen, announced the formation of a governmental structure on July 9.
2017 07-11 ctp update and assessment
2017 07-11 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
1.Russia deployed military personnel to Libya to secure its military and economic interests amid the escalating civil war. U.S. and Egyptian officials reported a Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) and drones deployment to a military base in western Egypt to support operations in Libya. Russia supports Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar as part of a larger plan to secure additional military basing on the Mediterranean and strengthen ties to Egypt. Russia also has significant economic interests in Libya’s oil industry. An Islamist militia coalition seized two key oil terminals from the LNA on March 3. The LNA reportedly recaptured the terminals on March 14, with likely Egyptian backing and possibly Russian and Emirati support. Hostilities will likely continue to escalate in Libya’s oil crescent. Russia will likely seize the opportunity to increase its diplomatic and military involvement in an effort to shape the outcome of the conflict. 2. The Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi will not agree to terms for a ceasefire with the al Houthi-Saleh faction while current frontlines hold in Yemen. Hadi refused to discuss ceasefire terms with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed on March 9. He refused to pursue negotiations until his forces seize Yemen’s Red Sea ports from the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. Coalition-backed forces control Mokha port in Taiz governorate but are unlikely to advance quickly into al Hudaydah governorate, where the Hadi government lacks popular support. Riyadh is in the midst of a diplomatic push to secure Washington’s support for its objectives in Yemen. U.S. support for a Saudi-led military solution would exacerbate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and drive the al Houthis further into the Iranian orbit. 3. Al Shabaab is conducting an explosive attack campaign in Mogadishu that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo. Al Shabaab detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) targeting a military position and a hotel in central Mogadishu on March 13. The militant group has now conducted four VBIED attacks in Mogadishu since President Farmajo took office in February. The SFG struggles to project its power beyond select population centers in Somalia, and al Shabaab is now challenging its ability to secure the hard-won capital city. The SFG’s legitimacy is central to the success of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia.
2017 03-14 ctp update and assessment
2017 03-14 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism. 2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya. 3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
2016 11-29 ctp update and assessment
2016 11-29 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
2017 10-03 CTP Update and Assessment
2017 10-03 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network, including its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.
2017 10-17 CTP Update and Assessment
2017 10-17 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a resort near Bamako, the capital of Mali, signaling the possible return of a terror campaign targeting West African sites frequented by Western officials, tourists, and expatriates. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups conducted a series of attacks on hotels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast in late 2015 and early 2016. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM in March 2017 and have since escalated an insurgency against Malian, French, and UN forces in northern Mali. 2. The Qatar diplomatic crisis is reverberating in the Horn of Africa region. Qatari peacekeeping troops withdrew from the contested border between Djibouti and Eritrea on June 14 after Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. Eritrea deployed troops to the contested border for the first time since the 2008 border war, prompting Djibouti to place its military on alert. 3. Iranian support for the al Houthi-Saleh faction threatens navigational freedom in the Red Sea. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a surface-to-ship missile at an Emirati vessel near Mokha port on June 15, wounding one crewmember. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Lebanese Hezbollah likely provided technical support for past shore-to-ship attacks, including the October 2016 attacks on a U.S. warship near the Bab al Mandab Strait.
2017-06-20 CTP Update and Assessment
2017-06-20 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. A Libyan militia freed Saif al Islam al Qaddafi, the favored son of deceased Libyan dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, on June 9. Saif al Islam’s release coincides with increasingly visible activity by Qaddafi-era figures, as well as strategic advances by the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These conditions threaten many Libyan stakeholders, especially political Islamists, who fear that Haftar will bring about the return of the regime. This fear strengthens hardline militias and Salafi-jihadi groups, particularly al Qaeda and its associates. 2. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is unlikely to address the long-term threat posed by al Shabaab. U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab site in southern Somalia in response to attacks on Somali and African Union peacekeeping troops, which began an operation to degrade al Shabaab’s strongholds in southern Somalia this week. Al Shabaab displayed strength on multiple fronts, however. The group resurged in northern Somalia, where it seized a town, and continued campaigns to counter the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and degrade security in Mogadishu. 3. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri characterized the Muslim world as fighting a single war on many fronts. He called for the unity of the umma, or Muslim community, against external foes, reiterating a theme emphasized by al Qaeda clerics and leadership. Zawahiri’s statement reflects al Qaeda’s efforts to influence Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen, and other conflict zones throughout the Muslim-majority world.
