1. Create an Excel spreadsheet with the following columns Title, .docx

1. Create an Excel spreadsheet with the following columns:
Title, Platform, Genre, and Score.
2. Fill the spreadsheet with data from this table: Best-Reviewed
Games (Any Platform), 2013 and save it as
CS102_Project7_YourUserName.xlsx.
3. Create a new Access database and import data from Excel.
Accept all default options and make sure to check that first row
of the spreadsheet contains column headings.
4. Add a calculated field Can Play that becomes true (Yes) if
the game platform matches your favorite platform (PS3, Wii,
PC, or 360).
5. Create a simple query that displays titles of the games you
can play only.
6. Create a crosstab query with Genre as row headings and
column headings. Use Count function to count number of titles
in the intersection of Platform/Genre.
7. Save your file as CS102_Project7_YourUserName.accdb and
submit it along with CS102_Project7_YourUserName.xlsx
Requirements
. A table with 5 specified fields
. Data imported from Excel to Access
. Yes/No field properly calculated
. A query that displays titles of the games for your platform
. A crosstab query that counts number of titles of each genre on
each platform
Self-enhancement and belief perseverance
Corey L. Guenther *, Mark D. Alicke
Ohio University, Department of Psychology, 200 Porter Hall,

Athens, OH 45701, USA
Received 23 June 2006; revised 17 April 2007
Available online 30 April 2007
Abstract
Belief perseverance—the tendency to make use of invalidated
information—is one of social psychology’s most reliable
phenomena.
Virtually all of the explanations proffered for the effect, as well
as the conditions that delimit it, involve the way people think
about or
explain the discredited feedback. But it seems reasonable to
assume that the importance of the feedback for the actor’s self-
image would
also influence the tendency to persevere on invalidated
feedback. From a self-enhancement perspective, one might ask:
Why would peo-
ple persist in negative self-beliefs, especially when the basis for
those beliefs has been discredited? In the present study, actors
and observ-
ers completed a word-identification task and were given bogus
success or failure feedback. After success feedback was
discredited, actors
and observers persevered equally in beliefs about the actor’s
abilities. However, following invalidation of failure feedback,
actors pro-
vided significantly higher performance evaluations than
observers, thus exhibiting less perseverance on the negative
feedback. These
results suggest that the motivation to maintain a relatively
favorable self-image may attenuate perseverance when
discredited feedback
threatens an important aspect of the self-concept.
! 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Self-enhancement; Belief perseverance; Motivation;
Self-perception; Self-evaluation; Task-importance; Failure
feedback
People believe many things that turn out to be untrue
but are not always able or willing to revise their beliefs.
Superstitions abound, and they require only sporadic rein-
forcement to be held tenaciously (Skinner, 1948). Further-
more, numerous studies show that believing occurs more
automatically than revising (Gilbert, 1991), which helps
to explain why many beliefs outlive the data that discredit
them.
The steadfastness of beliefs in the face of invalidating
evidence is a topic that traverses many research areas in
psychology including correspondence bias (Gilbert & Mal-
one, 1995; Jones & Harris, 1967), psycho-legal studies of
inadmissible evidence (e.g., Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Kas-
sin & Sommers, 1997; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973;
Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981), and basic research
on impression formation (Schul & Burnstein, 1985; Schul
& Goren, 1997; Wyer & Unverzagt, 1985). But the research
area that addresses this tendency most directly is called
‘‘belief perseverance’’. Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard
(1975), following up an earlier study by Walster, Berscheid,
Abrahams, and Aronson (1967), conducted the experi-
ments that stimulated widespread interest in this phenom-
enon. Participants in their studies evaluated the
genuineness of suicide notes in what they believed was a
study on physiological responses during decision making.
After being connected to electrodes and making their judg-
ments, participants received bogus feedback which indi-
cated that they had succeeded or failed at the task.
Participants were subsequently told that the feedback was

