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Ninth Annual Terrorism
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Publication: China Brief Volum e: 16 Issue: 4
February 23, 2016 08:39 AM Age: 3 days
NLD Chairperson Aung San Suu Kyi visits
with Chinese President Xi Jinping in June of
2015. The NLD has since won a major
electoral victory.
C hine se Influe nce F ace s U nce rtain F uture in M yanm ar
By: Sudha Ramachandran
At the beginning of February, m em bers of Myanm ar’s National
League for Dem ocracy (NLD) took their seats in the national
parliam ent (People’s Daily, February 2). Though the transition
w as peaceful, Myanm ar’s neighbors are anticipating political
instability and ethnic unrest to escalate in the com ing m onths,
and Myanm ar’s neighbors, including China, are anxious that the
resulting population flow s across borders could inflam e ethnic
insurgencies in volatile border areas. As the new governm ent
navigates these dom estic and international currents, China is
w atching to see if the NLD w ill rush to em brace the W est, or adopt
a m ore cautious approach.
The NLD’s connections to W estern nations are w ell established. Since its founding in 1988, the NLD
has had a w arm relationship w ith W estern countries and received full support for its struggle against
m ilitary rule in Myanm ar. Indeed, the United States’ policy tow ard Myanm ar, especially its decisions to
im pose, extend, and lift econom ic sanctions w ere reportedly influenced, even determ ined by the view s
of Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD’s chairperson (Mizzim a, January 23, 2012). In contrast, there w as little
engagem ent betw een the W est and Myanm ar’s m ilitary rulers, pushing the latter to build relations
w ith China, India and m em ber countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), w ho
rarely criticized the generals for suppressing dem ocracy in Myanm ar. China in particular strongly
backed m ilitary rule in Myanm ar and provided it w ith generous political, diplom atic, econom ic and
m ilitary support. This support helped the generals not only survive the W est’s sanctions, but also
consolidate their iron-grip over the country, prolonging the NLD’s struggle against m ilitary rule.
C h in a se e m s “cle a rly a n x io u s” th a t th e W e stw a rd sh ift in M ya n m a r’s fo re ig n p o licy w a s
se t in m o tio n u n d e r P re sid e n t T h e in S e in ’s q u a si- civilia n g o ve rn m e n t co u ld “g o e ve n
fu rth e r in th a t d ire ctio n ” u n d e r th e civilia n a n d p ro - W e st N LD g o ve rn m e n t (M ya n m a r
T im e s, Ja n u a ry 8 ). H o w e ve r, th e N LD ca n n o t ig n o re th e “lo g ic o f g e o g ra p h y” ste m m in g
fro m th e le n g th y b o rd e r M ya n m a r sh a re s w ith C h in a (Indian Express, June 14, 2015). W hile
diversifying its partners to correct the extrem e pro-China tilt of the past 25 years in Myanm ar’s
foreign policy, the NLD can be expected to avoid entering into a close relationship w ith the W est.
China w ill have to contend w ith com petition from other countries, though it w ill rem ain a m ajor
source of investm ent and trade for Myanm ar.
C h in a ’s C o n ce rn s
In 1988, Myanm ar abandoned roughly four decades of non-alignm ent to becom e a close ally of
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China. The ruling junta, w hich w as ostracized by the W est for its violent suppression of protests in
Yangon and other cities that year, turned to China for econom ic aid to help w eather a crippling
econom ic crisis and w eapons to deal w ith dom estic unrest and the threat of a W estern invasion. The
“explicitly close partnership” betw een the m ilitary rulers and China in the period betw een 1988–2010
saw China em erge as Myanm ar’s largest foreign investor, its second largest trade partner and top
m ilitary supplier. [1 ] Chinese cum ulative investm ent in Myanm ar in this period reached $9.6 billion, a
third of w hich w ent into oil, natural gas and hydropow er projects (Mizzim a, February 22, 2011).
China’s heavy investm ent in natural resources and transport infrastructure in Myanm ar has facilitated
extraction and im port of its electricity, oil, gas, tim ber, and gem s and has enabled it to acquire
enorm ous influence over Myanm ar’s econom y. Myanm ar’s value to China goes beyond its natural
resources. Like the China-Pakistan Econom ic Corridor (CPEC), Myanm ar provides an alternate
overland route to the Indian Ocean, reducing threats to its energy supply lines through the South
China Sea (China Brief, July 31, 2015; China Brief, April 12, 2006). Several of Myanm ar’s ports w ere
m odernized by China and Chinese naval ships have docked in Myanm ar’s ports in recent years
(Youku, August 30, 2010).