2017 06-13 ctp update and assessment
2017 06-13 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda celebrated key members of the September 11 attacks to commemorate the sixteenth anniversary of the attacks. Al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing released the video will of one of the attackers, the first in five years. Al Sahab also released a letter from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the September 11 attacks, addressed to President Barack Obama in 2015 claiming the attacks were a defensive measure. These propaganda pieces are part of al Qaeda’s effort to reinforce its role as a leader of the Salafi-jihadi movement. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s landmark report: “America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement.”] 2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh remains strained. Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) party criticized the al Houthi movement’s attempt to replace Saleh loyalists within the al Houthi-Saleh unity government with al Houthi movement supporters. The al Houthi-Saleh bloc will not fracture while the Saudi-led coalition remains a threat to both groups, though Saleh actively seeks to negotiate terms for a settlement. [Sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Situation Reports.] 3. Kenyan presidential candidates are threatening to escalate civil unrest in the country ahead of the October presidential election. President Uhuru Kenyatta threatened to impeach opposition leader Raila Odinga should Odinga win the presidency after Odinga’s party boycotted the first session of parliament. The current political battle is reminiscent of the 2007 election, which escalated to widespread political unrest. Al Shabaab is conducting an attack campaign against Kenyan forces to sway the election in favor of Odinga, who advocates withdrawing from the counter-al Shabaab mission in Somalia. [Read CTP’s US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?]
2017-09-12 CTP Update and Assessment
2017-09-12 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The members of al Qaeda’s affiliate network coordinate closely to produce strategic messaging. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a joint statement calling for attacks on Jews on July 16. The statement is a response to Israel’s temporary closure of al Aqsa Mosque on July 14 after three Arab Israeli gunmen killed two Israeli policemen in Jerusalem. AQAP and AQIM likely use secure communications or embedded personnel to rapidly coordinate messaging. 2. Country-wide protests are challenging the Moroccan state. Protest movements are coalescing around shared grievances against Morocco’s security forces, as well as unemployment and underdevelopment. Organizers are planning a national protest for July 20. The protests’ focus on security forces, on which the state relies, signals a possible threat to King Mohammed VI’s power as he seeks to meet protesters’ demands after several failed attempts. 3. The UN is pursuing a plan to transfer control of Yemen’s al Hudaydah port from the al Houthi-Saleh faction to a neutral party as a first step to resuming stalled ceasefire talks. Al Hudaydah is the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s only port. The UN effort, mediated by China, is intended to prevent a Saudi-led coalition offensive to seize al Hudaydah, which will have dire humanitarian consequences. The al Houthi-Saleh faction is unlikely to support the transfer of the port through the UN, which it sees as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2017 07-18 ctp update and assessment
2017 07-18 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. U.S. Special Operations Forces participated in an Emirati-backed Yemeni operation to secure populated areas and oil pipelines in Shabwah governorate, southern Yemen. The operation aims to degrade the ability of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to coordinate external attacks from safe havens in Yemen. AQAP militants withdrew from Shabwah to strongholds in neighboring Abyan governorate in response. The operation is unlikely to affect AQAP’s capabilities in the long term. 2. U.S. airstrikes targeted Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) forces in Libya mobilizing outside of Sirte city, the group’s former stronghold on the Mediterranean coast. ISIS retains the capability to recruit and train fighters despite losses inflicted by the U.S.-backed campaign to retake Sirte and subsequent airstrikes. 3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) ransoms hostages to fund its broader efforts to destabilize and replace West African states, as well as expel Western influence from the region. AQIM received at least $4.2 million in exchange for the release of Swedish and South Africa hostages in the past two months. AQIM will likely plan or support additional attacks on sites frequented by Western expatriates, continuing a campaign resumed by an AQIM affiliate in Mali in June.
