Myanma election-overview

MYANMAR ELECTION OVERVIEW
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Content
I. A SOFT COUP AHEAD OF AN ELECTION
II. WHY AUNG SAN SUU KYI’S ‘MANDELA MOMENT’ IS A VICTORY FOR
MYANMAR’S GENERALS
III. THINK BURMA IS A DEMOCRACY NOW? THINK AGAIN
IV. WILL THE MILITARY LET AUNG SAN SUU KYI GOVERN?
V. IN MYANMAR, PEACE FOR ETHNIC RIGHTS
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1. A SOFT COUP AHEAD OF AN ELECTION
1. THE ELECTION SYSTEM
 In Myanmar, the democracy system is not a fully democracy.
• BY constitution the 25% of the seats are reserved for the army.
 All legislators will then elect the president by a simple majority from among three vice presidential
candidates:
• Two nominated by each house of Parliament,
• The third designated by the military.
 To win the presidency, its allies would need to secure a supermajority among the nonmilitary
members of Parliament.
• OR who was endorsed by the army, being assured the votes of military representatives, could
become president even if the party lost the popular vote.
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2. AHEAD OF AN ELECTION
 Ms. Daw Aung san Suu Kyi
• The National League for Democracy
 Mr.Thura Shwe Mann
• A high-ranking general in the previous military government
• But last months, was forcibly removed from his position as chairman of the ruling Union
Solidarity and Development Party (U.S.D.P.).
 Mr. Thein Sein
• The President of Mayamar
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3. THE ACTIVITY OF THE ELECTION
 Last month, Thura Shwe Mann — a rival of President Thein Sein, was forcibly removed
from his position as chairman.
 The purge was from an internal coup by the president and his traditional backers, mostly
among the military.
• The army is eager to reassert control over Myanmar’s political process, and remind
all contenders for power that it will allow liberalization only.
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 lately Mr. Shwe Mann, He had also been building bridges with the opposition and had
dared to challenge the military directly.
• By offering them higher salaries and pork-barrel spending
 The army chief wrote a letter to Mr. Shwe Mann detailing his missteps: among other things,
supporting Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s call for a high-level political dialogue, and backing a bill
proposing to lift the army’s veto authority over constitutional reform.
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 In late July, the army circulated a petition to impeach him.
 When last month Mr. Shwe Mann and other U.S.D.P. leaders rejected more than half of
the retired senior officers the army had preselected as candidates to put on the party’s
ticket for the November election, the generals had had enough.
 Late at night on Aug. 12, the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is directly controlled by
the military, sent some 400 police officers to surround U.S.D.P. headquarters and
obtain Mr. Shwe Mann’s demotion.
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 U Htay Oo, who now chairs the U.S.D.P. along with Mr. Thein Sein, said that Mr. Than Shwe
regards the party — whose predecessor he founded two decades ago — as his brainchild,
and that he had planned for it and the army to jointly run Myanmar for several decades
after the country’s ostensible move toward democracy in 2010.
 Mr. Shwe Mann’s rising influence seems to have forced Mr. Than Shwe’s hand, convincing
him that the military needed to step in to save his vision of the U.S.D.P.
 Mr. Shwe Mann has remained speaker since being deposed as party leader.
• (There are rules about how to strip him of that post, and the army apparently is
bashful enough not to bypass them.)
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 He has been keeping a low profile. Yet to the dismay of the military and the party’s
new leaders, Parliament voted to suspend discussion of a bill proposing his
impeachment: Mr. Shwe Mann’s power may have been undercut, but he does not
stand alone.
 Distrust between the army and civilian politicians has continued to grow in the
meantime, as the military has resumed pushing for more senior officers to be
included on the U.S.D.P.’s ticket.
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 Mr. Thein Sein’s putsch against Mr. Shwe Mann put a dent in the legitimacy of the government —
 which is now redoubling efforts to secure a major cease-fire agreement with ethnic
armed groups so it can claim to have ended Myanmar’s long-running civil war.
 But by sidelining a leading figure of the U.S.D.P. whom Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi had called an ally,
the president managed to undermine two rivals at once while consolidating his ties with the
military.
