STIRLING SQUAREHollywood, Fl 333122901 Stirling RoadIn.docx

STIRLING SQUARE
Hollywood, Fl 33312
2901 Stirling Road
Investment Brochure
EXCLUSIVELY PRESENTED BY:
Simona Paige
Eli Calatayud "Results Through Collaboration"
0
Confidentiality Agreement
STIRLING SQUARE
Exclusively presented by:
ELI CALATAYUD & SIMONA PAIGE
This is a confidential Memorandum intended solely for your
limited
use and benefit in determining whether you desire to express
further interest into the acquisition of the Subject Property. This
Memorandum contains selected information pertaining to the
Property and does not purport to be a representation of state of
affairs of the Owner or the Property, to be all-inclusive or to
contain
all or part of the information which prospective investors may
require to evaluate a purchase of real property The Owner
expressly
reserves the right, at its sole discretion, to reject any or all

expressions of interest or offers to purchase Property, and/or to
terminate discussions with any entity at any time with or
without
notice which may arise as a result of review of this
Memorandum.
The Owner shall have no legal commitment or obligation to any
entity reviewing this Memorandum or making an offer to
purchase
the Property unless and until written agreement(s) for the
purchase
of the Property have been fully executed, delivered, and
approved
by the Owner and any obligations therein have been satisfied or
waived.
By receipt of the Memorandum, you agree that this
Memorandum
and its contents are of a confidential nature, that you will hold
and
treat it in the strictest confidence and that you will not disclose
this
Memorandum or any of its contents to any other entity without
the
prior written authorization of the Owner, Finite Real Estate or
ACV
Furthermore, you agree not to use this Memorandum or any of
its
contents in a manner detrimental to the interest of the Owner ,
Finite Real Estate or ACV.
In this Memorandum, certain documents and other materials, are
described in summary form. These summaries do not purport to
be
complete nor necessarily accurate descriptions of the full
agreements referenced. Interested parties are so advised and
expected to review all such summaries and other documents of
whatever nature independently and not to rely on the contents of
this Memorandum in any manner.

Table of Contents
STIRLING SQUARE
SECTION ONE………. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
SECTION TWO……… PRICING & FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
SECTION THREE…….. SITE PLANS, PICTURES
SECTION FOUR……. RENT COMPARABLES
SECTION FIVE……. DEMOGRAPHICS
Salient Facts
STIRLING SQUARE
Location & Parcel ID
Address 2901 Stirling Road
City, State, ZIP Hollywood, Fl 33312
County Broward County
Parcel/Folio 50-42-32-39-0010, 50-42-32-17-131, 50-42-32-17-
1310
Site Description
Lot Size 311,737 SF
Buildings Size SF 105249
Number of Buildings 2

Number of Stories 3
Year Built 1987
Rentable SF 92,695
Construction
Framing Frame & Gypsum Board
Exterior Wall Reinforced Concrete Block with Stucco
Parking Surface Concrete Asphalt Surface Parking
Roof Structure Concrete Slab over Open Web Steel Joists
Roof Cover Water Heater (each unit)
Plumbing Copper, PVC & Galvanized Steel
Electric 120/240 Single Phase (separately metered)
Elevator Elevator (01)
Irrigation System Underground, Zoned Automatic Sprinklers
Waste Removal Dumpster pads
Fire Protection Smoke Detectors, Fire Alarm, Fire Extinguishers
& Fire Hydrants
HVAC Individual Air Conditioning Units
PropertyDescription
This analysis has been prepared solely for informational
purposes to assist the owner(s) in determining whether to
proceed with the sale of the property. No representation as to
the accuracy or
appropriateness of the information is made. Although we
believe the information to be reliable, we will not be liable for
misstatements of facts, errors, omissions, or prior sale of the
property. Ouyersm ust
verify the information when determining their best choice of
action.

.
Investment Overview
STIRLING SQUARE
Investment
Highlights
PropertyDescription
proceed with the sale of the property. No
representation as to the accuracy or appropriateness of the
information is made. Although we believe the information to be
reliable, we will not be liable for
property. Ouyersm ust verify the information when determining
their best choice of action.
.
This outstanding 3 story retail/office shopping
center has retail spaces on the first floor, offices
on the second and third floor, the office building
is attached to the adjacent strip center with a
separate folio number. The property sits directly
on Stirling Rd. featuring high traffic volume and

Great exposure!
The National tenants are: Bank of America,
Walgreens Pharmacy and others. Ample Parking
is provided in the front and rear of plaza. The
leases with the anchor tennants are Triple Net
and the CAM expenses are passed through to
tenants!
-Investment Highlights
•NNN Leases
•Direct Frontage to Stirling Rd
•Excellent Hollywood |Fort
Lauderdale Location
•Ample Parking
•Significant "Upside" due to
Under Market Rents & Market
Recovery
•Anchor Tenants
RENT ROLL
STIRLING SQUARE

the accuracy or appropriateness of the information is made.
Although we believe the
information to be reliable, we will not be liable for
Tenant Name Tenant Addess Type Monthly Rents Sq. Ft.
$ per Sq.
Ft. CAM
Deposit/Last
Month Rent Lease From Expiration Option
Income
Annually
Walgreens 2855 Stirling Rd Retail $28,010.33 19,772.00
17.61 $1,000.00 - 10/30/1985 10/31/2066
Can terminate 10/31/2034 with six
(6) month advanced notice. 348,123.96
Crown Pown 2861 Stirling Rd Retail $4,725.00 1,455.00
37.11 $0.00 9,000.00 11/7/2008 .11/06/2017 none
56,700.00
Bet Menachem 2863 Stirling Rd Retail $7,350.00 4,065.00
20.67 5,500.00 11/1/2008 3/30/2019 Two (2) option for 5
years 88,200.00
Advanced Pet Care of Miami 2871 Stirling Road Retail
$4,583.33 2,500.00 29.21 $1,598.22 13,749.99
10/15/2009 10/14/2019 none 74,178.60

