1. Mobile Code Mining For Discovery and Exploits

2. Who Am I?
Hemil Shah – hemil@blueinfy.net
Co-CEO & Director, Blueinfy Solutions
Past experience
eSphere Security, HBO, KPMG, IL&FS, Net Square
Interest
Web and mobile security research
Published research
Articles / Papers – Packstroem, etc.
Web Tools – wsScanner, scanweb2.0, AppMap, AppCodeScan, AppPrint etc.
Mobile Tools – FSDroid, iAppliScan, DumpDroid
hemil@blueinfy.com
http://www.blueinfy.com
Blog – http://blog.blueinfy.com/
hemil@blueinfy.com
http://www.blueinfy.com
Blog – http://blog.blueinfy.com/

3. Enterprise Technology Trend
2007. Web services would rocket from $1.6
billion in 2004 to $34 billion. [IDC]
2008. Web Services or Service-Oriented
Architecture (SOA) would surge ahead.
[Gartner]
2009. Enterprise 2.0 in action and penetrating
deeper into the corporate environment
2010. Flex/HTML5/Cloud/API
2012. HTML5/Mobile era.

4. Past, Present and Future
Cloud
2010
Focus

5. Mobile Infrastructure
www mail
intranet
router
DMZ
Internet
VPN
Dial-up
Other
Offices
Exchange
firewall
Database
RAS

6. Mobile App Environment
Web
Server
Static pages only
(HTML,HTM, etc.)Web
Client
Scripted
Web
Engine
Dynamic pages
(ASP,DHTML, PHP,
CGI, etc.)
ASP.NET on
.Net Framework,
J2EE App Server,
Web Services,
etc.
Application
Servers
And
Integrated
Framework
Internet DMZ Trusted
WW
EE
BB
SS
EE
RR
VV
II
CC
EE
SS
Mobile
SOAP/JSON etc.
DB
X
Internal/Corporate

7. Mobile Apps

8. Mobile Changes
Application Infrastructure
Changing dimension Web Mobile
(AI1) Protocols HTTP & HTTPS JSON, SOAP, REST etc. over
HTTP & HTTPS
(AI2) Information
structures
HTML transfer JSON, JS Objects, XML, etc.
(AI3) Technology Java, DotNet, PHP,
Python and so on
Cocoa, Java with Platform
SDKs, HTML5
(AI4) Information
Store/Process
Mainly on Server Side Client and Server Side

9. Mobile Changes
Security Threats
Changing dimension Web Mobile
(T1) Entry points Structured Scattered and multiple
(T2) Dependencies Limited • Multiple technologies
• Information sources
• Protocols
(T3) Vulnerabilities Server side [Typical
injections]
• Web services [Payloads]
• Client side [Local Storage]
(T4) Exploitation Server side exploitation Both server and client side
exploitation

10. Mobile Attacks

11. Insecure Storage

12. Insecure Storage
Why application needs to store data
• Ease of use for the user
• Popularity
• Competition
• Activity with single click
• Decrease Transaction time
• Post/Get information to/from Social Sites
9 out of 10 applications have this vulnerability

13. Insecure Storage
How attacker can gain access
• Wifi
• Default password after jail breaking (alpine)
• Adb over wifi
• Physical Theft
• Temporary access to device

14. Insecure Storage
What information we usually find
• Authentication Credentials
• Authorization tokens
• Financial Statements
• Credit card numbers
• Owner’s Information – Physical Address, Name,
Phone number
• Social Engineering Sites profile/habbits
• SQL Queries

15. DEMO

16. Insecure Network
Communication

17. Insecure Network Channel
• Easy to perform MiM attacks as Mobile devices
uses untrusted network i.e open/Public WiFi,
HotSpot, Carrier’s Network
• Application deals with sensitive data i.e.
• Authentication credentials
• Authorization token
• PII Information (Privacy Violation) (Owner Name,
Phone number, UDID)

