Financial/Netflix Example Response 1.docxResponse to Case 0: Netflix
In an attempt to become the market leader and the biggest player out there and to solidify its position as an internet provider of movies and television shows for both kids and adults, Netflix has made a lot of spectacular moves. However, one that has been questioned is its move into producing its own original shows. Original shows is expensive and Netflix has to pay for it up front. So why did Netflix go into it and was it a good idea? Netflix has plenty of subscribers and they could save a lot of money. Original content is definitely a way for Netflix to strengthen its business model.
One of the first things to consider is Netflix business model. Netflix has customers, products, operations, financials, competitors, and partners in its business model. All are really important to its business model. The originals allow it to make new partners with movie producers instead of using movie studios to buy movies. This should save it 30% to 50% which would improve its financials. Its going to change its operations and its competitors won’t like it. Also, its product would increase.
Netflix is an amazing company that has tons of movies and shows that customers love, and one of my favorites that is an original production is Orange Is the New Black. Because it has so many shows, Netflix has millions of subscribers and these subscribers pay $8.99 for a basic subscription, $12.99 for a standard subscription and $15.99 for a premium subscription. The prices were raised at the beginning of 2019. All of this has made it possible for Netflix to make 15,794,341 thousand dollars in 2018. Because it makes so much money, Netflix should be able to figure out how to make a positive profit instead of a negative one. Original content should help it be able to turn its fortunes around. Many of the original productions are really good shows. This should attract new customers and help it grow its subscriber base. Netflix is probably really good at making new movies because it knows so much about its customers. Netflix is able to track a lot of information about people, which helps it know what people like. This can help Netflix find good shows and movies to produce. This probably why its original products are so good.
Also, one of the things to think about is how Netflix competes with other companies. Amazon and Hulu all have streaming services. Others will soon follow and Apple is one of them. Netflix wants to have something that the others don’t, so it is important for Netflix to make new shows that they own. It helps that Netflix has a great CEO. Reed Hastings has made a great company culture that can be tough at times but really drives good results. This is important to have in the movie industry where people may not work hard. Its culture can help it make sure movies are made correctly or so that people will like them. Also, Netflix will be able to make movies for less money due to the fact that.
Diuretic, Hypoglycemic and Limit test of Heavy metals and Arsenic.-1.pdf
FinancialNetflix Example Response 1.docxResponse to Case 0 Net.docx
1. Financial/Netflix Example Response 1.docxResponse to Case 0:
Netflix
In an attempt to become the market leader and the biggest
player out there and to solidify its position as an internet
provider of movies and television shows for both kids and
adults, Netflix has made a lot of spectacular moves. However,
one that has been questioned is its move into producing its own
original shows. Original shows is expensive and Netflix has to
pay for it up front. So why did Netflix go into it and was it a
good idea? Netflix has plenty of subscribers and they could save
a lot of money. Original content is definitely a way for Netflix
to strengthen its business model.
One of the first things to consider is Netflix business model.
Netflix has customers, products, operations, financials,
competitors, and partners in its business model. All are really
important to its business model. The originals allow it to make
new partners with movie producers instead of using movie
studios to buy movies. This should save it 30% to 50% which
would improve its financials. Its going to change its operations
and its competitors won’t like it. Also, its product would
increase.
Netflix is an amazing company that has tons of movies and
shows that customers love, and one of my favorites that is an
original production is Orange Is the New Black. Because it has
so many shows, Netflix has millions of subscribers and these
subscribers pay $8.99 for a basic subscription, $12.99 for a
standard subscription and $15.99 for a premium subscription.
The prices were raised at the beginning of 2019. All of this has
made it possible for Netflix to make 15,794,341 thousand
dollars in 2018. Because it makes so much money, Netflix
should be able to figure out how to make a positive profit
instead of a negative one. Original content should help it be
able to turn its fortunes around. Many of the original
2. productions are really good shows. This should attract new
customers and help it grow its subscriber base. Netflix is
probably really good at making new movies because it knows so
much about its customers. Netflix is able to track a lot of
information about people, which helps it know what people like.
This can help Netflix find good shows and movies to produce.
This probably why its original products are so good.
Also, one of the things to think about is how Netflix competes
with other companies. Amazon and Hulu all have streaming
services. Others will soon follow and Apple is one of them.
