Military Support Shapes Democratic Transitions

PRISM 3, no. 3 Features | 3
I
n the past year three dictatorships with strong military support ended peacefully—in
Tunisia, Egypt, and Burma. The armed forces of all three countries played a decisive role.
Having for years supported autocratic regimes in which they enjoyed privileged positions,
the army leaders in Tunisia and Egypt turned away from the very dictators who made them
generals years before. In Burma a younger generation of officers took off their uniforms and set
up the rudiments of a more democratic form of government. The outcome of the events in all
three countries is not yet clear; what is clear is that military leaders in autocratic countries are
not blind followers of the dictators who appointed them. They can turn against the regime or
reform themselves in surprising ways.
Why do some military leaders step down as dictators, and why do others withdraw support
from civilian autocrats who are often ex-military officers themselves, in favor of democratic
elections? It has happened often. The Argentine junta handed over power in disgrace in 1983;
the Turkish army has taken power several times but has then relinquished it; Thai General and
then President Prem Tinnasulanond scheduled an election in 1989 and did not run in it; at
about the same time in the Philippines, General and then President Fidel Ramos declined to
change the constitutional term limit and retired; in Nigeria in 1999, a series of military coups
ended in flawed but adequate elections that were followed by a decade of relative stability. This
article examines the dynamics and causes of transitions from military-supported dictatorships
to more democratic governments.
If military-supported dictatorships are susceptible to change, what can the developed democra-
cies—the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, France, Germany, India, and the
many smaller mature and established democracies—do to encourage the armed forces of autocratic
countries to support these transitions? This article proposes ways in which the developed democracies
Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN (Ret.), is the former United States Director of National
Intelligence and was Commander of U.S. Pacific Command.
By Dennis C. Blair
Military Support
for Democracy

DOD(NathanielHenry)
U.S. Marines demonstrate amphibious
maneuver during multinational
exercise Cobra Gold 2011 in Thailand

6 | Features PRISM 3, no. 3
BLAIR
can use their military-military relations to
encourage and assist democratic development
around the world.
The Worldwide Democratic Trend
Democracy has been on the move for
years. It has taken different shapes in differ-
ent parts of the world and in different coun-
tries. However, John Locke and James Madison
would recognize it in many locations. The
fundamental components are accountability
of the government to an electorate; an elec-
torate that can give a government another
term or vote it out of office; freedom of that
electorate to organize itself for political activ-
ity; protection of the rights of all citizens,
including minorities, by a system of laws that
are fairly enforced by competent police and
an independent judiciary; a low level of cor-
ruption with laws and institutions to contain
it both in government and in business; and a
free press. With the defeat of the two major
antidemocratic ideologies of the last century—
fascism and communism—and with the spread
of information around the world, the univer-
sal appeal of democratic principles is having
an ever stronger influence. Even the world’s
two largest dictatorships in China and Russia
find they must use the language of democracy
and pretend they embrace it. Strong govern-
ments that are not fully democratic nonethe-
less adopt some democratic practices to satisfy
their people’s aspirations, providing a basis
from which further gains can be made.
There are also defining characteristics of
the armed forces in a democracy. Their alle-
giance is to the people of their country, not
to an individual, party, tribe, or ethnic or reli-
gious faction; they follow the orders of a freely
and fairly elected government that represents
the people; they do not support political par-
ties or factions; and their primary mission is
the defense of their country against external
threats. When they are used within the coun-
try, whether it is to suppress an armed revolt,
enforce a border, or provide relief following a
natural disaster, it is for a limited time in sup-
port of domestic government organizations
under special authorities and strict controls.
They are established under provisions of a con-
stitution or set of laws approved by a legisla-
ture, there is a means to determine the legality
of orders they are given and actions they carry
out, their budgets are provided by the legisla-
ture, and there is an established and fair system
for promotion of officers and in the ranks based
on performance.
Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Zine el-
Abidine Ben Ali were unpleasantly surprised
when the generals they had moved into lead-
ership positions and cultivated for many years
turned on them. They should not have been
surprised. Generals around the world learned
long ago that military dictatorships were los-
ing propositions. Even when there was sig-
nificant popular support for coups, as there
was in Argentina in 1976 and in Turkey in
1971, generals and admirals found that they
did not have the mandate or the skills to
govern successfully for extended periods.
In 2006, the Thai army found it difficult to
solve the problems that motivated it to take
power, and it quickly set up elections to
return the country to a representative gov-
ernment. Burma was in fact the only purely
even the world’s two largest
dictatorships find they must use the
language of democracy and pretend they
embrace it

military support for democracy
military dictatorship on the planet until
last year. However, although military lead-
ers are loath to govern through martial law
themselves, in many countries they support
authoritarian leaders. In these countries the
generals seek to maintain a privileged posi-
tion for themselves and their services while
avoiding the risks of actually governing. They
have learned that they know little about the
economic management of their countries and
that the top-down approach they have used
in running military services is often ineffec-
tive and can excite widespread resentment
when applied to national problems. They
therefore stay out of direct involvement in
internal governance and maintain a separate
identity from the police, who handle inter-
nal security. However, they make it clear that
they support the regime, and if necessary they
will bring armed force to bear against those
who oppose the regime and seek to change it.
On a day-to-day basis, they often protect the
regime through military intelligence services
that operate domestically with the full range
of military technical intelligence systems,
and with unchecked arrest, intimidation,
and incarceration capabilities. In the case of
large-scale protests such as those in Iran in
2009 and in Syria at present, they use military
units directly against regime opponents.
Nevertheless, military leaders around
the world are increasingly realizing that
working for a dictator is a bad bargain over
the long term both for their services and for
themselves. Their services will often receive
institutional benefits such as autonomy, per-
mission to run profitable businesses, virtual
licenses for corrupt enrichment, and parades.
They themselves will often receive personal
rewards for a time—kickbacks, mansions,
airplanes, and drivers—but those rewards
can be withdrawn as well as bestowed. More
importantly, the longer a military-supported
regime lasts, the more popular resentment
builds up against both the dictator and his
army. Military leaders realize that at some
point a dictator will order them to turn their
soldiers’ guns against their people. When they
do, the leaders become one with the regime,
and from that time on popular opposition to
the regime becomes hostility to the armed
forces that support it. At that point, when the
army becomes not the defender of the people
but their oppressor, an important ethical and
psychological threshold is crossed. To turn
their guns on their people violates the core
of their ethos as military officers. No mat-
ter how corrupt and cynical they may have
become, the great majority of officers first put
on the uniform to protect their country and
its citizens, not to fight them. They are proud
to fight violent insurgents, and they do not
mind intimidating individual regime oppo-
nents who seem to undermine their country.
However, they do not wish to oppose large
numbers of peaceful citizens who have legiti-
mate grievances against a repressive regime.
Finally, military officers care about their lega-
cies, and they do not want to be remembered
as butchers of their own people.
The parts played by the Egyptian,
Tunisian, Libyan, and Yemeni armed forces
during the Arab Spring are therefore the
latest chapter in a long story of democratic
transitions in which the armed forces played
military leaders around the world are
increasingly realizing that working for
a dictator is a bad bargain over the
long term

a positive role, or at least a passive role, in
bringing unpopular dictatorships to an end.
Nevertheless, not all military leaders will
abandon an authoritarian regime when pro-
tests arise. The sustained regime loyalty of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the
Bahraini armed forces and their willingness to
gun down unarmed protestors in the streets are
current examples. In Syria, too, as of this writ-
ing, the armed forces have largely supported
the regime and moved against widespread
protestors. In addition, democratic transitions
are not irreversible, and some countries have
moved back and forth between democratic and
authoritarian rule, with the armed forces sup-
porting both directions.
Yet, over the last 30 years, armed forces
around the world have understood the advan-
tages of democracy for their countries and
for their military services and have played an
important role in bringing more representative
governments to power.
The trend has been worldwide, taking
different forms in different regions and countries.
In East Asia from 1985 to 1988, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Korea—
all countries that had been ruled by dictators,
many of whom were ex-military men backed by
their armed forces—held elections that brought
opposition leaders to power. The armed forces in
all cases supported the transition, and since that
time democratic civil-military relations have
become more stable and democracy has become
more strongly established.
Countries in Latin America have
often alternated periods of military rule
with democratic interludes since gaining
their independence from colonial masters.
However, beginning with Argentina in 1983,
and followed by Brazil in 1985 and Chile in
1990, the largest countries in South America
transitioned peacefully to democracy with the
support of the armed forces. All three of these
democratic governments have strengthened
their legitimacy since those transitions.
A large measure of accountability for past
military abuses of power has been established,
and civil-military relations appear to be on a
firm footing.
Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union in the 1990s, a large number of Eastern
European countries made the transition to
democracy. In many cases, with the assis-
tance of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) countries, these governments over-
hauled their departments of defense and the
armed forces that had been organized on the
pattern of the Red army and dominated by
their Soviet senior allies in the Warsaw Pact.
Military leaders emerged who understood the
role of their forces in a democracy, and they
actively assisted newly elected and appointed
government officials in wrenching transitions
of their military services.
Unfinished Business
There are still many countries and regions
in which authoritarian governments per-
sist and in which the armed forces support
the regimes in power. As the nascent transi-
tion in Burma demonstrates, however, even
in closed countries the winds of change can
be felt. The global explosion of information,
in which events in one part of the world are
known quickly in its far corners, fan these
over the last 30 years, armed forces have
understood the advantages of democracy
for their countries and for their
military services
BLAIR