18. Insecure Network Channel
• Can sniff the traffic to get an access to
sensitive data
• SSL is the best way to secure communication
channel
• Common Issues
• Does not deprecate HTTP requests
• Allowing invalid certificates
• Sensitive information in GET requests

19. Session token

20. Unauthorized Dialing/SMS

21. Unauthorized Dialing/SMS
• Social Engineering using Mobile Devices
• Attacker plays with user’s mind
• User installs application
• Application sends premium rate SMS or a
premium rate phone call to unknown number
• Used by Malware/Trojans

22. AndroidOS.FakePlayer
August 2010
• Sends costly International SMS
• One SMS Costs – 25 USD (INR 1250)
• Application Sends SMS to –
• 3353 & 3354 numbers in Russia

23. GGTracker
June 2010
• Another Application which sends International
SMS
• One SMS Costs – 40 USD (INR 2000)
• Application Sends Premium SMS to US
numbers

24. UI Impersonation

25. UI Impersonation
• Attack has been there since long
• On a mobile stack, known as UI impersonation
• Other names are Phishing Attack, ClickJacking
• Attacker plays with user’s mind and try to
impersonate as other user or other application

26. UI Impersonation
• Victim looses credit card information or
authentication credentials or secret
• One application can create local PUSH
notification as it is created from apple store
• Flow in review process of AppStore – Anyone
can name anything to their application

27. NetFlix
Oct -2011
• Steals users “netflix” account information
• Application shows error message to user
“Compatibility issues with the user’s hardware”
when user enters username and password
• Once error message, application uninstalls
itself

28. Activity Monitoring

29. Activity Monitoring
• Sending a blind carbon copy of each email to
attacker
• Listening all phone calls
• Email contact list, pictures to attacker
• Read all emails stored on the device
• Usual intension of Spyware/Trojans

30. Activity Monitoring
Attacker can monitor –
• Audio Files
• Video
• Pictures
• Location
• Contact List
• Call/Browser/SMS History
• Data files

31. Android.Pjapps
Early 2010
• Steal/Change users information
• PjApps Application –
• Send and monitor incoming SMS messages
• Read/write to the user's browsing history and
bookmarks
• Install packages and Open Sockets
• Write to external storage
• Read the phone's state

32. System Modification

33. System Modification
• Application will attempt to modify system
configuration to hide itself (Historically this is
known as ROOTKIT)
• Configuration changes makes certain attack
possible i.e. –
• Modifying device proxy to get user’s activity
monitoring
• Configure BCC email sending to attacker

34. iKee – iPhone Worm
“ikee” iPhone Worm
Change root password
Change wallpaper to Ricky Martin.
After infected by “ikee“
iPhone look like this

35. PII Information Leakage

36. PII Information Leakage
• Application usually have access to user’s
private information i.e. Owner Name, Location,
Physical Address, AppID, Phone Number
• This information needs to be handled very
carefully as per the law in some countries
• Storing this information in plain text is not
allowed in some countries

37. DEMO

38. Hardcoded Secrets

39. Hardcoded Secrets
• Easiest way for developer to solve complex
issues/functionality
• Attacker can get this information by either
reverse engineering application or by checking
local storage

40. DEMO

41. Language Specific Issues

42. Language Specific Issues
• Application in iOS are developed in Objective-
C language which is derived from classic C
language
• Along with this derivation, it also derives
security issues in C language i.e. overflow
attacks

43. SQL Injection in Local database

44. SQL Injection in Local database
• Most Mobile platforms uses SQLite as
database to store information on the device
• Using any SQLite Database Browser, it is
possible to access database logs which has
queries and other sensitive database
information
• In case application is not filtering input, SQL
Injection on local database is possible

45. DEMO

46. Information in Common Services

47. Common Services
• KeyBoard, Clipboard are shared amongst all
the applications.
• Information stored in clipboard can be
accessed by all the application
• Sensitive information should not be allowed to
copy/paste in the application

