ivchapter9thearreStDecISIOnSimulation Studi.docx

iv
chapter
9
the arreSt DecISIOn
Simulation Studies
Police Bias in the Arrest Decision
Racism
Early Studies
Later Studies
Sexism
Early Studies
Later Studies
Biased-Based Policing
A Critique
Controlling Police Officer Discretion
The Locus of Change

The Policy Formulation Process
Summary
Review Questions
Discussion Questions
Selected Internet Sites
References
275
chapter OutlIne
Key Terms
Learning Objectives
Introduction
Full versus Selective Enforcement
Reasons for Police Discretion
Unclear Laws
Nuisance Behavior
Broad Statutes
Moral Standards
Outdated Laws

Defining Discretion
Handling Calls for Service
Police Operators and Dispatchers
Handling Calls in the Field
Observational Studies
Controlling the Call
Putting It Together
The Arrest Decision
Field Encounter Studies
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276 Part 3 On the Streets
pretextual stop
proactive policing
quota
racial profiling
reactive policing
selective enforcement
simulation
unarticulated improvisation
Key termS
chivalry hypothesis
coercive regulation
definitional regulation
discretion
field observation

full enforcement
imperative regulation
masculinity hypothesis
policy
• Comment on why some people call
police telephone operators and
dispatchers the “gatekeepers to the
police system;”
• Talk about how police officers use
definition, imperative, and coercive
regulation;
• Explain how legal and non-legal vari-
ables influence the decision to arrest
a person;
• Debate whether racism and sexism
bias the arrest decision
• Critique the arrest literature that
relies heavily on just social variables;
• Review the policy formulation pro-
cess; and,
• Discuss the importance of police for
police discretion.
learnIng ObjectIveS
The study of this chapter will enable

you to:
• Explain why arrest is such a monu-
mental power;
• Understand why full enforcement
is a myth;
• Outline what selective enforcement
means;
• Appreciate what unarticulated
improvisation is;
• List two objections to unarticulated
improvisation
• Define police discretion;
• Appreciate why the decision not to
arrest is important;
• Give five reasons why police
discretion exists
• Differentiate discretion from
discrimination;
• Contrast proactive with reactive
policing;
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Chapter 9 the arrest Decision 277
Introduction
One of the more monumental powers a police officer can
exercise is an arrest. Why
do we refer to arrest powers as being monumental? Very simply,
being arrested car-
ries a negative image that taints the arrestee for years to come.
One classic example of
this adverse impact comes from an ingenious field experiment.
Schwartz and Skolnick
(1962) designed a resumé for four fictitious job seekers. While
all the pertinent details
were the same for each candidate, the criminal records varied.
The first application con-
tained no mention of an arrest history. The second folder listed
an arrest for assault, but

also included a letter from the judge explaining that the person
was found not guilty. The
third packet was like the second folder, except it did not include
an explanatory note
from the judge. The final condition was an arrest along with a
conviction.
While chatting with resort owners, the researcher would pass on
a folder saying this
person was looking for a job. As you can imagine, the chances
of getting hired varied
according to one’s prior record. Applicants with an arrest
history had fewer job offers.
Even applicants with an acquittal faced serious obstacles. An
arrest hindered the job
hunt. In short, the decision to arrest carries enormous long-term
implications.
Decisions generally consist of a goal, alternatives, and
information to help select
a viable course of action (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1988). In
this context, an arrest
represents a decision that a police officer reaches after
evaluating the available data
and alternatives. These three elements lead to a simple
consideration. Is a police officer
obligated to arrest each and every single violator? The answer,
of course, is no. Police
officers are vested with discretion—that is, officers have a
variety of options at their dis-
posal. If officers do not have to arrest all violators, then how do
they select which ones
to detain and which ones to let go?
This chapter explores the guidelines that direct or control an
officer’s decision to

arrest. We examine what discretion is and why it exists. We
must also recognize that
unbridled discretion, particularly if left unchecked, can
deteriorate into discrimination.
To understand this issue more fully, we will explore two related
literatures. The first deals
with the influence of racism on the arrest decision. The second
looks at the influence of
sexism upon the arrest decision. In other words, are police
officers more likely to arrest
blacks than whites and males than females? The final portion of
this chapter addresses
the problem of how to control police discretion. By the end of
this chapter, you should
have gained a deeper appreciation for the complexities that
surround the arrest decision.
Full versus Selective enforcement
One common myth surrounding police work is the belief in full
enforcement. Full
enforcement means that the police confront and deal with each
and every single viola-
tion that comes to their attention. Adherents of this view
maintain that the police are not
in a position to agree or disagree with the law (Goldstein,
1960). The role of an officer
is to enforce the law in every possible instance. While the
position of full enforcement
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may represent an ideal posture in a democratic society, the
reality of police work is dis-
tinctly different.
The police, out of necessity, must engage in selective
enforcement practices. Selective
enforcement means that the police do not enforce all the laws
all the time against every
single violator. Sometimes selective enforcement can be quite
understandable and tol-
erable. Police resources are neither infinite nor bottomless.
Taxpayers finance police
budgets with certain expectations and constraints. While
personnel allocations seek to
provide optimal service delivery in a fiscally responsible
manner, demand strains these
resources from time to time. Activity levels may be higher than

normally expected. A
temporary personnel shortage can exist because of such outside
demands as subpoenas
for courtroom testimony. A serious incident, such as a
barricaded suspect or a public
health hazard, could monopolize an inordinate share of police
resources. Countless other
circumstances have the potential to result in a temporary
situation where the police
agency must compromise its ostensible goal of full enforcement.
When police administrators fail to set an explicit agenda for
selective enforcement
by formulating policy or rules for officer behavior, they are
delegating policy formula-
tion to individual police officers (Davis, 1975). Under these
conditions, agency policy
amounts to unarticulated improvisation. In other words, officers
lack the guidance of
explicit policy and must make their own decisions without any
administrative structur-
ing. This practice carries at least two inherent liabilities.
First, the most disconcerting enigma is that the bottom rung of
the organizational
ladder is formulating and enacting policy. One perplexing
problem cited earlier was that
the educational attainment of a police officer lags behind the
general population that he
or she serves. Furthermore, these de facto policy-makers are not
members of the admin-
istrative echelon. They do not have a clear vision of the
organization’s mandate. As a
result, the least capable and the least accountable members are
molding the day-to-day
agency position on a wide range of issues.

Second, the establishment and enactment of policy by individual
patrol officers do not
ensure continuity or uniformity. Official actions are wide open
to considerable variability.
Decisions depend mostly upon who the investigating officer is
and whether that officer
has certain preferences (President’s Commission, 1967, p. 16).
As a result, the department
is embracing the most threatening feature of discretion. Officers
are not applying the
same rules all the time to all persons encountered under similar
situations. While there is
much to be said for police discretion, there is a danger here.
Sufficient safeguards must
be firmly in place to ensure that discretionary action does not
erode into discrimination.
reasons for police Discretion
One of the most comprehensive and thorough analyses of police
decision making con-
cerning arrest can be found in the work of Wayne R. LaFave
(1965). The American Bar
Association commissioned a series of studies to examine the
criminal justice system during
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the mid-1950s. Since the police and their arrest powers
represent the most common entry
point into criminal proceedings, LaFave conducted an intensive
and exhaustive review
of police practices. However, LaFave added a novel twist.
Instead of asking what fac-
tors influence the decision to arrest, he reversed the inquiry.
What variables influence the
officer’s decision not to invoke the criminal process? As a
result, LaFave articulated many
reasons for apparent police inaction where an arrest was one
plausible course of action.
A major source for police inaction lies in the shortcomings of
some criminal stat-
utes. According to LaFave (1965, pp. 83–101), there are at least
five difficulties present
in statutory formulations. These inadequacies include
ambiguous and unclear statutes,
laws created to handle nuisance behavior and not criminal

activity, broad and sweeping
statutes designed to prevent loopholes rather than to specify a
clear legislative intent, a
reaffirmation of some moral standard rather than criminal
conduct, and outdated stat-
utes. The following materials explain each of these aspects.
unclear laws
One purpose behind the enactment and publication of criminal
laws is to define behaviors
that are offensive and unacceptable. Laws specify normative
behavior. Unfortunately,
some statutes are vague and unclear. These statutes invite
officer interpretation of what
they mean rather than provide straightforward application.
Obscenity laws are one example of the dilemma police officers
face here. Most
states forbid possession of or transactions involving lewd,
obscene, or indecent materials.
However, court decisions have left the exact determination of
what is obscene or porno-
graphic to “community standards.” There is no single definition
of obscenity or pornogra-
phy. The meaning of what violates community standards can
fluctuate from place to place
within the same state. The law enforcement officer who
confronts such a situation must
serve as a barometer of community sentiment. As a result,
materials considered obscene in
one part of the state might not be obscene in a different section
of the same state.
Sometimes criminal statutes embody a very precise standard,
but with some awk-
ward language. For instance, it is unlawful in Florida to make a

bonfire within ten rods of
a structure (Florida Statutes 2011, § 823.02). Pause for a
moment and ask yourself how
long a rod is. A rod is 16½ feet in length. Now consider the
following. You are attending
college, one of the highest levels of education available in this
country. More than likely,
you could not answer this question correctly. What about the
average law enforcement
officer who stumbles across a bonfire while on routine patrol?
Surely it would clarify
matters immensely if the statute specified the distance as 165
feet or used some other
common metric.
nuisance behavior
A second reason LaFave isolated for police discretion stems
from the use of criminal
law to control non-criminal matters. Alcoholism is a disease
requiring medical attention.
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However, many states still retain laws prohibiting intoxication
in a public area. Let us
look at one such statute. Florida Statutes 2011, § 856.011(3)
reads:
Any peace offi cer, in lieu of incarcerating an intoxicated
person for violation of
subsection (1), may take or send the intoxicated person to her or
his home or
to a public or private health facility, and the law enforcement
offi cer may take
reasonable measures to ascertain the commercial transportation
used for such
purposes is paid for by such person in advance. Any law
enforcement offi cers so
acting shall be considered as carrying out their offi cial.
This statute vests offi cers with considerable powers and
discretion. The offi cer may
choose to arrest the intoxicated person or skip the arrest and
arrange for transportation
to that person’s house. Despite the latitude permitted by this
statute, it fails to provide
any guidelines for deciding when to arrest or when not to arrest,
except for the ability to

