1. As of July 2010, with a total of 2,013 military and police currently in theatre,
the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) ranks as the 16th
largest provider of
peacekeepers worldwide.1
While Chinese contributions are certainly much lower than
those of the traditional peacekeeping nations such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and India,
these numbers represent an important transition in the country’s foreign policy. From
initial open hostility to peacekeeping operations (PKO), through a period of quiet
acquiescence, to voluntary funding and participation, China’s relationship with United
Nations peace operations has seen a gradual shift. Analysis of the current state of
Chinese cooperation in United Nations peacekeeping operations raises numerous
debates whereby various theories of international relations may be instrumental in
explaining China’s change in attitude vis-à-vis such operations: the rationalization of
a strong belief in state sovereignty with peacekeeping, the motivations to participate,
and peacekeeping in the lens of China’s rise and the resulting transformation of its
identity and interest. Finally, the current shortcomings in Chinese peacekeeping will
be examined as will future possibilities. The following will begin with a brief
historical outline of the interplay between China and the United Nations in regards to
peacekeeping operations and will continue to discuss the debates and approaches of
analysis on the subject in relation to operations in Africa. As research on Chinese
peacekeeping operations specifically in Africa is less than prolific, given the fact that
the majority of and the most high profile UN PKOs are in Africa, research into
Chinese peacekeeping in general is of great value.
At its inception, the People’s Republic of China was, to say the least,
distrustful of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Following UN intervention
during the Korean War such distrust would evolve to open hostility and the feeling
that such actions were merely a tool of Western imperialism.2
Moreover, such
hostility kept in line with China’s self-image as a champion Third-World causes and a
leader in the front against supposed meddling in its internal affairs by the more
wealthy countries in the international state system. Given such suspicions, Chinese
1
United Nations. “Rankings of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations.” Month of
Report, 31 July 2010. Accessed: September 9, 2010. Available:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/july10_2.pdf
2
Gill, Bates and Chin-Hao Huang. "China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy
Implications." SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 25 (November 2009), p. 4.

2. policy espoused the notion of a strong state sovereignty and non-intervention in
internal affairs of all states.
With China’s opening in the 1980s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, a
gradual shift towards acceptance of PKOs was manifested in its authorization in 1981
of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). While this move
was certainly telling, China nonetheless remained hesitant to vote for authorization
throughout the 1980s and, for the most part, the 1990s. During this period China
generally opted for acquiescence; abstaining from voting for authorization while also
abstaining from voicing opposition.
Starting in the year 2000 with the deployment of a civilian police contingent in
East Timor, China showed itself eager to participate in UN PKOs. While Chinese
participation has increased at an impressive rate over the last decade, participation
remains small compared to the largest contributors. In financial terms, China
provides 3.94% of the total UN peacekeeping budget, placing it in the seventh
position between Italy and Canada respectively.3
Also important to note in relation to
China’s UN contributions is the purely non-combat nature.
Overall % Of Chinese
China Mission Participation
MINURSO
experts on mission 6 198 0.030
individual police 0 6 0
contingent troops 0 20 0
total 6 224 0.027
MONUSCO
experts on mission 16 716 0.022
individual police 0 336 0
contingent troops 218 8603 0.025
total 234 9655 0.024
UNAMID
experts on mission 2 242 0.008
individual police 0 2769 0
contingent troops 322 16997 0.019
total 324 20008 0.016
UNMIL
3
United Nations Peacekeeping. Accessed: September 19, 2010. Available:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/financing.shtml

3. experts on mission 2 128 0.016
individual police 18 481 0.037
contingent troops 565 7923 0.071
total 585 8532 0.069
UNMIS
experts on mission 12 493 0.024
individual police 11 665 0.017
contingent troops 444 9445 0.047
total 467 10603 0.044
UNOCI
experts on mission 6 191 0.031
individual police 0 424 0
contingent troops 0 7194 0
total 6 7809 0.001
Source: United Nations Peacekeeping website.
Note: Current Chinese troop contributions by mission as of August 2010.4
Flexibility
Rationalizing China’s Interpretation of State Sovereignty with Peacekeeping
While no longer categorically against PKOs, China retains policies based on
notions of “strong” state sovereignty. Such policies are certainly more nuanced than
before yet there remains a necessity for host-state acceptance of UN PKO
deployments as a prerequisite for possible Chinese participation. In the framework of
UN PKOs the use of force is only an option in instance of self-defense. To this point,
China has yet to contribute any combat troops as a part of its personnel contributions
to UN PKOs.
Geographic Considerations
Geographic considerations are two-fold for China in that, first, regional actors
are thought to be the first option in responding to crises and that intervention is not to
be undertaken on purely humanitarian grounds. Secondly, China has shown itself
more likely to accept deployment in its immediate neighborhood where a political
crisis in one country may affect its region’s overall stability. Chinese peacekeeping
policies and actions regarding the former Yugoslavia versus East Timor illustrate
4
United Nations Peacekeeping. Accessed: September 19, 2010. Available:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/aug10_5.pdf

