1. A Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused
Universe (2008)
Quentin Smith
Introduction: The Meaning of "The Universe Causes Itself"
Part One: The Entailment Argument for a Self-Caused
Universe
Part Two: A Universe that Causes Itself to Begin to Exist
Part Three: Complete Explanations
Appendix: The Abbreviation Argument for a Self-Caused
Universe
Introduction: The Meaning of "The Universe Causes Itself"
I intend to argue for the conclusion that the universe, be it
infinitely old or finitely old, causes itself. One might object
that no such argument could possibly succeed, because the
claim that "the universe causes itself" is incoherent. I agree
that this claim is incoherent if it is understood to mean that
one individual, the universe, causes that same individual to
come into existence. No individual can bring about its own
existence, because no individual can bring about anything
unless it (already) exists. What I mean by "self-caused" in
this paper is that there is a certain type of whole of parts,
namely, a temporal and causal sequence of different
individuals, with each individual being caused by earlier
individuals in the sequence. What I mean by "the universe is
self-caused" is that (a) the universe is a whole of parts,
specifically, a sequence of states of the universe, with each
part or state being an individual; (b) the existence of each
part (state) of the universe is caused by earlier parts of the
universe; and (c) the reason the universe as a whole exists
is either because it is composed of or is identical with these
successively caused parts.
A clear representation of these two senses of "self-caused"
can be made if we use the letters x, y and z. If an individual x
caused itself, this would be expressed by "x causes x." I
reject the formulation, x causes x, and explain "self-cause" in
a way that applies only to a sequentially extended whole of
parts. The universe is a sequence of states and "the
2. universe is self-caused" means that there are successive
states of the universe x, y, z, etc., with x causing y, and y
causing the later state z. The arrow means causes; x →
ymeans that x causes y to exist. The brackets { } denote the
sequence as a whole and x, y, z are successive parts of this
sequence. Accordingly, if the universe sequentially causes
itself to exist, this is expressed by
{. . . x → y → z . . .}
But we cannot stop here in explaining the meaning of "the
universe is self-caused"; this paper's argument that the
universe is self-caused is also an explanation of what "the
universe is self-caused" means, and this is a progressive
task.
This paper is divided into three main parts followed by an
appendix. In Part One, I defend what I call theentailment
argument for a universe that is self-caused in the sense just
explained. Roughly, this argument claims that each part of
the universe is sufficiently caused by earlier parts and the
existence of the universe as a whole is entailed by the
existence of all of the parts that compose this whole. The
obtaining of this entailment relation between the causally
explained parts and the universe they compose is the
sufficient reason why the universe exists. If I am right about
this, then the traditional ways of thinking about the
cosmological argument for God's existence, both pro and
con, are false. Defenders of the cosmological argument,
going back at least as far as Leibniz and Clarke, have
thought that, while the state of the universe at a time is
caused by earlier states of the universe, the whole universe
composed of all of its states is caused by God. Critics of the
cosmological argument have claimed instead that the
existence of the whole universe has no cause or
explanation--its existence is just a brute fact. According to
the entailment argument, both of these positions are
mistaken. The universe has an explanation, but that
explanation is not God or anything else distinct from the
universe and its states.
In Part Two, I show that this entailment argument is
consistent with a finitely old universe, and in particular with
the most widely accepted cosmological theory of the
universe, the Big Bang theory. In Part Three, I defend my
3. position that the entailment argument is itself
a complete explanation of the universe. Finally, in an
appendix to this paper, I develop an alternative argument for
a self-caused universe, one that does not assume that there
is a universe distinct from all of its states. This argument is
called the abbreviation argument since it assumes that the
term "the universe" is used merely as an abbreviation of "all
the states that exist" or other plural phrases that refer to all
the states. There is no individual that is distinct from all the
states and that is composed of all the states; the whole of all
the states is identical with all the states, and its existence is
either uncaused, or caused by God, or entailed by the
existence of the states. In the abbreviation argument, the
universe is "self-caused" because it is not distinct from all the
states that exist and each state that exists is causally
explained by earlier states. The motivation for this additional
argument may be obscure to those without a background in
philosophy, which is why I have placed the argument in an
appendix. If the reader is not concerned about whether the
universe exists as an individual distinct from all of its parts,
then there is no need to read this appendix.