pay for such transportation.
broad Statutes
Sometimes criminal statutes are written in very broad and
sweeping terms to prevent any
possible loopholes. Overzealous legislative attempts to forbid
gambling would fall into
this area. Social gambling, whether in public or private, is a
violation in some states. For
example, two people are playing a friendly game of pool in a
tavern. The agreement is
that the loser must pay the table charge and buy supper. Is there
a criminal violation in
progress here? Whether the police should conduct surveillances,
raids, and make arrests
in these situations is exactly what discretion entails.
moral Standards
Another reason LaFave offers is that some statutes express a
moral, rather than criminal,
standard. As Figure 9.1 illustrates, some jurisdictions prohibit
fornication, adultery, and
cohabitation. Suppose that two consenting, but unmarried,
adults engage in an intimate
relationship. They would have violated the criminal code in
many states. Whether the
police should regulate such behaviors is, of course, debatable.
Outdated laws
Many statutes that appear on the books are outdated relics from
the past. Sometimes we
call these prohibitions “blue laws.” Such laws have long
outlived their intended purpose.
For example, it might be illegal to wash a cow or pig on the
Sabbath. There may be an
ordinance that bans dancing after a certain hour on Saturday

night or selling particular
items on Sunday. In any event, enforcement of such laws would
do nothing more than
raise the ire of the people involved in these innocuous
activities.
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Defi ning Discretion
By now it should be evident that police discretion involves the
element of decision mak-
ing. When handling a call in the fi eld, offi cers must choose

from a variety of alternative
actions in order to resolve the situation. These options range
from taking no action, to
giving advice, to issuing a warning, to making an arrest. As you
can see, discretion rep-
resents an enormous expanse of power entrusted to individual
police offi cers.
Although an exact defi nition of police discretion remains
somewhat elusive,
Goldstein’s (1977, p. 94) summary might help:
In some departments discretion means merely using good
common sense in
exceptional circumstances. It connotes a degree of fl exibility in
an unusual situ-
ation when more formal treatment would bring embarrassment
to the police
offi cer and the agency. In other departments discretion is
thought to apply solely
to the judgments police must make in using the criminal
process—in searching
suspects and vehicles, in obtaining search warrants, in
conducting lineups, and
in seizing property. And in still others discretion refers
primarily to selective
enforcement—when to take action against conduct defi ned as
criminal.
handling calls for Service
When a citizen calls the police to report a situation or to request
assistance, a carefully
orchestrated set of actors begin carrying out their roles. The
police operator takes the ini-
tial call and conveys the appropriate information to the
dispatcher. The dispatcher then

FIgure 9.1
an example of a statute that expresses
a moral standard.
798.01 living in open adultery. Whoever lives in an
open state of adultery shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082
or s. 775.083. Where either of the parties living in an open state
of adultery is mar-
ried, both parties so living shall be deemed to be guilty of the
offense provided for
in this section.
798.02 lewd and lascivious behavior. If any man and woman,
not being married to
each other, lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit
together, or if any man or
woman, married or unmarried, engages in open and gross
lewdness and lascivious
behavior, they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second
degree, punishable
as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Source: Florida Statutes 2011.
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selects and notifies a field unit of the circumstances. The patrol
officer, in turn, responds
to the scene to dispose of the situation appropriately.
The most important aspect of this chain of events is that each
player in the system
reacts to the decision-making product of an earlier participant.
As a result, it is very
important to realize that people often overlook the discretion
that is involved at the
junctures prior to officer arrival at the scene and the subsequent
police-citizen field con-
tact. Our orientation will not allow this point to go unnoticed.
As a result, this section
of the chapter consists of two parts. The first part contains a
discussion of the decisions
police operators and dispatchers make. The second part visits
police officer handling
of a field encounter.

police Operators and Dispatchers
One of the most fundamental units of analysis for researchers
interested in police work is
the call for service or an incident. A very common distinction
applied here is the differ-
ence between proactive and reactive policing. Proactive
policing means that the officer
initiates the discovery and responds to the incident. For
example, an officer who sees a
fight-in-progress and intervenes is engaged in proactive police
work. Reactive policing,
on the other hand, means that a third party notifies the police
about a situation and then
the police respond to the call. Answering a burglary alarm
would be an example of reac-
tive police work. The bulk of police activity is reactive.
One problem with reactive policing is that reliance upon third-
party notification,
if left unchecked, can become a drain on scarce resources. For
example, the San Jose
Police Department (2011) recently announced that it would
longer respond to unverified
alarms. An unverified alarm refers to an alarm activation which
has no other indica-
tion or supportive information that a crime or an emergency
situation is actually occur-
ring. San Jose police officials advise that over 98% of the
alarms to which its officers
responded were triggered accidentally or by malfunctioning
equipment. These bogus
calls for service represented a cost of $662,000 to the city. The
fact that only two arrests
stemmed from 12,450 alarm activations in 2010 prompted San
Jose to adopt a policy

of non-response without extenuating circumstances. Other
locations have attempted to
curtail the problem of false alarm activations by passing
ordinances that impose fines on
persistent or chronic violators. As Figure 9.2 illustrates, the
problem of false alarms is so
pervasive that the Florida Police Chiefs Association has drafted
its own model ordinance
for municipalities to consider.
Another important feature of calls for service is that an
overwhelming amount of
time goes to non-police activities. A fair estimate would be that
about 20% of all police
activity pertains to criminal matters while the remaining 80% is
spent on other non-
criminal matters (Lab, 1984). In view of these figures, one
might be tempted to rewrite
the police motto “to serve and protect” as “to serve, to serve, to
serve, and then protect.”
One way to determine what the police are doing is to examine
the nature of incoming
telephone calls. When a citizen dials the police with a request
for service, the telephone
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FIgure 9.2
a model false alarm ordinance.
The purpose of this ordinance is to establish reasonable
expectations of alarm users
and to ensure that alarm users are held responsible for their use
of alarm system.
False alarm means the activation of an alarm system through
mechanical or elec-
tronic failure, malfunction, improper installation, or the
negligence of the alarm user,
his/her employees or agents, and signals activated to summon
law enforcement per-
sonnel unless law enforcement response was cancelled by the
alarm user or his/her
agent before law enforcement personnel arrive at the alarm
location. An alarm is
false within the meaning of this article when, upon inspection
by the Police

Department, evidence indicates that no unauthorized entry,
robbery, or other such
crime was committed or attempted in or on the premises which
would have acti-
vated a properly functioning alarm system. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, a false
alarm shall not include an alarm which can reasonably be
determined to have been
caused or activated by unusually violent conditions of nature
nor does it include other
extraordinary circumstances not reasonably subject to control
by the alarm user.
No person shall use an alarm system without fi rst obtaining a
permit for such alarm
system from the City or County. A fee may be required for the
initial registration and
annual renewals. Each alarm permit shall be assigned a unique
permit number, and
the user shall provide the permit number to the alarm company
to facilitate law
enforcement dispatch.
It shall be unlawful to activate an alarm system for the purpose
of summoning law
enforcement when no burglary, robbery, or other crime
dangerous to life or property
is being committed or attempted on the premises, or otherwise
to cause a false alarm.
It is hereby found and determined that three or more false
alarms within a permit year
is excessive, constitutes a public nuisance, and shall be
unlawful. Civil penalties for
false alarms within a permit year may be assessed against an
alarm user as follows:

Third, fourth, and fi fth false alarm $ 50.00
Sixth and seventh false alarm $100.00
Eighth and ninth false alarm $250.00
Tenth and over false alarms $500.00
The failure of an alarm user to make payment of any civil
penalty(ies) assessed
under this ordinance within 30 days from the date of the invoice
shall result in dis-
continuance of law enforcement response to alarm signals that
may occur at the
premises described in the alarm user’s permit until payment is
received.
Source: Florida Police Chiefs Association (2010). Draft Police
Alarm Ordinance. Tallahassee, FL: Florida Police
Chiefs Association. Retrieved on April 15, 2012 from
http://www.fpca.com/modelalarmordinance.htm
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FIgure 9.3
a job advertisement for a police
dispatcherposition.
The Police Dispatcher position is skilled emergency service
work that involves receiv-
ing emergency 911 and non-emergency requests for police
assistance, determin-
ing nature/urgency of calls, initiating police or other emergency
personnel action
and maintaining close contact with fi eld units to monitor
response and needed
support requirements.
It requires a considerable degree of initiative and independent
judgment within
procedural boundaries in responding to emotional, disturbed and
sometimes abu-
sive people in a variety of situations.
Duties/responsibilities
• Receives and responds to emergency and non-emergency calls

from the public,
dispatchers, and law enforcement agencies via telephone and
radio systems
and computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems;
• Processes and evaluates information received, prioritizes calls,
and dispatches
required units and/or agencies;
• Monitors and coordinates police unit activity and assignments
via police radio
frequencies;
• Maintains status and locations of public safety personnel;
• Creates and maintains automated or manual logs of public
safety communica-
tions activity;
• Accesses and enters sensitive data in local/state/national
databases as neces-
sary for investigative purposes;
• Enters and maintains fi les for persons or property pending
apprehension/recov-
ery; and,
• Maintains appropriate security and confi dentiality of
information created or
encountered in the performance of assigned duties.
Desirable Knowledge, Skills, and abilities
• Knowledge of public service activity and methods of local
government;