Advanced Vision Care 2873 Stirling Rd Retail $2,566.66
1,400.00 29.22 $895.00 1,808.33 10/1/2000 9/30/2018
One (1) option for 5 years 41,539.92
GAW Holdings, LLC 2875 Stirling Road Retail $3,563.06
1,407.00 30.39 $0.00 14,252.24 7/1/2014 6/30/2019
The Original Brooklyn Bagle 2877 Stirling Road Retail
$5,512.56 2,676.00 31.92 $1,710.73 21,132.37
6/10/2011 5/31/2021 One (1) option for 5 years 86,679.48
Stirling Road Crossfit, LLC 2889 Stirling Road Retail
$9,486.17 8,131.00 $0.00 20,110.67 12/15/2014
12/14/2019
Two (2) option for a total of 5
years (3+2) 113,834.04
DSH Oakwood Jewelers 2893 Stirling Road Retail $7,157.37
2,911.00 31.56 $821.40 11,158.84 2/1/2007 1/31/2017
Bank of America 2903 Stirling Road Retail $11,969.66 5,933.00
32.78 $4,587.52 11/1/1999 10/31/2016 Three (3) option for 5
years 198,686.16
Grand Café 2905 Stirling Road Retail $6,000.00 752.00
2,549.00 27.78 $100.00 12,296.00 4/1/2014 3/30/2019
2907 Stirling Road Retail/Office 1,797.00 0.00 -
VACANT 2909 Stirling Road Office 1,700.00 600.00
0.00

Oz Leasing
Office $2,100.00 1,335.00 18.88 $0.00 2,226.00
12/15/2014 12/14/2016 One (1) 2 year option 25,200.00
Fantasy World Girl's Birthday LLC 2915 Stirling Road Office
$2,575.00 1,983.00 15.13 $0.00 2,650.00 5/1/2014
4/30/2017 One (1) option for 3 years 30,900.00
Oriental Massage/ Tropical Spa 2921 Stirling Road Retail
$4,081.63 1,974.00 32.78 $1,504.69 8,554.00
11/1/2010 10/31/2015 One (1) option for 5 years 67,035.84
JC Professional Corp 2901 Stirlind Road #200 Office $4,000.00
2000 SSF 3,091.00 15.53 $0.00 8,748.82 1/13/2014
1/12/2019 One (1) option for 5 years 48,000.00
2901 Stirling Road #201 Office 1091 SF -
Korik Realty Inc. 2901 Stirling Road #202 Office 824.00
500.00 19.20 $0.00 1,721.44 5/1/2014 4/30/2016
Nationwide Recovery Bearau 2901 Stirling Road #203 Office
$1,547.78 650.00 28.57 - 2,060.00
10/1/2012 12/31/2016 n/a 18,573.36
Infinity Behaviour health services 2901 Stirling Road #205
Office 3,519.00 0.00 -
Office $1,798.95 1,165.00 19.50 $0.00 3,933.66
21,587.40
Unit was split to 4 rooms 2901 Stirling Road #207 total SF
2,024 that were devided to four offices: -

Vacant 2901 Stirling Road #207-1 Office 0.00 583.00
Nature Wellness 2901 Stirling Road #207-2-3 Office $772.50
0.00 $0.00 1,637.00 6/1/2014 5/31/2015 One (1) 1 year
option 9,270.00
South Flora Inc. 2901 Stirling Road #207-4 Office $477.21 0.00
$0.00 927.00 4/5/2013 4/4/2015 5,726.52
VACANT 2901 Stirling Road #207-5 Office 700.00
Kass Shuler , LLC 2901 Stirling Road #208 Office $4,254.21
2,406.00 20.60 $0.00 4,130.00 5/1/2014 12/31/2017
Two (2) options for 2 year 51,050.52
Office 3,500.00 2,194.00 0.00 -
APVL LLC 2901 Stirling Road #210 Office $2,594.34 2,070.00
15.04 5,300.00 3/1/2015 2/28/2018 One(1) option for 3
years 31,132.08
Simply Unique laser hair removal 2901 Stirling Road #211
Office $1,209.66 764.00 16.62 2,564.48 10/17/2013
10/16/2016 none 14,515.92
Office 34,417.97 9,000.00 14,059.00 29.38 $0.00 73,122.82
3/31/2018 Two (2) options for 1 year 413,015.64
5,059.00 0.00 -
Samuel Accounting 2901 Stirling Road #307 Office $2,203.26
1,110.00 34.51 $1,065.73 4,534.85 2/1/2014 1/31/2019
One(1) option for 5 years 39,227.88

Samuel Accounting 2901 Stirling Road #308 Office 241.00
0.00 -
Office 1,600.00 0.00 -
Office 905.00 0.00 $0.00 -
Verison Wireless Tower 1 Tower $2,766.55 - $0.00
4/1/2002 7/31/2019 Four (4) option for 5 years 33,198.60
AT&T Wireless Tower 2 Tower $3,624.90 - $0.00
6/24/1999 10/20/2019 Three (3) option for 5 years
43,498.80
-
-
TOTALS: $160,172.10 92,965.00 $13,283.29 $231,701.51
$2,081,464.68
STIRLING SQUARE
Pricing
& Financial Analysis

2014
Square Footage:
Annual Monthly Per Sqft % of GPI
Gross "Actual" Income: $2,081,464 $173,455 $22.46 100.0%
Economic Vacancy: $62,444 $5,204 $0.67 3.0%
Effective Rental Income: $2,019,020 $168,252 $21.78 97.0%
Other Income:
Rooftop Leases * Please See Rent Roll
CAM Charges $211,536 $8,333 $0.92
Miscelaneos Income $58,769 $4,897 $0.63 2.8%
Total Other Income: $270,305 $22,525 $2.92 13.0%
Effective Gross Income $2,289,325 $190,777 $24.70 110.0%
Operating Expenses:
Real Estate Taxes $324,548 $27,046 $3.50 15.6%
Retail Building Expenses $78,708 $6,559 $0.85 3.8%
Office Building Expenses $161,243 $13,437 $1.74 7.7%
Managment Fees $79,094 $6,591 $0.85 3.8%
Insurance (Flood,Hazard,Liabilit y) $126,129 $10,511 $1.36
6.1%
Payroll $73,687 $6,141 $0.80 3.5%
Total Expenses: $518,861 $43,238 $5.60 24.9%

Net Operating Income: $1,770,464 $147,539 $19.10 85.1%
Cash Flow : $1,770,464 $147,539 $19.10 85.1%
Purchase Price: $25,000,000 $269.73 Per Sqft
Cap Rate: 7.1%
Operating Statement
STIRLING SQUARE OFFICE / RETAIL CENTER -
HOLLYWOOD, FL
92,685
Investment Overview
STIRLING SQUARE
Location
Overview
PropertyDescription
.