Part One: The Entailment Argument for a Self-Caused
Universe
This argument supposes that the universe is a whole, an
individual existent, that is different from all the parts of the
whole. We are using "U" as the name of this whole. It is an
"entailment" argument in the sense that the explanation of
why the universe U exists is that its existence is entailed by
the existence of its parts, each of which is causally explained
in terms of earlier parts.
U, the whole of all the parts, is not causally explained by all
the parts, since its parts do not cause it to exist. Rather,
each part of U is caused to exist by earlier parts of U, and
the causally explained existence of all the parts of the whole
U logically require or entail the existence of the whole U, and
in this sense the existence of the whole U is logically
explained by the causally explained existence of its parts. It
is a logical truth that if the parts of the whole U are caused to
exist, then the whole U also exists. Once the existence of
each of the parts is causally explained, the existence of the
whole is logically explained, since it is a logical consequence
4. of the existence of the parts of the whole that the whole
exists.
It is either senseless or logically self-contradictory to
suppose that, even if all the parts of the whole have a causal
explanation of their existence, there still needs to be (or even
can be) a causal explanation of the existence of their whole.
There cannot be an external or divine cause of the whole,
since a cause is logically "too late" in the following sense. It
is logically necessary that if there exist parts of a whole, the
whole exists. Each part of the whole has a sufficient cause of
its existence in earlier parts. Accordingly, the existence of
each part has a causal explanation and the existence of the
whole has a logical explanation. Regardless of whether or
not some (purported) external causal act is directed upon the
whole, the whole exists because it is logically required to
exist by the existence of its parts. Since this (alleged)
external causal relation or causal act has no affect
whatsoever on the logically necessitated existence of the
whole, it is ineffective and so is not a "causal relation" in any
intelligible sense of this phrase. This is stated more clearly if
we say there is no such purported causal relation; there is no
external cause or divine cause of the universe.
Part Two: A Universe that Causes Itself to Begin to Exist
The most widely accepted cosmological theory of the
universe since the late 1960s is not the "oscillating universe"
version that implies that there are infinitely many past cycles
of expansion and contraction. Rather, it is the version that
implies that the universe began to exist 15 billion years ago
in a Big Bang singularity. To say that its beginning is a
"singularity" means that the universe begins to exist but
there is no first instant t=0 at which it begins. The cosmic
singularity is a hypothetical time t=0 at which all the laws of
nature, space and time break down. It is hypothetical or
merely imaginary because if it did exist, it would be a
physically impossible state, due to the breakdown of all laws,
even the laws required for time to exist. This breakdown at
the hypothetical t=0 implies there is no first instant t=0 of the
finitely old time-series and that each instant is preceded by
earlier instants. An instant is a time that is instantaneous or
has zero duration. An interval is a time that is temporally
extended and has a duration of a certain length, such as one
hour or one minute.
5. Since there is a Big Bang singularity, the first interval of each
length is "past-open," which means that there is no instant t
that is the first instant of each earliest interval of any length,
be the interval an hour, minute or second, etc. Before any
instant in an earliest hour, minute, second, etc., there is an
infinite number of other instants. Formulated in terms of
instantaneous states of the universe, this means that before
each instantaneous state of the universe, there are other
instantaneous states, and each instantaneous state of the
universe is caused by earlier instantaneous states.