2017 08-08 ctp update and assessment
2017 08-08 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
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CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates. 2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them. 3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.
2017 07-05 ctp update and assessment
2017 07-05 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues. 2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region. 3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
2017 01-24 ctp update and assessment
2017 01-24 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya. 2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire. 3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
2017 05-31 ctp update and assessment
2017 05-31 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West. 2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS. 3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017-11-07 CTP Update and Assessment
2017-11-07 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason. 2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya. 3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.] 2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.] 3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
2016 12-13 ctp update and assessment
2016 12-13 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. A coordinated release of strategic guidance across al Qaeda’s affiliates indicates continued centralized direction from al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri to the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent issued a detailed statement outlining how its followers should interact with other Salafi-jihadi groups and treat Muslim civilians in order to cultivate the support of the masses. The document also listed and prioritized legitimate targets for attacks. Al Shabaab emir Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubaidah) issued guidance for Muslims in East Africa, couching the local objectives in terms of the global fight. 2. Ongoing negotiations between members of the Saudi-led coalition and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s block are occurring outside of the UN-led process. An elite-brokered deal is unlikely to address the core underlying grievances that feed conflict in Yemen’s civil war and therefore may not stabilize the country. Current reports indicate that former Yemeni prime minister Khaled Bahah could replace Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and Saleh’s son, Ahmed Saleh, would take the office of the vice president. 3. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attacking oil infrastructure in Libya. ISIS in Libya has reconstituted sufficiently to launch a counter-counter-offensive to destabilize Libya further and create space for its forces to regroup. The Misratan counter-ISIS offensive in Libya degraded ISIS significantly, but did not defeat the group.
2017 06-28 ctp update and assessment
2017 06-28 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The Trump administration is weighing increased involvement in Libya that may tip the scale further in favor of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the dominant militia force in eastern Libya. The administration might be considering a diplomatic presence of an intelligence coordination center in Benghazi. The reported policy discussion emerged after Haftar declared victory in Benghazi on July 5, ending a three-year effort to clear the city of Islamist militias and Salafi-jihadi groups. Haftar, backed by Egypt and the UAE, seeks to parlay his growing power into a leading role in a national political settlement. The U.S. must tread carefully when engaging with Haftar, whose quest to stabilize eastern Libya and eradicate political Islam has harmed democratic institutions and played in to extremist narratives. 2. Al Shabaab escalated attacks in northeastern Kenya in an attempt to turn Kenyan voters against the military intervention in Somalia before general elections in August. Militants beheaded nine civilians in Lamu County on the northern Kenyan coast July 9, four days after nearly 200 al Shabaab militants clashed with police forces in the same region. Kenyan warplanes conducted strikes targeting al Shabaab strongholds in the Boni Forest along the Somali border in response to the attacks. 3. The fracturing of the Yemeni state undermines U.S. policy in Yemen, which relies on the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s already weak administration is losing control of southern Yemen. The Transitional Political Council of the South, a rival body that seeks to form an independent governing entity for southern Yemen, announced the formation of a governmental structure on July 9.