• Knowledge of computer technology and equipment;
• Knowledge of law enforcement terminology and procedures;
• Knowledge of geography for the Town of Oro Valley and
surrounding areas;
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operator listens to what the caller relays and deciphers the
pertinent information.
Sometimes, the operator must extract important details from the

caller. For example, the
caller might be distraught and upset to the point of being
somewhat incoherent. In this
instance, the worker must calm the person quickly. He or she
needs to get the location
of the incident and must determine if an emergency exists that
requires an immediate
police response. The operator will try to get as many details as
possible. Finally, he or
she must decide what the appropriate agency response should
be. Once the operator
classifi es the call, he or she passes on the details to a
dispatcher, who then assigns the
call to a patrol unit. Figure 9.3 contains a job description for a
police dispatcher.
This series of events, coupled with the decisions reached by the
people staffi ng these
positions, lead some researchers to designate police telephone
operators as “gatekeepers
to the police” (Antunes & Scott, 1981; Bercal, 1970, p. 689;
Gilsinan, 1989). In other
words, the civilian employees who take complaints over the
telephone control how the
call gets categorized and help determine what the appropriate
agency action will be. This
FIgure 9.3 cOnt.
• Knowledge of English language for spelling and proper word
usage;
• Skills in multitasking, coordinating simultaneous mental,
manual, and visual
activities;

• Skill in observing situations analytically and objectively and
relaying details
accurately;
• Ability to speak clearly and concisely; and,
• Ability to think clearly and act quickly in emergencies
minimum Qualifi cations
• High school diploma or G.E.D.;
• At least 18 years of age;
• United States citizen;
• No felony conviction or conviction of an offense that would be
a felony if com-
mitted in Arizona; and,
• Satisfactory completion of a personal background
investigation and the ability
to meet minimum POST qualifi cations regarding police
employment.
Job advertisement for a Police Dispatcher position from
www.orovalleyaz.gov website. Copyright © 2012
Oro Valley, AZ. Reprinted by permission.
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enormous responsibility formed the basis for Antunes and
Scott’s (1981) analysis of over
26,000 calls for service in 21 major police departments
throughout the country.
Antunes and Scott (1981) found that less than 20% of the calls
for service involved
criminal incidents. Many calls were simple requests for
information. These inquiries
ranged from questions about the handling of a specific case to
getting directions to a
geographical location. Other calls included loud noise and
nuisance complaints, traffic
problems, disturbances, and suspicious circumstances. Police
operators promised half
the callers that they would send an officer to investigate the
situation. Other available

alternatives included taking down the information over the
phone and posting it for
patrol officers, referring the caller to a more appropriate
agency, or explaining depart-
mental policy.
Operators promised to dispatch an officer in over 70% of all
calls dealing with
crimes, disturbances, public nuisances, and suspicious
circumstances. There appears to
be an unwritten rule among police telephone operators to send
an officer unless it is
patently clear there is no need to do so. The calculus is very
simple. Mobilizing a unit
does not deplete or strain departmental finances. Officers are
already on duty to answer
calls. Thus, dispatching a unit to an unwarranted call does not
amount to any outland-
ish expenditure. However, if the operator does not send a unit
and there is a significant
injury or property loss, the repercussions could be serious. As a
result, the default is
to assign an officer whenever there is any doubt. As the
researchers (Antunes & Scott,
1981, pp. 174–175) observed:
By promising that a unit will be sent, except in those instances
where it is quite
clear that none is needed, complaint operators do not have to
make the ultimate
decision about what action should be taken. That responsibility
is shifted to the
officer dispatched to the scene, who presumably will have more
information
about the problem at hand, and in any event is professionally
trained to make

such decisions.
Police operators and dispatchers perform other critical tasks
central to law enforce-
ment service delivery (Antunes & Scott, 1981; Scott & Percy,
1983). In addition to
ferreting out which service calls merit attention from patrol
officers, dispatchers must
decide how to prioritize calls. Sometimes the demand for
service exceeds the number
of available units. To reduce dispatcher discretion and to
structure a uniform response,
some agencies have formulated specific policies to handle this
decision. Figure 9.4 con-
tains an example of policy guidelines that govern call
prioritization, dispatcher respon-
sibilities, and call stacking.
handling calls in the Field
What are the conditions under which law enforcement officers
are in a position to apply
discretionary alternatives short of an arrest? In earlier chapters,
we discussed conditions
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FIgure 9.4
policy guidelinesgoverning dispatch procedures.
A. An expeditious dispatch to high priority calls for service is
necessary for the Department
to accomplish its mission. This procedure describes how high
priority calls for service
will be dispatched when insuffi cient resources are immediately
available.
B. The Department’s response time goals are less than 7
minutes to all precedence 0
and 1 calls, less than 15 minutes to all precedence 2 calls, and
less than 30 minutes to
all precedence 3 calls.
1. If a high precedence (0 and 1) or precedence 2 call cannot
be immediately dis-
patched, the call information will be broadcast over the
appropriate talk group(s)
and the dispatcher will ask if any unit(s) can be clear to
respond. This gives all units

the opportunity to volunteer and assist in a response, such as
Traffi c, K-9, CPT, ACT,
SWAT, Detectives, Prisoner Vans, etc.
2. For high precedence (0 and 1) calls, if no units immediately
volunteer to respond,
the dispatcher will determine which units are on low
precedence/paper calls and
request they respond. The dispatcher will not hesitate to free
and assign units who
are on downtimes or other nonemergency situations. If the
dispatcher receives
unreasonable resistance, the Chief Dispatcher and Sector
Sergeant should be
notifi ed immediately.
a. If the dispatcher is still unable to assign units, a Precinct
Supervisor (Sector
Sergeant or Watch Commander), will be advised over the air
and the dis-
patcher will continue to search for units to respond.
b. Dispatchers should always consider the option of cross-
precinct dispatching.
This should be done in conjunction with the Chief Dispatcher
who is respon-
sible for notifying the affected Precinct’s Supervisors once the
call has been
assigned.
c. If assignment of the call is still unsuccessful, the dispatcher
will update the call
to show no units available (NUA). This shall only be noted once
all of the above
steps have been taken. The dispatcher will continue efforts to
assign the call.

3. Precedence 3 and 4 calls of an investigative nature are to be
dispatched or
pended to the district car when at all possible. If the district car
is unavailable, the
call can be assigned to another car within the sector.
4. Depending upon the type of call (not of an investigative
nature), dispatchers can
sometimes more effectively handle lower precedence 3 and 4
calls by broadcast-
ing the information when units are not available. This will give
Patrol and other units
(e.g., CPT, ACT, SWAT or Traffi c), who are nearby the
location or have recently been
through the area, a chance to clear the call. Examples of
appropriate calls to be
handled in this manner would be area checks for mischief,
minor hazards, etc.
Source: Seattle Police Department (2012). Policies &
Procedures: 12.010 – Communications. Seattle Police
Department, WA: City of Seattle. Retrieved on April 9, 2012
from http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/
policy/spd_manual.pdf
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governing arrest practices. For example, a police officer who
has probable cause can
make a legitimate warrantless arrest in all felony situations.
However, an officer can
make a warrantless arrest only in those misdemeanor cases
where he or she actually
witnesses the violation. This consideration is very important,
because most academic
research on the decision to arrest fails to take this stipulation
into account.
Observational Studies
Four criteria govern possible police actions. These items
include statutory definitions,
departmental policy, suspect demeanor towards the officer, and
whether the suspect
threatens the officer’s physical safety. Sykes, Fox, and Clark
(1985) hypothesized that
these four factors would determine whether police discretion
was a viable alternative

when handling calls for service in the field. In order to test their
perspective, the research
team examined incident reports of police-civilian interactions
prepared by observers
riding with officers in patrol cars. The researchers retained only
those crimes in which
the suspect was still at the scene upon officer arrival. Every
felony violation produced
an arrest without fail. The biggest variation took place in the
misdemeanor category.
Although these incidents accounted for over half the
observations, officers made an
arrest in less than 15% of the cases.
There is another way to interpret these data. Officers made an
arrest every time such
action was mandatory (felony cases). Officers did not effect an
arrest where the law
prohibited such actions (misdemeanors committed outside the
officer’s presence). But,
officers exercised considerable latitude whenever an arrest was
an optional outcome. As
the researchers (Sykes et al., 1985, p. 176) put it:
If law enforcement were limited to arrest, and legal criteria
were all that an
officer used in his decision to place a suspect into custody, then
it would be
self-evident that the law is dramatically underenforced . . . .
Since nonarrest
decisions account for a much greater proportion of the cases
than arrest deci-
sions did, there must have been other factors than legal criteria
which affected
the decision to arrest.