 The army, for its part, is once again manipulating Myanmar’s political scene to ensure that it
remains in charge, election or not.
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2. WHY AUNG SAN SUU KYI’S ‘MANDELA MOMENT’ IS A VICTORY
 Though in exile 6,000 miles away from Myanmar, I can almost taste the euphoria. Aung
San Suu Kyi’s wildly popular opposition – the National League for Democracy – has
won a landslide in the multiparty elections, and 31 million voters, most apparently
backing the NLD, are savouring a long-awaited moment of jubilation. The NLD leader,
whom they call Amay or mother, appeared on TV, her eyes shining with tears of joy.
 Even foreign journalists covering the country in the 25 years since Aung San Suu Kyi
was placed under house arrest have scarcely been able to conceal their excitement at
the prospect of a new era of freedom and democracy, ushered in through her non-
violent, pragmatic leadership.
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 A sober analysis may be in order. Aside from the fact that Myanmar’s military leaders have,
constitutionally, blocked any possibility of “the Woman” with her two “impure-blooded sons”
and “foreign privileges” assuming the presidency, Aung San Suu Kyi’s party faces huge barriers to
turn a resounding electoral mandate into a real step towards a genuinely representative
government.
 And this is not the first time the public has felt euphoric about the power of its votes. In May
1990 Aung San Suu Kyi and her then fledgling opposition party won a decisive mandate taking
82% of the parliamentary seats and 62% of the total votes.
 That landslide came despite the fact that the generals placed her and her senior colleagues
under house arrest on the eve of the elections, in effect barring them from the electoral process.
So the opposition knows how it feels to fail to convert this mandate a quarter-century ago into a
real political gain or put the country on the path of democracy.
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 The generals annulled the results of that election and imprisoned hundreds of newly elected
MPs. Their excuse was that the NLD had been infiltrated by communists, considered a threat to
national security. Now, 25 years on, Myanmar finds itself in a similar situation. This time the
ruling military has prepared itself to meet the popular challenge for democratisation through
electoral politics. To appreciate how difficult it is for Aung San Suu Kyi and her opposition to
move the country in a genuinely democratic direction, it is imperative to understand how the
military – fascist at root, and authoritarian in outlook and operation – defines and approaches
the issue of electoral democracy.
 To start with, elections overseen by the generals are held not to usher in a representative
government as it is understood in any system worthy of the term “democracy”; but to legitimise
the system they call “discipline-flourishing democracy”. This means the military serves as the
ultimate custodian with the power to discipline any elected government or MP who dares to
stray from the military’s chosen path and its definition of parliamentary democracy.
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 The main instrument is the 2008 constitution, which elevates core interests of the military (such
as the military budget, appointments, business conglomerates and security matters) above the
law and parliamentary oversight.
 Specifically, the constitution authorises the commander-in-chief to appoint and control all
cabinet members in charge of departments relating to the apparatus of state security, such as
defence, home affairs and border affairs (dealing with ethnic and strategic matters). He also
approves all presidential and vice-presidential candidates. In other words, this top-ranking
soldier can stage a coup any time he deems fit.
 In addition, he holds the constitutional authority to in effect veto any popularly elected
government’s attempt to amend the 2008 constitution, which of course safeguards the military’s
prerogatives. Even if the NLD now forms a government, the all-powerful military can and will
reject any changes that seek to convert the generals’ discipline-flourishing democracy into
something more democratic and less disciplined.
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 It is little wonder then that Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief, with a smile on his face,
wrote off popular fears that the army might stage a coup, annul the results, and lock up the new
MPs . A coup was “not conceivable”, he said.
 For his part, the acting chairman of the ruling Union Solidarity and Development party – the
former general Htay Oo – was heard conceding that his party had suffered big losses in many
areas. But in spite of his own defeat, he looked unnaturally relaxed when he said that the ruling
party would accept any outcome, including an NLD landslide, and that the mission of the
generals was to put the country on the path of democracy. He can say this, because of course it
is the military’s version of democracy.