Accordingly, the universe causes or explains itself in the
sense that, even though it began a finite number of years
ago, say 15 billion years, each instantaneous state in any
earliest interval is caused to exist and hence explained by
earlier instantaneous states. In terms of the entailment
argument for a self-caused universe, this means that the
states are parts of a whole, the individual U, and U causes
itself in the sense that (a) each instantaneous part S of the
whole U is sufficiently caused by earlier instantaneous parts
of U; (b) U is finitely old in the sense that there are no
instantaneous parts of the whole that exist earlier than some
finite number of equal-length, nonoverlapping intervals; and
(c) the existence of all these parts of the whole U entails the
existence of the whole U.[1]
Some philosophers have argued that if the first instant of the
first hour after the Big Bang can be "deleted" (i.e., regarded
as a nonexistent), then the first instant of any hour can be
deleted. This would allow one to say that any hour or hour-long
process has no external cause, since each of its
instantaneous states is caused by earlier instantaneous
states that are internal to the hour-long process. They say a
cannon ball's flying through the air could then be "causally
explained" without referring to the relevant external event,
the explosion of the gun powder in the cannon, by saying
that each instantaneous state of the ball's movement is
caused by earlier instantaneous states of its movement,
implying that the external event, the gun powder explosion,
is not the cause of the ball's movement. Their mistake is
failing to realize that the first hour after the Big Bang lacks a
first instant because of a unique circumstance, that there is a
cosmic singularity. There is no cosmic singularity at the
present hour or at the various hours they mention and Big
Bang cosmology implies these hours or hour-long processes
must have a first instant. The first instantaneous state of the
6. cannon's ball movement is externally caused by the
explosion of the gunpowder.[2]
Part Three: Complete Explanations
Not every argument is an explanation, but some arguments
are explanations and my entailment argument is a causal
explanation of the universe's existence. The universe and its
parts are contingent in the sense that they might not have
existed. Since the existence of each state is caused by an
earlier state, and since the existence of all these states
entails the universe's existence, there is an explanation for
each of these contingent beings.
Some philosophers, like Jordan Howard Sobel, maintain
that, "if anything is contingent, then it is not possible that, for
every fact or entity, x, there is a reason of some sort or other
for x" (Sobel, 2004, p. 222). I disagree. I believe that
something is contingent, but I also believe that every fact or
entity x has a reason. If x is a part of the universe, it has a
reason in earlier parts; if x is the universe, it has a reason for
its existence in the existence of its parts. We shall shortly
discuss some contingent facts or entities that some allege
cannot be explained.
The entailment explanation of the universe's existence
invalidates Sobel's argument that a complete explanation of
the universe's existence requires that the premises all be
necessary truths and that the conclusion thereby be a
necessary truth. The entailment cosmological argument for a
self-caused universe, for example, is a complete explanation
of the universe's existence and its premises are the
contingent truths that each state S contingently exists, that
S's existence is sufficiently causally explained by earlier
states, and that the existence of the whole universe, U, is
explained by virtue of being logically necessitated by the
existence of its parts, the states. This can be formulated as
an argument with premises and a conclusion, such that the
conclusion logically derived from these premises is the
contingent truth that the universe exists. Accordingly, a
complete explanation of the universe's existence does not
require that the premises all be necessary truths and that the
conclusion be a necessary truth.
7. William Rowe says that a dependent being is a being whose
sufficient reason for existence lies in the causal activity of
other beings. He writes that "if every being were dependent,
it does seem that there would be a contingent fact without
any explanation--the fact that there are dependent beings"
(Rowe, 1998, p. xiii). I would ask, if every being were
dependent, why would it then seem that the contingent fact
that there are dependent beings has no explanation? How
could one logically proceed from the premise that every
being is dependent to the conclusion that there is no
explanation for the fact that there are dependent beings?
Rowe holds that "the sufficient reason for a fact is another
fact that entails it" (Rowe, 1998, p. xvii). But it seems clear
there are many facts that entail the fact that there are
dependent beings. For example, the fact that there is a state
of the universe S2 entails the fact that there are dependent
beings; S2 is a dependent being since S2's "sufficient reason
lies in the causal activity of other beings." If we interpret
Rowe's sentence as meaning that a sufficient reason for a
fact is an explanation for the fact, then the fact that S2
exists is an explanation of the fact that there are dependent
beings.