fictitious and that the purpose of the study was to assess
physiological responses to success and failure feedback.
They then estimated their actual performance. Despite hav-
ing been told that the feedback was fabricated, participants
who received success feedback continued to evaluate them-
selves more favorably than those who received failure feed-
back. Parallel effects were obtained from observers who
witnessed the feedback being administered and saw it
discredited.
0022-1031/$ - see front matter ! 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.04.010
* Corresponding author. Fax: +1 740 593 0579.
E-mail address: [email protected] (C.L. Guenther).
www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 706–712
mailto:[email protected]
Ross et al. argued that perseverance occurs because peo-
ple spontaneously construct causal stories to explain the
original feedback. These explanations become highly acces-
sible and autonomous from the information on which they
were based, and contain new inferences that are relatively
impervious to invalidation. According to this view, some-
one who succeeds or fails imagines various causal factors
that could have produced this outcome, and when the ori-
ginal feedback is discredited, these new causal inferences
inadvertently affect the person’s attributions. This assump-

tion is consistent with the general conclusion that consider-
ing alternative hypotheses corrects numerous social
judgment biases (e.g., Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff,
1980; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984). Numerous experi-
ments have supported these assumptions (e.g., Anderson,
1982, 1983; Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Anderson,
New, & Speer, 1985; McFarland, Cheam, & Buehler,
2007), although there is some question as to whether the
generation of causal explanations is always required for
belief perseverance (Wegner, Coulton, & Wenzlaff, 1985).
Although competing explanations continue to be prof-
fered for belief perseverance (see also, Anderson & Lind-
say, 1998; Anderson & Sechler, 1986; Lieberman &
Arndt, 2000; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Smith, 1982), there is
little doubt that the tendency to adhere to initial feedback
is one of the most reliable effects in the social judgment
canon. In fact, belief perseverance is so powerful that to
date, researchers have reported relatively few factors that
moderate its strength. Among the moderating factors iden-
tified is explicitly informing participants about the pro-
cesses underlying perseverance (Ross et al., 1975),
increasing self-awareness (Davies, 1982), having partici-
pants generate alternatives to the feedback (Anderson,
1982; Anderson & Sechler, 1986; Massad, Hubbard, &
Newtson, 1979), and telling participants that both the feed-
back and the test from which it was generated are bogus
(McFarland et al., 2007).
So far, the factors that have been shown to moderate
belief perseverance have all involved the way participants
attend to, think about, or explain the feedback they receive.
But there is another class of moderating factors that could
plausibly affect the tendency to be influenced by discredited
feedback, namely, the importance of the feedback for peo-
ple’s self-concepts. Abundant research suggests that people

generally strive to maintain the most favorable self-image
that reality constraints will allow (Alicke & Govorun,
2005; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). From this vantage, the
tendency to persevere on discredited feedback (particularly
unfavorable feedback) is puzzling. If people are concerned
with maintaining reasonably favorable self-views, why
don’t they seize the opportunity to restore positive self-
evaluations when they are given every reason to believe
that the unfavorable feedback was false?
The main reason, we suspect, lies in the sheer strength of
the perseverance effect, which constrains the operation of
self-enhancement. Still, it seems reasonable to assume,
based on the voluminous self-enhancement literature, that
there would be circumstances in which the desire to eschew
negative information about oneself would moderate belief
perseverance. However, belief perseverance studies have
not typically been designed to evoke self-enhancement con-
cerns. For one thing, many of these studies assess judg-
ments of other people rather than oneself (e.g.,
Anderson, 1982; Anderson et al., 1980). In studies that
do include self-related judgments (e.g., Ross et al., 1975;
Wegner et al., 1985), investigators do not usually portray
the task as an important one for diagnosing personal char-
acteristics, and thus the chances of activating self-enhance-
ment motives is minimized. In the study described below,
we compare actors’ and observers’ perseverance tendencies
following feedback on a task that they are explicitly told
involves an important characteristic, namely, intelligence.
Until now, the only belief perseverance studies that
employed actor–observer paradigms were the original ones
by Ross et al. (1975) and those reported by Wegner et al.
(1985). Neither of these studies revealed perseverance dif-
ferences between actors and observers. However, these