DIRECTIONS
From I-95 :
1. Exit West on Stirling Rd.
2. Drive about 3 Miles.
Property is on North side of road.
Aerial
STIRLING SQUARE
PropertyDescription
Although we believe the information to
be reliable, we will not be liable for misstatements of facts,
errors, omissions, or prior sale of the property. Ouyersm ust
action.
.
Site Plan
STIRLING SQUARE
Parcel 2901-2921 Folio# 5042 32 39 0010 Size: 57,046
Sq.Ft.

PropertyDescription
action.
.
Site Plan
STIRLING SQUARE
Parcel 2855-2897 fo Folios# 50-42-32-17-131, 50-42-32-17-
1310 Size: 48203 Sq Ft
PropertyDescription
action.
.

Additional Property Photos
STIRLING SQUARE
PropertyDescription
action.
.
Property Photos
STIRLING SQUARE
PropertyDescription
action.
.

STIRLING SQUARE
Hollywood, Fl 33312
2901 Stirling Road
Exclusively presented by:
"Results Through Collaboration"
Results Through Colaboration
Collaboration Though Results"
0
1
Bargaining Strategy in Major League Baseball
Introduction
During the winter of 2005-2006, Donald Fehr was faced with
some monumental decisions. As the head
of the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), he
had been arduously preparing for the

upcoming round of negotiation s between his union and the
owners of the 30 major league baseball
clubs (collectively known as Major League Baseball, or MLB).
Being the representative of the labor force
in a multi-billion-dollar business was no easy task, even for a
seasoned negotiating veteran. The health-
even the very survival-of his union had hung in the balance each
time a new basic agreement (the
uniform contract between the two sides) was negotiated, and
Fehr couldn’t help but remember past
work stoppages, which hurt both sides tremendously. Fehr knew
that hard bargaining with the
ownership group might cause another strike or lockout, but with
attendance levels at the highest they
had ever been in the history of the sport, he needed to gauge his
constituents' (and his opposition's)
resolve to decide how to approach the process.
History
The Early Years
Tumultuous labor relations in professional baseball were almost
as old as the sport itself. What started
as a "gentlemen 's game" in the mid-1800's quickly turned into
business when the general public started

taking interest in the sport. Throughout the second half of the
19th century, different leagues were
formed by American industrialists whose intentions were to
capitalize financially on the sport's growing
popularity. Only two leagues stood the test of time, the National
League, formed in 1875, and the
American League, formed in 1901. In 1903 the two leagues
merged to become Major League Baseball,
which quickly became the most profitable sports business in
America.
When players began to realize that their unique skills could be
marketed to the highest bidder, nervous
owners began to seek ways to ensure that their moneymakers
would not jump ship. In the most
controversial move in baseball' s early history, the "reserve
clause" was developed and implemented
into player contracts. In a move that some considered a form of
outright collusion, owners agreed
amongst themselves that after each season, each club was able
to "reserve" five players that could not
be sought after by the other teams. In this regard, the five
players on each team that were reserved had
no right to switch teams if they found the conditions deplorable
or found that they could make more

money elsewhere. Eventually this clause would be written into
all contracts, and players who chose to
dishonor the clause were blacklisted from organized baseball.
Opposition to the reserve clause became a rallying point for the
players, and several unions were
formed over the next few decades in an attempt to give players
bargaining leverage and a bigger voice.
The Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players (1885), the
Players Protective Association (1900), the
Baseball Players' Fraternity (1912), the National Baseball
Players' Association of the United States
(1922), and the Association of Professional Ballplayers (1924)
all had formed, in part, to oppose the
reserve clause. However, those unions had trouble sustaining
member interest and financial backing and
eventually disbanded. During the time of these unions'
formations, the anti-union sentiment was high
2
among the general public due to several highly publicized
instances of labor union violence. The union s'
failures meant the owners maintained complete control over

their players' salaries, benefits, and
livelihoods.
Illegal Restraint of Trade?
By restricting the movement of labor from team to team, which
in almost all cases would be over state
lines, it seemed to many that the owners were illegally
restraining trade, a violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Several legal challenges were mounted against
organized baseball by rival start-up leagues
who were angered when they were denied access to the player
market. In 1922, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that baseball was a sport, not a business,
and since it was conducted in local
ballparks for local fans, it was mainly involved in intrastate
commerce. The Federal Baseball Club vs.
National League decision (aka the Holmes decision, named after
Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes) would
ultimately give baseball an "antitrust exemption. "In 1953, the
Supreme Court would reaffirm the ruling
after a player (George Toolson of the New York Yankees) filed
suit, claiming the reserve clause was
illegal and was threatening his livelihood. Chief Justice Earl
Warren reiterated that baseball "was not

within the scope of federal antitrust laws," and that action taken
against the exemption should be by the
U.S. Congress, not the courts. The reserve clause would remain
untouched and embedded in players'
contracts until the mid-1970s.
The Major League Baseball Players Association
In 1946, a Mexican league was hiring several prominent U.S.
players, creating competitive pressure on
American player salaries. U.S. owners wanted to avoid a
bidding war with the Mexican League. That
same year, a labor lawyer convinced U.S. players to organize
the American Baseball Guild. This union's
existence concerned management enough to cause them to
bargain over a uniform players' contract.
The contract called for a minimum player salary ($5,000) and a
guaranteed pension plan. Players
contributed the bulk of the retirement funds, paying into the
pension plan until their tenth season;
owners contributed to it primarily from radio, television, and
post-season ticket revenue. The union was
short-lived, fading into obscurity by the end of that same year;
however, the pension fund endured. By
the early 1950s funds for the pension plan fell short, and the
players felt it was i n their best interest to

organize once again.
In 1953, the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA) was formed to serve as the players'
main bargaining body and the owners implicitly voluntarily
recognized the union by allowing it to
operate the pension fund and by contributing to the fund. The
union was led by player representatives
and legal advisors until 1965 when it hired its first full-time
executive, Marvin Miller, an economist with
the Steelworkers Union. Miller brought with him experience in
industrial relations and a hardline bar-
gaining approach. In response, the owners formed the Major
League Player Relations Committee (PRC)
to serve as their negotiating body. In 1968, the two sides
hammered out the 1st Basic Agreement, a
uniform contract that established (among other things) a formal
grievance procedure for players and a
significantly increased minimum salary level. Baseball historian
Lee Lowenfish writes, “[the owners]
conceded more rights in the 1st Basic Agreement than in all
previous decades of the sport."
The Early 1970s: Players Challenge the Reserve Clause