But Rowe can be more charitably interpreted as meaning
that the sufficient reason for a fact is another fact that entails
it, but not every sufficient reason for a fact also explains that
fact. If we adopt this interpretation, there is some further
feature F that a sufficient reason must possess in order for
the sufficient reason to explain the fact that it entails. But
Rowe does not indicate what F is; furthermore, it is not
obvious that what I called "the charitable interpretation" is
what Rowe had in mind by his statement. He might be read
as saying that sufficient reasons are explanations, but that
some of these explanations are circular or viciously circular
(and perhaps some are noncircular). Rowe offers another
example of something that he believes cannot be explained.
He says that the fact
t: there being positive contingent states of affairs
cannot have a sufficient reason for obtaining. However, it
seems clear that this fact does have a sufficient reason for
obtaining. There obtains the positive contingent state of
affairs, there being an occurrence of the state of the universe
S2, and this entails the fact t: there being positive contingent
8. states of affairs. Rowe would say of a proposed explanation
of this type that "such a proposed explanation is circular"
(Rowe, 1998, p. xvi). But what does "circular" mean here?
Rowe does not explain what he means by this word and it is
hard to see why or how "circular" could mean something
different than the positive theoretical virtue of being
a valid argument. The premise entails the conclusion. If
"circular" means that the premise entails the conclusion, then
circularity is a necessary property of any deductively valid
argument. However, I do not think that "circular" as this word
is used in works on the logic of explanations means this;
rather, it means that the conclusion of the argument not only
is entailed by the premise, but also entails the premise. For
example, S1's being earlier than S2 entails that S2 is later
than S1. But S2's being later than S1 also entails that S1 is
earlier than S2. Thus, to use one of these facts to explain the
other is circular. By contrast, S2's occurrence entails the fact
that there are positive contingent states, but the fact that
there are positive contingent states does not entail S2's
occurrence. Therefore, to use S2's occurrence to explain the
fact that there are positive contingent states of affairs is not
circular (unless of course one insists on calling any valid
argument circular, in which case it is not "viciously circular").
But Rowe could be read as meaning that an explanation is
circular if what is explained is a general fact and the
explanation is a particular fact involving a being of the kind
that the general fact is about. It is alleged that a general fact
such as there are contingent things cannot be noncircularly
explained by a particular fact about contingent things. But no
justification is offered for believing this sort of explanation is
"circular" in a sense of this word that implies that the
explanation is defective or not very good or is in some way
not satisfactory. Consider this example: Why do any red
things exist? Why are there red things? Why is this general
fact not explained by the particular fact that a green apple
exists and that a causal process involving internal changes
in the apple eventually produced a certain change of state in
the apple resulting in the apple losing its green color and
acquiring a red color. When the apple's red state has been
caused to exist, there exists something that is red, namely,
the red apple. This is a causal explanation of why there
exists at least one red thing. If this is a "circular explanation"
in some bad sense of "circular," then all causal scientific
explanations (or almost all of them) are "circular" in a bad
9. sense and a good or noncircular causal explanation is
impossible.
The fact that the contingent being S2 is caused to exist by
earlier contingent beings, each of which is also caused to
exist by earlier contingent beings, explains why it is true that
there is at least one contingent being. Nonetheless, the
feeling still remains that something along the lines of what
Rowe has in mind is true and that, whatever this is, it shows
that my argument that the universe is self-caused is
unsound, or else it shows that this explanation of the
existence of the universe is not complete or is unsatisfactory
in some respect. But what could this be? What seem to be
worrisome are such questions as these: Why do these parts
or states exist rather than other parts or states, or no states
at all? Why does this whole exist rather than some other
whole? Why does any contingent being at all exist?