48. DEMO

49. Server Side Issues

50. Server Side Issues
• Most Application makes server side calls to
either web services or some other component.
Security of server side component is equally
important as client side
• Controls to be tested on the server side –
Security Control Categories for Server Side
Application– Authentication, Access
Controls/Authorization, API misuse, Path
traversal, Sensitive information leakage,

51. Server Side Issues
• Error handling, Session management, Protocol
abuse, Input validations, XSS, CSRF, Logic
bypass, Insecure crypto, DoS, Malicious Code
Injection, SQL injection, XPATH and LDAP
injections, OS command injection, Parameter
manipulations, BruteForce, Buffer Overflow,
HTTP response splitting, HTTP replay, XML
injection, Canonicalization, Logging and
auditing.

52. Mobile Top 10 - OWASP
• Insecure Data Storage
• Weak Server Side Controls
• Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
• Client Side Injection
• Poor Authorization and Authentication
• Improper Session Handling
• Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs
• Side Channel Data Leakage
• Broken Cryptography
• Sensitive Information Disclosure

53. Decompiling Android Applications

54. Decompiling android application
• Using Apktool -
http://code.google.com/p/android-apktool/
• Using Dex2Jar -
http://code.google.com/p/dex2jar/
• Using aapt (Bundled with Android SDK)

55. Use Apktool to convert the XML to readable format
Android manifest file:
APK Tool

56. DEMO

57. Use dex2jar to convert classes.dex file in the extracted folder to .class files
Use JAD to convert the class files into JAVA files
Dex2Jar and JAD

58. DEMO

59. Aapt
• Android Asset Packaging Tool
• Allows you to view , create and update Zip-compatible archives
View components in an apk:

60. DEMO

61. Looking in to Code

62. Static Code Analysis
• Introduce in Mac OS X v10.6, XCode 3.2,
Clang analyzer merged into XCode.
• Memory leakage warning
• Run from Build->Analyze
• Innovative shows you complete flow of
object start to end
• Configure as a automatic analysis during
build process

63. Static Code Analysis
Potential Memory Leak

64. Static Code Analysis
Dead store – variable never used

65. Static Code Analysis
Uninitialized Variable

66. Static Code Analysis
Type Size Mismatch

67. Static Code Analysis
Object used after release

68. Code Analysis with AppCodeScan
• Semi automated tool
• Ability to expand with custom rules
• Simple tracing utility to verify and track
vulnerabilities
• Simple HTML reporting which can be
converted to PDF

69. AppCodeScan
• Sophisticated tool consist of two components
• Code Scanning
• Code Tracer
• Allows you to trace back the variable
• AppCodeScan is not complete automated
static code analyzer.
• It only relies on regex and lets you find
SOURCE of the SINK

70. DEMO

71. ScanDroid
• Ruby script to scan through source code
(Pattern matching) for APIs
• Also takes care about reverse engineering
application
• Make list of permissions
• No code trace
• No reporting

72. Rules in AppCodeScan
• Writing rules is very straight forward
• In an XML file which is loaded at run time
• This release has rules for iOS and Android for
- Local Storage, Unsafe APIs, SQL Injection,
Network Connection, SSL Certificate
Handling, Client Side Exploitation, URL
Handlers, Logging, Credential Management
and Accessing PII.

73. Sample Rules - Android

74. Android DEMO

75. Sample Rules - iOS

76. iOS DEMO

77. Debuggable flag in Android
• One of the key attribute in android manifest
file
• Under “application” section
• Describes debugging in enabled
• If “Debuggable”attribute is set o true, the
application will try to connect to a local unix
socket “@jdwp-control”
• Using JDWP, It is possible to gain full access
to the Java process and execute arbitrary
code in the context of the debugable
application

78. CheckDebuggable Script
• Checks in APK whether debuggable is
enabled
• Script can be found at –
http://www.espheresecurity.com/resourcestool
s.html
• Paper can be found at -
http://www.espheresecurity.com/CheckDebug
gable.pdf

79. DEMO

80. Conclusion – Questions?