2017 07-11 ctp update and assessment
2017 07-11 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
1.Russia deployed military personnel to Libya to secure its military and economic interests amid the escalating civil war. U.S. and Egyptian officials reported a Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) and drones deployment to a military base in western Egypt to support operations in Libya. Russia supports Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar as part of a larger plan to secure additional military basing on the Mediterranean and strengthen ties to Egypt. Russia also has significant economic interests in Libya’s oil industry. An Islamist militia coalition seized two key oil terminals from the LNA on March 3. The LNA reportedly recaptured the terminals on March 14, with likely Egyptian backing and possibly Russian and Emirati support. Hostilities will likely continue to escalate in Libya’s oil crescent. Russia will likely seize the opportunity to increase its diplomatic and military involvement in an effort to shape the outcome of the conflict. 2. The Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi will not agree to terms for a ceasefire with the al Houthi-Saleh faction while current frontlines hold in Yemen. Hadi refused to discuss ceasefire terms with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed on March 9. He refused to pursue negotiations until his forces seize Yemen’s Red Sea ports from the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. Coalition-backed forces control Mokha port in Taiz governorate but are unlikely to advance quickly into al Hudaydah governorate, where the Hadi government lacks popular support. Riyadh is in the midst of a diplomatic push to secure Washington’s support for its objectives in Yemen. U.S. support for a Saudi-led military solution would exacerbate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and drive the al Houthis further into the Iranian orbit. 3. Al Shabaab is conducting an explosive attack campaign in Mogadishu that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo. Al Shabaab detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) targeting a military position and a hotel in central Mogadishu on March 13. The militant group has now conducted four VBIED attacks in Mogadishu since President Farmajo took office in February. The SFG struggles to project its power beyond select population centers in Somalia, and al Shabaab is now challenging its ability to secure the hard-won capital city. The SFG’s legitimacy is central to the success of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia.
2017 03-14 ctp update and assessment
2017 03-14 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism. 2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya. 3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
2016 11-29 ctp update and assessment
2016 11-29 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
2017 10-03 CTP Update and Assessment
2017 10-03 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network, including its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.
2017 10-17 CTP Update and Assessment
2017 10-17 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a resort near Bamako, the capital of Mali, signaling the possible return of a terror campaign targeting West African sites frequented by Western officials, tourists, and expatriates. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups conducted a series of attacks on hotels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast in late 2015 and early 2016. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM in March 2017 and have since escalated an insurgency against Malian, French, and UN forces in northern Mali. 2. The Qatar diplomatic crisis is reverberating in the Horn of Africa region. Qatari peacekeeping troops withdrew from the contested border between Djibouti and Eritrea on June 14 after Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. Eritrea deployed troops to the contested border for the first time since the 2008 border war, prompting Djibouti to place its military on alert. 3. Iranian support for the al Houthi-Saleh faction threatens navigational freedom in the Red Sea. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a surface-to-ship missile at an Emirati vessel near Mokha port on June 15, wounding one crewmember. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Lebanese Hezbollah likely provided technical support for past shore-to-ship attacks, including the October 2016 attacks on a U.S. warship near the Bab al Mandab Strait.
2017-06-20 CTP Update and Assessment
2017-06-20 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. A Libyan militia freed Saif al Islam al Qaddafi, the favored son of deceased Libyan dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, on June 9. Saif al Islam’s release coincides with increasingly visible activity by Qaddafi-era figures, as well as strategic advances by the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These conditions threaten many Libyan stakeholders, especially political Islamists, who fear that Haftar will bring about the return of the regime. This fear strengthens hardline militias and Salafi-jihadi groups, particularly al Qaeda and its associates. 2. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is unlikely to address the long-term threat posed by al Shabaab. U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab site in southern Somalia in response to attacks on Somali and African Union peacekeeping troops, which began an operation to degrade al Shabaab’s strongholds in southern Somalia this week. Al Shabaab displayed strength on multiple fronts, however. The group resurged in northern Somalia, where it seized a town, and continued campaigns to counter the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and degrade security in Mogadishu. 3. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri characterized the Muslim world as fighting a single war on many fronts. He called for the unity of the umma, or Muslim community, against external foes, reiterating a theme emphasized by al Qaeda clerics and leadership. Zawahiri’s statement reflects al Qaeda’s efforts to influence Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen, and other conflict zones throughout the Muslim-majority world.