China’s presence and influence in Myanm ar has suffered setbacks in recent years. Political reform s
initiated in 2011 triggered protests against China-backed infrastructure projects w hose term s w ere
m uch m ore favorable for China. The $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project, for exam ple, w as to send 90
percent of the electricity generated to China (Mizzim a, March 12, 2012). The Thein Sein governm ent
subsequently suspended a num ber of projects including the Myitsone project and the $1 billion
Leptadaung copper m ine project (Global Tim es, Novem ber 27, 2013). The 2011 reform s also
prom pted the W est to begin lifting trade and investm ent restrictions, paving the w ay for m ore diverse
sources of investm ent. For the first tim e in over tw o decades, Chinese investors faced com petition
from W estern and Japanese investors, resulting in Chinese investm ent in Myanm ar plunging from $12
billion in 2008–2011 to just $407 m illion in 2012–2013 (The Irraw addy, January 1, 2013; The
Irraw addy, Septem ber 17, 2013; Global Tim es, March 27, 2014).
This decline in Chinese investm ent in Myanm ar is expected to accelerate w ith the NLD’s ascent to
pow er. Although there is disappointm ent in the W est over Suu Kyi’s autocratic style of functioning and
her silence on the violence unleashed against the Rohingya Muslim m inority, the U.S. is expected to
perm anently lift sanctions if Myanm ar’s m ilitary continues to respect the electoral verdict (The
Irraw addy, Novem ber 13, 2015). Cancellation of Chinese infrastructure projects w ould not only
w eaken Myanm ar’s capacity to be China’s corridor to the Indian Ocean but also it could erode its
grand plans for the Maritim e Silk Route (MSR) initiative, part of China’s “Belt and Road” project to
connect China w ith m arkets across Eurasia. Rail and gas-pipelines linking Myanm ar’s Kyaukpyu port
city w ith Kunm ing in China’s Yunnan Province are a key part of the MSR. The Myanm ar side of the
Kyaukpyu-Kunm ing rail project has run into trouble, though w ork continues on the Chinese side
(Phoenix New s, July 23, 2014; China Econom ic Net, Decem ber 7, 2015). If the NLD governm ent scraps
the project, it w ill further underm ine the MSR (The Hindu, August 21, 2015).
C h in a ’s O u tre a ch to th e N LD
According to an analyst at Myanm ar’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies, China “did not
have to w orry about com petition from the U.S.” in the 1988–2010 period. By im posing sanctions and
refusing to engage the ruling junta, the U.S. and other countries “voluntarily cut them selves out of
Myanm ar’s econom ic and strategic space.” That changed in 2011 w hen China had to contend w ith
“m ounting com petition from W estern countries and im portantly Japan” in Myanm ar.” [2 ] As it becam e
apparent that reform s w ould lead to a larger role for the NLD in politics, non-engagem ent of the NLD
w as “no longer a sensible or practical strategy” (Myanm ar Tim es, Decem ber 16, 2015).
W ith the aim of protecting its econom ic and strategic interests in Myanm ar, China sought to broaden
its base of support in Myanm ar. It reached out to m ajor political parties and civil society organizations
at the national and regional level. China sw itched from ignoring the NLD and its leadership to courting
them instead. Chinese envoys and officials visited NLD leaders, especially Suu Kyi, and NLD delegations
w ere invited to China (Myanm ar Tim es, May 1, 2013; Mizzim a, May 8, 2013; The Irraw addy, January
17, 2014).
In July 2015, the Chinese Com m unist Party (CCP) invited Suu Kyi to Beijing prior to the anticipated NLD
victory in the general elections scheduled for Novem ber. This m arked the first tim e China had invited
an opposition leader from Myanm ar to the country (Myanm ar Tim es, October 26, 2015). Indeed, the
state-run Global Tim es described the invitation of Suu Kyi as a “strategic m ove from China to
safeguard ties w ith its southern neighbor,” since the NLD’s influence w as “projected to grow in the
upcom ing elections” (Global Tim es, June 10, 2015). Suu Kyi m et w ith Chinese President and CCP
leader Xi Jinping, Prem ier Li Keqiang, form er foreign m inister and current State Councilor Yang Jiechi
and a host of other top officials, treatm ent usually reserved for heads of state— not leaders of
opposition parties. Clearly, China w as preparing the stage for a new era in its relations w ith Myanm ar.
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3. W h a t Lie s A h e a d
Despite anticipation of close relations betw een an NLD governm ent and the W est, Suu Kyi has show n
herself to be “a hard-nosed and pragm atic politician and that in dealing w ith foreign policy issues she
w ill be ruled by her head, not heart.” [3 ] Suu Kyi has also indicated that she w ill not oppose
infrastructure projects sim ply because they are Chinese. As head of a parliam entary panel probing the
Letpadaung copper m ine project, she recom m ended continuing the controversial project, despite
local opposition to it, on the ground that shutting it dow n w ould turn aw ay foreign investors. She is
“deeply aw are that Myanm ar needs Chinese investm ent.” [4 ] “W e have to get along w ith [China]
w hether w e like it or not,” she told villagers protesting against the project (Mizzim a, March 13, 2015).
At the sam e tim e, Myanm ar’s relations w ith W estern countries can be expected to expand. For one,
especially in the context of the United States’ pivot to Asia and Myanm ar possibly em erging a “crucial
piece” in that policy, W estern interest and investm ent in Myanm ar w ill intensify in the com ing years.