winds. Most dictatorial closed regimes fear
these developments and seek to insulate their
armed forces from them. Military officers in
Iran and North Korea, for example, are for-
bidden from having any unsupervised official
contact with their counterparts in democratic
countries for fear they may contract infectious
ideas of reform. China also limits the con-
tact of its officers with outsiders, supervises it
closely, fosters nationalistic sentiment within
its officer corps, and at the same time holds out
the prospect of a democratic future in order
to keep the People’s Liberation Army loyal to
the Chinese Communist Party. African dicta-
tors maintain the loyalty of their armed forces
using tribal ties, and they attempt to discredit
democracy by associating it with the former
colonial powers. Central Asian strongmen use
the techniques they inherited from the Soviet
Union to maintain party control over the
armed forces.
However, military leaders in these still
authoritarian countries are subject to the
same factors that have influenced their coun-
terparts around the world, and the pressures
are increasing to withdraw support from dic-
tators, welcome popular democratic move-
ments, and make the transition to civil-mili-
tary relations. These initiatives will turn the
officers into true defenders of their people and
members of an institution that is respected
by their fellow citizens. There are positive
steps that the developed democracies, and
especially their armed forces, can take to
influence military leaders in dictatorships to
realize these initiatives.
Outside Military Influences on
Democratic Transitions
In almost all instances in which the
armed forces of an autocratic country have
either initiated or supported a transition to
an elected government, the most important
factors have been internal and often
unique to that country. In the case of the
Argentine junta’s departure from power in
1983, the causes included their economic
mismanagement and loss of the Falklands/
Malvinas war. The Turkish army was
influenced by their Attaturk legacy. General-
then-President Prem in Thailand had to put
down several military coups himself and faced
strong popular pressure and royal support for
the establishment of an elected government.
General-then-President Ramos in the
Philippines did not want to become another
Ferdinand Marcos.
However, outside influences can play
a part, and among those influences are the
military forces of the mature democracies.
Armed forces the world over have hundreds
of points of contact, from attachés in their
embassies to visits of delegations back and
forth, to common participation in exercises
and international military events, and
to education and training in each other’s
countries. These interactions offer valuable
opportunities to influence the officer corps
and military leadership of dictatorial regimes
to support democratic transitions in their
own countries.
Military democratic influences are spread
by example. The most advanced, most skilled,
and most respected armed forces in the world
are those of the mature democratic countries.
the most advanced, most skilled, and
most respected armed forces in the
world are those of the mature
democratic countries

The military leaders of other countries look
up to them and often seek to emulate them.
Visiting officers from the People’s Liberation
Army often comment on the appearance,
skills, and maturity of the noncommissioned
officers in democratic countries. Officers
from autocratic countries who have served
in peacekeeping missions with officers from
democracies are generally more progressive
within their own armed forces when they
return. While not every officer from an auto-
cratic country who attends a course in a dem-
ocratic country becomes an ardent democrat,
what they observe gives them an important
frame of reference. President Ramos was a
graduate of West Point and President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono completed studies at
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College. Several currently serving senior
Egyptian generals are graduates of the École
de Guerre in Paris. Sometimes individual
officers and other officials from democratic
countries have an opportunity to influence
their counterparts in authoritarian countries
directly, one-on-one.
All the developed democracies recognize
the opportunities for influence that arise in
military relations. Defense officials and mili-
tary officers instinctively believe it is impor-
tant to spread democratic values through their
contacts with counterparts in countries that
are autocratic or that are in transition from a
dictatorship. Individuals and specific programs
pursue the goal of influencing foreign military
services toward the advantages of democracy
and the means to achieve it in their countries.
Nevertheless, no country takes full advantage
of its many points of contact with foreign
armed forces to foster democratic develop-
ment, and none has a systematic effort based
on strong policy guidance and smart programs.
Part of the reason is historical. During the
Cold War, the United States and other democ-
racies often supported anticommunist dicta-
tors and their armed forces. While checking
Soviet military power was essential, however,
the decisive factor in ending the Cold War was
the recognition by Soviet leaders that their
autocratic system of government was inferior
to the dynamic and free democratic system of
the West. Since the Berlin Wall came down,
there has been no national interest compel-
ling enough in the advanced democracies to
overrule their interest in widening the circle
of democratic countries as the best policy to
ensure that the world of the future will be
friendly and share their democratic values.
Neither the cooperation of autocratic coun-
tries against violent terrorist groups nor their
export of petroleum is sufficiently important to
prevent the advanced democracies from per-
suading the military leaders of those countries,
current and future, that both their nations and
their services would be better off in a more
democratic form of government.
However, the habit of downplaying long-
term important objectives at the expense of more
immediate short-term goals persists. Currently,
the policy priorities for military engagement
with autocratic or transitional countries are to
influence them to support overall and specific
American (or British or French or Australian)
policies to build capacity and interoperability
for them to operate in a coalition. The greatest
effort put into military relationships has been
BLAIR
officers from autocratic countries
who have served with officers from
democracies are generally more
progressive when they return

combined exercises with the objective of increas-
ing the interoperability of transitional forces and
improving their skills, and arms sales to further
enhance their capabilities. When the military
relations with an autocratic regime have been
put to larger purposes, it has often been to limit
the impact of the regime’s military because of its
human rights abuses.
Building Military Support for
Democratic Transitions
The first step for the advanced democratic
nations to take is simple but vital—to clearly
state that the development of support for
democracy is the top long-term policy objec-
tive for military relations with autocratic
or transitional countries. At present, in the
official policies of the advanced democracies,
this objective is generally not specified, is not
given a prominent place, or is hidden behind
more neutral concepts such as “Security Sector
Reform.” For example, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee,
in its 2007 Ministerial Statement on security
sector reform, never used the word “democ-
racy.” Many of the specific objectives it
established, such as “effective governance,
oversight and accountability systems,” are
characteristics of the armed forces in demo-
cratic countries, but in the statement they are
not put into the larger framework of democ-
racy. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
by the U.S. Department of Defense listed five
“operational benefits” for security cooperation
with other countries. Number five was “influ-
encing the development of foreign military
institutions and their roles in democratic soci-
eties.” These elliptical allusions to support-
ing democratic development do not offer the
solid foundation needed for defense officials
and military officers to provide guidance and
design sound programs.
With a clear policy foundation in place,
defense officials and military officers can design
and carry out sound programs. Despite the lack of
clear guidance, many programs have been devel-
oped that have proved effective in influencing
the armed forces of autocratic or transitional
countries to support democratic development.
International Military Education
One of the best opportunities to influ-
ence foreign officers from autocratic countries
is when they come to the military colleges
and other educational institutions in demo-
cratic countries. These courses range from a
full academic year at a service command or
staff college to a few weeks for a specialized
technical course. Other countries will often
send their best and brightest. For example,
some 35 officers have attended the Army War
College and returned home to become chiefs
in their armies.
The advantage to a country, of educat-
ing international students, is well recognized.
However, there is more that can be done in
the education of international military offi-
cers to give them an appreciation for the
foundational elements and advantages of a
democratic system.
The curricula for international officers
in the command and staff colleges of most
democratic countries include explanations of
one of the best opportunities to
influence foreign officers from autocratic
countries is when they come to
educational institutions in
democratic countries

the civil-military system in the host country.
In the case of the United States, for exam-
ple, there are classes on the role of the U.S.
Armed Forces as established by the U.S.
Constitution. It would be much more pow-
erful and relevant to international officers
if the lectures and discussions covered the
many ways in which countries achieve the
same foundational elements of a democratic
civil-military structure: political control of
the armed forces; legislative authorization of
budgets and oversight of activities; govern-
ment control of the promotion of senior offi-
cers; judicial authority over military activi-
ties; and press access to military activities.
Exposed to examples drawn from a wide vari-
ety of countries, international students from
authoritarian countries would find it much
easier to imagine how their own countries
might evolve to a democratic system.
For senior military officers the world over,
one of the most important professional issues
is their relationship to their political superi-
ors. They are expected to provide their best
professional advice and then to carry out legal
orders. In democracies, the worst that can hap-
pen to a senior officer if his advice is not wel-
come is that he is replaced. If the order is not
legal or he believes it is wrong, he can resign.
He retires with his pension. In autocracies a
general who provides unwelcome advice or
refuses to obey an order can be imprisoned or
worse. Seminar study in war college courses of
the responsibilities of senior officers to their
political superiors, and how to handle illegal
or dangerous orders, would be very effective in
reinforcing the ethos of loyalty to the nation,
not to an individual or party.
Surveys of international graduates of
command courses in the United Kingdom and
the United States make it clear that they are
influenced as much by what they observe out-
side their classrooms as what they are taught
inside them. It is important that in field trips
around their host countries, the international
students learn about the full range of organiza-
tions and groups that interact with the armed
forces. The democracies generally take better
care of their veterans than autocratic countries
do, so visits to veterans hospitals and clinics
would be valuable; it would be eye-opening
to many international students to talk with
the many volunteer organizations that have
sprung up in democratic countries to help vet-
erans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan: the
Yellow Ribbon Society in the United States
and the Veterans Advisory and Pensions
Committees in the United Kingdom, for
example. International students should talk to
military journalists from the media about the
role of a free press in writing not just about the
successes and positive accomplishments of the
armed forces, but about mistakes and worse.
It was civilian correspondents who broke
the stories of My Lai and Abu Ghraib and of
major cost overruns and performance short-
falls in military hardware programs. Although
these stories caused hardship at the time, their
final result was to strengthen the armed forces.
International students should meet with offi-
cers and noncommissioned officers who have
completed military careers and gone on to suc-
ceed in other fields, from high school teaching
to corporate management. The overall objec-
tive of outside programs should be to expose
international students should meet with
officers and noncommissioned officers
who have completed military careers and
gone on to succeed in other fields
BLAIR