3
In 1972, the MLBPA and the PRC ran into trouble while
negotiating the 3rd Basic Agreement. The major
disagreement between the two sides stemmed from the amount
the owners were willing to contribute
to the players' pension fund. Players union head Marvin Miller
claimed that there was a surplus of
pension funding that could be used to offset increased cost-of-
living expenses that the players had been
incurring. The owners showed solidarity (which has been rare
throughout the league's history) by
refusing the MLBPA's demands. The union even went so far as
to file an "unfair labor practice" claim
with the National Labor Relations Board when the owners
refused to share certain financial information
with them (the information was eventually provided). On April
1, 1972, a day that the Sporting News
would call "the darkest day in sports history," the players went
on strike. The strike did not last long, as
the two sides eventually reached a compromise on the
contribution amount ($500,000). The half-million
dollars that the players received in increased pension
contributions was far less than the salary losses

they incurred during the two-week long strike. The owners, who
had talked the union down from their
initial proposal of a $1 million increase in contributions, had
lost $5.2 million in revenue.
Shortly after the strike of 1972, the reserve clause was
threatened once again. Outfielder Curt Flood of
the St. Louis Cardinals challenged the legality of the reserve
clause in court, and in Flood v. Kuhn, the
Supreme Court once again upheld the Holmes decision. Flood
was successful, however, in attracting
Congress's and the media' s attention to the reserve clause issue.
In 1974, pitcher Catfish Hunter sought
to become the league's first free agent when the owner of his
team (the Oakland A's) dishonored a
provision in his contract. Hunter's case went to a three-man
arbitration panel, which had been created
and outlined in the 3rd Basic Agreement. The panel voted 2 to 1
that Hunter had the right to "shop his
services" to other clubs since his own club did not honor the
legally binding contract. Hunter became
baseball's first free agent.
A year later, two players (Dave McNally and Andy
Messersmith) challenged the clause once again. The

two teams that held the rights to McNally and Messersmith had
renewed the players' contracts for the
1975 season, and for different reasons, both players refused to
sign them. They played out the season
anyway, without being under contract, and when the season
concluded, the clubs employed the reserve
clause once again. The players claimed that the reserve clause
only provided that clubs could renew the
contracts for one year, and that since they were not under
contract during the 1975 season, the clubs
were not within their rights to renew them for the 1976 season.
The case went to arbitration, and by a 2
to 1 vote, the McNally and Messersmith won. The players had
won the right to offer their services to the
highest bidder (a process called "free agency"), and the reserve
clause was dead. The new labor
environment would become even more turbulent as free agency
shook the economics of the game to its
core.
1976 to 1989: Free Agency Becomes the Norm
In 1976, the MLBPA and the PRC were split on the new free
agency issue. The owners wanted players to
gain free agency eligibility after 10 years of professional
service, while the union proposed a five-year

requirement. During Spring Training, the owners instituted a
lockout. Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, who
was technically an "employee of the owners," ordered the
owners to end the lockout, a move that lost
him favor with many on the management side. The two sides
eventually agreed on an eligibility mini-
mum of six years of professional service, and compensation in
the form of a draft pick for the team who
was losing the player.
4
Prior to the start of the 1980 season, the two sides were again
far apart when negotiating the 5th Basic
Agreement. The major issue was the compensation that a team
would receive after losing a free agent.
The proposals that the PRC presented were seen by Marvin
Miller as an attempt to "dismantle free
agency in its infancy." On April 1, the players again went on
strike. They agreed to start the season on
the scheduled opening day, but promised to resume the strike on
May 23 (the week that attendance
usually plateaued) if no agreement had been reached. On the

morning of May 23, the two sides reached
a deal which basically provided that the free-agent
compensation issue be studied for a year, after
which negotiations regarding the issue would reopen.
The committee that was selected to study the issue produced
nothing substantial, and in 1981, the two
sides were again having trouble finding common ground. The
MLBPA's Marvin Miller and the PRC's
president Ray Grebey had developed a bitter rivalry that the
press could not get enough of. On May 29,
the players went on strike once again. The strike lasted 50 days.
The National Labor Relations Board,
Congress's Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services, and the
Department of Labor all attempted to
help the parties end their strike. On July 31, the two sides
reached a deal that would provide the team
losing a free agent compensation. The team that lost the player
would receive a player from the
"signing" team. The union won a free agency system that was
similar to their own bargaining position
but at a heavy price. Players lost a total of $30 million in
wages, and the owners lost roughly $72
million in revenues. Miller, Grebey, Kuhn, and other key
figures in the negotiation process left their

positions, and baseball witnessed labor peace and an attendance
boom over the next four years.
In 1985, with Donald Fehr heading the MLBPA, the two sides
were determined to avoid a work stoppage
while negotiating the 6th Basic Agreement. The two main issues
that divided the two sides were once
again free agent compensation and pension contribution levels.
Several issues were agreed upon early
(e.g., a drug review board would investigate cases where a
player was accused of using cocaine), but it
was still not enough to avoid another work stoppage. On August
6, the players went on strike, but with
the 1981 strike still fresh in their minds, the two sides reached
an agreement within a day.
The risk of alienating the fans, who were spending more money
than ever on baseball: proved to be the
driving force behind the speedy resolution.
The Early 1990s: Salary Arbitration, Revenue Sharing, and “The
Big Strike"
In 1990, the owners instituted another lockout while bargaining
with the union over the 7th Basic
Agreement. The disparity between large market teams (such as
the New York Yankees and Los Angeles