The NLD governm ent w ould w elcom e investm ent from the W est, “not because of its pro-W est leaning
but because it w ould be keen to diversify its partners and reduce dependence on China.” [5 ] Suu Kyi’s
statem ent praising China’s Belt and Road initiative indicates that Myanm ar under the NLD could
continue to w elcom e Chinese investm ent, only it w ould seek to ensure that this investm ent is m utually
beneficial (Xinhuanet, Novem ber 17, 2015).
New investm ent and trade partners from the W est, Japan, and other Asian countries could put the NLD
governm ent in a “far stronger position” than its m ilitary and quasi-civilian predecessors to bargain
w ith China on econom ic deals. In the 1990s, the junta w as dependent on China and engaged Beijing
from a position of w eakness. This resulted in deals that w ere favorable to China. In contrast, the NLD
governm ent w ill have com panies in the W est eager to invest and trade w ith Myanm ar. Burm ese
international affairs analysts em phasize that w ith “other options available it need not settle for w hat
Chinese com panies offer.” This could result in investm ent and trade agreem ents w ith China that are
“m ore favorable to Myanm ar” than they have been in the past. [6 ]
Despite its W estern support, the NLD governm ent is unlikely to put Myanm ar on a pro-W est path. It
cannot afford to do so. China, after all, is a pow erful neighbor that continues to w ield im m ense
influence in Myanm ar. It can incite unrest and instability in Myanm ar and fuel its ethnic insurgencies
(Mizzim a, March 5, 2015). Mem ories of China’s role in supporting ethnic insurgencies in Myanm ar in
the early post-independence decades, even instigating a Com m unist uprising in Myanm ar in the late
1960s rem ain vivid in the country. Recent reports of Chinese com plicity in Myanm ar’s Kokang conflict
and its support to ethnic m ilitias like the United W a State Arm y (UW SA) as w ell as allegations that it
encouraged the UW SA and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) to refrain from signing the
ceasefire agreem ent indicate that Beijing is not averse to disrupting Myanm ar’s peace process. Its
influence over groups like the UW SA provides Beijing w ith a bargaining chip in negotiations w ith
Naypyidaw (Mizzim a, June 2, 2015; The Irraw addy, July 13, 2015; Mizzim a, October 9, 2015). At a tim e
w hen it is struggling to put in place a peace process to end the country’s m ultiple ethnic conflicts,
Myanm ar cannot afford Chinese interference.
C o n clu sio n
The NLD already faces m ultiple challenges, nam ely a highly politicized m ilitary, w hich rem ains
exceedingly pow erful. W hile the generals are by and large suspicious of China’s intentions, several
prom inent m ilitary officials have lucrative business dealings w ith the China and w ould likely oppose
w eakening ties (The Irraw addy, October 23, 2015). Thus, the NLD could com e under conflicting
pressures from the m ilitary in the conduct of its China policy. At a tim e w hen it is figuring out its
relationship w ith the m ilitary, the NLD w ill avoid opening up contentious subjects like relations w ith
China. It w ill thus adopt a cautious foreign policy that seeks som e distance from China, even as it
avoids ruffling feathers am ong its ow n generals or in Beijing.
Myanm ar’s history is replete w ith exam ples of its rulers adopting a cautious approach tow ard China.
The sw ift recognition that its civilian governm ent (1948–1960) accorded Com m unist China in
Decem ber 1949 w as reportedly aim ed at deterring a possible Chinese invasion. Again, even w hen
relations turned hostile in 1969, Myanm ar’s junta sought rapprochem ent w ith China. [7 ] More
recently, the Thein Sein governm ent preferred suspending the Myitsone Dam project, rather than
cancelling it. Sim ilar caution w ill color the NLD’s approach to China, as w ell.
Over the past 25 years, Myanm ar’s foreign policy had a pro-China tilt that saw it m ove aw ay from the
neutrality of the preceding 40 years. Under an NLD governm ent, this tilt is likely to be corrected. It w ill
seek to m ove Myanm ar aw ay from abnorm al proxim ity to China to a m ore norm al relationship.
How ever, it w ill avoid replacing this w ith a w estw ard tilt and refrain from entering into a close
em brace w ith the W est, especially of the United States W hile the NLD w ill be open to Chinese
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Tw eet
investm ent it w ill leverage its grow ing options to ensure that projects benefit Myanm ar as w ell.
Dr. Sudha Ram achandran is an independent researcher and journalist based in Bangalore, India. She
has written extensively on South Asian peace and conflict, political and security issues for The
Diplom at, Asia Tim es Online, CaciAnalyst am ong others.
N o te s
1. Sudha Ram achandran, “Sino-Myanm ar Relationship: Past Im perfect, Future Tense,” Institute of
South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, W orking Paper, no. 158, August 23, 2012, p. 6.
2. Author’s Interview , strategic analyst, Myanm ar Institute of Strategic and International Studies,
Yangon, January 5.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ram achandran, n. 1, pp. 4–5.
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