 Having secured their ill-gotten gains – billions of dollars amassed from the proceeds of jade,
natural gas and other national assets and a quarter-century of the military’s “Burmese Way to
Capitalism”- and with the constitutional right to take power back 24/7, the generals will keep on
smiling.
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 It is win-win: incremental change with echoes of the Arab spring, without
bloodshed or chaos. The public and opposition get to experience another
ephemeral wave of euphoria. And democratic governments in Washington,
London, Paris or Canberra can now hold up Burma as a success story of the
kind of business, diplomatic and military engagement they practise vis-a-vis
China.
 Aung San Suu Kyi can feel vindicated about her Mandela-like status and her
choice of a pragmatic strategy of no longer rocking the boat and fighting hard
for human rights.
 Never mind that the “ democracy” midwifed by these powerful actors excludes
and undermines the welfare and interests of the country’s jailed student and
labour activists, farmers, ethnic minorities in the civil war zones, and the
disenfranchised Rohingya people and other Muslims.
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3. THINK BURMA IS A DEMOCRACY NOW? THINK AGAIN
 For millions of people in Burma and for supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi around the
world, Sunday's election appears to be the fulfillment of their dreams. Aung San Suu
Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) looks to have won a landslide victory,
ending more than fifty years of military rule. Democracy has finally arrived. Or has it?
 Burma's generals didn't suddenly wake up one day believing in democracy. They
wanted to end sanctions and their pariah status, but they didn't want to give up
control of the country. They knew that couldn't win an election. The NLD are far too
popular. Their solution? A shiny new constitution which has the appearance of a
democracy, but which still gives them ultimate control.
 When the new Parliament sits, the realities are going to start hitting home. Newly
elected MPs will be joined by 116 MPs, 25 percent of the total, who are appointed by
the head of the army. These MPs will choose one of the two vice presidents, who will,
like them, be a soldier.
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Burm now has a hybrid system of military rule and democracy. It's democracy on a leash
 The generals despise and fear Aung San Suu Kyi. They put a special clause in the constitution
that a president can't have children who are citizens of foreign countries, which she does, to
prevent her becoming president.
 The head of the Burmese army also gets to choose key government ministers. The Defense
Minister, Home Affairs Minister and Border Affairs Minister will all be serving soldiers. This puts
the armed forces outside of the control of the new government. The government will also not
have control over the police, justice system, security services or issues in ethnic sates, critical for
ending conflict which has lasted for more than 60 years.
 In terms of human rights, this is a disaster. The Burmese Army has been committing horrific
human rights abuses against ethnic minorities in the country. Rape is used as a weapon of war,
farmers are tortured and executed, and villages are bombed and burned. Legal experts say the
abuses taking place meet the legal definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity. An NLD
government will be virtually powerless to stop this.
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Every decision the government makes, it will have to keep looking over its shoulder,
judging how far it can safely go.
 The issue of political prisoners, which has also plagued the country for decades, won't be going
away. During the election campaign, people were thrown into jail for Facebook posts that the army
didn't like. Without control of the police or being able to create a truly independent judiciary, this
is another area where the NLD will be hamstrung. People could still be jailed for their political
beliefs or actions.
 An NLD government can't even use the military budget to try to reign in the army. The army sets its
own budget. The government has to make do with the money left over. No surprise then, than
military spending is higher than health and education combined.
 Just in case an NLD government still tries to implement policies the military doesn't like, above
both parliament and government is a National Defense and Security Council. Constitutionally, it is
the most powerful body in Burma. It has eleven members, six of whom come from the military, so
it has a built-in majority. It could overrule decisions made by an NLD government.
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In terms of human rights, this is a disaster
 As if all these checks on the power of the government were not enough, the military also inserted
clauses in the constitution that give it the right to retake power for vague and unspecified "national
security" and "national unity" reasons. Basically, any time they like. Every decision an NLD government
makes, it will have to keep looking over its shoulder, judging how far it can safely go.