DOD(JacobN.Bailey)
U.S. Air Force C-17 flies over pyramids
of Giza Plateau as part of USCENTCOM
biennial multinational exercise Bright Star

international military students to the complex
texture of relationships of the armed forces in a
democracy, relationships that ensure that those
forces play their appropriate role of protect-
ing their country’s citizens, and in turn being
understood and rewarded for their service.
Training
The armed forces of most countries find
the greatest opportunity for interaction during
exercises. These range from large multilateral
exercises like Cobra Gold in Thailand, Eagle
Resolve in the Persian Gulf, and Bright Star
in Egypt to small bilateral encounters involv-
ing a few dozen participants. The objective
of most of these exercises is to establish or
enhance the ability of the units involved to
work together—to practice common proce-
dures and communications and to iron out
interoperability problems.
Most exercises involving the forces of
established democracies and authoritarian or
transitional countries are politically neutral
peace operations. The scenarios range from
search and rescue efforts to disaster relief to
peacekeeping. These scenarios offer the oppor-
tunity to reinforce the fundamental commit-
ment of military forces to protect and rescue
civilian citizens from violence and danger.
It is this commitment that will prevent mili-
tary forces from carrying out the orders of a
repressive regime to put down peaceful protests
by its citizens. Too often international exer-
cises move quickly to the operational phases,
exercising military functions such as com-
bined helicopter extractions and roadblock
procedures. Emphasis needs to be placed on
an initial phase in which the legal basis of
the military action in the particular scenario
is established: international law and custom
for search and rescue; a host country invita-
tion for disaster relief; or a United Nations
resolution for peacekeeping operations. The
objective is to reinforce the concept that all
military operations must have a legal basis. In
the initial planning phase, emphasis also needs
to be placed on civil-military relationships,
underscoring that military operations take
place within a larger political context—for
example, that military units operate in support
of civilian-led government disaster relief agen-
cies and that peacekeeping operations support
political agreements reached between govern-
ments. Finally, the initial planning phase of
these exercises needs to emphasize the legal
basis and control of the use of military force in
the exercise scenario. Should troops be armed
or unarmed? Under what circumstances can
force be used? In a disaster relief operation, can
force be used, for example, against looters? In
a peacekeeping operation, can force be used
only in self-defense or can it be used against an
armed faction that is breaking the conditions
of a ceasefire?
In this initial planning phase, the objec-
tive is to convey to the officers and noncommis-
sioned officers of autocratic countries the con-
cepts of the legal use of force, of proportional
use of force, and the subordination and control
of the use of force to political direction. These
concepts will cause them to question their own
regimes over time.
The same concepts can be reinforced dur-
ing the later phases of the exercise by appropri-
ate selection of events within the scenario and
when senior U.S. officers visited
Indonesia in the late 1990s, they were
thoroughly prepared regarding the East
Timor crisis
BLAIR

by the after action review, which is the final
phase of all exercises in which the performance
of the units is evaluated and issues that are
exposed are discussed.
Conferences and Visits
The scale of meetings, conferences, and
visits among the armed forces of the estab-
lished democracies and autocratic or transi-
tional countries is vast. When the author was
Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, the
staff prepared a list of the visits scheduled over
the course of a year with China, and the list ran
on for pages.
The great majority of these interactions are
among functional counterparts in the armed
forces—military doctors visit their counterparts
and logisticians have conferences; so do special
forces officers. Army, Navy, and Air Force chiefs
consider it part of their duties to visit counter-
parts around the world.
The preparation of officers from the estab-
lished democracies for these interactions is
generally of two types: functional and political.
First, their staffs work to identify safe common
professional topics that they and their bosses
can discuss with counterparts. The objective
is to establish a common professional bond.
Second, there is preparation on how to handle
the current political issues between their coun-
tries. When the author and other senior U.S.
officers visited Indonesia in the late 1990s,
for example, they were thoroughly prepared
regarding the latest developments in the East
Timor crisis. What officers from democratic
countries are not thoroughly prepared for
by their staffs or their experience to discuss,
however, are the civil-military issues in the
particular autocratic countries they are visit-
ing. They probably know the order of battle
of an autocratic country, but they generally do
not know enough to engage their counterparts
on issues such as the internal security role of
the armed forces, the relationship with the
intelligence and internal security services, the
sources of funding for the armed forces, or the
recent history of the armed forces’ relationship
with the regime. It is discussions about such
topics, not in open meetings or seminars but
during private conversations, that can open
the minds of officers in autocratic countries to
the possibilities for progress in their countries
toward the more democratic forms of govern-
ment that would give their services more stable
and honorable positions.
Conclusion
These examples for improving the effec-
tiveness of military education and training
programs, exercises, conferences, and visits
are only a few of the ways that the advanced
democratic countries can focus their inter-
actions with autocratic armed forces on the
objective of supporting democratic transi-
tions. There are literally thousands of points
of contact among the armed forces of the
democracies and autocratic countries, and
all of them offer opportunities for influence.
Once this objective is established clearly by
the governments of the advanced democra-
cies, their extremely capable defense officials
and military officers will devise many ways to
carry out the mission.
The events of the Arab Spring are the
latest in a long line of failures of dictator-
ships, stretching from Latin America across
East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe.
The Arab Spring also reemphasizes the cen-
trality of the armed forces in popular protests
against dictatorships and whether countries
transition to democratic forms of government
or revert to rule by repressive regimes. The

democracies of the world have no more important objective than the successful transition of
dictatorships to democracies. The armed forces of democratic countries can be even more posi-
tive and effective influences on the counterparts in autocratic countries if they are given the
policy guidance and mission. PRISM
BLAIR

Lest there be any misunderstanding, I am
not going to attempt to argue that an educa-
tion in strategic theory will serve like the phi-
losopher’s stone postulated in medieval alchemy
to be able to turn the base metal of failure or
impasse into the gold of strategic success.
Rather, it is my claim only that there is avail-
able a relatively simple general theory of strat-
egy (and war) that transcends and conceptually
reorganizes such subordinate subjects as COIN
and counterterrorism. This general theory,
far from retiring COIN theory, actually saves
it from the misconceptions of overzealous if
undereducated advocate theorist-practitioners.
So what is my argument?
Argument
If this debate about COIN is to be reset
along more productive lines than those typi-
cally pursued in the often heated and bad-
tempered exchanges of recent times, it is
necessary to place some reliance on the con-
ceptual tools that strategic theory provides.
Unsurprisingly, in its several forms that the-
ory yields what Clausewitz specified: it sorts
out what needs sorting. There is much that
should be debated about COIN, but the con-
troversy is not helpful for national security if
the structure and functioning of the subject
matter, suitably defined, are not grasped and
gripped with intellectual discipline. To that
end, what follows is a nine-part argument
intended to make more sense of the not-so-
great COIN debate triggered by the unmistak-
able evidence of confusion, frustration, and
either failure or unsatisfactorily fragile suc-
cess in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is neither
policy nor strategy advocacy, but generically
it is advocacy of policy (and its politics) and
strategy, properly employed.
Formal education in strategy is not an
adequate substitute for experience or tal-
ent and aptitude, but it should help. COIN
debate would benefit if the debaters took a
refresher course in the basics of strategy.
Many fallacies and inadequate arguments
about COIN in Afghanistan, for instance,
are avoidable if their proponents were will-
ing to seek and were able to receive help from
theory. Harold Winton offers useful guidance
when he identifies five functions for compe-
tent theory: such theory “defines, categorizes,
explains, connects, and anticipates.”10
About
what does theory perform those functions?
The answer, which for strategy is the equiva-
lent of E = mc2
, is ends, ways, means, and
(with caveats) assumptions. If a strategist’s
narrative performs well on this formula, he
has indeed cracked the code that enables—
though it cannot guarantee—strategic suc-
cess. The strategist needs to understand his
subject, which is not COIN or counterterror-
ism; it is strategy for his particular challenge
in COIN or counterterrorism. It is hard to
find compensation for a lack of case-specific
local knowledge, but it is even harder, and
can be impossible, to compensate for weak-
ness in understanding of strategy.
There is a classical canon of authors worth
reading for their contributions, both intended
and not, to the general theory of strategy.
This theorist has reshaped and assembled the
theory in the form of dicta (formal statements
that are not quite principles and definitely not
laws).11
Rather than test readers’ patience with
a recital of my dicta, here I capture much of
COIN debate would benefit if the
debaters took a refresher course in the
basics of strategy
gray

their meanings and implications by offering a list of “strategists’ questions,” some of which, with
some amendments, I have borrowed with gratitude from the late Philip Crowl, followed by my
own redrafting of the now long-traditional “Principles of War” as a set of Principles of War that I
believe more suitably serves the declared purpose. First, the following are the strategists’ questions:
❖❖ What is it all about? What are the political stakes, and how much do they matter to us?
❖❖ So what? What will be the strategic effect of the sundry characters of behavior that we
choose to conduct?
❖❖ Is the strategy selected tailored well enough to meet our political objectives?
❖❖ What are the probable limits of our (military) power as a basket of complementary agencies
to influence and endeavor to control the enemy’s will?
❖❖ How could the enemy strive to thwart us?
❖❖ What are our alternative courses of action/inaction? What are their prospective costs
and benefits?
❖❖ How robust is our home front?
❖❖ Does the strategy we prefer today draw prudently and honestly upon the strategic education
that history can provide?
❖❖ What have we overlooked?
concept failure?
DOD
U.S. Marine greets local children during
partnered security patrol with ANA
soldiers in Helmand Province