researchers were primarily interested in establishing the
perseverance effect and testing competing explanations,
and did not emphasize the importance of the performance
outcomes for any particular abilities or traits. In fact, par-
ticipants in their studies were led to believe that the exper-
imenters were interested in physiological responses during
performance and that the performance outcome informa-
tion itself was relatively unimportant. Our goal in the pres-
ent study was to show that when the performance
dimension is explicitly described as one that measures intel-
ligence—an attribute that is presumably important to most
college students—actors will exhibit a reduced tendency
relative to observers to persevere on negative feedback.
The present study
Participants were told that they would complete a test of
mental acuity that measured a fundamental aspect of intel-
ligence. Actors actually took the test, which involved their
ability to detect subliminal stimuli, and received feedback
indicating that they had performed very well or very
poorly. Observers saw the actor take the test and also
learned of the favorable or unfavorable outcome. Experi-
menters then told actors that they had applied the wrong
answer key to their performance, which resulted in the
actor receiving incorrect feedback. Performance ratings
were obtained at three separate times: before participants
began the task, after the initial feedback was received,
and after the feedback was discredited. Initial ratings were
used as a covariate for post-discredit ratings.
Consistent with prior research, we expected to obtain
perseverance effects from both actors and observers such
that a significant difference between favorable and unfavor-
able feedback conditions would remain in their perfor-
mance judgments even after the feedback was discredited.

We further expected, however, that the magnitude of perse-
verance effects would differ between actors and observers.
C.L. Guenther, M.D. Alicke / Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology 44 (2008) 706–712 707
Because self-enhancement is generally stronger on negative
than on positive response dimensions (Alicke, Klotz, Bre-
itenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995), we were more
confident of obtaining differential perseverance following
negative than positive feedback. Evidence of self-enhance-
ment would be revealed by actors evaluating themselves
more favorably than observers following the receipt and
subsequent invalidation of negative feedback.
Method
Participants
Participants were 122 (47 male, 75 female) undergradu-
ate students whose participation partially fulfilled a
requirement for introductory psychology.
Procedure
Participants completed the experiment individually.
Upon arrival, they were seated in front of a computer
and asked to complete the consent form which contained
the basic instructions. The study was described as one that
investigated mental acuity, defined as one of three primary
components of intelligence.
After the consent form was completed, further instruc-
tions were delivered by computer and recited orally by

the experimenter. The instructions explained that mental
acuity involved the ability to quickly identify, discriminate,
and categorize information in one’s perceptual field. Partic-
ipants were told that previous research has shown that
those who score high on tests of mental acuity also tend
to score high on tests of overall intelligence.
Participants were randomly assigned to the actor and
observer roles. Observers were told that through computer
networking, they would observe the task as another partic-
ipant completed it from another room. They were told that
once the actor completed the task, they would see the
actor’s score and be asked to complete a questionnaire
regarding his or her performance.
The task comprised a series of 25 words that would be
flashed individually on the computer screen for 11 ms.
After each word was shown, participants were asked to
record the word they believed had been flashed on the
screen. They were told that at the end of the 25 trials, a
composite score would be calculated and presented, and
that a short questionnaire would follow. Participants were
then instructed to begin the task.
Words used in the experimental task ranged in length
from 4-6 letters, appeared in 22 point Times New Roman
font, and were flashed on the screen for 11 ms. Each word
was preceded by a masking row of 8 asterisks for 135 ms to
focus participants’ attention on the center of the screen.
The same 135 ms mask was added following each word.
Participants were given five practice trials to familiarize
themselves with the procedure before beginning the actual
experimental task. Actors were given as much time as nec-
essary to provide a response. On each trial, observers saw
‘‘Participant Response’’ on their screens for 3 s between