 Given all this, it's not surprising that one of the top priorities for Aung San Suu Kyi and the National
League for Democracy is constitutional reform. The generals realized this as well. That's where the 25
percent of seats reserved for them in parliament comes in to play. To change the constitution, more than
75 percent of MPs have to vote for it. This means the military have veto power over constitutional
reform. No change unless they decide they want it.
 Despite all these problems, having an NLD government, however hamstrung, will undoubtedly be better
that what came before it. But it isn't democracy, and it isn't acceptable. It can't be described as a step in
a transition process, because under the constitution, no further steps towards a genuine democracy are
possible.
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The military inserted clauses in the constitution that give it the right to retake
power for vague and unspecified 'national security' and 'national unity' reasons.
 Burma now has a hybrid system of military rule and democracy. It's democracy on a leash.
It might be good enough for much of the international community, who keep patronizing
Burmese people by telling them these things take time and no transition is smooth, but it
isn't good enough for Burmese people. In Western countries, a situation where the military
are not under the control of the government and where the military appoint key
government ministers, would be considered completely unacceptable. It is just as
unacceptable in Burma.
 A long slow transition means many more years of human rights abuses. More women
raped by the Burmese Army, more political prisoners, more villages burned. The victims of
human rights abuses can't wait for a hoped slow transition. They need genuine democracy,
and they need it now. For them it is, quite literally, a matter of life and death. It isn't time to
celebrate yet.
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4. WILL THE MILITARY LET AUNG SAN SUU KYI GOVERN
 The last time Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide election victory, the army generals who
rule Myanmar rejected the result, placed her under house arrest and jailed thousands
of her supporters, many of whom were brutally tortured.
 They claim they will. President Thein Sein, a former general who took over from the
country’s military junta in 2011 after a bogus election process boycotted by the NLD,
appeared fatalistic about the result.
 “We have to accept our voters’ desire. Whoever leads the country, the most important
thing is to have stability and development,” he said. Thein Sein sounded like a
disappointed man contemplating retirement, not one plotting another coup against
democracy.
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 These concession speeches may not count for much. It is hardline members of the old guard –
who ran the junta before 2011 and treated Aung San Suu Kyi as a mortal enemy, trying to
assassinate her on at least one occasion – who hold the key to what happens next.
 The old guard will also fear a settling of scores if their former foes and victims take power,
despite Aung San Suu Kyi’s conciliatory words and non-violent approach. “It is important not to
provoke the candidates who didn’t win,” she told supporters on Monday.
 General Than Shwe, the strongman leader of the junta for nearly two decades, has more to
worry about than most. The regime of which he was a part committed appalling human rights
abuses. According to a Human Rights Watch report on the aftermath of the 1990 election, use of
torture was widespread.
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 The baleful influence of the old guard aside, the fact the army still holds many political aces
spells trouble for Aung San Suu Kyi. Even if the NLD wins a large percentage of the 664
parliamentary seats, the USDP, meaning the military, will automatically retain 25% of them
under the terms of the junta’s gerrymandered constitution.
 Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi is barred from becoming president because she married a foreigner
– the late Oxford historian Michael Aris – and has two British sons. This is another constitutional
tripwire deliberately set up by the generals.
 Aung San Suu Kyi has said she will nevertheless rule the country by positioning herself “above
the president”. But that may prove a hard trick to pull off, especially since parliament will not
elect a new president until February next year.
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 As matters stand, the military’s National Defence and Security Council is a more
powerful body than parliament. Thus an NLD government would have no say, for
example, if the army decided to continue attacks on ethnic minority groups and
persecution of Myanmar’s disenfranchised Rohingya Muslim minority.
 This has led campaigners to suggest real power will remain where it has always been,
despite the NLD’s success.
 Managing this delicate situation will require a high degree of political skill and subtlety
on Aung San Suu Kyi’s part if she is to keep the military on side and in barracks, while
addressing Myanmar’s many divisions and problems.
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 Her unmatched international standing and proud lineage – she is the daughter
of Aung San, Myanmar’s independence leader and founder of the Burmese
army – will help. But a host of other issues such as Buddhist chuavinism,
ongoing political repression and high poverty levels will complicate her task.