Dodgers) and small market teams (such as the Kansas City)
Royals and Milwaukee Brewers) was
growing. With a larger fan base, large market teams were able
to attract significantly richer television
contracts from local networks. Because no salary cap existed,
large market teams could sign better
players due to their ability to offer high salaries. The owners
saw this as a major problem, and proposed
a "revenue sharing" program, in which large market teams
would share a certain portion of their local
revenue with small market teams. Their justification was that by
increasing competitive balance, playoff
races would be closer, attracting more people to the ballparks
late in the season and producing higher
television ratings. The union opposed a revenue sharing
proposal because, if the large market teams had
less money, they could not afford to offer top dollar contracts to
free agents. Players employed by
teams that received revenue sharing would not necessarily
benefit either, because those teams were
not obligated to spend the funds on player salaries. The owners
tried to preempt a strike by locking the
5

players out of spring training. After 32 days, an agreement was
reached; the revenue sharing issue was
put on hold.
In 1994, the owners realized that not only was competitive and
financial disparity hurting their profits,
but salary arbitration was driving up salary levels. Beginning
with the 1985 contract, players with three
years of major-league service who felt that they were underpaid
could demand that their salaries be
adjusted upward through a process called "final offer
arbitration." The process worked as follows: The
player 's representative presented evidence that the player was
underpaid, relative to peers with
comparable records. The team owner's representative presented
evidence that the player was equitably
compensated, given other players in his peer group. Each side
proposed a salary figure. The arbitrator
then had to select either the player's proposal or the owner's
proposal. Teams had been more inclined
to pay players a little bit more than what they were worth
instead of risking a loss in the final-offer
arbitration process (where they stood to pay considerably more).
The owners suggested an overhaul of

the entire economic structure of the league: eliminating salary
arbitration, phasing in a "salary cap"
(where a team 's total payroll was limited to a specified
amount), lowering free agency eligibility, and
splitting television revenue 50/50 with the players. Fehr and the
MLBPA, on the other hand, rejected
these proposals. On August 11, I994, the players went on strike.
This time, the strike lasted 232 days, and the World Series was
cancelled for the first time ever. The
courts, the NLRB, Congress, the FMCS, and President Clinton
all intervened at some point during the
stoppage. The strike eventually ended when Judge Sonia
Sotomayor of the United States District Court
in Manhattan granted the NLRB 's request for an injunction. The
NLRB was claiming that the owners had
implemented their proposals during the strike without the
existence of a good-faith impasse. Baseball
resumed on April 26, 1995, with the old contract provisions
being re-implemented. Historian Paul
Staudohar calls the strike "one of the most eventful, but
unproductive, ever." The owners estimated
their total losses to be in upwards of $1 billion, and the players
saw their salaries drop considerably as

cash-strapped clubs sought cheaper talent from the minor
leagues. Some fans turned to minor league
teams for baseball entertainment; others abandoned the game
altogether. Meanwhile bargaining
continued. The 8th Basic Agreement wasn't agreed upon until
late December, 1996. A revenue sharing
program was implemented, but the owners did not receive their
highly sought salary cap.
Labor Relations Developments from 1998 to 2002: The Curt
Flood Act and Contraction
In 1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act. The law called for
an end to baseball's storied antitrust
exemption, but only as it applied to labor relations. The premise
of the bill was to "reduce the chance of
future strikes by allowing players to bring an antitrust suit
against the owners if labor negotiations stall."
All other aspects of the exemption still applied.
In July 2000, the owners tried to partially rectify the problem of
competitive and financial disparity by
eliminating (or contracting) two teams from Major League
Baseball. Their rationalization was that by
having two of the poorly performing clubs gone, the revenue
sharing burden would be eased
substantially. Congress unsuccessfully attempted to stop the

contraction, and the union responded by
filing a grievance. Eventually, the owner of the Montreal Expos
(one of the teams that was being
considered for contraction) sold his team to an ownership group
made up of the other 29 owners for
$120 million. They moved the team to Washington, D.C.,
renamed it the Nationals, and then found a
buyer for the team.9 The issue of contraction was put on hold.
6
In 2002, the two sides entered a bargaining process that was
calmer and more productive than in
previous bargaining sessions. The owners wanted to implement
a "luxury tax" (a team exceeding a
certain payroll threshold would pay money to MLB and those
funds would be redistributed among the
other teams) and a competitive balance draft (the eight worst
teams could select players from the eight
best teams). Fehr and the union opposed these provisions (the
original proposal by the owners was a 50
percent tax on all salary spending over $84 million), and
disagreements over a proposed expansion of

the drug testing policy also arose. The union set a strike date of
August 30, and the two sides struck a
deal the night before the work stoppage was to take place. A
luxury tax with higher thresholds than
originally proposed was implemented as a way to slow rising
player salaries, and, perhaps just as
importantly, the post season (which accounts for a large portion
of baseball's revenue) was saved.
The Upcoming 10th Basic Agreement
The 2002 contract was set to expire in December 2006. The
history of labor relations in professional
baseball-the lost revenue from strikes and lockouts, attempts to
control escalating players' salaries, and
clauses found in prior contracts-all cast a long shadow over the
2006 negotiations. Baseball
Commissioner Allen H. (Bud) Selig issued an order to all MLB
employees that no one outside of his office
was to discuss upcoming labor negotiations. While the
MLBPA's Fehr planned to travel to each of the
teams to li- ten to player concerns in the early spring, as of
December 2005 the following issue, seemed
prominent:
1. Steroids