Netflix wants to have something that the others don’t, so it is
important for Netflix to make new shows that they own. It helps
that Netflix has a great CEO. Reed Hastings has made a great
company culture that can be tough at times but really drives
good results. This is important to have in the movie industry
where people may not work hard. Its culture can help it make
sure movies are made correctly or so that people will like them.
Also, Netflix will be able to make movies for less money due to
the fact that they have a good culture. It could also help it get
good actors and producers due to the fact that it is Netflix.
So as I think about whether Netflix should make its own
movies, I think it makes sense. Netflix could save a lot of
money and build a really strong business model. I think it helps
to have a great CEO. Netflix should be around a long time.
Financial/asreported (1).xls
Sheet: asreported
Powered by Clearbit
Papa Murphy's Holdings Inc (NMS: FRSH)
Exchange rate used is that of the Year End reported date
As Reported Annual Balance Sheet
Report Date
12/31/2018
19. 3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
-
Total principal amount of long-term debt
82.508
95.9
109.679
112.2
115.0
170.0
125.28
Less: unamortized debt issuance costs
-0.464
-0.506
-0.835
-1.163
-
-
-
Total long-term debt
82.044
95.394
108.844
-
-
-
-
Less current portion
11.4
8.4
7.879
2.8
2.8
20. 1.67
0.88
Long-term debt, net of current portion
70.644
86.994
100.965
108.237
112.2
168.33
124.4
Lease liabilities, net of current portion
8.806
-
-
-
-
-
-
Unearned franchise & development fees, net of current portion
8.546
0.784
0.41
0.54
0.64
1.113
1.405
Deferred tax liability,net
23.121
24.457
44.179
42.439
42.069
41.465
39.567
Preferred & common stock subject to put options
-
23. -
-
-
-
-
0.002
Total Papa Murphy's Holdings Inc. shareholders' equity
99.023
102.171
101.496
97.656
91.298
33.925
63.93
Noncontrolling interests
-
-
-
-
0.444
0.222
-
Total equity
99.023
102.171
101.496
97.656
91.742
34.147
63.93
Financial/asreported.xls
Sheet: asreported
Powered by Clearbit
Papa Murphy's Holdings Inc (NMS: FRSH)
Exchange rate used is that of the Year End reported date
24. As Reported Annual Balance Sheet
Report Date
12/31/2018
01/01/2018
01/02/2017
12/28/2015
12/29/2014
Currency
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
Audit Status
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
Consolidated
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Scale
Thousands
Thousands
Thousands
Thousands
Thousands
Cash & cash equivalents
5766.0
2174.0
2069.0
6867.0
25. 5056.0
Customer receivables, gross
3634.0
3855.0
5367.0
4975.0
5727.0
Reserve for doubtful accounts
70.0
67.0
37.0
31.0
66.0
Accounts receivable, net
3564.0
3788.0
5330.0
4944.0
5661.0
Current portion of notes receivable
-
97.0
92.0
78.0
62.0
Inventories
549.0
719.0
917.0
868.0
640.0
Prepaid media development costs
724.0
376.0
606.0
352.0
33. -
Lease liabilities held for sale
763.0
-
-
-
-
Other accrued & other current liabilities
945.0
751.0
525.0
615.0
704.0
Accrued expenses & other current liabilities
12389.0
13139.0
7503.0
9756.0
9600.0
Current portion of lease liabilities
2510.0
-
-
-
-
Advertising cooperative liabilities
-
-
-
-
253.0
Current portion of unearned franchise & development fees
1715.0
918.0
1358.0
1795.0
34. 2848.0
Current portion of long-term debt
11400.0
8400.0
7879.0
2800.0
2800.0
Total current liabilities
32787.0
27846.0
22900.0
24149.0
18558.0
Term loan
-
92900.0
105879.0
109200.0
112000.0
Revolving line of credit
-
-
800.0
-
-
Term loan under credit facility
79508.0
-
-
-
-
Notes payable
3000.0
3000.0
3000.0
3000.0
35. 3000.0
Total principal amount of long-term debt
82508.0
95900.0
109679.0
112200.0
115000.0
Less: unamortized debt issuance costs
-464.0
-506.0
-835.0
-1163.0
-
Total long-term debt
82044.0
95394.0
108844.0
-
-
Less current portion
11400.0
8400.0
7879.0
2800.0
2800.0
Long-term debt, net of current portion
70644.0
86994.0
100965.0
108237.0
112200.0
Lease liabilities, net of current portion
8806.0
-
-
-
36. -
Unearned franchise & development fees, net of current portion
8546.0
784.0
410.0
540.0
640.0
Deferred tax liability,net