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Democracy and the Military
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Introduction: Democracy and the Military in comparative
perspective
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Huntington (1957), in a study based primarily on the history of the military in Western societies), elaborated
what was widely accepted as the liberal democratic model of civil-military interaction. ‘[T]he principal
responsibility of the military officer’, Huntington said, ‘is to the state’:[10]
Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in
politics undermines their professionalism … The military officer must remain neutral politically …
The area of military science is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics … The
military profession exists to serve the state … The superior political wisdom of the statesman must
be accepted as a fact (Huntington 1957:16, 71, 73, 76).
The idea of the subservience of the military to civilian authority, as Grundy (1968) has pointed out, follows a
tradition going back to Plato.[11] Huntington, however, challenged the simple identification of civilian control
with democratic government, and military control with absolute or totalitarian government: the military may
undermine civilian control in a democracy, he argued, acquiring power by legitimate processes,[12] and
within a totalitarian system the power of the military may be reduced by such means as creating competing
military or paramilitary units or by infiltrating it with ‘political commissars’. ‘Subjective civilian control’, he

concluded, ‘thus is not the monopoly of any particular constitutional system’ (ibid.:82). Huntington went on
to distinguish five patterns of civil-military relations, based on differing relative degrees of military/anti-
military ideology, military power, and military professionalism (see ibid.: chapter 4), but as evidenced in his
later study (Huntington 1968), for Huntington military ‘intervention’ represented an essential breakdown of
the liberal democratic political order.
While Huntington’s concept of military professionalism has remained influential, the spate of post-
independence military coups in the new states of Africa and Asia from the late 1950s prompted a more
critical examination of the relation between civilian government and the military. Some commentators,
indeed, suggested that the presumed neutrality and separation of the military from politics was at best a
Western concept, if not a complete fiction (see, for example Perlmutter 1980:119; Valenzuela 1985:142;
Ashkenazy 1994:178). Not only did military intervention sometimes occur in response to the effective
breakdown of democratic civil regimes – with the ostensible aim of restoring democracy, and often with
substantial popular support – but in some new states, notably the communist ‘people’s republics’ and the
‘guided democracy’ of Indonesia’s President Soekarno, an alternative model of ‘democracy’ was espoused, in
which the military was seen as an integral part of the political system rather than, as in Huntington’s
formulation, an agency outside the political realm.[13]
That a variety of political regimes, in which the pattern of relations between civilian politicians and the
military covers a broad spectrum, should claim to be ‘democratic’ is testimony to the popularity of the term
in international political discourse. Such popularity reflects the extent to which the term acts as an agent of
political legitimation in a world where democracy is accepted, at least rhetorically, as a universal ‘good’. But
can military regimes ever be described as democratic? Or, indeed, are they necessarily anti-democratic?

Gallie’s (1956) formulation of democracy as an ‘essentially contested concept’ lends support to a relativist
position, the extension of which is that democracy can mean all things to all people. As Hewison, Robison
and Rodan (1993:5) point out, this effectively denies the possibility that any universal understandings can be
reached and serves to ‘indemnify the most scurrilous of dictatorships and to undermine the legitimacy of
democratic and reformist oppositions’. On the other hand, too narrow a definition, especially with respect to
institutional forms, is unrealistic.
One way of dealing with this definitional problem is to acknowledge that regimes measure up differently
against various criteria of democracy, and that the idea of a continuum from more democratic to less
democratic is the most useful and meaningful approach to the problem of analysing and comparing regimes.
Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990:6-7), for example, define democracy in terms of three essential and
generally accepted conditions: meaningful competition for government office; a high level of political
participation; and a level of civil and political liberties sufficient to ensure competition and participation. They
recognise, at the same time, that ‘countries that broadly satisfy these criteria, nevertheless do so to different
degrees’ and that the ‘boundary between democratic and undemocratic is sometimes blurred and imperfect’
(ibid.:7; see also Dahl 1989:112; Hadenius 1992; Sørensen 1993; Lawson 1993).
For military rulers, however, the widespread association of democracy with civilian supremacy has created a
particular crisis of legitimacy. A central pillar of modern democratic theory is the doctrine of constitutionalism
which, in its simplest form, refers to limited government, a system in which any body of rulers is as much
subject to the rule of law as the body of citizens. An important corollary to the democratic doctrine of
constitutionalism is civilian supremacy (though this in itself is not a sufficient condition for democracy since,
as Huntington pointed out, many non-democratic governments maintain civilian control over their military

and police organisations). Democracy requires, therefore, not only that armed forces be subject to civilian
control, but that ‘those civilians who control the military and police must themselves be subject to the
democratic process’ (Dahl 1989:245). A fundamental principle of the democratic model of civilian supremacy
in civil-military relations resides in the important distinction between the state and the legitimate
government. It is to the latter that the military owes its primary allegiance, and any implicit distinction that
the military might be tempted to draw between the goals of the government and those of the state must
provoke a serious legitimacy problem (Harries-Jenkins and van Doorn 1976); this is so because the
democracy model insists that the military’s power is legitimate only in so far as it has been endorsed by
society as a whole and that its practical objectives are those set for it by the government of the day. Van
Gils (1971:274) states this succinctly:
Under the conditions of pluralistic democracy, the relations between the armed forces and civilians
are, at least theoretically, quite straightforward. Soldiers are public officials. They are not the
embodiment of any particular set of values. They are not the chosen defenders of any specific
social or political institution. They hold public office on the assumption that they will provide society
with a specific set of services whenever society considers itself in the need of having such services
performed.
This reflects the deeply embedded assumption of modern democratic theory, that it is the popularly elected
government, and no other body or person, that is wholly responsible for deciding what policies are to be
pursued in the name of the people. In so doing, the government is constrained by the limits to action set out
under the law of the constitution, and is ultimately held accountable for its activities and decisions when it
faces the judgement of the people at the polls.

But what if a constitutionally and popularly elected civilian government once in office abrogates the
constitution and rejects the democratic values embodied in it (including genuinely competitive elections)? In
such circumstances – which have been not uncommon in post-colonial states – the military may be the only
entity within the country capable of reversing such a development and reinstating democratic government.
While contemporary democratic theory appears to be entirely at odds with the notion that the military has
any role in unilaterally acting to ‘safeguard the national interest’, the most common justification for military
intervention is just this. Such appeals to the national interest have frequently been coupled with references
to some perceived crisis or threat involving the security of the state or serious economic or social problems.
As Goodman (1990:xiii) observes for Latin America:
The frequent military ascension to power has often been motivated by a perceived need to save
their nations from weak, corrupt, and undisciplined civilian leadership.
Numerous commentators on the role of the military in politics have observed the tendency of armed forces
to justify their intervention in terms of the national interest, and thereby to identify themselves with the
desiderata of nationhood. Most have been sceptical. Lissak (1976:20), for example, notes that the military
can acquire a self image as guarantor of the fundamental and permanent interests of the nation, thereby
arrogating to itself the requisite legitimacy to assume the right to rule. Similarly, Nordlinger (1970:1137-8)
highlights the manner in which the military’s corporate interests can be defined, legitimised, and rationalised
by a close identification with the interests of the nation, while at the same time portraying oppositional
protests to their actions as ‘expressions of partial and selfish interests’.