2017 06-13 ctp update and assessment
2017 06-13 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda celebrated key members of the September 11 attacks to commemorate the sixteenth anniversary of the attacks. Al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing released the video will of one of the attackers, the first in five years. Al Sahab also released a letter from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the September 11 attacks, addressed to President Barack Obama in 2015 claiming the attacks were a defensive measure. These propaganda pieces are part of al Qaeda’s effort to reinforce its role as a leader of the Salafi-jihadi movement. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s landmark report: “America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement.”] 2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh remains strained. Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) party criticized the al Houthi movement’s attempt to replace Saleh loyalists within the al Houthi-Saleh unity government with al Houthi movement supporters. The al Houthi-Saleh bloc will not fracture while the Saudi-led coalition remains a threat to both groups, though Saleh actively seeks to negotiate terms for a settlement. [Sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Situation Reports.] 3. Kenyan presidential candidates are threatening to escalate civil unrest in the country ahead of the October presidential election. President Uhuru Kenyatta threatened to impeach opposition leader Raila Odinga should Odinga win the presidency after Odinga’s party boycotted the first session of parliament. The current political battle is reminiscent of the 2007 election, which escalated to widespread political unrest. Al Shabaab is conducting an attack campaign against Kenyan forces to sway the election in favor of Odinga, who advocates withdrawing from the counter-al Shabaab mission in Somalia. [Read CTP’s US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?]
2017-09-12 CTP Update and Assessment
2017-09-12 CTP Update and Assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The members of al Qaeda’s affiliate network coordinate closely to produce strategic messaging. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a joint statement calling for attacks on Jews on July 16. The statement is a response to Israel’s temporary closure of al Aqsa Mosque on July 14 after three Arab Israeli gunmen killed two Israeli policemen in Jerusalem. AQAP and AQIM likely use secure communications or embedded personnel to rapidly coordinate messaging. 2. Country-wide protests are challenging the Moroccan state. Protest movements are coalescing around shared grievances against Morocco’s security forces, as well as unemployment and underdevelopment. Organizers are planning a national protest for July 20. The protests’ focus on security forces, on which the state relies, signals a possible threat to King Mohammed VI’s power as he seeks to meet protesters’ demands after several failed attempts. 3. The UN is pursuing a plan to transfer control of Yemen’s al Hudaydah port from the al Houthi-Saleh faction to a neutral party as a first step to resuming stalled ceasefire talks. Al Hudaydah is the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s only port. The UN effort, mediated by China, is intended to prevent a Saudi-led coalition offensive to seize al Hudaydah, which will have dire humanitarian consequences. The al Houthi-Saleh faction is unlikely to support the transfer of the port through the UN, which it sees as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2017 07-18 ctp update and assessment
2017 07-18 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. U.S. Special Operations Forces participated in an Emirati-backed Yemeni operation to secure populated areas and oil pipelines in Shabwah governorate, southern Yemen. The operation aims to degrade the ability of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to coordinate external attacks from safe havens in Yemen. AQAP militants withdrew from Shabwah to strongholds in neighboring Abyan governorate in response. The operation is unlikely to affect AQAP’s capabilities in the long term. 2. U.S. airstrikes targeted Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) forces in Libya mobilizing outside of Sirte city, the group’s former stronghold on the Mediterranean coast. ISIS retains the capability to recruit and train fighters despite losses inflicted by the U.S.-backed campaign to retake Sirte and subsequent airstrikes. 3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) ransoms hostages to fund its broader efforts to destabilize and replace West African states, as well as expel Western influence from the region. AQIM received at least $4.2 million in exchange for the release of Swedish and South Africa hostages in the past two months. AQIM will likely plan or support additional attacks on sites frequented by Western expatriates, continuing a campaign resumed by an AQIM affiliate in Mali in June.