23121.0
24457.0
44179.0
42439.0
42069.0
Other long-term liabilities
3797.0
3922.0
3922.0
2450.0
1740.0
Total liabilities
147701.0
144003.0
172376.0
177815.0
175207.0
Common stock
170.0
170.0
170.0
169.0
169.0
Additional paid-in capital
121171.0
120614.0
119932.0
118801.0
37. 117354.0
Stock subscription receivable
-
-
-
-100.0
-100.0
Retained earnings (accumulated deficit)
-22318.0
-18613.0
-18606.0
-21214.0
-26125.0
Total Papa Murphy's Holdings Inc. shareholders' equity
99023.0
102171.0
101496.0
97656.0
91298.0
Noncontrolling interests
-
-
-
-
444.0
Total equity
99023.0
102171.0
101496.0
97656.0
91742.0
Financial/A bigger bill is coming due for airlines.docxA bigger
bill is coming due for airlines
By Jon Sindreu, Wall Street Journal, 27 December 2018
Costs are a key concern for airline investors, who have fretted
38. about pilot shortages, union disputes and oil prices over the past
year. But there is a less obvious bill that they will likely face in
2019: higher airport fees.
Over the past decade, air travel has grown much faster than the
economy. Yet U.S. airports' spending on infrastructure fell 24%
between 2013 and 2017 compared with the previous five-year
period, according to North America's Airports Council
International.
Now the infrastructure needs to catch up.
Airlines, as well as local governments and federal agencies, will
invest $100 billion in U.S. airports over the next five years,
ACI estimates, more than at any point on record. Hub airports --
those used to connect flights -- will spend the most, because
that is where U.S. airlines have focused their expansion.
As a result, the fee paid by U.S. airlines to airports for each
passenger will increase 19% between 2017 and 2020, a report
by brokerage Cowen predicts.
Admittedly, airport costs add up to just 2% of U.S. airlines'
total costs, on average. Fuel and labor are the key expenses,
contributing more than 30% each.
Yet some airlines are more exposed: Airport fees account for
4% of costs for ultralow-cost carriers such as Allegiant Travel
and Spirit Airlines, which also find it harder to pass extra costs
onto consumers. Meanwhile, Alaska Airlines and JetBlue
Airways are expanding in airports that are undergoing large
renovations and are about to become more expensive.
There also is the risk that the final bill ends up larger than
investors anticipate, even for big legacy carriers like Delta Air
Lines, United Continental and American Airlines. Of the $100
billion of planned infrastructure spending, only 63% will be
used to expand capacity, the ACI believes. That means higher
investment may be needed for many years to come.
A lot of resources will go to refurbishing old terminals, which
have dragged down consumer satisfaction in many of the U.S.'s
major hubs.
A clear example is New York's LaGuardia Airport. It often
40. Transport Association.
“It’s certainly high by airline historic standards. But it’s not
high if you look across other companies in the U.S. economy.
It’s average,” says Brian Pearce, IATA’s chief economist.
U.S. airlines were on pace to take in more than $4 billion in
baggage fees and $3 billion in reservation-change and
cancellation penalties in 2017, according to Transportation
Department data. (The full year hasn’t been tallied yet.) Most of
that drops straight to the bottom line. The two categories add up
to about more than half of the net profits airlines posted last
year.
Airline earnings are further boosted by other fees for things like
seats assignments, extra legroom, early boarding and pets, plus
sales of frequent flier miles to banks for credit-card rewards.
Given the $20-per-passenger haul ($40 round-trip), it’s easy to
see why airlines are so intent on cramming in more seats, even
when they know travelers hate the lack of space and complain
bitterly about shrunken bathrooms, slim seat padding and skinny
rows.
Last year, the average round-trip fare on the seven largest U.S.
carriers— American , Delta ,United, Southwest , Alaska ,
JetBlue and Spirit —was $355, based on their financial reports,
up from $351 in 2016. Getting an extra two rows of seats on a
plane can mean the difference between profit and loss.