Sykes and his associates posed the research question in its
antithetical form. Most
cases did not result in an arrest, even though the incident
satisfied the legal requirements.
In other words, a substantial number of cases failed to
culminate in an arrest even though
all the necessary legal ingredients were present. What, then,
does a person have to do for
the officer to arrest him or her?
One prominent feature of case outcome was the impoliteness the
suspect displayed
towards the officer. Civilians who verbally abused and cursed
officers placed themselves
in greater jeopardy of an arrest than citizens who remained
polite. Thus,
the overwhelming atmosphere of alleged violator-present
police-citizen encoun-
ters was relatively calm, routine, and not particularly entangling
for all parties
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concerned. In spite of the circumstances which generated the
presence of police
officers with their uniforms and weapons—the high incidence of
drunkenness,
the presence of adversaries, and the occasional presence of
known past offend-
ers—one must be impressed with the high degree of civility all
parties accorded
each other (Sykes et al., 1985, p. 179).
Controlling the Call
A more exhaustive study afforded the opportunity to probe
deeper into the dynamics of
how a field encounter develops and what techniques officers
commonly invoke. A major
goal of police officers is to establish and to retain control when
dealing with civilians
and their problems (Sykes & Brent, 1980). Police officers
usually have four goals in
mind when handling a call for service. First, the officer must
gather information. These
details include the nature of the problem and identifying the
suspect, victim, and wit-
nesses. Second, the officer seeks behavioral order. This task

includes who talks when,
who remains on the scene, and who vacates the area. Third,
respect for the officer is of
paramount importance and may delay other goal-seeking
activity. Finally, the ultimate
goal is to resolve or to complete the call appropriately.
In order to resolve a situation, the responding officer can use
three different tech-
niques of maintaining order. These three techniques are
definitional, imperative, and
coercive regulation. Let us examine each technique in turn.
The most subtle way of handling a call and the people involved
is through the expe-
ditious use of questioning or definitional regulation. Questions
help achieve the goal of
information gathering. They also force the respondent to
acknowledge the officer’s pres-
ence and to submit to the officer’s authority. The designation of
the parties as suspect,
victim, or witness is also an important part of definitional
regulation.
Imperative regulation occurs when the officer issues a command
or an order.
Directing traffic around an accident scene would be one
example. Advising an individual
to leave the premises or else face an arrest on a trespass charge
constitutes imperative
regulation. Another example would be telling a crowd to
disperse. Sometimes things
are very disorganized when an officer arrives on the scene. Cars
may be upside down,
people are crying, others are injured, and some folks are leaving
the scene. In these

instances, the officer may resort to imperative regulation before
he or she pursues defi-
nitional regulation.
Coercive regulation takes place when the officer uses, or
threatens to use, physical
force or arrest. This form of regulation ranges from the actual
display of a weapon down
to subtle body language or other cues of impending action.
Later, we will devote an
entire chapter to the use of force.
What are the conditions under which police officers invoke the
various forms of
regulation? Sykes and Brent (1980) studied the conversations
between police officers
and civilians during the course of a call for service. This
approach permitted a unique
view of what goes on during police-citizen encounters and how
the participants act and
react to the chain of events.
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The first person to speak in 95% of the situations was the police
officer. Definitional
regulation was the predominant focus. The officer asked
questions. If the civilian failed
to respond appropriately to the inquiry, the officer typically
asked the question again. The
most common observation was that police officers repeated their
questions over and over.
Most of the time, this strategy won citizen compliance with the
officer’s directive.
The officer’s tone and behavior, along with the civilian’s
response, dictated the next
sequence of interaction. For example, when repeated questions
failed to establish suitable
definitions of the situation, the officer would switch to an
imperative mode. Once the citi-
zen responded appropriately, the confrontation would de-
escalate and resume a normal
course. According to Sykes and Brent (1980, p. 194),
“confrontation appears to be more
likely to result when the civilian is the first to issue a negative
act, though the officers
appear to be more likely than civilians to respond to disturbing

acts with imperative acts.”
The bulk of the interaction consisted of the officer trying to
establish definitional
regulation. Officers simply repeated questions when necessary
to control the flow of
the encounter. When multiple inquiries failed to produce a
relevant or usable response,
imperative regulation came into play. It was rare for officers to
resort immediately to
coercive regulation.
Putting It Together
When we stand back for a moment and reflect on these findings,
they make perfect
sense for at least three reasons. First, we spent some time in
Chapter 6 discussing the
elements that compose the various criminal offenses. Officers
must determine whether
the elements that define a particular crime are met. Most
citizens do not have a suitable
working knowledge of criminal law. Hence, the officer must ask
a series of questions to
determine whether the events match the elements of a particular
offense.
Second, we also discussed laws of arrest, along with search-
and-seizure standards,
earlier in Chapter 7. The officer must ask a series of questions
in order to establish the
grounds of his or her authority. For instance, where the alleged
offense took place is a
very important consideration. If the officer belongs to a
municipal police department
and the incident took place outside city limits, the officer lacks
proper jurisdiction over

the matter. In addition, the officer must determine whether
probable cause exists. If
probable cause is present, the officer must decide if the offense
is a misdemeanor or a
felony. If the crime is a felony, the officer can go ahead and
make a warrantless arrest.
Should the incident involve a misdemeanor, the officer may not
be able to make a war-
rantless lawful arrest. Perhaps now you can see why police
officers make extensive use
of definitional regulation.
Third, Chapter 8 dealt with interrogation standards. The officer
must operate with
the Miranda requirement in mind if he or she wishes to
interrogate the suspect and if
that person is not free to leave the scene of his or her own
accord. In addition, the arrest
situation may trigger additional points involving key search-
and-seizure issues. As you
can see, officers have several streams of considerations that
they must piece together
whenever they decide to take legal action.
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the arrest Decision
By now, we are quite familiar with the practice of selective
enforcement. As Figure 9.5
shows, selective enforcement means that police officers do not
have to make an arrest
in every instance where probable cause exists. What factors,
then, influence the arrest
decision? What considerations are important enough to make a
police officer go ahead
with the arrest option? As we will see in a moment, two
research strategies have guided
the literature. The first is field observation. Here spectators
watch and record what hap-
pens during a call for service. The other approach is a
simulation. In other words, the
researcher presents a situation to an officer and asks what he or
she would do if it were an
actual call. Both research techniques have shed considerable
light on how officers arrive
at the arrest decision in situations where arrest is not
mandatory.

Fieldencounter Studies
One of the most intensive studies for its time was an analysis of
police-citizen field
encounters in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. that was
undertaken for the 1967
President’s Commission. Black (1970, 1971) divided the
incidents into those calls where
both a complainant and suspect were present and those incidents
with just a suspect and
no complainant. He found a strong correlation between police
action and what course of
action the complainant wished the officer to take.
The police were more likely to arrest the suspect when the
complainant made such
a request. Similarly, the police were not likely to take the
suspect into custody when the
complainant made that preference known. In addition, the
victim-offender relationship
carried important weight. Arrest was a more common outcome
when the parties were
strangers, as opposed to being family members or close
acquaintances.
Another important finding was the impact of incivility. Police
were more likely to
release an individual without making arrest if the subject treated
the officer politely and
respectfully. Disrespectful behavior invited the police officer to
exercise the arrest option.
Demeanor consistently appears as an extremely important
feature of the decision to
arrest. In what has come to be a classic study, Piliavin and Briar
isolated one’s attitude as
the most important determinant of police action. They (1964,

pp. 210–211) explained:
Juveniles who were contrite about their infractions, respectful
to officers, and
fearful of the sanctions that might be employed against them
tended to be viewed
by patrolmen as basically law abiding or at least salvageable.
For these youths,
it was usually assumed that an informal or formal reprimand
would suffice to
guarantee their future conformity. In contrast, youthful
offenders who were frac-
tious, obdurate, or who appeared nonchalant in their encounters
with patrol-
man were likely to be viewed as “would-be-tough-guys” or
“punks” who fully
deserved the most severe sanction possible—arrest.
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FIgure 9.5
an example of policy guidelinesregarding
arrest and discretion.
Decision to arrest
A. If a violation of law or ordinance has occurred, it is the
responsibility of on-duty
police offi cers and offi cers working secondary employment,
using reasonable
judgment and appropriate discretion, to take all steps necessary
to effect an
arrest of the suspect(s). Offi cers shall use appropriate offi cer
safety tactics in
every arrest incident.
B. Offi cers should not consider the following in any arrest
situation:
1. The victim’s willingness to pursue criminal charges in court.
2. The possibility the suspect may not be prosecuted.
3. The possibility the suspect may be used as a confi dential
informant.
C. Except when approved by a named representative of the
State Attorney’s

Offi ce, or lieutenant or higher rank in the arrest member’s
chain-of-command,
offi cers shall always make arrests when:
1. Probable cause exists to believe a person has committed a
felony.
2. A person has an outstanding warrant or active capias.
Decision to not arrest
A. There may be situations where probable cause exists for the
arrest of a suspect,
but circumstances might cause offi cers to not effect an arrest.
Some of these
circumstances include:
1. When the arrest would cause a greater risk of harm to the
general public than
not arresting the suspect (e.g., the suspect in a minor offense
takes refuse in a
large, volatile crowd).
2. When police resources are limited and there is a large
volume of high priority
calls for service (e.g., arrests for minor offenses where the City
of State is the vic-
tim during an extremely busy shift would take too much
valuable offi cer time).
B. Even if an arrest is not made at the time of the crime, sworn
members may obtain
arrest warrants for suspect for whom they have probable cause
to believe com-
mitted a crime.