2017 08-08 ctp update and assessment
2017 08-08 ctp update and assessment
AEI's Critical Threats Project
An Enhanced Train-and-Equip Program for the Moderate Syrian Opposition
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2017 07-05 ctp update and assessment
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An Enhanced Train-and-Equip Program for the Moderate Syrian Opposition
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Welcome to our daily summary of the Israel-Hamas war on day 82. As the conflict continues, we provide a comprehensive overview of the key events that took place on this day. Key takeaways: Significant escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas International diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful resolution Worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza Strip Military actions including airstrikes and rocket attacks Global reactions to the ongoing conflict
Day 82 Israel-Hamas War Key Events.pdf
Day 82 Israel-Hamas War Key Events.pdf
Google
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IDF News From the Front: What our Soldiers Did in June 2013
IDF News From the Front: What our Soldiers Did in June 2013
Day 82 Israel-Hamas War Key Events.pdf
Day 82 Israel-Hamas War Key Events.pdf
Paper about the Goldstone report
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Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India. CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/ #First_India_NewsPaper
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FIRST INDIA
26 अप्रैल को, सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने याचिकाओं के एक समूह को खारिज कर दिया, जिसमें एसोसिएशन फॉर डेमोक्रेटिक रिफॉर्म्स (एडीआर) द्वारा दायर मुख्य याचिका थी, जिसमें ईवीएम वोटों के साथ वीवीपैट पेपर ट्रेल पर्चियों के 100% क्रॉस सत्यापन की मांग की गई थी
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This article aims to demonstrate that the Lula government is faced with two major challenges in its effort to promote Brazil's economic and social development. The first challenge, of an economic nature, is represented by the obstacles that exist with the spending cap policy, despite the flexibility provided by the fiscal framework and the existence of an independent Central Bank, which make the Brazilian government unable to coordinate its fiscal and monetary policies, make public investments in the expansion of the economy and obtain macroeconomic stability and, the second challenge, of a political nature, is represented by the obstacles existing in the National Congress due to the fact that it does not have a majority in parliament, which prevents the federal government from putting its national developmental project into practice and fully meet social demands. For Brazil's progressive forces to re-elect President Lula in the 2026 presidential elections and obtain a parliamentary majority in the National Congress committed to political, economic and social advances, the Lula government will have to be successful on the economic front, promoting the expansion of the economy, increasing significantly generating jobs and income, keeping inflation under control and meeting the maximum social demands that benefit, above all, the country's underserved populations. Brazil's progressive forces need to commit, starting from the 2024 municipal elections, towards to elect the maximum number of mayors and councilors committed to Brazil's political, economic and social advances. These are the conditions to prevent, in 2026, right-wing extremists from regaining the Presidency of the Republic, expanding their participation in state governments and the National Congress and putting their nefarious anti-social and anti-national project into practice.
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Under the visionary leadership of N Chandrababu Naidu, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) has continuously prioritized family welfare at the top of its agenda for administration. Through a comprehensive framework that encompasses education, healthcare, women and children's empowerment, economic development, and strategic welfare programs, the TDP has carved a distinctive path in fostering an optimal level of family well-being in Andhra Pradesh. Under the visionary leadership of N Chandrababu Naidu, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) has continuously prioritized family welfare at the top of its agenda for administration.
Nurturing Families, Empowering Lives: TDP's Vision for Family Welfare in Andh...
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Article in The Times of Israel by Andy Blumenthal: This is not about free speech but about a takeover of America. These vile terrorist supporters are using our very Constitution against us as they falsely cry Islamophobia and free speech, all the while impeding, threatening, and committing acts of violence against students, citizens, and an orderly democracy. It is time for Americans to stop being complacent or fooled by their terrorist talking points and rhetoric of hate, racism, and Communist ideology. In the face of this evil, we are finally seeing Patriots emerge, proudly carrying and defending the American flag, singing the Star-Spangled Banner, and boldly chanting USA!
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IDF operation in gaza strip - day 3 (29.12)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Hamas Targets Hit
by the IAF
6.
7.
8.
Download now