Airline earnings are getting a boost from fees for things like
seats assignments, extra legroom and pets. Above, a woman pets
a dog at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in
Arlington, Va., on Dec. 21. PHOTO: CAROLYN KASTER/AP
Of course, some passengers are far more profitable than others.
First-class and business-class travelers are more valuable when
they pay for their tickets; less when they get a free upgrade. But
even then, road warriors are often upgraded from high-dollar,
last-minute coach tickets. Frequent travelers account for a large
percentage of airline revenue—and profit.
Low-fare passengers shoehorned into the back of the plane may
41. not even be covering what it costs to transport them. But they
scored a low fare because the airline was concerned it might not
fill all the seats on a particular flight, and some fare is better
than no fare.
IATA’s Mr. Pearce says airline profits last year were squeezed
by higher fuel and labor costs, and that trend is continuing in
2018. Jet fuel prices were up 26% last year compared with
2016, and prices are expected to be about 10% higher this year.
Airline fuel efficiency has improved significantly world-wide as
newer planes go into service, and older gas-guzzlers are retired.
But higher fuel prices have driven airline costs higher.
Higher fuel prices have helped drive airline costs higher.
Above, a Southwest plane is refueled at John Wayne Airport in
Santa Ana, Calif., in April 2016. PHOTO: PATRICK T.
FALLON/BLOOMBERG
At the same time, expanding competition from low-fare carriers
has kept fare increases small. Big airlines are building up in
competitive markets like Seattle, Boston and Los Angeles. Even
some cities that saw dramatic air-service cuts are getting more
flights now; Delta recently announced an expansion in
Cincinnati, for example. With more empty seats to sell, airlines
are finding it even harder to raise ticket prices.
“Fares are too low for oil prices this high,” American Airlines
Chief Executive Doug Parker said on an earnings call with
analysts last month. “Over time you’ll see it adjust.”
American spent $1.3 billion more on fuel in 2017 than the
previous year, a 22% increase. The carrier also spent nearly $1
billion more on labor, a 9% increase. The airline grew only
about 1% last year, so rising costs meant earnings were down
$757 million. Thus Mr. Parker is pushing for higher fares.
Among the big U.S. airlines, Southwest had the largest net
profit margin last year, at 16.5%. Southwest continues to defy
conventional airline wisdom. It doesn’t charge baggage fees;
instead, it believes it attracts more passengers to each flight
because many want to avoid the baggage fees charged by
competitors.
43. ircraft
fuel$829.9$340.5$3,342.0$3,892.3$569.1$644.1$255.6$2,956.3
$3,611.1$411.8$762.1$277.7$3,647.6$3,588.5$418.2Food$118.
3$6.2$642.4$50.0$1.6$105.7$5.6$534.3$47.7$1.8$101.9$4.5$5
11.9$46.7$1.4Advertising$63.7$16.6$197.4$221.4$26.3$60.2$1
4.3$190.3$229.4$24.8$54.2$12.1$155.3$215.9$22.7Landing
fees$91.4$53.1$371.4$544.7$77.3$78.7$46.6$362.9$503.2$63.6
$73.5$41.7$347.1$491.3$52.3Selected ratiosRevenues per 2,000
passenger
miles$306$259$413$336$217$354$255$411$334$217$369$272
$408$343$239Operating expenses per 2,000 passenger
miles$281$224$361$280$185$265$188$342$272$176$284$193
$341$272$182¹ Excludes regional carrier revenues and
expenses² Passeger miles is the total miles travelled by all
passengers (passengers * average distance)
Financial/Airlines strike a delicate balance when selling
discount tickets.docxAirlines strike a delicate balance when
selling discount ticketsAre you seeing more discounts in
advance from Alaska Airlines? Maybe you’re seeing fewer
cheap seats in advance from United? This isn’t a fluke. Both
airlines have made changes to revenue strategies in recent
months.
By Brian Sumers, Skift, 21 March 2019
Before it was absorbed by Alaska Airlines, Virgin America
fashioned itself a business person’s airline, focusing on tech-
forward travelers willing to pay hundreds or thousands of
dollars to fly last-minute to and from San Francisco and Los
Angeles.