C. When offi cers do not effect an arrest in an incident, they
shall still complete an
offense report if anyone involved in the incident could
subsequently:
1. Claim to be physical injured.
2. Claim to have suffered a property loss.
3. Seek to pursue criminal charges against another person
involved in the incident.
Source: Lake City Police Department (2010). General Orders
153: Arrests, General Orders Manual. Lake City,
FL: Lake City Police Department. Retrieved on April 13, 2012
from http://www.lcfl a.com/documents/Police/
Arrests.pdf
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The importance of demeanor, the suspect’s attitude and
respectfulness, has not
escaped the attention of civilians. For example, one gang
member remarked:
One day we were standing on the corner about three blocks from
school and this
juvenile officer comes up. He say, “Hey you boys! Come here!”
So everybody
else walked over there. But this one stud made like he didn’t
hear him. So the
cop say, “Hey punk! Come here!” So the stud sorta look up like
he hear him and
start walking over. But he walking over real slow. So the cop
walk over there and
grab him by the collar and throw him down and put the
handcuffs on him, say-
ing, “When I call you next time come see what I want!” So
everybody was stand-
ing by the car, and he say, “All right you black * * *! Get your
* * * home!” Just
like that. And he handcuffed the stud and took him to juvenile
hall for nothing.
Just for standing there looking at him (President’s Commission,
1967, p. 180).
Bittner (1967) undertook a fascinating field study when he
investigated police activ-

ity on skid row, the habitat of winos, alcoholics, and other
street people. The main police
function here is simply to keep the peace. The criminal code
affords a very convenient
tool for this task. As Bittner (1967, p. 710) noted,
the problem patrolmen confront is not which drunks, beggars, or
disturbers of
the peace should be arrested and which can be let go as
exceptions to the rule.
Rather, the problem is whether, when someone “needs” to be
arrested, he should
be charged with drunkenness, begging, or disturbing the peace.
Sometimes officers use an arrest to prevent problems from
happening. For instance,
when one newcomer to skid row refused to account for his
whereabouts, he found
himself arrested on a weapons charge. He was carrying a pocket
knife. Two concerns
emerged simultaneously. The first dealt with the man’s lack of
respectful response to
the officer’s inquiry. The second was the fear that this stranger
was new to the area and
could not be trusted not to become aggressive. In short, arrests
may be used to forestall
impending difficulties.
In order to avoid making impressionistic conclusions, Smith and
Visher (1981) con-
ducted an elaborate analysis of police-citizen field encounters
monitored by observers
in 24 different departments. Victim preference and the
relationship between victim and
offender exerted an important impact upon police decisions.
Incidents between strangers

were more likely to produce an arrest than when the parties
were known to each other.
All the studies presented so far have dealt with criminal acts.
One researcher found
this singularity too restrictive and expanded this orientation by
analyzing officer actions
in traffic cases (Lundman, 1979). Given the fact that the driver
has breached some rule
of the road, what determines whether or not a ticket is
forthcoming?
Earlier we mentioned that some police administrators favor
objective job perfor-
mance measures. A common practice in some police agencies is
a quota. A quota is an
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expectation that offi cers will write a certain number of traffi c
citations every month.
Monitoring an offi cer’s fi eld performance is simple. Simply
compare the number of
tickets issued by an offi cer during this time period against the
norm. Thus, Lundman
(1979) reasoned that the organizational environment could be a
very important variable
that criminologists commonly neglected.
Citizen observers rode with police offi cers during randomly
selected shift periods
and recorded information after watching routine traffi c stops.
(Figure 9.6 contains an
example of a police ride-along policy). The totals showed that
offi cers issued a citation
FIgure 9.6
an example of a citizen ride-alongprogram.
The Tulsa Police Department encourages open and candid police
operations and
strives to establish a climate that allows offi cers to perform
their duties with the
acceptance, understanding, and approval of the public. Citizens
are allowed to
ride with offi cers to promote trust and understanding.
regulations

• Participants shall wear professional casual clothing. Shorts,
sleeveless shirts, and
t-shirts will not be acceptable attire.
• Participants shall be under the direct control of the police offi
cer.
• Offi cers will not allow participants to enter private homes or
other areas where a
citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy without the
explicit consent of
the citizen. Participants will also not be allowed to photograph
and/or videotape
within these same areas.
• Participants shall conduct themselves in a civil and courteous
manner at all
times.
• Participants shall not interfere with police offi cers while in
the performance of
their duties.
• Participants shall not perform police duties. In an emergency,
they may take
appropriate action to protect themselves and/or offi cers.
• Offi cers shall not engage in pursuits while participants are
passengers in their
vehicles.
• Participants shall not carry weapons while they are
participating in the Ride-
Along Program.

Source: Adapted from Tulsa Police Department (2012). Citizen
Ride-Along. Tulsa, OK: City of Tulsa. Retrieved
on April 13, 2012 from http://www.tulsapolice.org/content/ride-
along.aspx
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almost half the time. However, many officers shirked traffic
duties during the first part
of the month. The second half of the month, though, witnessed a
scramble to write a
sufficient number of traffic tickets to appease supervisors.

Thus, a traffic stop was more
likely to result in a formal citation if the encounter took place
in the latter part of the
month. As a result, Lundman (1979, pp. 168-169) concluded
that social variables were
insufficient by themselves when studying police discretion:
While it is likely that these, and other, factors play a role in
police decision
making, it is also likely that their priority and intensity are
established by refer-
ence to organizationally generated constraints. It therefore
appears necessary
to explore the possibility that organizational norms may be at
least as impor-
tant as the individualistic and situational contingencies
previously identified as
important in the context of police exercise of discretion.
Simulation Studies
One way for social scientists to reach a more definitive
assessment about which vari-
ables affect the police decision-making process is to remove
officers from the field. This
strategy allows the researcher to control for any unwitting
forces that could influence
the officer’s decision. The typical procedure is to present the
officer with a scenario or
a description of a field encounter. The researcher then records
what option the officer
selects as the best way to handle the incident. The major
advantage of this technique
is that it allows the researcher to gather data over a wide range
of situations in only a
fraction of the time required by the field observation approach.
The sacrifice is that the

recorded decisions occur in a sterile environment. They may
lack the flavor of what
really takes place during a police-civilian exchange.
Sullivan and Siegel (1972) used the simulation technique to
determine what pieces
of information police use. Officers read a scenario in which
they come across a drunk
14-year-old male juvenile who is creating a public disturbance.
The booklet each officer
received contained 24 pieces of information. Some of these
tidbits included such items
as cleanliness, physical size, prior record, dress, time of day,
place, home situation, offi-
cer’s mood, witnesses, friends present, and so forth. The
instructions asked the officers
to pick as many pieces of information as they needed in order to
reach a decision about
what to do. The decision involved a simple warning, a trip to
police headquarters in
order to release the juvenile to a parent or guardian, or an
arrest.
The results displayed a striking uniformity. The officers picked
the details sur-
rounding the offense as the most important consideration.
However, none of the officers
reached a decision based on this variable alone. They all wanted
additional information.
One variable proved critical. When the offender’s attitude was
described as belliger-
ent and disrespectful, officers suspended their investigations
and took the suspect into
custody. Thus, given that probable cause already existed, the
suspect basically talked
himself into becoming arrested.

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An interest in police actions during low-visibility situations
prompted Finckenauer
(1976) to distribute simulations to recruits at the police
academy. These cases involved
gambling, public drunkenness, welfare fraud, prostitution, and a
juvenile speeding in a
car. The most consistent finding was a reluctance to make an
arrest in victimless cases.
When asked why, recruits responded that an arrest was way out

of line with community
expectations. Finckenauer 1976, p. 43) summarized this point:
The primary factor characterizing all the situations which
seemed to influence
the exercise of discretion was the desire on the part of the
respondents to main-
tain a certain public image of the police role. There was a clear
sensitivity to
community attitudes, beliefs, and expectations. The recruits
seemed to react in
accordance with a certain preconceived notion of what the
appropriate police
action should be, but these reactions were not so much governed
by a legal defi-
nition of what must be done as by a personal definition of the
situation.
What these studies show is that police officers apply both legal
and social variables
to the arrest decision. The mere presence of probable cause does
not automatically trig-
ger police action in every case. Some social variables are
critical. Victim preference
or suspect demeanor may propel officers over the arrest
threshold. While these actions
comply with the minimal criteria to be legally defensible, critics
fear that this calculus
invites an uneven application of the law. More specifically, the
charge is that these biases
result in certain groups of people being the objects of
differential treatment at the hands
of the police.
police bias in the arrest Decision
Despite the enormous gravity of the arrest decision, most arrests

occur in low-visibility
situations. Supervisors are not at the scene monitoring officer
field performance. The
lack of any meaningful review renders the patrol officer’s
decision almighty. These cir-
cumstances have led to accusations that police officers
sometimes make an arrest deci-
sion on inappropriate grounds. The worry is that officers are
basing their decisions on
such legally irrelevant considerations as race and gender.
Instead of dispensing justice,
officers are taking discriminatory actions against select groups
of people. The following
materials take a closer look at these allegations with regard to
the impact of race and
gender on the arrest process.
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racism
One persistent regularity in official crime data is that blacks are
over-represented in
arrest statistics in comparison to their relative population
composition. In other words, if
blacks constitute 12% of the population, then one would
anticipate that minority persons
would make up 12% of the arrest statistics. Table 9.1 presents
the distribution of arrests
by race for the entire United States during the year 2010. A
glance at the table reveals
that black persons of African-American heritage are over-
represented in arrest statistics.
That is, the relative proportion of minority members in arrest
figures exceeds what one
would expect on the basis of population composition.
How does one account for this race differential? Some people
would argue that blacks
are disproportionately present in the lower-class ghetto areas,
have much lower incomes,
and greater family instability—all of which are conducive to a
greater involvement in
criminal activity. Other researchers reject this notion and
contend that more recent fig-
ures show that whites actually have a greater likelihood of
being arrested. D’Alessio and
Stolzenberg (2003) maintain that blacks tend to mistrust the
police and not cooperate

with the authorities. As a result, officers have great difficulty
formulating probable cause
when dealing with black-on-black crime. Still other observers
would argue that black
arrest figures surpass expectations not because of what blacks
do, but as a result of what
the police do. The police arrest blacks more often because
agencies saturate these areas
with more patrol assignments. Furthermore, these officers hold
jaundiced and biased
attitudes. The combined impact of these considerations is
important because:
the police officer must often rely on his or her own judgment in
making the deci-
sion to arrest and then the decision to refer the case to court.
When essential
pieces of information about an alleged deviant act are missing,
the officer must
“fill them in” by constructing an informed conjecture based on
experience and
general background knowledge. Inevitably, such a process must
rely on the per-
ceptual and evaluative constraints of the officer’s own
biography, including typi-
fications of some juveniles as more likely than others to be
probably in need of
control or assistance by the juvenile court (Dannefer & Schutt,
1982, p. 1117).
The direct consequence, according to proponents of this view, is
that police officers
who patrol black areas are less tolerant. They are not as likely
to choose non-arrest alter-
natives. Thus, the higher black arrest rate reflects officer
predispositions rather than the

criminal actions of the arrested persons.
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Early Studies
The initial body of literature that developed in this vein was
very simplistic and focused
mostly upon juvenile processing. A common strategy was to
compare case dispositions
by race at various decision-making points. The fi ndings showed
that black youths were

table 9.1
arrests by Suspect race, united States, 2010.
number OF perSOnS arreSteD
Offense charged White black Other % black
Murder 4,261 4,209 171 49
Forcible Rape 10,178 4,925 400 32
Robbery 37,906 48,154 1,527 55
Aggravated Assault 202,275 106,382 8,778 34
Burglary 152,210 69,541 4,024 31
Larceny-Theft 687,609 282,246 28,621 28
Motor Vehicle Theft 35,009 18,797 1,472 34
Arson 6,592 1,978 196 23
Other Assaults 659,171 318,117 26,985 32
Forgery/Counterfeiting 40,167 19,350 1,021 32
Fraud 95,126 46,493 2,595 32
Embezzlement 8,568 4,037 325 31
Stolen Property 48,303 24,494 1,325 33
Vandalism 145,284 46,306 5,425 24