In the fall of 2005, with negotiation s over the 10th Basic
Agreement still month s away, the two sides
were forced to bargain over a drug testing program. The endless
media coverage over certain players'
alleged steroid usage was harming Major League Baseball 's
image greatly, and Congress (most notably
Senator John McCain, R-Arizona) had been threatening to act if
the two sides could not develop a
tougher policy. The controversy began when a book by ex-
slugger Jose Canseco claimed to reveal the
extent to which major league ballplayers were using and
abusing steroids. The steroid issue had been
gaining momentum for several years prior, as home-run records
were broken and balls were flying out
of the park like never before. In what some say was an attempt
to garner media attention and solidify
anti-drug stances with the public, several Congressmen became
involved, even subpoenaing several
former players and executives to testify in front of the
Government Reform Committee in March of
2005. The MLBPA complained that the union should be
contacted before either current or former player
spoke out publicly on this issue.
Fehr and Commissioner Selig were far apart on the issue of

punishment for steroid users, with Fehr's
proposal being far more lenient than Selig's. Fehr was calling
for suspensions of 20 games for the first
time a player was tested positive for steroid. 75 games for the
second penalty (with some flexibility,
based on circumstances), and a lifetime ban for the third
penalty. Selig countered with an absolute ban
of 50 games for the first penalty, 100 games for the second
penalty, and a lifetime ban "for anybody
dumb enough to be caught a third time." Congress was
threatening to act if the two sides could not
voluntarily agree on a drug testing program for steroids.
Amphetamines also became a topic for discussion. Owners
wanted to expand the drug testing program
to include amphetamines, albeit with lighter penalties than for
steroids. The union leadership generally
7
opposed this expansion of the drug testing program, but again
Fehr was sensitive to Congressional
pressure.
2. Contraction

In 2002, "contraction"-a possible decrease in the number of
MLB teams and/or relocation of poorly
performing clubs-was a prominent topic. However, with the
transformation of the Montreal Expos into
the Washington, D.C. Nationals, it was unlikely that the topic
would be a part of the 2006 negotiation s;
the owners had sent signals that contraction was no longer a
pressing issue. However, it was possible
that the topic could reemerge, if only as a "throw-away" issue.
The 9th Basic Agreement stated that the
owners had until July 2006 to notify the union of
contraction/relocation plans.
3. The "Luxury Tax"
Financial disparity was a topic that the PRC would certainly not
consider to be "throw- away" issues.
Owners argued that because some teams could afford to pay
high salaries, they could hire the best
players and make it unlikely that most other teams could make
the playoffs. To restore competitive
parity, the owners wanted to continue, and even expand, the
luxury tax that had been implemented i n
2002. The player’s union remained philosophically opposed to
any formula such as the luxury tax (which

they considered to be a type of flexible salary cap) that might
hurt player incomes. However, as Murray
Chass of the New York Times wrote, ". . . the owners would be
hard pressed to make proposals based on
economic hardship. Industry revenues didn't reach $2 billion
until 1997, and last year [2005] it soared to
$4.7 billion." The luxury tax which was laid out in the 9th Basic
Agreement only affected a few teams
(most of the penalties were paid by the New York Yankees), so
both sides could have trouble proving or
disproving its worth. It started in 2003 with a tax threshold of
$117 million and rose to $136.5 million in
2006. Certain alterations to the complicated tax formula-the tax
increased with each offense--could be
proposed during bargaining, but it was doubtful that team
owners would agree to a complete overhaul
of the system so early in its existence.
4. Revenue Sharing
In addition to the luxury tax, MLB used revenue sharing (e.g.,
from television contract rights and ticket
sales) to distribute income from the most profitable teams to the
least profitable teams. In 2004 and
2005, Major League Baseball witnessed its highest attendance
levels ever, with 73,022,969 and

74,915,268 fans passing through the turnstiles, respectively.
With luxury box and ticket prices rising, this
attendance boom signaled an unprecedented rise in gate
revenue. While this helped improve the
profitability of the smaller-market teams, the union was
concerned about how these funds were used.
Minimum team salary levels needed to be addressed. After the
Florida Marlins club received luxury tax
and revenue sharing funds, it slashed its payroll to $15 million
($20 million less than the second lowest
payroll). To the union leaders, such a move exposed holes in the
revenue sharing program-in effect,
funds were being transferred from some owners to other owners,
but there was no guarantee that the
players would see any of those funds.
5. Salary Levels
The average salary earned by a MLB player rose 7 percent-
about double the inflation rate for 2005. The
average MLB player certainly seemed well-paid, with a 2005
salary of $2.4 million. However, this figure
8

was skewed by the very high salaries paid to star players, some
of whom earned over $20 million
annually. The minimum annual salary was $327,000. The union
wanted to increase that minimum.
6. Salary Arbitration and Free Agency
How long one must play before becoming eligible for salary
arbitration and/or free agency remained an
issue. The union wanted to shorten the length of time so that
high- performing players could increase
their income to be comparable to their peers. The owners
wanted to keep it where it was, or perhaps
even lengthen the eligibility requirements. The appropriate
compensation a signing team should pay to
the team losing a free agent also remained a topic of potential
discussion in contract negotiations.
1. Pension Contribution Levels
The union wanted owners to increase their contributions to the
player 's pension fund. Owners balked
at this request, citing declining television revenues, which were
used to fund pension contributions. The
World Series television contract that Major League Baseball
could sign with the FOX network might be
the X-factor in the owners' approach to bargaining over

economic matters. A large percentage of
baseball's revenues came from national broadcasting contracts,
which gave a network the right to
broadcast playoff games, the All-Star Game, and a certain
number of games throughout the regular
season. The previous contract with FOX, which ran from 2000
through 2006, was worth $2.5 billion, but
unfortunately coincided with the lowest television ratings in the
sport's history. The World Series ratings
in 2000, 2002, and 2005 were the three lowest- rated broadcasts
since the Series began airing in 1968.
Because of this surprising trend. the new contract with FOX,
which was to be signed in July of 2006, was
rumored to be worth significantly less (estimated at $1.75
billion over seven years). Since the owners
used large portion s of the television contract to fund the
players' pension fund, the claim of financial
hardship by the PRC could rear its ugly head during Basic
Agreement negotiations.
2. Strike Risks
The potential alienation of baseball 's fan base by undergoing
another work stoppage might prove to
exert more influence over bargaining matters than any other
factor. Past work stoppages had cost both