Our questions can be phrased in terms of the metaphysics of
possibilities. A "possible world" is a complete way things
might have been. Why are these possibilities actual, rather
than some other possibilities? Why, for example, is
it true that our universe exists but false that there exists a
universe that lasts for only one minute before ceasing to
exist, and that never becomes larger than the size of the
head of a pin? Regarding the false statement, the reason
this is false is that nothing caused there to exist a universe of
this small size and brief duration. Rather, the sequences of
causes and effects has resulted (at present) in the existence
of a universe that has lasted for at least 15 billion years and
that is infinite in size or (talking only about the observable
universe) has a radius of 13 billion light years, where one
light year is 6 trillion miles. In other words, there is a
concrete sequence of causes and effects that made
actual the possibility mentioned, namely, that there is a
universe at least 15 billion years old and at least 13 billion
light years in radius, and there is no concrete sequence of
causes and effects that actualized the possibility of a
pinhead-sized universe that lasts for only a minute. This is
why it is true that our universe exists but false that the other
universe exists.[3]
Appendix: The Abbreviation Argument for a Self-Caused
Universe
10. If we adopt the theory that there is no individual U, no
universe that is a whole that is a distinct existent from all of
its parts, then the reason for the universe's existence cannot
be that U's existence is entailed by the existence of U's
parts. There are no parts and there is no whole in the sense
of "parts" and "whole" that I used in the entailment argument.
Consequently, either there is a different sort of sufficient
reason for the universe's existence or else there is no reason
at all.
Hume and others were mistaken when they said that once
each part of any whole is explained, the whole is explained.
But whether or not Hume was mistaken is irrelevant to the
abbreviation argument for a self-caused universe, since this
argument implies that the universe is not the whole U and
that there are not parts of the whole U. There is no
individual, the universe U, which is a distinct existent from all
of the parts of this individual. Rather, "U" or "the universe"
does not refer to an individual, but is used as an abbreviation
of "all the states" or "S1 and S2 and S3, and all the other
states" or "S1, S2, S3, etc."
Each state includes the maximal three dimensional space
that exists at a time t, and includes all the other contingent
concrete beings that exist at the time t, such as galaxies and
organisms as they are at the time t. The sentence "S is a
part of the universe" is stipulated (in the abbreviation
argument) to have the sense expressed by "S is one of all
the states."
The states have various ordering relations among
themselves. For example, each instantaneously existing
three-dimensional space, each different maximal 3D space
at each different time t, has a wider radius than all earlier 3D
spaces, which is one way of suggesting a cosmological
theory that space (or space-time) has been expanding since
the Big Bang 15 billion years ago. Accordingly, we can have
a consistent theory if we adopt the convention or stipulation
that "the universe" does not refer to a distinct, individual
existent, but is instead an abbreviation of "all the
cosmological states." If the existence of each state has a
sufficient reason by virtue of being caused by earlier states,
then each state has a sufficient, causal, explanation for its
existence and there is no state that is either uncaused or that
has an external or divine cause of its existence.
11. I have adopted the convention that "the universe" is an
abbreviation of such plural expressions as "S1 and S2 and
S3 and so on." There is no logical or empirical contradiction
or problem that results from adopting this convention and
one could argue by Occam's razor (which tells us not to
postulate any more individuals than is necessary) that since
there is no need to postulate an individual whole U, we
should not posit an individual U and instead stipulate that "U"
is an abbreviation of "all the states."
Both basic and nonbasic laws of nature are dispositional
properties possessed by each state and in some cases they
are actualized in the form of an occurrent property or
relation. For example, the law of evolution is a dispositional
property of states and it was not actualized or occurrently
realized until life began to exist, perhaps 4.5 billion years ago
on the earth. Since these are dispositional properties of a
state S, the cause of S is ipso facto the cause of the
possession by S of all its dispositional properties. Since each
state is caused to exist by other states, so each law,
including the basic laws of nature, is caused to exist as a
dispositional property of each state. These laws of nature
include all the causal laws, which are causal dispositions of a
state, many of which are occurrently realized. Each state has
sufficiently many occurrent actualizations of causal
dispositions to cause a later state to exist. Here "cause"
means total cause; a state S1 causes S2 in the sense that
sufficiently many causal dispositions are occurrently realized
for S3 to be caused, and all of these occurrent causal
relations make up the "total cause" of S3; this total cause of
S3 is what I have been calling the "cause" of S3. For
example, state S1 at t1 causes the state S2, which exists at
t2, to actualize its disposition to cause the state S3, which
exists at the later time t3.