Weapons 71,772 49,443 2,063 40
Prostitution 26,156 20,405 1,593 42
Sex Offenses 41,406 13,182 1,537 24
Drug Abuse 846,736 404,609 19,098 32
Gambling 2,160 5,071 281 68
Family and Children 56,233 26,470 2,109 31
DUI 927,516 124,467 30,318 12
Liquor Laws 329,895 47,529 19,518 12
Drunkenness 362,396 66,837 11,455 15
Disorderly Conduct 305,154 162,521 12,405 34
Vagrancy 14,092 9,935 732 40
All Other Offenses 1,905,436 893,018 79,233 31
Curfew and Loitering 43,961 28,036 1,673 38
Source: Adapted from Federal Bureau of Investigation (2011).
Crime in the United States – 2010. Washington, DC: U.S.
Department
of Justice. Retrieved on April 13, 2012 from
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/
table-43/10tbl43a.xls
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more likely to become arrested, get a court referral, and have a
formal hearing before a
judge. As a result, people concluded that the system was
treating blacks more harshly
than whites. However, control variables were absent or
extremely limited.
Observers criticized these early studies as primitive because
they overlooked several
important things. For example, blacks might receive more
formal processing because the
current offense was quite serious. As a result, investigators

advocated the use of more
appropriate and relevant variables. They argued that one should
group variables into
legal and non-legal or social concerns.
Legal variables include such items as offense severity and prior
record. Non-legal
aspects reference such salient features as the offender’s race,
age, and gender. The
research task is to pit these two variable sets against each other
to see which is more
capable of explaining official actions. If the legal items emerge
as being more important
than non-legal variables, then one could not conclude that
discriminatory practices were
important. But, if the non-legal variables have more influence
than legal ones, it would
appear that discriminatory practices were operative.
Later Studies
The adoption of the legal versus non-legal variables framework
did not quiet the debate.
Some studies found that race was a very important consideration
in examining official
action. Ferdinand and Luchterhand (1970) discovered that
police officers were more
likely to give black youths a formal referral to the juvenile
court, particularly when the
incident involved a serious violation. Piliavin and Briar (1964)
also noted a racial imbal-
ance. Some of their variation stemmed in part from the poor
demeanor that black youths
exhibited towards police officers.
On the other hand, a number of studies point to the opposite
conclusion. Although

black juveniles have a higher arrest rate than do white youths,
part of the reason is that
the police honor the wishes of victims (Black & Reiss, 1970;
Lundman, Sykes, & Clark,
1978). If the victim wants the offender arrested, officers may
not have any choice. Other
studies highlight prior record and offense seriousness as
dominant influences in the deci-
sion to formally charge a juvenile.
While the typical approach has been to view legal and social
variables as disjointed
or totally separate from one another, such may not be the case.
Consider the following
point about how a social variable can become transferred into a
legal variable:
If there is bias at the point of police dispositions, it will
ultimately translate into
differences in prior record—a variable which had a stronger
effect on court
dispositions than any other variable studied. The effect of prior
record may, in
other words, include a component due to police bias (Dannefer
& Schutt, 1982,
p. 1129).
Assume for the moment that race, a social characteristic, is the
main determinant of
police action in a field encounter. The officer makes an arrest in
this situation. Suppose
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that this same subject is involved in another field encounter at a
later date. If the investi-
gating officer runs a check for priors, the computer would show
the individual as having
an arrest history. Any action taken by the officer in this second
encounter would appear
to stem from the legal variable of prior record. However, the
fact of the matter is that the
attainment of the legal variable prior record was tainted
originally by a social consider-
ation, the subject’s race. While the strategy of pitting legal
against non-legal indicators
seems logical, the possibility of an interpretational error
because of misplaced trust

looms large.
Another way to determine the validity of the arrest decision
would be to follow a
case through the criminal justice process. Systematic case
tracking can provide feedback
about the quality of the arrest decision (Gottfredson &
Gottfredson, 1988, p. 71). Before
putting a case on the docket, the prosecutor reviews it. At this
point, the prosecutor can
accept the case as is, amend the original charge, or dismiss it
entirely. Although prosecu-
tors exert considerable discretion in their own domain, this
processing stage is the only
real point at which the initial arrest decision gets examined.
The decision to accept or reject a case based on sufficient
probable cause for an
arrest was the subject of a study by Hepburn (1978). He
analyzed arrests made in a mid-
western city to see whether there was enough evidence to
support prosecution. Dividing
cases by suspect race allowed an examination of attrition for
blacks and whites. Hepburn
found no differences in prosecutorial rejection of arrests for
serious index offenses.
However, substantial losses occurred when the charge was a
victimless crime. The pros-
ecutor refused to process black suspects more often in cases of
prostitution, gambling,
vagrancy, and drunkenness. This pattern led Hepburn (1978, pp.
60–61) to state that
“nonwhite arrests are more likely than white arrests to have the
warrant application
refused, a finding which may be interpreted as partial support
for the hypothesis that

nonwhites are more likely than whites to be arrested on
insufficient evidence.”
Sexism
The sex distribution of arrests for the entire United States
during 2010 appears in
Table 9.2 below. For the most part, female representation in
arrest statistics does not
approach their relative presence in the overall population. But,
female arrest patterns do
vary according to offense and might exceed expectations based
upon how some people
think females ordinarily behave. As a result, female
involvement in the criminal justice
system has captured scholarly attention.
Some criminologists contend that contemporary arrest rates for
females are sky-
rocketing at unprecedented levels. Several reasons for this
upward trend have surfaced.
One argument, the masculinity thesis, is that females are
engaging in more criminal
activity because they are incorporating more masculine
personality traits. Traditionally,
females have occupied very passive and dependent niches. Only
males could be aggres-
sive and competitive. Crime was a male activity. However, the
advent of the women’s lib-
eration movement dismantled sex-role stereotypical barriers. As
females became more
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liberated, they rejected traditional sex-role perceptions. They
adopted more masculine
traits and began to engage in more aggressive behaviors. One
major manifestation of
this trend is a greater involvement in criminal activity and a
corresponding rise in female
arrest statistics.
table 9.2
arrests by Suspect Sex, united States, 2010.
number OF perSOnS arreSteD
Offense charged male Female % Female

Murder 6,276 751 11
Forcible Rape 12,475 113 1
Robbery 62,383 9,010 13
Aggravated Assault 208,367 60,145 22
Burglary 159,813 30,627 16
Larceny-Theft 454,079 359,414 44
Motor Vehicle Theft 36,238 7,887 18
Arson 6,237 1,277 17
Other Assaults 603,501 226,024 27
Forgery/Counterfeiting 29,878 17,967 38
Fraud 69,079 51,685 43
Embezzlement 5,538 5,763 51
Stolen Property 50,045 12,229 20
Vandalism 131,349 30,319 19
Weapons 89,693 8,374 9
Prostitution 10,844 25,961 71
Sex Offenses 42,833 3,256 7
Drug Abuse 816,307 198,076 20

Gambling 2,614 432 14
Family and Children 52,116 17,455 25
DUI 639,291 196,727 24
Liquor Laws 230,230 91,025 28
Drunkenness 308,784 65,102 17
Disorderly Conduct 251,193 99,580 28
Vagrancy 16,981 4,271 20
All Other Offenses 1,782,491 557,410 24
Curfew and Loitering 43,778 18,175 29
Source: Adapted from Federal Bureau of Investigation (2011).
Crime in the United States—2010. Washington, DC: U.S.
Depart-
ment of Justice. Retrieved on April 13, 2012 from
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/
tables/10tbl33.xls
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A competing explanation for the recent appearance of females
in official crime
statistics is the chivalry hypothesis. This perspective redirects
attention away from the
offender. Instead, it places law enforcement personnel in the
limelight. Advocates link
changes in female arrest patterns to chivalrous and paternalistic
police practices. In other
words, police officers subscribe to certain preconceived notions
of how females should
act. When a female subject fails to adhere to these stereotypes,
she is more likely to find
herself under arrest. Females who conform to traditional sex-
role expectations are more
likely to be the recipients of police discretion and avoid a
formal arrest.
Several criminologists have taken note of such preferential
treatment based upon the