players and owners significant amounts of money. A strike
could result in team owners attempting to
bring in "scab" players (e.g., minor league players) or it could
result in the decertification of the union by
disgruntled players.
3. The Media and Public Perception
Finally, with any labor relations situation, the media play an
important role in the approaches that the
two sides take to bargaining. In prior negotiations, national
media attention to labor contract
negotiations was considerably more intense than in other
industries. The ESPN television network only
added to the scrutiny as it complemented traditional media
outlets, such as Sports Illustrated magazine
and the USA Today, New York Times, and Washington Post
newspapers. The MLBPA was recently
accused of shielding drug addicts and criminals because of its
stance on steroid testing. Yet to give in to
owner demands for a tough new drug testing policy would only
lead to media criticism that "the
strongest union in America" was ineffective and could be beaten
by determined owners. Such criticism
could cause some union leaders to encourage taking a hardline

approach to regain the confidence of
their constituents.
9
The Big Decision: What Bargaining Strategy Should Fehr
Adopt?
Donald Fehr realized that he could go one of two ways when the
bargaining sessions were to begin
during the 2006 season. On one hand, he could probably secure
the "basic" increases in minimum salary
and pension contributions without a lot of resistance from the
PRC and its leader, Commissioner Bud
Selig. Although the owners might claim that the decreased
television revenue put them in a less
desirable financial position, Fehr knew that he could retaliate
by going to the media with the
astronomical industry revenue figures that baseball was
currently realizing. With gate revenues and
industry profits at an all-time high, a hard-line approach and the
threat of a strike or antitrust lawsuit
might allow the union to secure better wages and benefits than
they had ever imagined. On the other

hand, Fehr knew that the public image of the union had suffered
because of past "strikes by
millionaires" and because of the union's current resistance to a
tougher steroid policy. As Fehr mulled
his options and planned his bargaining strategy, he perhaps
hoped that Jose Canseco wasn 't planning
on writing another book anytime soon.
Source: This case was prepared by Daniel T. Romportl and
William H. Ross, Jr., both of the University of
Wisconsin-La Crosse. Used with permission from the authors
and the Society for Case Research.

10
Source: Lewicki, Negotiation, readings, exercises and cases.
Case 5.
Page 1
12/16/2015
02:39 PM
Income Statement (Accrual)
Inland Towers of North Miami Beach, LLC - (inland)
January 2015 - November 2015
Period to Date % Year to Date %
INCOME
RENT INCOME
Rent 1,589,977.92 87.65 1,589,977.92 87.65
NET RENT INCOME 1,589,977.92 87.65 1,589,977.92
87.65
PASSTHRU INCOME
Passthru Water & Sewer 198.81 0.01 198.81 0.01
Estimated CAM Charges 218,851.84 12.06 218,851.84
12.06
CAM Reconciliation -3,598.31 -0.20 -3,598.31 -0.20

TOTAL REIMBURSEMENT 215,452.34 11.88
215,452.34 11.88
OTHER INCOME
Late Fees Income 3,111.26 0.17 3,111.26 0.17
Interest Income 297.45 0.02 297.45 0.02
Other Income 5,000.00 0.28 5,000.00 0.28
NSF Fees 245.00 0.01 245.00 0.01
TOTAL OTHER INCOME 8,653.71 0.48 8,653.71 0.48
TOTAL INCOME 1,814,083.97 100.00 1,814,083.97
100.00
EXPENSES
DIRECT EXPENSES
Materials on repairs 9,820.90 0.54 9,820.90 0.54
Building Repairs 39,634.52 2.18 39,634.52 2.18
Lease Commissions 22,384.23 1.23 22,384.23 1.23
Licenses, Permits & Renewals 7,021.28 0.39 7,021.28 0.39
Locksmith/Key Replacement 175.00 0.01 175.00 0.01
Janitor Services 65,987.81 3.64 65,987.81 3.64
HVAC (Heat, Ventilation, Air) 9,125.45 0.50 9,125.45
0.50
Elevator Inspection, Maintenance & 3,659.52 0.20
3,659.52 0.20
Landscaping/Fumigation 42,949.75 2.37 42,949.75 2.37
Pest control 1,926.00 0.11 1,926.00 0.11
Management Fees 85,055.69 4.69 85,055.69 4.69
Fire Alarm/Inspection/Security Servi 10,246.78 0.56
10,246.78 0.56
Insurance 46,548.72 2.57 46,548.72 2.57
Flood Insurance 2,171.00 0.12 2,171.00 0.12

Property Taxes 260,821.47 14.38 260,821.47 14.38
Electricity 97,173.40 5.36 97,173.40 5.36
Water & Sewer 27,793.11 1.53 27,793.11 1.53
Garbage/Trash Disposal 11,142.16 0.61 11,142.16 0.61
TOTAL DIRECT EXPENSES 743,636.79 40.99
743,636.79 40.99
GENERAL & ADMINISTRATIVE
Janitorial Supplies 10,636.50 0.59 10,636.50 0.59
Donations 3,000.00 0.17 3,000.00 0.17
Office Expenses 155.14 0.01 155.14 0.01
Postage & Delivery Services 92.23 0.01 92.23 0.01
Telephone 2,372.47 0.13 2,372.47 0.13
Legal Fees Expense 8,593.33 0.47 8,593.33 0.47
Accounting Fees 3,210.00 0.18 3,210.00 0.18
Bank Charges Expense 53.12 0.00 53.12 0.00
Professional Fees 5,750.00 0.32 5,750.00 0.32
Page 2
12/16/2015
02:39 PM
Income Statement (Accrual)
Inland Towers of North Miami Beach, LLC - (inland)
January 2015 - November 2015
Period to Date % Year to Date %
TOTAL G & A EXPENSE 33,862.79 1.87 33,862.79 1.87
DEBT EXPENSE

1st Mortgage Interest 643,368.05 35.47 643,368.05 35.47
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE 643,368.05 35.47 643,368.05
35.47
TOTAL EXPENSES 1,420,867.63 78.32
1,420,867.63 78.32
NET INCOME 393,216.34 21.68 393,216.34 21.68
email sent to proffesor
Hi Dr. ,
We wanted to know if our group can use an actual listing of
mine for Project 2. It is a $23 mil mix use retail and office
center in Broward county. Walgreens and Bank of America are
two national tenants that are currently in the center. The $2.5
mil downpayment will represent almost 11%. Please advise.
hes answer was
Yes, you are welcome to use this property. You will probably
need more than 2.5M as a down payment, but I am ok with that.
You can use any down payment amount that is suitable for this
project.
Good luck and please let me know if you have any questions for
me.
Hi Team,
Dr. said we can use my real life listing. Please let me know if
everyone is in agreement. We should figure out what our
downpayment should be. We will need more than 10% probably.