Nevertheless, authoritarian rule is not exclusive to military regimes and, as the case studies in this volume
illustrate, armed forces have played a role in pro-democracy regime transitions (see also Chazan et al. 1988;
Goodman 1990; Rial 1990a). The critical factor for most commentators on civil-military relations concerns
the intention of military rulers to return to the barracks.
To legitimise their intervention, military regimes commonly contend that their rule is only a preparatory or
transitory (but entirely necessary) stage along the road to a fully democratic political system, and promise
an early return to civilian rule, thereby recognising, Dahl (1989:2) argues, that ‘an indispensable ingredient
for their legitimacy is a dash or two of the language of democracy’. In some cases, military rule has been
justified ‘as necessary for the regeneration of the polity to allow for stable and effective rule’; military
regimes have even portrayed their role as that of ‘democratic tutor’ (Huntington 1968; Nordlinger 1977:204-
5). Yet once out of the barracks military rulers have seldom been anxious to relinquish power and even
where there have been transitions back to civilian rule the armed forces have typically retained an
involvement in politics and have been more likely to intervene again if dissatisfied with the performance of
civilian governments.
Observing processes of transition from authoritarian military rule to democracy in Latin America, Goodman
(1990:xiv) comments that, ‘successful transitions have utilised a process of incremental rather than
immediate civilian control’; he goes on to suggest:
For democracy to take root in Latin America, both military men and civilian leaders must take on
new roles…. Recognition that the military is one of the strongest formal institutions in societies that
are in dire need of political and social coherence poses challenges to Latin American civilian leaders

that are very different from those confronted by their developed-nation counterparts (ibid.:xiv; see
also Stepan 1988; Rial 1990a, b and Varas 1990).
Goodman, however, is not explicit on the nature of these ‘new roles’, and other contributors to the same
volume suggest that recently democratised regimes in Latin America remain vulnerable to ‘the rapid rebirth
of military authoritarianism’ (Rial 1990b:289).
In Asia and the Pacific armed forces have played a role in both democratising and anti-democratic
transitions, and though, as elsewhere, their tendency as rulers has been towards authoritarianism, patterns
of civil-military relations and degrees of authoritarianism/democracy in governance have varied widely. Any
attempt at understanding this variety must begin with an appreciation of the particular historical and cultural
circumstances under which military involvement in politics has developed in different countries.
[10] In context, Huntington appears to equate ‘state’ with ‘government’; the significance of distinguishing
‘state’ from ‘government’ is discussed below.
[11] Also note von Clausewitz (1832/1968:405): ‘… subordination of the military point of view to the political
is … the only thing which is possible’.
[12] For a recent statement of this theme, drawing primarily on US experience, see Johansen (1992).

[13] See, for example, Albright’s (1980) critique of Huntington’s ‘conceptual framework’ on the basis of the
experiences of sixteen communist states. On civil-military relations in communist states, also see Perlmutter
(1982) and Herspring and Volgyes (1978).
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By David Scott Palmer
One of the most dramatic developments in Latin America today is the unprecedented shift in the nature of politics since
the late 1970s. At no time in the history of the Latin American republics have so many countries established and
sustained electoral democracies without military takeovers.
The military coup is no longer an alternative mechanism for acceding to power in the region. There were 19 successful
coups in the 1960s in Latin America and 18 in the 1970s, but just seven in the 1980s and only two in the 1990s. The two
coups thus far in the new century lasted just hours, both aborted by intense international pressure.
Within a single political generation, electoral democracy has become the norm in almost all of the 20 Latin American
nations, imperfect and facing multiple challenges, to be sure, but seen as legitimate by most citizens everywhere in the
region. One noteworthy change is the unprecedented willingness of the military in recent years to remain on the political
sidelines in Latin America. How can this extraordinary development be explained?
One answer may be found in the failure by the Latin American militaries, that took power throughout the region during
the so-called Third Wave of authoritarianism between the 1960s and the 1980s, to accomplish their political and
economic objectives. The long-term institutionalized military regimes in place in many Latin American countries during
these years found that it was much harder to implement policies than to make plans. Chastened by their experience as
well as weakened and divided, most were only too glad to return to the barracks—and stay there. The end of the Cold
War certainly has contributed to this process.
Another is the combination of the debt crisis of the 1980s and the lost decade of national economic erosion that
weakened the military institutions through reduced budgets and training. The economic crisis forced them to reassess
their historic roles and missions.
From such a reassessment, many Latin American armed forces began to take on a new mission—international
peacekeeper. Military and police contingents from 13 countries were serving in the 22 United Nations peacekeeping and
other operations in place in 2000. Among the most active were Argentina and Uruguay, with 12, Bolivia and Chile, with
six, El Salvador with four, and Brazil and Peru, with three. Such missions can only serve to enhance the professional
stature of the armed forces and help to justify their continued relevance in the post-Cold War era.
With the establishment of inclusive mass democracy during a period of economic distress, civilian authorities faced a
guns OR butter situation. They were under great pressure to increase social expenditures, often at the militaries'
expense, thus further weakening the institutional capacity of the armed forces. While the military establishments were
not bereft, many were not able to modernize.

The terms of negotiation for the transition from military to civilian rule in several cases served to protect armed forces
interests within civilian rule. In Chile and Ecuador, the military retained a guaranteed share of copper and oil revenues. In
Brazil, the military tinkered with the electoral mechanisms until it found a formula that provided relative assurance of
moderate civilian rule. Chile's military leaders also adjusted electoral provisions to assure selection of su cient
conservative senators to block constitutional change and formed a National Security Board that their members
dominated and that was not accountable to civilian authority. In Uruguay, the military protected itself from prosecution
for abuses while in power through legal provisions proscribing such initiatives under civilian rule.
Short of military takeovers, the armed forces also in uenced politics by building alliances with civilians and in uencing
politics from within. One example is Peru's use of the principle of civilian control in the 1990s to protect military interests
and preserve its privileges.
Haiti and Panama serve to illustrate how egregious military abuse in power can lead to outside intervention and the
decision to abolish the military altogether. Such initiatives reinforced a parallel campaign by Nobel Peace Prize recipient
Oscar Arias to apply the Costa Rican model of a political system without a military establishment to other smaller
countries of the region.
In combination, these explanations suggest an emerging new dynamic of civil-military relations in Latin America in which
the armed forces are coming to accept a di erent role from that which has prevailed in the region since independence.
The changes over time in patterns of military expenditures within Latin America are also revealing. While many changes
within individual countries respond to local or sub-regional security issues, the consistent overall pattern over the
decades has been a progressive reduction in the burden of military expenditures as a proportion of central government
budgets. These have declined from about 21% in the early 1920s, 19% around 1940, 15% as of 1960, 12% in 1970, and 11%
about 1980. The only broad exception to this trend is the 1980s, when overall military expenditures increased by over
40%, largely to develop counterinsurgency and counter-drug capacities, before dropping back to about 10% in 1993 and
9% in 1997. Data for 2000 sug gest that this trend is continuing—eight of the 20 Latin American countries reduced their
military budgets between 1997 and 2000, three remained about the same, and nine increased.
These recent expenditure patterns, including both police and military, suggest that the armed forces of Latin America no
longer in most cases consume a disproportionate share of the budget (Chile, at 17.8% in 1997, Colombia with 19.9%, and
Ecuador at 20.3%, are the major exceptions.). This trend appears to suggest one of the bene cial e ects of democratic
practices and civilian control.
Continued expansion of democratic practice and its gradual consolidation get a signi cant boost from the unprecedented
change in the regional and international context of international agreements. These include the Santiago Accords of 1991
Organization of American States (OAS) Resolution 1080, the OAS Washington Resolution of 1997, and the Democratic
Charter of Lima of 2001. By signing these multilateral accords, Latin American governments have agreed to give up their
long-standing principle of non-intervention. They now allow a regional body to determine appropriate measures when

democracy is threatened in a member state. The OAS has invoked one or another of these provisions to respond to
internal political crises in various member countries, including Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay. Furthermore, the
mere presence of these multilateral instruments has also served as a further stimulus for political elites to work out their
problems without threatening democratic forms.
The rapid proliferation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), both national and international, has also contributed
to the consolidation of democratic procedures. These groups have worked to protect, preserve, and expand democratic
procedures and practices by calling attention to abuses, protecting human rights, overseeing elections, and generally
reinforcing civilian actors and civil society. They include civil-military groups and associations of representatives from
both sectors that meet regularly to work through issues and foster mutual understanding. NGO presence and
advocacyhelps to further legitimate the democratic process and to make government organizations and procedures,
including those of the military, more open and transparent.
While civilian democratic rule now prevails almost everywhere in Latin America, speci c cases illustrate some of the
challenges that individual countries continue to face.
In Venezuela, the election of a military leader associated with a violent failed coup, Hugo ChÃ¡vez Frias, introduced a
new pattern of military institutional involvement in activities historically carried out by civilian or police authorities—such
as crowd control, citizen mobilization, and public works. The creation of popular militias, the so-called Bolivarian Circles,
is also a distressing development. Chávez and the military have lled the political space left by the progressive
discrediting of once robust political parties. In Venezuela, the electoral process rather than the coup has reintroduced the
military into politics, posing a new type of threat to the principle of civilian authority.
The case of Peru reveals a second troubling pattern of civil-military relations. This is the systematic abuse by an elected
government of democratic procedures and civilian as well as military organizations to ensure continuation in power.
Abuses included a unilateral amnesty for the military and police for human rights violations, the thwarting of a
referendum on an unconstitutional third successive election of the president, the stacking of judicial and electoral bodies
with government loyalists, and the use of computer machinations to change the presidential vote count. The civilian
regime also resorted to massive bribery to ensure a congressional majority and manipulated military and police
appointments to ensure compliant armed forces and an intelligence service that would serve the government by
intimidating the opposition.
Through such measures, the institutional integrity of the military was severely compromised in ways that contributed to
its dramatic failure to dislodge Ecuador's forces in the 1995 border war. The intelligence services were also adversely
a ected. Consumed by tracking the legal opposition, they failed to prevent the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA) takeover of the Japanese Ambassador's residence for four months in 1996-97.
Civilian democratic forces regained the upper hand in the dramatic political denouement of late 2000 and brought about
the removal of the elected regime and the arrest of scores of corrupt politicians, military, and police. However, the