 After a quarter of a century in the wilderness, Aung San Suu Kyi has made a
glorious comeback. Whatever the final election tally, she has given a
memorable thrashing to the generals who persecuted her and so many others
for so long. But she will not be able to govern without them.
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5. PEACE FOR ETHNIC RIGHTS
 The government of Myanmar has been touting progress on a nationwide cease-fire
deal, claiming it is a major step toward ending the country’s long-running armed
conflicts. But the latest summit meeting on Sept. 9, attended by President Thein Sein
and representatives of more than a dozen ethnic armed groups, ended inconclusively.
 Some groups have refused to sign the agreement unless the government allows all of
them to join it. The Kachin Independence Organization, the second-largest of the
groups, is recalcitrant because three of its closest allies, which are still actively fighting
the Myanmar Army in the country’s northeast, are being sidelined.
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 Working out an accord acceptable to all the guerrillas was always going to be
difficult given their differing interests. Some groups, like the Karen National
Union, view the cease-fire as an economic opportunity, because it would open
up access to the Asian Highway network that is being built; others, like the
Kachin, are worried it will bring unwanted dam projects, excessive jade mining
and more deforestation, and undermine their calls for a more federal system.
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 They are right. I grew up in Mandalay in an extended military family. Like the
vast majority of Myanmar’s people, we are Bamar and Buddhist, and have
been imbued with a dominant culture that is distrustful of Muslims and
condescending toward ethnic groups.
 For many minorities, Myanmar’s independence from Britain in 1948 was less a
moment of emancipation than a shift to another form of oppression. Colonial
subjugation morphed into centralized rule under a chauvinistic majority.
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 Almost seven decades later, Myanmar politics is inherently sectarian, and when the
government isn’t downright exploitative of minorities, it is paternalistic and
domineering. Small wonder that our military leaders, who see themselves as the
guardians of national sovereignty, feel little need to pursue genuine peace with ethnic
armed groups. Or that even those ethnic groups that seek peace are wary of the
government’s recent overtures.
 That the army is waging strikes while the president is talking about peace does not
reflect a split between the military and the executive branch; it is just the
government’s version of playing good cop/bad cop. And the government’s attempt to
leave some groups out of the nationwide cease-fire agreement — for instance, the
Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Arakan Army and the Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance Army — is a ploy to divide and conquer the ethnic opposition.
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 With the ethnic armed groups understandably skeptical, the only way to make
real progress toward peace is for the government to offer them some
significant military and political concessions, and fast.
 The government must also drop its demand that outlier groups sign bilateral
cease-fire agreements as a precondition to their being included in the
comprehensive accord. And the commander-in-chief must publicly declare that
the military will abide by the addendum to the proposed cease-fire.
 The addendum has not been made public, but according to senior advisers to
one major ethnic group that has been involved in the negotiations, it provides
that the security sector will undertake reforms — including allowing some
parliamentary oversight — before the ethnic groups are asked to disarm.
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 To overcome the distrust of minority groups, the government must also devolve more
power to the ethnic areas. Both the commander-in-chief and the government should
commit now to ending the current practice by which the president handpicks chief
ministers for the country’s 14 regions and states. Text should be inserted into the
addendum of the cease-fire deal stating that the authority to select chief ministers will
be transferred to local legislatures, including in ethnic-majority areas.
 The government appears determined to arrange a signing ceremony for the ceasefire
accord before the general election in November, partly to shore up its popularity with
both voters and international donors, which dwindled after it took a series of
controversial moves: The government has prevented the opposition leader, Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi, from running for president; sacked the relatively liberal head of the ruling
party; banned statements critical of the military in state media during the campaign;
and stripped Rohingyas, a Muslim minority, of their voting rights.
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 The government’s current vulnerability is a precious opportunity for Myanmar’s ethnic
armed groups. They must stand together, and hold out on signing the nationwide
cease-fire until all of them are included in the deal and they have secured concrete
military and political concessions.
 If the government is as serious as it claims about wanting peace, it must let go of its
oppressively majoritarian mind-set and recognize ethnic minorities’ legitimate
aspirations for more autonomy.
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