I will create number 1 and 2 .
first part of project so you could look how is coming along Part
1:
Introduction:
The following report is an analytical summary of a retail mixed
use building our group is considering for purchase for $23
million. We are evaluating the income producing property and
deciding wether or not to purchase the property. We are
analyzing the expected levered before tax return. The report
will provide a full property description, make reasonable
assumptions about the NOI growth rate. We will also calculate
terminal growth rate, current mortgage interest rate along with
the downpayment requirement and required rate of returns.
Terminal cap rate will also be analyzed. We will show the
maximum price that we are willing and able to pay for this
property. In addition, a sensitivity analysis will be performed as
well. This report will give a full overall picture of the
commercial property on wether it is a good investment or not.
Part 2:
Property Description:
This outstanding 3 story retail/office shopping
center has retail spaces on the first floor, offices
on the second and third floor. The property is located at
2901 Slirling Road Hollywood, FL 33312. The office building
is attached to the adjacent strip center with a
separate folio number. The property sits directly
on Stirling Rd. featuring high traffic volume and great
exposure!

The national anchor tenants are: Bank of America,
Walgreens Pharmacy and Crossfit. Ample Parking
is provided in the front and rear of plaza. The
long term leases with the anchor tennants are Triple Net
and the CAM expenses are passed through to the tenants.
Property has significant "upside" due to under market rents and
market recovery.
Rentable square footage is 92,695. Currently the property is
97% occupied.
Property was built in 1987. Significant property improvements
were added recently.
Currently the property is completely up to date.
PastedGraphic-2.tiff
Project #2: Investment in an Income Producing Property.
In this report you will consider a hypothetical purchase of a real
estate income producing property and evaluate the expected
levered before tax returns on a property of your choice.
Ultimately, you should decide whether committing your capital
to the real estate property that you considered is a wise
decision. You will be working on this assignment in a group of
three to five students. The assignment is due on or before
February 24th at 11:55 p.m. EST. By that time you should
submit an electronic copy (via email) of your assignment. If you
turn your assignment late, 10% will be deducted from your
grade for every calendar-day delay.
Your complete assignment should read and look like a
professional report and include the following sections:
1. Short introduction – Tell the reader what she/he is about to
read.
2. Property description – Identify and describe an income
producing property that you would be able to purchase with a
$2,500,000 down payment. You are expected to hold this

investment for eight years. You may use the entire $2.5M but do
not have to. (However, a certain percentage of the property
must be financed. That is, you can not buy the property with
100% cash). You can evaluate any property you would like and
you are not limited to a specific location. I recommend using a
website such as www.Loopnet.com to search for your property.
3. Assumptions – Make reasonable assumptions about the NOI
growth rate, terminal growth rate, mortgage interest rate,
required rates of returns, down payment and terminal cap rate.
All assumptions should be justified in the text. To construct
your assumptions you are encouraged to use your class notes,
documents from the course’s website and the internet. (You may
assume without justification that selling expenses are 4%. You
may also assume financing with a 10-year interest only fixed
rate loan and DCR of no less than 1.3). For this project you may
assume that the NOI reported by the seller (or the implied NOI
reported, given the asking price and the reported CAP) is
correct and no due diligence is required.
4. Before tax expected return – Using an Excel spreadsheet,
determine the “before tax” annual expected rate of return on
your capital.
5. Max price – Based on the scenario above, calculate the
absolute maximum price you are willing to pay for the property.
Obviously, you will never tell this to the seller, but it is
important to have this number in mind when/if you are ready to
negotiate the price you pay for the property.
6. Sensitivity analysis – Consider and analyze two additional
scenarios (one optimistic scenario and one pessimistic
scenario). In each scenario you will need
to change the NOI and/or NOI growth and/or the terminal CAP

rate. You will need to articulate the reasons for the possible
changes and their magnitude.
7. Conclusion – Summarize your findings. Do you think that
you should commit your hypothetical funds to this income
producing property?
Note: a snap shot of all Excel spreadsheets and calculations
used to derive your result should be included in your report.
Deliverables:
ONE Excel file of the spreadsheets and ONE Word file
including text and snap shots from your Excel spreadsheet. The
Word file should be organized as a complete and well flowing
report.
Your assignment files should be named as the following: “THE
SENDER’S NAME – Proj2_Excel” and “THE SENDER’S
NAME – Proj2_Text”
Grading criteria:
Following the project guidance: 10%
Please make sure that your report follows the description
provided above, including the names of files submitted and the
material included in each section.
Professionalism and clarity: 15%
Pictures of the properties, margins, spacing, and fonts have
been chosen to make the document attractive and easy to read.
Tables, figures and graphs have been used to summarize data
and effectively illustrate points. Headings are used judiciously
to help reader find key sections in longer reports. Use a table of
content and reference to page numbers and/or appendices
throughout the report. Main Excel findings should be
highlighted. It should look like a professional report. Contains
few typographical errors and is well-printed.
Be brief and clear! The total length of the report must not
exceed 10 pages.
Section 1: 5%
Section 2: 5%

Section 3: 15%
Section 4: 15%
Section 5: 10%
Section 6: 15%
Section 7: 10%
*PART 1 & 2 - Simona
*NOI growth rate - Alina
*terminal growth rate - Mohammed
*mortgage interest rate - Robert
*required rates of returns - Khalid
*terminal cap rate - Jonathan
*4 - Before tax expected return – Josh
*down payment – Let’s all agree on an appropriate down
payment
*5 - Max Price - Robert

STIRLING SQUAREHollywood, Fl 333122901 Stirling RoadIn.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to STIRLING SQUAREHollywood, Fl 333122901 Stirling RoadIn.docx

Similar to STIRLING SQUAREHollywood, Fl 333122901 Stirling RoadIn.docx (20)

More from dessiechisomjj4

More from dessiechisomjj4 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

STIRLING SQUAREHollywood, Fl 333122901 Stirling RoadIn.docx