damage done to the political and security institutions of Peru will take years to overcome.
Ecuador's recent experience suggests a third pattern. Successive elected presidents were removed by congress and a
brief civil-military takeover that only international pressure kept from becoming the rst successful coup of the 21st
century in Latin America. Ecuador provides an example of sustained electoral democracy, but with a multiplicity of
parties and procedural regulations that virtually ensure political immobility in combination with a strong armed forces
fresh from the military success of the border con ict with Peru. While civilian rule was quickly restored in 2000, a well-
institutionalized military establishment remains a political alternative should the civilians falter again. The weight of OAS,
United States, and European Union sanctions is the major force standing in the way of any unconstitutional takeover by
the military in Ecuador.
Argentina's sad tale may be the limiting case in civil-military relations. Here the economic crisis of late 2001 and early
2002 led to the president's resignation and a revolving door of short-term heads of state, with early elections now in the
o ng. Throughout the crisis the Argentine military, dramatically downsized by elected governments after its debacle in
the Malvinas war and its gross mismanagement and human rights abuses while in power between 1976 and 1983, played
no role. Here the civilian authorities were forced to try to work out alone some solution to their country's problems that
appear to be resolvable only with some accommodation with the international nancial community.
Colombia, formally democratic since the late 1950s, re ects a progressive erosion of central government capacity in the
face of economic stagnation, major drug production, the breakdown of personal security, and generalized political
violence. In this context, the armed forces became less able over time to carry out its basic mission of protecting the
population and the government. Plan Colombia was designed to reverse this trend by providing substantial economic
and military assistance to enable the military to increase its capacity to better protect a beleaguered civilian government.
While many of Plan Colombia's provisions are controversial, the resources provided appear to be in the process of
accomplishing their goal. The military is now larger and better prepared. Formal democracy continues, though with the
recent election of a hard-liner with a mandate to restore peace through military initiatives. In Colombia democracy is
trying to survive, and the military at this point is committed to its protection. There is no question in the Colombian case
of a military takeover, but concerns remain over the likely dynamics of a military-led initiative to end the violence rather
than peace negotiations.
As these speci c examples suggest, on balance Latin American democracies remain troubled, but in place. The
dynamics of civil-military relations vary widely from country to country, but overall the trend continues toward the
continued prevalence of civilian-led government and democratic procedures. In most countries, the military has accepted
its role as subordinate to civilian authority and is working to rede ne its mission within that context. The nancial woes of
the 1980s and the market liberalization initiatives of the 1990s continue to limit the ability of most armed forces to retain
the strong institutional capacity that they developed in earlier decades, with attendant e ects on their commitment to

professionalism. While this could pose a danger for democracy at some point, the regional and international consensus
on the value of civilian elected government o sets such tendencies.
Nevertheless, the armed forces of the region continue to have several important roles to ful ll. One is the new focus on
international peacekeeping. Another is the protection of borders still in dispute, both land and sea. In addition, natural
disasters require the military to take on emergency rescue and civilian support tasks. Finally, counter-drug operations
require armed forces initiatives. As a result, military establishments of the region can continue to justify their presence
and their signi cance without recourse to coups. Democracy in Latin America has multiple challenges to overcome, but
in most countries the threat of a military takeover is not one of them.
David Scott Palmer teaches Latin American politics and United States-Latin American relations at Boston University. His
recent writings include The Military in Latin America, in Jack Hopkins, ed. Latin America: Perspectives on a Region, 2nd
edition (1998), and, with Carmen Rosa Balbi, 'Reinventing' Democracy in Peru, Current History (February 2001).
See also: Democracy
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8 A A
A theory of military dictatorships
Daron Acemoğlu, Davide Ticchi , Andrea Vindigni 16 June 2008
Encouraging democracy is one goal of most industrialised nations’ foreign economic
policies. Formulating such policies requires an understanding of the political-economy
logic governing democratic transitions. This column describes an important recent
advance in theoretical thinking on the military’s role.
Throughout history, the military has been concerned with much more than
national defense. In Imperial Rome, for instance, by the era of the mid Empire it
had become customary for the military to influence the selection of the new
Emperor. In modern times, virtually all Latin American and African nations have
seen military interventions, often culminating in military coups and the
emergence of military dictatorships. There are also instances of military
involvement in domestic politics, even in apparently consolidated democracies.
Daron Acemoğlu
Professor of Applied
Economics, MIT
Davide Ticchi
Professor of Economics,
IMT Institute for Advanced
Studies Lucca
By Topic By Date By Reads By Tag

In 1958, the democratically-elected French government was forced to back
down in a confrontation with a unified military command.
While, economists have been studying the political logic of transitions to and
from democracy (e.g. Wintrobe 1998 and Dixit 2006), the military’s role has
been largely ignored. Our recent work, A Theory of Military Dictatorships, takes
a first step towards a systematic framework for the analysis of the role of the
military in domestic politics. Our objective is to ultimately understand what types
of nondemocratic regimes can survive with the support of the military, which
regimes will generate interventions from the military, and why the military may
align itself with some segments of the society against others.
Our basic analytic framework is simple. Two groups, the elite rich and the
citizens, are in conflict under democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Under
democracy, redistributive policies benefit the citizens at the expense of the rich.
Under oligarchy the rich keep their wealth but have to create (and pay) a
repressive military to maintain them in power. A repressive military is a double-
edged sword, however; once created, it has the option of attempting to
establish a military dictatorship, seizing power from democratic or oligarchic
governments. This is the political moral hazard problem at the core of our
framework.
The framework helps us think about the military’s relationship with oligarchies,
specifically the conditions under which the military will act as a perfect agent of
the elite in oligarchies, and the conditions under which the military will turn
against the elite and attempt to set up its own dictatorship.
The framework also clarifies thinking on the military’s role in transitions to
democracy. The key element concerns the credibility of future pay-offs. Since
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oligarchies need a repressive military in ways that democracies do not, the
oligarch’s commitment to future pay-offs is credible while those of a democratic
government may not be. Consequently, our framework suggests that military
coups are more likely to take place against democracies than against
oligarchies because of the inability of democratic regimes to commit to not
reforming the military in the future. Nevertheless, military coups against
oligarchies are also possible when the political moral hazard problem is
sufficiently severe. The point turns on the assumption that there is a probability
that coups against oligarchies will fail.
This perspective also suggests that military coups may be more likely when the
external role of the military is more limited. When a strong military is needed for
national defense, democratic regimes can also commit to keeping a relatively
large military, thus reducing the incentive for military takeover at the early
stages of democracy.
This framework also predicts that the historical relations between
nondemocratic regimes and the military are important for the consolidation of
democracy once this regime emerges. If a powerful military has been created
by the elite to prevent democratization, then this military will be present at the
early stages of the nascent democracy. However, since democracy does not
have as much of a need for coercion as the nondemocratic regime, the military
anticipates future reforms by the democratic government to reduce its size and
power. This anticipation induces the military to take action against nascent
democratic regimes, unless credible commitments for the continued role of the
military in politics or other significant concessions can be made.
Other factors that are highlighted as important by our framework include the
extent of income inequality and abundance of natural resources. Greater
Guns and votes
Firearm background
checks and suicide
Credit growth and the
Global Crisis: A new
narrative
Investment and growth
in advanced
economies: Selected
takeaways from the
ECB’s Sintra Forum
Bernard, Capponi, Stiglitz
Bouton, Conconi, Pino,
Zanardi
Lang
Albanesi, De Giorgi,
Nosal
Constâncio, Hartmann,
McAdam
Events
Political Economy of
International
Organizations
8 - 10 February 2018 /
Wisconsin-Madison,
United States / University
of Wisconsin-Madison
ADBI-IDB-WTO
Conference on Trade
Adjustment

inequality increases the conflict between the elite and the citizens and
encourages oligarchic regimes to maintain power by using stronger militaries.
This increases both the risk of military intervention during the oligarchic regime
and also once democracy emerges. Natural resources further increase the
political stakes and make it more difficult to prevent the political moral hazard
problem because the military can exploit natural resources once it comes to
power. As such, they often make military interventions more likely.
Conclusions
One of the important implications of this general research program is that, when
trying to shape or influence transitions to democracy, it is important that policy
makers consider the complexities of the three-way interactions between the
elite, the military and citizens. Our theory is a step towards a systematic
framework for the analysis of the role of the military in domestic politics and will
hopefully spur more theoretical and empirical research to understand the
factors that facilitate the emergence and persistence of democratic regimes.
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni (2008). “A Theory of
Military Dictatorships.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper
No. 13915.
Dixit, Avinash K. (2006). “Predatory States and Failing States: An Agency
Perspective,” Princeton Research in Political Economy Working Paper.
Wintrobe, Ronald (1998) The Political Economy of Dictatorship, New York;
Cambridge University Press.
16 - 17 November 2017 /
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Australian National
University Research
School of Economics in
Canberra, Australia /
CEPR Policy
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Discussion Papers Insights