Because techies, consultants, producers, directors, and actors in
Silicon Valley and Hollywood could pay two to five times as
much as leisure travelers, Virgin America set aside seats for
them, hoping they would snatch them up a few days before
departure and boost profits.
When Alaska’s revenue managers examined the data, they didn’t
like what they saw. Sometimes, the high-value customers
44. materialized. Other times, they didn’t, and the airline may have
lost revenue it could have earned weeks earlier.
Alaska changed the strategy. On former Virgin America routes
between major cities, it reduced the number of seats held for
last-minute travelers, increasing availability for leisure
passengers who book further in advance but demand cheaper
prices.
“Our traditional comfort level was to take them further out and
so we adjusted our booking practices there,” Alaska Chief
Commercial Officer Andrew Harrison told investment analysts
in January.
Alaska is one of two U.S. airlines to tweak its booking curve
strategy recently. The other, United Airlines, went the other
way, saying it had erred by leaving too few seats for big
spenders. On core business routes, it’s probably tougher to
score a deal on United than a few years ago.
The struggles to get it right at Alaska and United highlight an
ongoing dilemma for revenue managers. Leisure travelers book
early, and often demand deals. But most airlines don’t want to
sell out at $49 or $99 fares. They must hold enough seats for the
lawyers, consultants and bankers who will pay astronomical
prices. But how many?
To decide, airlines look at basic indicators, including route, day
of the week, and time of year. They also plug information about
past bookings into sophisticated computer systems, which spit
out recommendations.
But humans guide the computers, and some management teams
have more tolerance for risking empty seats than others. Some
carriers prefer to book more revenue early, giving them
certainty, while others wait for big spenders.
“The whole concept of revenue management is that you get a
call from a customer and you have to decide whether or not to
take it,” said Tom Bacon, a consultant and former vice president
for revenue planning at Frontier Airlines. “It is a bird in the
hand issue. You can say, ‘Nope I am not going to take this
booking at $79 because I know I can get a higher fare passenger
45. to book if I just wait.’”
UNITED’S CASE
United’s journey to taking more last-minute revenue began after
Scott Kirby joined as president in August 2016.
Early in his tenure, Kirby told investment analysts the airline
had an antiquated revenue management system that could not
predict with enough certainty which customers would show last
minute, so it preferred to fill planes early.
And even when computer recommended United wait for better
revenue, United’s revenue managers might override it. They
feared having too many empty seats, Kirby said.
“It’s easy to sit around and say, ‘Oh my God, December load
factor is off by x points,’” Kirby said three years ago, pitching
the need for a better system to analysts. “[People say] ‘We’ve
got to go open inventory or lower the fares.’”
Over the past three years, United had updated its revenue
management platform, now called Gemini. United sets aside
more seats for its most lucrative passengers, and sells fewer
deeply discounted tickets months in advance. Also, United lets
the system work as designed — with limited human
interference.
“We continue to successfully shift our booking profile to reduce
dependence on lower-yielding tickets booked further out from
departure, while increasing our share of higher yielding
business tickets generally booked closer in,” United Chief
Commercial Officer Andrew Nocella said on the airline’s
January earnings call.
Indications suggest it’s working. In 2015, United filled 83.4
percent of its seats, with an average yield of 15.72 cents per
passenger mile. In 2018, load factor was 83.6 percent, with
yield of 16.38 cents. In October, analyst Hunter Keay of Wolf
Researched credited the system with “driving high loads and
close-in yields, as designed.”
How does United know how many passengers will show?
It is a guess based on math. United may not sell all seats it
46. leaves open. But the airline has calculated it will make more
money attempting to sell them than if it put the seats on sale six
weeks prior to departure.
“These models try to come up with the best possible guess or
demand predictions, and it is a statistical estimation,” said
Surain Adyanthaya, senior vice president of Strategy for PROS,
a revenue management consulting firm. “It is a combination of
the mathematics along with the strategy the airline wants to
employ in that market.”
If the demand does not materialize, an airline can sell cheap
seats last minute. But since no premium airline wants a
corporate lawyer to snag a low fare three days before departure,
the carrier may decide to leave the seat empty. (Another option
to sell only basic economy fares cheaply just before departure,
since business travelers rarely buy them.)