There are no particulars, initial conditions or basic laws of
nature that are causally unexplained. To say that a universe
is self-caused is not only to say that each of its initial or
boundary conditions or particulars are caused to exist (by
earlier states), but also that all of its laws of nature are
caused to exist and obtain (by earlier states).[4]
Continue the Debate
12. v-include: file not found
References
Clarke, Samuel (1738). A Discourse Concerning the Being
and Attributes of God, 9th ed. London: Knapton Publishers.
Gale, Richard (1991). On the Existence and Nature of God.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hume, David (1779). Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
Leibniz, Gottfried. (1934). "On the Ultimate Origination of
Things" in The Philosophical Writings of Leibniz, trans. by M.
Morris. London: J. M. Dent and Sons (Everyman Library), pp.
31ff.
Rowe, William (1998). The Cosmological Argument.
Fordham: Fordham University Press.
Rowe, William (1997). "Circular Explanations, Cosmological
Arguments, and Sufficient Reasons." Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 21: 188-201.
Smith, Quentin (1999). "The Reason the Universe Exists is
that it Causes Itself to Exist." Philosophy 74: 136-146.
Sobel, Jordan Howard (2004). Logic and Theism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Notes
[1] In terms of the Abbreviation Argument for a self-caused
universe, this means the universe causes itself to begin to
exist in the sense that (a) each instantaneous state S is
sufficiently caused by earlier states and (b) there are no
instantaneous states that exist earlier than some finite
number of equal-length, nonoverlapping intervals. For
example, all of the states are such that each state is caused
by earlier instantaneous states but no state exists earlier
than 15 billion years ago.
[2] If one does not want to talk about a current scientific
theory of the universe, but about mere logical possibilities,
13. one can correctly say that it is logically possible for a
universe to begin to exist with a first instantaneous state. But
it is false to say that there are only two possibilities, that this
state is either uncaused or caused by God (or some sort of
cause external to the universe). There are instantaneous
causal relations (as is shown to be the case in the actual
universe by the Bell-Aspect experiments) and a self-caused
universe of this sort causes itself to begin to exist in the
sense that the different spatial parts of the first instantaneous
state of the universe are each sufficiently caused to exist by
other spatial parts of this first state. I have argued this
elsewhere (Smith, 1999), but the length of the argument
prevents it from being restated here.
[3] Why is the possibility that there is some contingent
concrete being an actualized possibility? Why was not the
possibility that there are no contingent concrete beings
actualized instead? The answer is that the first possibility
was caused to be actualized, leaving the second possibility
unactualized. For example, the cause of the present state of
the universe, the cause consisting of the various causal
processes in the previous states of the universe, caused
there to be a contingent concrete being, namely, the present
state of the universe. Since the present state of the universe
is some contingent concrete being, the explanation of why
this contingent concrete being exists explains why "there is
some contingent concrete being" and why "there are any
contingent concrete beings at all." Suppose the possible
world P is the actual world. Why is the possible world P
actual rather than some other possible world Q? I will follow
Adams, Pollock and others and adopt as my possible world
metaphysical semantics the thesis that a possible world is a
maximal proposition p, such that the actual world is a
conjunction p of all and only the true propositions. For every
proposition p', p includes p' as one of its conjuncts or it
includes the negation of p' as one of its conjuncts. The
actual world P is (identically) the actually true proposition p.
Why is P actual rather than some other world, or, asking this
same question but using different terminology, why is the
maximal proposition ptrue, rather than some other maximal
proposition q? Consider all the propositions that assert that
some state S of the universe exists, such that each of these
propositions is a long, conjunctive proposition that describes
all the physical and mental events, relations, parts or
properties of the state S. The proposition rasserts that the