4. bring light and present debate. According to Pang Zhongying, in the case of the
former Yugoslavia, China rejected NATO actions due to the lack of a UN mandate
yet later participated in the peacebuilding process in East Timor as it gained
confidence in its ability to act in multilateral security mechanisms by freeing itself
from former strong notions of sovereignty.5
In contrast, according to Gill Bates and
James Reilly, China in fact made more calculating considerations. In the case of
Kosovo, China kept in line with its traditional reflex to seek a domestic solution and
later became disillusioned with the marginalization of the UN and the ensuing NATO
response which effectively sidelined the Chinese ability to influence emerging norms
in humanitarian intervention.6
Although historic suspicion toward UN humanitarian
intervention has been a hallmark of Chinese policy, in the case of East Timor China
supported this very type of action. To explain this Bates and Reilly look beyond the
mere host-state acceptance of UN intervention by Indonesia by also pointing out that
China had an interest in such action due to East Timor’s geographic proximity and the
presence of Chinese minorities.
In other words, it may be argued that Chinese action vis-à-vis peacekeeping
and humanitarian intervention has shown a measure of flexibility in correlation to
national interests. In the case of Kosovo, Chinese hostility to NATO action may be
interpreted as a reaction to the undermining of the influence which it may have
wielded in the UN forum. In East Timor, humanitarian intervention was acceptable
especially due to the challenges that potential instability in the country’s immediate
region may have presented. In the case of UN PKOs in Africa Chinese interest to
participate may thus have several underlying motivations from the financial, military,
political or altruistic.
5
Zhongying, Pang. (2005) "China's changing attitude to UN peacekeeping." International
Peacekeeping, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), p. 97.
6
Gill, Bates and James Reilly. "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing."
Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 41-59.

5. Under Mao Zedong Chinese policy vis-à-vis Africa mainly consisted of
supporting movements for independence against imperial regimes. However, in
recent decades facing independence movements of its own China has emphasized
the central of state authorities in questions of sovereignty.7
Despite a change in
dynamics between China and African states due to the former’s impressive
economic growth, if one is to view China’s foreign policy through a realist lens,
where the principal concern is to create a counter-balance to the West, foreign
policy has remained consistent with its aims.
The end of colonization in Africa and the emergence of the United Sates as
the lone superpower following the end of the Cold War necessitated a new Chinese
balancing strategy. Multilateralism, while generally considered a form of
international cooperation, in the Chinese case may be viewed as a strategy of creating
a balance to Western interests in favor of the developing world.
Economic Model
Stability good for business / Protecting Interests Abroad
China’s economic interests in Africa have increased substantially through the
1990s and the 2000s. In a rational-actor model, Chinese peacekeeping assistance in
Africa is tied to its commercial interests whereby stability is essential for efficiently
functioning business. Having substantial economic interests in a country at risk of
collapse makes non-participation in UN PKOs difficult while at the same time risk of
UNSC Chapter VII sanctions can potentially cut off trade flows.8
One China Policy
Just as China seeks a multilateral balancing strategy, this approach also creates
a coalition to serve the country’s One China Policy.
Military
7
Gill, Bates and James Reilly. "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing."
Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), p. 42.
8
Houser, Trevor and Roy Levy. "Energy Security and China's UN Diplomacy." China Security, Vol.
4, No. 3 (Summer 2008), p. 65-66.

6. Operational learning
Contact with the armed forces of other states allows for operational learning.
MOOTW, riot control, disaster
Defense spending justification
Continued engagement in peacekeeping is a means for China’s military to
continue high defense spending and to curtail attempts by the civilian administration
to attempt to push through defense budget cuts.
Force projection (physically and visually)
China’s participation in UN PKOs allows its armed forces visibility. At the
same time, given their nature within a peacekeeping framework, such shows of force
are categorized as antagonistic or threatening with great difficulty.
China’s participation in anti-piracy operations of the African coast likewise
allow for a display of naval force, an area where China’s modern military capacity has
been lacking.
China’s Rise: Changes in Identity and Interests
Gill (2000) risk of China’s interfering....however may be now put aside given
Chinese endorsement of the Brahimi report
Socialization
Peacekeeping is often
Domestic
Change in interests through internal processes
System-Level
Constructivism
Promoting a positive image, responsible power
Shortcomings
Decision making process
Transparency
Contributions, lacking combat troops
Competent English speakers

7. Operational learning
Contact with the armed forces of other states allows for operational learning.
MOOTW, riot control, disaster
Defense spending justification
Continued engagement in peacekeeping is a means for China’s military to
continue high defense spending and to curtail attempts by the civilian administration
to attempt to push through defense budget cuts.
Force projection (physically and visually)
China’s participation in UN PKOs allows its armed forces visibility. At the
same time, given their nature within a peacekeeping framework, such shows of force
are categorized as antagonistic or threatening with great difficulty.
China’s participation in anti-piracy operations of the African coast likewise
allow for a display of naval force, an area where China’s modern military capacity has
been lacking.
China’s Rise: Changes in Identity and Interests
Gill (2000) risk of China’s interfering....however may be now put aside given
Chinese endorsement of the Brahimi report
Socialization
Peacekeeping is often
Domestic
Change in interests through internal processes
System-Level
Constructivism
Promoting a positive image, responsible power
Shortcomings
Decision making process
Transparency
Contributions, lacking combat troops
Competent English speakers