sexual identity of the citizen. Reckless (1961, p. 37), for
example, wrote:
Citizens are willing to report the behavior of males more readily
than that of
females. The police are . . . much more lenient in their arrests
of females. Judicial
processes in America are supposed to be very much more
lenient with women
than men. Consequently, female offenders have a much better
chance than male
offenders of not being reported, of not being arrested, and of
dropping out of the
judicial process.
Early Studies
Many early studies examining the chivalry hypothesis focused
upon police handling of
juveniles. The typical research approach compared the number
of males and females
arrested after police field contact. Some interesting revelations
surfaced. One finding
was that females were more likely to be arrested for status
offenses (skipping school,
smoking, curfew violations, etc.) and other minor transgressions
than were males.
A variety of limitations in these early studies on police arrest
decisions prompted
criminologists to look for a more sophisticated research
strategy. This new approach took
a familiar tact. It divided variables into two conceptual sets:
legal and social variables.
Legal variables include such items as the type of offense, the
person’s prior arrest

history, and the seriousness of the current offense. Social
variables cover such factors
as the individual’s race, gender, and age. This research strategy
could determine which
set of variables, legal or social, is more influential in the arrest
decision. If the analysis
shows that social variables are more important than legal
variables, then the conclusion
is that some form of discrimination exists. If the legal variables
appear more influential,
then the conclusion is that discriminatory practices are absent.
Later Studies
In an attempt to evaluate the impact of a juvenile’s sex upon
police dispositions,
Teilmann and Landry (1981) studied arrest decisions in
locations drawn from five states.
The researchers found that gender had a minuscule impact when
controlling for offense
type and prior record. If there was a bias against juvenile
females, it was more likely to
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surface in cases involving first-time offenders. Police officers
were more likely to pro-
cess these cases formally than to select an alternative
disposition.
Another test of the chivalry hypothesis came when Visher
(1983) analyzed field
data. Trained observers rode in patrol cars and witnessed
police-citizen encounters in
24 different agencies in three metropolitan areas. To see if
officers made consistent and
legally sound decisions regarding arrest, Visher blocked the
data into social and legal
variables. She expected that police officers would consider
some behaviors exhibited by
females as improper and these breaches would elicit a
differential response. For exam-
ple, officers may treat older females differently because of their
age. They may become
aggressive towards antagonistic female subjects. Finally, the
police may arrest females
more often if they encounter them at night in public places
when one may expect these
females to be at home.

The results of an elaborate analysis indicated that social
variables exerted an influ-
ence upon the arrest decision. This finding prompted Visher
(1983, p. 23) to issue the
following scathing comment:
as long as men continue to dominate the criminal justice system
through their
roles as police officers, prosecutors, and judges, traditional
patterns of interac-
tion between men and women will influence the formal
sanctioning of female
offenders. Some females will receive lenient treatment because
they display
appropriate gender behaviors and characteristics; other females
who violate
traditional sex-role expectations will not receive leniency.
Discretion in the
criminal justice system involving female offenders appears
related to notions
of chivalry.
Krohn and his colleagues (1983) investigated the issue of
chivalry in a slightly dif-
ferent way. They argued that the masculinization thesis
demanded longitudinal data.
If sex-role changes undergird female involvement in criminal
activity, then looking at
arrests over several years should identify certain conspicuous
trends. Cohort data from
Racine, Wisconsin, enabled the research team to examine both
juvenile and adult arrest
histories for the same individuals for the three time periods of
1960–1966, 1967–1972,
and 1973–1976. The results substantiated earlier findings. That

is, female status offend-
ers were just as likely to be arrested as male misdemeanor
offenders. However, the adult
arrest statistics displayed some change. Although arrest patterns
appeared to approach
a more egalitarian distribution, “chivalrous treatment of females
is evident in the refer-
ral pattern for adult misdemeanors that constituted a large
proportion of the offenders
handled by police” (Krohn et al., 1983, p. 428). While these
practices may seem to be
troublesome, the researchers cautioned that many of the adult
gender differences were
minute. It appears that changes in female arrest patterns show
an overall decline in chiv-
alrous practices and a more evenhanded approach to street
justice.
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biased-based policing
Charges of race-based police activity became more pointed
during the mid-1990s.
Authorities had come to rely upon profi ling techniques in
efforts to make airports more
secure and to become more aggressive in the war against drugs
(Williams & Arrigo,
1999). Although some of these efforts were based on dubious
indicators, they concen-
trated on observable behaviors that would trigger individualized
suspicions. Persons
who bought round-trip airline tickets with very little stay-over
time, paid for their tickets
in cash using small denominations, and who carried very little,
if any, luggage were
regarded as prime suspects. Flamboyantly dressed persons,
driving large-scale outland-
ish vehicles, and who had no visible legitimate means of
support became drug inter-
diction surveillance targets. Eventually, though, the emphasis
on behavior grew less
important and race became the dominant criterion. The erosion
was now complete. The
black person in a predominantly white area was suspicious. The
white person in a black
neighborhood was probably looking for either drugs or tricks.
Race-based enforcement
practices, often hailed as being nothing more than good old-

fashioned and hard-nosed
policing, had taken over as a standard short-cut in the war
against crime. In other words,
the success of fi nding drugs or uncovering other illicit activity
fueled the justifi cation for
race-based enforcement (Engel & Calnon, 2004).
Racial profi ling, also known as biased-based policing, refers to
the practice of tak-
ing law enforcement actions because of a person’s perceived
racial background (see
Figure 9.7). In other words, offi cers stop motorists or search
subjects because members
of this particular race are known to be involved inordinately in
certain types of illegal
behaviors. Instead of using the person’s behavior to generate
reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, offi cers rely upon race as a hunch. The
Supreme Court’s blessing of
FIgure 9.7
Defi nition of racial profi ling.
Racial profi ling refers to the discriminatory practice by law
enforcement offi cials of
targeting individuals for suspicion of crime based on the
individual’s race, ethnicity,
religion or national origin. Criminal profi ling, generally, as
practiced by police, is the
reliance on a group of characteristics they believe to be
associated with crime.
Examples of racial profi ling are the use of race to determine
which drivers to stop
for minor traffi c violations (commonly referred to as “driving
while black or brown”),
or the use of race to determine which pedestrians to search for

illegal contraband.
Racial profi ling does not refer to the act of a law enforcement
agent pursuing a
suspect in which the specifi c description of the suspect
includes race or ethnicity in
combination with other identifying factors.
Source: American Civil Liberties Union (2005). Racial Profi
ling: Defi nition. New York, NY: American Civil Liber-
ties Union. Retrieved on April 15, 2012 from
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/racial-profi ling-defi nition
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pretextual stops in Whren (1996) lent a sense of legitimacy to
these intrusions. A pre-
textual stop takes place when an officer develops an interest in
what a party is doing or
in the contents of a vehicle. Although the officer does not have
a sufficient legal basis
to initiate a full-blown investigation, he or she simply follows
the driver until there is a
minor traffic violation (i.e., illegal lane change, malfunctioning
tail lights, improper tag,
etc.). At that point, the officer has the lawful authority to stop
the vehicle and initiate a
police-citizen encounter. Whatever unfolds after that point can
either dispel the officer’s
original inclination or reinforce the hunch and elevate it to a
search or arrest status.
These concerns became crystalized when New Jersey motorists
went to court argu-
ing that their vehicular stops and subsequent arrests stemmed
from their minority status
rather than any legal factors (Buerger & Farrell, 2002). In other
words, their contention
was that officers were stopping motorists on the basis of
“driving while black” rather than
for any articulated reasons. The plaintiffs assembled statistical
data which showed that
officers were almost five times more likely to stop black, rather
than white, drivers. This
information convinced the court that something was amiss and
the court ruled on behalf
of the defendants. In short, the court suspected that racial
profiling, an unacceptable prac-

tice, was at the root of these traffic stops (State of New Jersey
v. Pedro Soto, et al., 1996).
The publicity surrounding this case and several other legal
proceedings prompted
further analyses which, in turn, spawned other reservations and
considerations. While a
number of studies found evidence of racial profiling, other
investigations did not. In fact,
Meehan and Ponder (2002a) showed that reliance upon mere
traffic-stop counts leads
to the misinterpretation that officers were engaged in racial
profiling. However, when
one takes into account the racial composition of drivers on the
roadways, it appears that
officers were not engaged in biased policing.
The mixed findings and other criticisms prompted McMahon
and his colleagues
(2002, pp. 32–43) to warn that five general flaws seemed to be
thwarting proper data
interpretation. These categories included difficulties with:
• Base rates;
• Measuring race;
• Geographical and functional officer staffing patterns;
• Multiple predictors of stops and searches; and,
• Criteria for the existence and extent of racial profiling.
The question of base rates refers to what benchmark is an
appropriate gauge or
referent point. For instance, should researchers utilize census

information to generate
estimates of the population composition, driver’s license
information available from
state agencies, or roadway surveys of drivers? One analysis of
motorists who exceeded
the speed limit by at least 15 miles-per-hour on the New Jersey
Turnpike reveals
that driving infractions are not distributed uniformly by race,
age, or gender (Lange,
Johnson, & Voas, 2005), a finding confirmed by researchers
analyzing speeding data in
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Massachusetts (Lundman & Kowalski, 2009). Thus, establishing
an appropriate norm or
reference group is of utmost importance.
The second issue concerns racial identifi cation. Some studies
have relied upon rov-
ing surveys to determine to generate racial estimates of drivers
(Meehan & Ponder,
2002b). One technique is to place observer vehicles on the
roadway with the cruise con-
trol set at a predetermined speed. The task, then, is to record the
race of passing drivers
or motorists within the immediate area. Of course, this approach
invites criticisms of
missing data, incomplete data, or misidentifi cation. Skin tone
among minority members,
for example, may invite distortion (Barlow & Barlow, 2002),
while windshield glare and
tint can taint rater reliability (Lange, Johnson, & Voas, 2005).
In addition, portrayal of
profi ling as simply a black/white issue overlooks other racially
sensitive groups, such as
Hispanics (Reitzel, Rice, & Piquero, 2004).
Patrol allocation or the number of offi cers assigned to an area
is usually based upon
past problems, calls for service, reduced response times, and a
host of other factors.
The point is that offi cers are not distributed randomly or
equitably within jurisdictions.
Hence, any observed disparities in suspect characteristics may
represent intentional
organizational or managerial decisions rather than individual
offi cer preferences.