“We don’t actually achieve 100 percent load factors despite
demand that might suggest we could get 100 percent load
factors,” Bacon said. “That’s because we have set aside those
last three seats for high fare passengers with only a 60 percent
chance that they will be filled. The probabilities and statistics
suggest that is a better result.”
DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHIES
United and Alaska probably should have disparate philosophies
about when to book more revenue, since they have different
business models.
United has hubs in five of the top six U.S metropolitan areas, as
measured by the U.S. census bureau. It carries a
disproportionate number of business travelers, many of whom
book in premium cabins. Alaska has just one major hub, in
Seattle, along with smaller ones in Los Angeles, San Francisco
and Portland, Oregon.
Alaska, which is more of a leisure airline than United, is not as
confident last-minute business travelers will show, Shane
Tackett, executive vice president of planning and strategy, told
investment analysts on the airline’s recent earnings call.
47. “The trade-off is if you hold out for yield or not, and then you
sort of hope that it comes and when it doesn’t, you feel bad
about your strategy and when it does you feel great,” Tackett
said. “We traditionally like to manage that just further out the
booking curve.”
For airlines, early-booking passengers have benefits, too,
Adyanthaya said. They may not help a carrier produce massive
margins, but they “give you certainty to keep the planes full and
keep the machinery running,” he said.
In addition, Adyanthaya said, some low-cost-carriers find early-
booking passengers more valuable than ever. When customers
book three months in advance, an airline has 90 days to ask
them if they want to add hotel rooms, rental cars, seat
assignments, baggage and onboard meals to their bookings. All
are high-margin items.
“That changes the equation a little bit,” Adyanthaya said. “Now
you want the planes as full as possible. There is a bigger cost to
spoilage, since you are not getting the potential ancillary
revenue from having a full flight.”
But it can be more complicated, Bacon noted. Some low-cost-
airlines call themselves “spill carriers,” thriving by selling to
customers who cannot afford a legacy airline’s last-minute fare.
These airlines may save tickets for the end of the booking
curve, waiting until full-service carriers hike their prices. If a
major airline asks for $400 one-way a next-day flight, a spill
carrier might charge $300.
Market dynamics play a role, too. Most airlines will sell more
tickets early in the booking curve on pure leisure routes, as
vacationers rarely book late.. United’s strategy on Los Angeles
to Honolulu is likely much different than from Los Angeles to
Newark.
Where an airline is based also matters, Adyanthaya said. In
some countries, airlines place an emphasis on filling every seat.
In others, that’s less important.
“You’ll see some premium international carriers that really
strive to have the best possible product and they value their
48. product very highly and they are willing to wait in the booking
cycle to get the demand for their flights and risk some spoilage,
whereas the North American and European carriers are more
aggressive in just filling the planes,” he said.
OTHER FACTORS
U.S. airlines have reported record or near-record profits since
2013, so carriers can afford to be choosy about which
passengers they want.
What about during rougher periods?
Other factors come into play, Bacon said. In 2008 and 2009,
when he was running Frontier’s revenue management
department, the airline was in bankruptcy. It needed cash, and
Bacon had to find it.
“We were managing cash flow every week, monitoring whether
we had enough cash to keep the airline going, so booking early
was pretty important to us,” he said. “Every change was a crisis.
We wanted to be aggressive and get the bookings in early.”
Sometimes, the situation can be out of an airline’s control.
During the financial crisis, Frontier noticed passengers weren’t
booking Christmas season flights months in advance as usual.
The airline, Bacon said, was fearful it would miss out on one of
its most lucrative periods.
That’s not what happened. Perhaps fearing the crisis would
worsen, leisure travelers waited. But as the holiday season
approach and travelers had to decide whether to skip travel or
go on the usual trip, most booked.
“The whole booking curve had changed,” Bacon said. “Our
revenue was right on track even though we hadn’t got the
bookings as well as expected.”
Kirby said he’s seen similar changes, which is why he tells his
revenue management team to trust the computer. Just as long-
term investors should not panic and sell all their stock when the
market drops for a couple of weeks, revenue managers should
not change focus because they’re not selling as many tickets as
expected, he said.
49. “Every single time the revenue environment has turned in my
career, there was a month or two where you were looking out
and saying, ‘Oh my God,’ and worried about it,” he said. “But
we had faith in the system and had faith in the forecast and it
turned,” Kirby said.
Financial/CourierC108006R2TFK0CA.PDF
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