8 A A
Topics: Politics and economics
Tags: democracy, Political Economy, military, coups, dictatorship, oligarchy
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11/3/2017 Dictatorship - Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictatorship 1/9
Dictatorship
Dictatorship is a form of government in which a country or a group of countries is ruled
by one person (a dictator) or by a polity, and power (social and political) is exercised
through various mechanisms to ensure that the entity's power remains strong.[1][2]
A dictatorship is a type of authoritarianism, in which politicians regulate nearly every
aspect of the public and private behavior of citizens. Dictatorship and totalitarian societies
generally employ political propaganda to decrease the influence of proponents of
alternative governing systems. In the past, different religious tactics were used by
dictators to maintain their rule, such as the monarchical system in the west.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, traditional monarchies gradually declined and
disappeared. Dictatorship and constitutional democracy emerged as the world's two
major forms of government.[1]
1 History
1.1 Republican Origins
1.2 19th-century Latin American caudillos
1.3 Communism and fascism in 20th-century dictatorships
1.4 Dictatorships in Africa and Asia after World War II
1.5 Democratization
2 Measuring dictatorships
3 Types
3.1 Classification
3.2 Origins of power
Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin are two people often used as
examples of 20th century dictators from two different ideologies.
Contents

3.3 Stable dictatorship
3.4 Benevolent dictatorship
4 Theories of dictatorship
4.1 Emergence out of anomy
5 See also
6 References
7 Further reading
Between the two world wars, four types of dictatorships have been described: constitutional, communist (nominally championing the dictatorship of the
proletariat), counterrevolutionary, and fascist, and many have questioned the distinctions between these prototypes. Since World War II a broader range of
dictatorships has been recognized, including Third World dictatorships, theocratic or religious dictatorships and dynastic or family-based dictatorships.[3]
During the Republican phase of Ancient Rome, a Roman dictator was the special magistrate who held well defined powers, normally for six months at a time,
usually in combination with a consulship. Roman dictators were allocated absolute power during times of emergency. In execution, their power was originally
neither arbitrary nor unaccountable, being subject to law and requiring retrospective justification. There were no such dictatorships after the beginning of the 2nd
century BC, and later dictators such as Sulla and the Roman Emperors exercised power much more personally and arbitrarily. As the Roman Emperor was a king
in all but name, a concept that remained anathema to traditional Roman society, the institution was not carried forward into the Roman Empire.
After the collapse of Spanish colonial rule, various dictators came to power in many liberated countries. Often leading a private army, these Caudillos or self-
appointed political-military leaders, attacked weak national Governments once they controlled a region's political and economic powers, with examples such as
Antonio López de Santa Anna in Mexico and Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina. Such dictators have been also referred to as personalismos.[1]
The wave of military dictatorships in South America in the second half of the twentieth century left a particular mark on Latin American culture. In Latin American
literature, the dictator novel challenging dictatorship and caudillismo is a significant genre. There are also many films depicting Latin American military
dictatorships.
History
Republican Origins
19th-century Latin American caudillos

In the first half of the 20th century, Stalinist and fascist dictatorships appeared in a variety of scientifically and technologically advanced countries, which are
distinct from dictatorships in Latin America and post-colonial dictatorships in Africa and Asia. Leading examples of modern totalitarian dictatorship include:[1]
Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany, Benito Mussolini's Italy, and other fascist dictatorships;
Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union, and other Stalinist and Soviet-style Communist dictatorships that appeared after World War II in Central Europe, Eastern
Europe, China and other countries.
After World War II, dictators established themselves in the several new states of Africa and Asia, often at the expense or failure of
the constitutions inherited from the colonial powers. These constitutions often failed to work without a strong middle class or work
against the preexisting autocratic rule. Some elected presidents and prime ministers captured power by suppressing the opposition
and installing one-party rule, and others established military dictatorships through their armies.[1] Whatever their form, these
dictatorships had an adverse impact on economic growth and the quality of political institutions.[4] Dictators who stayed in office for
a long period of time found it increasingly difficult to carry out sound economic policies.
The often-cited exploitative dictatorship is the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled Zaire from 1965 to 1997, embezzling over
$5 billion from his country.[5]
The global dynamics of democratization has been a central question for political Scientists.[6][7] The Third Wave Democracy was
said to turn some dictatorships into democracies.[6] (see also the contrast between the two figures of the Democracy-Dictatorship
Index in 1988 and 2008).
The conceptual and methodological differences in political science literature exist with regards to measuring and classifying regimes as either dictatorships or
democracies, with prominent examples such as Freedom House, Polity IV and Democracy-Dictatorship Index, and their validity and reliability being discussed.[9]
Roughly two research approaches exist: the minimalist approach focuses on whether a country has continued elections that are competitive, and the substantive
approach expands the concept of democracy to include human rights, freedom of the press, the rule of law, etc.[10][11][12] The DD index is seen as an example of
the minimalist approach, whereas the Polity data series, relatively more substantive.[13]
Communism and fascism in 20th-century dictatorships
Dictatorships in Africa and Asia after World War II
Mobutu Sese Seko,
Zaire's longtime
dictator.
Democratization
Measuring dictatorships

The most general term is despotism, a form of government in which a single entity rules with absolute power.
That entity may be an individual, as in an autocracy, or it may be a group,[14] as in an oligarchy. Despotism can
mean tyranny (dominance through the threat of punishment and violence), or absolutism; or dictatorship (a
form of government in which the ruler is an absolute dictator, not restricted by a constitution, laws or
opposition, etc.).[15] Dictatorships may take the form of authoritarianism or totalitarianism.
Dictatorship is 'a form of government in which absolute power is concentrated in a dictator or a small clique' or
'a government organization or group in which absolute power is so concentrated',[16] whereas democracy, with
which the concept of dictatorship is often compared, is defined by most people as a form of government where
those who govern are elected through contested elections. Authoritarian dictatorships are those in which there is
little political mobilization and a small group exercizes power within formally ill-defined limits but actually
quite predictable ones.[17] Totalitarian dictatorships involve a single party led by a single powerful individual
with a powerful secret police and a highly developed ideology. Here, the government has total control of mass communications and social and economic
organizations.[18] Hannah Arendt labelled totalitarianism a new and extreme form of dictatorship involving atomized, isolated individuals in which ideology
plays a leading role in defining how the entire society should be organized.[19] Juan Linz argues that the distinction between an authoritarian regime and a
totalitarian one is that while an authoritarian one seeks to suffocate politics and political mobilization (depoliticization), a totalitarian one seeks to control politics
and political mobilization.[20]
Dictatorships may be classified in a number of ways, such as:
Social class
Dictatorship of the bourgeoisie
Dictatorship of the proletariat
Military dictatorship
arbitrator and ruler types may be distinguished; arbitrator regimes are professional, civilian-oriented, willing to give up power once problems have
been resolved, and support the existing social order; ruler types view civilians as incompetent and have no intention of returning power to them, are
politically organized, and have a coherent ideology[21]
Civil-military dictatorship
An example is the Civic-military dictatorship of Uruguay (1973–85)
Democracy Index by the Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2016.[8] Blue represents
more democratic countries, while red are
considered authoritarian. Dark red are
most often totalitarian dictatorships.
Types
Classification

One-party state
weak and strong versions may be distinguished; in weak one-party states, at least one other actor eclipses the
role of the party (like a single individual, the military, or the president).[22] The Joseph Stalin era in the Soviet
Union[23] and the Mao Zedong era in China can be cited as examples.
Personalist
Hybrid
Power behind the throne
There are some instances where poweful people made a head of state as a figurehead or puppet ruler while they
wield real power. In Korea, Bojang of Goguryeo was placed as a puppet ruler by Yeon Gaesomun in response to his
uncle, King Yeongnyu's plot to assassinate him. Yeon Gaesomun appointed himself as Dae Magniji (대막리지, 大莫
離支, generalissimo) and assumed de facto control over the kingdom. In Japan, the Emperors were figureheads to
the Shogunate, a military dictatorship that held political power till Emperor Meiji abolished it after the Boshin War.
Some combination of the types above.
Family dictatorship – inheriting power through family ties
Military dictatorship – through military force or coup d'état. In Latin America, military dictatorships were often ruled by committees known as military juntas.
Constitutional dictatorship – dictatorial powers provided for by constitutional means (often as a provision in case of emergency)
Self-coup – by suspending existing democratic mechanisms after attaining office by constitutional means.
A stable dictatorship is a dictatorship that is able to remain in power for a long period of time. The stable dictatorship theory concerning the Soviet Union held
that after the succession crisis following Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, the victorious leader assumed the status of a Stalinist dictator without Stalin's terror
apparatus.[24] Chile and Paraguay were both considered stable dictatorships in the 1970s.[25] It has been argued that stable dictatorships behave differently than
unstable dictatorships. For instance, Maria Brouwer opines that expansionary policies can fail and undermine the authority of the leader. Stable dictators, would
therefore, be inclined to refrain from military aggression. This applies to imperial China, Byzantium and Japan, which refrained from expanding their empires at
some point in time. Emerging dictators, by contrast, want to win the people's support by promising them riches and appropriating them from domestic or foreign
wealth. They do not have much to lose from failure, whereas success could elevate them to positions of wealth and power.[26]
Antonio López de Santa Anna
wearing Mexican military
uniforms
Origins of power
Stable dictatorship