Reliance upon just stop data may overlook other intricacies in
police-citizen encoun-
ters. Requests for consent searches, acquiescence to such
requests, active warrants and
capiases, probable cause that unfolds during the course of a
stop, and the like may
compromise an easy understanding of data. A study conducted
by Smith and Petrocelli
(2001) found that although the police were more likely to stop
black motorists, the odds
of a subsequent search were no different. Interestingly,
Ridgeway (2006) found that
offi cers in one jurisdiction were not more inclined to stop
minority drivers. However,
black operators were more likely to be subjected to frisks and
lengthier detentions than
white drivers.
Some observers contend that counts of events represent a far cry
from explaining
the genesis of these events (Engel, Calnon, & Bernard, 2002).
Until researchers start
invoking explicit theoretical frameworks which aim at
understanding why police offi cers
take certain actions, the fi eld will not advance past name-
calling and unsubstantiated
assumptions of police misconduct. That, in turn, will impede
any efforts intended to
inform or reform police practices and will serve merely to infl
ame already entrenched
positions. Along these lines, the public does not view profi ling
as a very fair tool and
when this habit is perceived as customary, there is a decline in
citizen trust in the police
(Engel & Canon, 2004; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Law

enforcement offi cials are aware
of these feelings and have taken steps to curtail racially-based
activities (Warren &
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2009). Many administrators have enacted
polices outlawing race-
based policing. A number of agencies have begun collecting
race information for traf-
fi c stops, citizen encounters, searches, use-of-force situations,
and other activities in
the fi eld. Some police administrators, as Figure 9.8 illustrates,
have issued statements
opposing race-based law enforcement practices.
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a critique
Researchers investigating racism and sexism in police fi eld
activity are adamant that
social variables, more so than legal considerations, improperly
infl uence the arrest deci-
sion. However, several basic defi ciencies work to undermine
the validity of these claims.
Let us visit some of them.
First, we learned earlier that probable cause is an important
legal ingredient. If it is
absent, the offi cer cannot make a legal arrest. Unfortunately,
many studies typically fail
to include any indication as to whether probable cause existed
at the onset.
Second, some studies include whether the incident was a felony
or misdemeanor.
Unfortunately, many researchers ignore a very important rule of
arrest. Generally, a
police offi cer can make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor
only if that crime took
place in the offi cer’s presence. The offi cer may have suffi
cient information to believe
that a crime took place. The offi cer also may know who the
perpetrator was. However,
the offi cer cannot make a bona fi de warrantless arrest without
witnessing the act. To do
otherwise would violate that person’s constitutional rights.
Third, none of these studies directly measure police attitudes
towards blacks or
females. The researchers merely assume that the lack of a

relationship between certain
legal variables and the arrest decision demonstrates prejudicial
feelings. Furthermore,
they guess that these biases sway an offi cer into resolving the
situation through an arrest
(Mastrofski & Parks, 1990). None of these studies measure offi
cer attitudes, nor do they
control for such things as offi cer race and gender.
Fourth, some critics have serious reservations about the way in
which research-
ers handle the construct demeanor. Klinger (1994, 1996) notes
with some dismay that
researchers commonly include criminal behavior, such as
pushing or shoving an offi cer,
FIgure 9.8
a policy banning biased-based profi ling.
Bias-based profi ling or racial profi ling in traffi c contacts, fi
eld contacts, and in asset
seizure and forfeiture efforts is strictly prohibited. Sworn offi
cers shall actively en-
force state and federal laws and applicable University policies
and procedures in
a responsible and professional manner, without regard to race,
ethnicity, national
origin, sexual orientation, or gender.
Offi cers may take into account the reported race or ethnicity of
a specifi c suspect
or suspects based upon trustworthy, locally relevant information
that links a person
or persons of a specifi c race/ethnicity to a particular unlawful
incident. Race and/
or ethnicity can never be used as the sole basis for probable

cause or reasonable
suspicion.
Source: Florida State University Police Department (2012).
Biased-Based Profi ling. Tallahassee, FL: Florida
State University. Retrieved on April 15, 2012 from
http://www.police.fsu.edu/Uniform-Patrol
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as an indication of the degree to which a subject is hostile.
These actions constitute bat-

tery upon a police officer, a felony in many jurisdictions which
will result in an immediate
arrest irrespective of the nature of the original call.
Furthermore, researchers usually fail
to distinguish crimes that took place before the officer arrived
from illegal activities that
occurred after the officer was on scene. While efforts to correct
these deficiencies have
surfaced (Lundman, 1994; Worden & Shepard, 1996), the
academic claim is that these
shortcomings have very little, if any, tangible effects upon the
original interpretations.
Finally, one should bear in mind that these data files are aging.
Lundman (1994), for
example, relies upon field observations collected in 1970, while
Worden and Shepard
(1996) analyze data gathered in 1977. If our earlier argument
that law enforcement offi-
cers today represent a new breed is true, then the demeanor-
arrest linkage is an anach-
ronism. For instance, more recent data reveal that officers who
support the precepts of
community policing differ from their colleagues in how they
apply their arrest powers
(Mastrofski, Worden, & Snipes, 1995). What all this boils down
to is that while the bulk
of the literature may describe past police behavior accurately,
such conclusions might
not be true today. What is needed, then, are more refined
analyses conducted on contem-
porary police activity.
In short, these flaws are sufficiently damaging to question any
conclusions gener-
ated to date. It would be premature to embrace the conclusion

that racially motivated
or chivalrous practices abound in every arrest situation. Future
studies need to be more
sensitive, along the lines suggested here, before one can reach a
definitive and valid
conclusion. Meanwhile, it would be fair to say that such biased
practices might exist in
low-visibility situations. However, the necessary scientific
evidence to make such a final
assessment is not yet available.
controlling police Officer Discretion
One point becomes clear after reviewing the various studies
concerning the arrest decision.
There is a need to establish adequate controls to curb any
possible unwarranted exercise
of police discretion. In short, the “essential problem becomes
that of the elusive balance
between structuring decisions and providing for individual
justice” (Atkins & Pogrebin,
1978, p. 2). As we shall see, reformers favor greater reins on
police officer discretion in
the field. However, they do not agree as to who should be in
charge of this restructuring.
Should police agencies determine their own selective
enforcement policies? Or, should an
independent overseer, such as the legislature or the courts,
supervise these efforts?
the locus of change
How can we control excessive police discretion? If one takes
LaFave’s position that
improperly drafted laws provide too little direction for police
officers in the field, then
one might push a very straightforward solution. That is, have
the legislature revise all

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unclear or vague statutory language and rescind all outdated
laws. While this approach
has a certain basic appeal, it is overly simplistic. What this
proposal really does is merely
call for a return to the myth of full enforcement. If the
legislature can define the ingre-
dients of a criminal violation, then the officer’s job is to
measure the situation against
a legislative yardstick. However laudable in its aim to ensure a

uniform reaction to all
legal violations, such an approach transforms police action into
a robotic response.
One of the more ironic features of policing is that most agencies
have a labyrinth of
rules and regulations that govern employees and their jobs. For
example, officers must
contend with restrictions governing the style, shape, and length
of hair. All officers must
conform to a dress code. There is a conduct code. There are
rules governing equipment.
Other rules cover which forms officers must complete and
when. This intense bureau-
cratic preoccupation with minute details stands in stark contrast
to the lack of guidance
given to field action.
The American Bar Association (ABA) noted with some alarm
that most police orga-
nizations had either turned a deaf ear to earlier pleas for policy
development or had not
yet placed these concerns on the agenda. The ABA issued a
series of standards reiter-
ating the critical need for administrative action. Standard 5.1
embodies the reasoning
behind this call for action. It reads:
Since a principal function of police is the safeguarding of
democratic processes,
if police fail to conform their conduct to the requirements of
law, they subvert
the democratic process and frustrate the achievement of a
principal police func-
tion. It is for this reason that high priority must be given for
ensuring that the

police are made fully accountable to their police administrator
and to the public
for their actions (American Bar Association, 1972, p. 144).
the policy Formulation process
The President’s Commission drew a picture of the policy
formulation process to help
agencies develop meaningful guidelines. As Figure 9.9 shows,
the policy formulation
process consists of several stages. Let us examine each step to
see what is involved.
The entry point into the process starts with the identification of
a problem. This first
step begins either internally or externally. Internal
identification of a problem may occur
as a result of accumulating and then analyzing citizen
complaints surrounding certain
activity. Supervisors and patrol officers who frequently
encounter difficult decisions in
the field are another routine source of internal identification.
External sources of input
include recurring difficulties experienced by prosecuting
attorneys, new legislation,
and judicial rulings where some standard of action is less than
adequate. Citizens may
express some discontent with the lack of police presence in
their neighborhoods. Finally,
social service providers may point to shortcomings that hinder
their own functioning.
Once the process identifies a problem, the next step is to clarify
the issue and to gather
appropriate information. This step may require additional data
collection, enlistment

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of outside consultants, or the creation of a research staff. In
many large agencies, the
research staff or the Internal Affairs Unit is responsible for
monitoring current policy as
well as entertaining new ideas.
The third stage calls for consultation with representatives from
inside and outside
the agency. Maybe a department decides to embark on a
domestic violence pro-arrest

policy. In other words, offi cers are instructed to make an arrest
whenever possible. A
policy change like this formulation might require coordination
with the state attorney,
local judges, jail offi cials, the probation offi ce, and social
service agencies. Contact with
the state attorney would ensure appropriate prosecutorial action
in these cases. A policy
FIgure 9.9
the formulation and execution of
police policy guidelines.
Source: Adapted from President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967),
Task Force Report: The Police. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Offi ce, p. 26.
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