A benevolent dictatorship is a theoretical form of government in which an authoritarian leader exercises absolute political power over the state but does so for the
benefit of the population as a whole. A benevolent dictator may allow some economic liberalization or a form of democratic decision-making to exist, such as
through public referenda or elected representatives with limited power, and he often makes preparations for a transition to genuine democracy during or after his
term. It might be seen as a republican form of enlightened despotism.
The label has been applied to leaders such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Turkey),[27] Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia),[28] Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore),[29] Abdullah II of
Jordan,[30] Paul Kagame (Rwanda), and Qaboos bin Said al Said (Oman).
Mancur Olson suggests that the emergence of dictatorships can be linked to the concept of roving bandits, individuals in an atomic system who move from place
to place extracting wealth from individuals. These bandits provide a disincentive for investment and production. Olson states that a community of individuals
would be better served if that bandit were to establish himself as a stationary bandit to monopolize theft in the form of taxes. Also, Except from the community, the
bandits themselves will be better served, according to Olson, by transforming themselves into stationary bandits. By settling down and making themselves the
rulers of a territory, they will be able to make more profits through taxes than they used to obtain through plunder. By maintaining order and providing protection
to the community, the bandits will create a peaceful environment in which their people can maximize their surplus which means a greater taxable base. Thus, a
potential dictator will have a greater incentive to provide security to a given community from which he is extracting taxes and conversely, the people from whom he
extracts the taxes are more likely to produce because they will be unconcerned with potential theft by other bandits. This is the rationality that bandits use in order
to justify their transformation from roving bandits into stationary bandits.[31]
Elective dictatorship
Generalissimo
Kleptocracy
List of longest-ruling non-royal national leaders since 1900
List of titles used by dictators
Maximum Leader
Nationalism
Nazism
Negative selection (politics)
Neo-fascism
Neo-Nazism
People's democratic dictatorship
Plutocracy
Selectorate theory
Benevolent dictatorship
Theories of dictatorship
Emergence out of anomy
See also

Strongman
Theocracy
Tyranny of the majority
1. dictatorship (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/162240/dictatorship). Encyclopædia Britannica. Chicago. 2013. 162240.
2. Margaret Power (2008). Dictatorship and Single-Party States. In Bonnie G. Smith. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Women in World History: 4 Volume Set (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=EFI7tr9XK6ECpg=RA1-PA55). Oxford University Press. pp. 1–. ISBN 978-0-19-514890-9. Retrieved 14 December 2013.
3. Frank J. Coppa (1 January 2006). Encyclopedia of Modern Dictators: From Napoleon to the Present (https://books.google.com/books?id=gTv99LBYSL4C).
Peter Lang. p. xiv. ISBN 978-0-8204-5010-0. Retrieved 25 March 2014. In the period between the two world wars, four types of dictatorships were
described by a number of smart people: constitutional, the communist (nominally championing the dictatorship of the proletariat), the
counterrevolutionary, and the fascist. Many have rightfully questioned the distinctions between these prototypes. In fact, since World War II, we have
recognized that the range of dictatorships is much broader than earlier posited and it includes so-called Third World dictatorships in Africa, Asia, Latin
America, and the Middle East and religious dictatorships....They are also family dictatorships ....
4. Papaioannou, Kostadis; vanZanden, Jan Luiten (2015). The Dictator Effect: How long years in office affect economic development (http://journals.cambridg
e.org/abstract_S1744137414000356). Journal of Institutional Economics. 11 (1). doi:10.1017/S1744137414000356 (https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS174413741
4000356).
5. Mobutu dies in exile in Morocco (http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9709/07/mobutu.wrap/). CNN. 7 September 1997.
6. Samuel P. Huntington (6 September 2012). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century (https://books.google.com/books?id=IMjyTFG04JYC).
University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 978-0-8061-8604-7.
7. Nathan J. Brown (31 August 2011). The Dynamics of Democratization: Dictatorship, Development, and Diffusion (https://books.google.com/books?id=F9LYM
p0RyD4C). JHU Press. ISBN 978-1-4214-0088-4.
8. Democracy Index 2015 (http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf) (PDF). Economist Intelligence Unit. 21 January 2016.
9. William Roberts Clark; Matt Golder; Sona N Golder (23 March 2012). Chapter 5. Democracy and Dictatorship: Conceptualization and Measurement.
Principles of Comparative Politics (http://college.cqpress.com/sites/principlescp/Home/chapter5.aspx). CQ Press. ISBN 978-1-60871-679-1.
10. Democracy and Dictatorship: Conceptualization and Measurement (http://college.cqpress.com/sites/principlescp/Home/chapter5.aspx). cqpress.com.
11. Jørgen Møller; Svend-Erik Skaaning (29 March 2012). Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Explanation (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=RtWoAgAAQBAJpg=PA78). Routledge. pp. 78–. ISBN 978-1-136-66584-4. Retrieved 30 March 2014.
12. William Roberts Clark; Matt Golder; Sona Nadenichek Golder (September 2009). Principles of comparative politics (https://books.google.com/books?id=RmPu
AAAAMAAJ). CQ Press. ISBN 978-0-87289-289-7.
References

13. Divergent Incentives for Dictators: Domestic Institutions and (International Promises Not to) Torture (http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/12/0022
002712459707?patientinform-links=yeslegid=spjcr;0022002712459707v1) Appendix (http://faculty.ucmerced.edu/cconrad2/Academic/Research_files/JCRA
ppendix25March2011.pdf) Unlike substantive measures of democracy (e.g., Polity IV and Freedom House), the binary conceptualization of democracy most
recently described by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vree-land (2010) focuses on one institution—elections—to distinguish between dictatorships and democracies.
Using a minimalist measure of democracy rather than a substantive one better allows for the isolation of causal mechanisms (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland,
2010, 73) linking regime type to human rights outcomes.
14. Despotism (https://archive.org/details/Despotis1946). Internet Archive (Film documentary). Prelinger Archives. Chicago, Illinois, US: Encyclopædia
Britannica, Inc. 1946. OCLC 6325325 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/6325325).
15. WordNet Search – 3.0 (http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=despotism)
16. Dictatorship – Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dictatorship). Merriam-
webster.com (31 August 2012). Retrieved on 2013-07-12.
17. Juan Linz, quoted in Natasha M. Ezrow, Erica Frantz (2011), Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders (https://bo
oks.google.com/books?hl=enlr=id=hOzp3xgL1FwCoi=fndpg=PR5), Continuum International Publishing Group. p2
18. Ezrow and Frantz (2011:2–3)
19. Ezrow and Frantz (2011:3)
21. Ezrow and Frantz (2011:6–7)
23. Stalinism
24. RC Thornton (1972), The Structure of Communist Politics, World Politics, JSTOR 2010454 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010454)
25. AG Cuzán (1986), Fiscal Policy, the Military, and Political Stability in Iberoamerica (https://secure.uwf.edu/govt/documents/Cuzan-1986-FiscalPolicytheMilitary
andPoliticalStabilityinIberoamerica.pdf) (PDF), Behavioral Science
26. M Brouwer (2006), Democracy and Dictatorship: The Politics of Innovation (https://web.archive.org/web/20120907114031/http://www1.fee.uva.nl/pp/bin/27
8fulltext.pdf) (PDF), archived from the original (http://www1.fee.uva.nl/pp/bin/278fulltext.pdf) (PDF) on 7 September 2012
27. Benevolent Dictator? Thinking About MK Atatürk (http://turkeyfile.blogspot.com/2009/10/benevolent-dictator.html). Turkey File. 19 October 2009.
28. Shapiro, Susan; Shapiro, Ronald (2004). The Curtain Rises: Oral Histories of the Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe (https://books.google.com/books?id=
oCqWFQ1WKlkCpg=PA180dq=tito+benevolent+dictatorhl=ensa=Xei=eZiVT8u1Io_NswahzJyVBAredir_esc=y#v=onepageq=tito%20benevolent%
20dictatorf=false). McFarland. ISBN 0-7864-1672-6.
...All Yugoslavs had educational opportunities, jobs, food, and housing regardless of nationality. Tito, seen by most as a benevolent dictator, brought
peaceful co-existence to the Balkan region, a region historically synonymous with factionalism.
29. Miller, Matt (2 May 2012). What Singapore can teach us (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-singapore-can-teach-us/2012/05/02/gIQAlQEGw
T_story.html). The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0190-8286). Retrieved 2015-11-25.
30. Kifah Jennifer (23 March 2013). King Abdullah II of Jordan, World Statesman? (http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10783/king-abdullah-ii-of-jordan-
world-statesman).
31. Olson, Mancur (1993). Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. American Political Science Review. 87 (3).

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