trials. The experiment was conducted using MediaLab
(Jarvis, 2004a,b) and Direct RT software.
Feedback manipulation
After the 25 trials were completed, participants were
randomly assigned to receive either positive or negative
performance feedback. In the positive feedback condition,
actors and observers learned that the actor had correctly
identified the word on 20 of the 25 trials, which placed
them at the 93rd percentile. In the negative feedback con-
dition, actors and observers learned that the actor had cor-
rectly identified the word on 12 of the 25 trials, which put
them at the 36th percentile.
Discrediting of feedback
After participants had completed the task, the experi-
menter returned and informed them that there had been
an unfortunate mistake. The experimenter explained that
there were different versions of the task, each with its
own answer key, and that by accident he (she) had paired
the participant’s task with the wrong answer key. Conse-
quently, their test had been scored incorrectly, and the
feedback they had been given did not reflect their actual
performance or intelligence. Furthermore, because
responses were anonymous, participants were told that
there was no way to recover their test and determine their
actual score.
Response measures
Pre-task ratings were obtained after the experimental
instructions had been given but prior to the start of the
task. Participants were asked to estimate, based on the
description of mental acuity and the experimental task,

how many items they believed that they (or if they were
in the observer role, the actor) would answer correctly,
how mentally acute they thought they were (the actor
was), and also at what percentile of the general population
(0–100) they believed their (the actor’s) mental acuity lied.
Performance estimations could range from 0–25 and men-
tal acuity ratings were made on 1–10 scales (0 = extremely
low, 10 = extremely high). These same judgments were
made a second time after the initial feedback was adminis-
tered. Here, participants were asked to make ratings based
on the feedback they received. Finally, ratings were
obtained a third time after the initial feedback had been
discredited.
Results and discussion
Nine participants were excluded from the analysis
because they failed to complete the primary response mea-
sures. Means and standard deviations for estimates of how
708 C.L. Guenther, M.D. Alicke / Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology 44 (2008) 706–712
many items the actor answered correctly, the actor’s mental
acuity, and the actor’s percentile standing, are displayed in
Table 1 for each of the three time frames.
A preliminary 2 (actor vs. observer) · 2 (positive vs. neg-
ative feedback) · 3 (pre-feedback vs. post-feedback vs.
post-discredit) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the
first two variables being between subjects factors and the
third measured within subjects, revealed a significant
three-way interaction for ratings of actor mental acuity,
F(2, 108) = 8.71, p < .0001, g2 = .139, and percentile rank,

F(2, 108) = 5.14, p < .007, g2 = .087, but was non-signifi-
cant for estimates of number correct (p > .05).
Because this analysis yields numerous effects, many of
which are irrelevant to our primary hypotheses, we have
organized the analysis below around the primary questions
we sought to address. The main questions in this study
were (1) whether traditional perseverance effects occurred,
and (2) whether actors persevered more on positive feed-
back, and less on negative feedback, than observers. Before
addressing these questions, it was necessary to show that
actors’ and observers’ perceptions of the actors’ abilities
did not differ prior to the receipt of the feedback, and also
to show that the feedback was effective in altering actors’
and observers’ initial perceptions.
Were there initial actor–observer differences?
Subsequent analyses would be difficult to interpret if
actors and observers differed in their initial estimates of
actors’ abilities. If there were initial differences, then the
tendency for actors to persevere more than observers on
positive feedback or less on negative feedback might simply
reflect actors’ more favorable performance expectations
rather than a desire to maintain a relatively favorable
self-view. Because previous belief perseverance studies have
not been concerned primarily with self-related judgments,
pre-feedback ratings have been less crucial and not
included in this research.
A 2 (actor vs. observer) · 2 (positive vs. negative feed-
back) ANOVA was conducted on pre-feedback ratings to
determine whether actors and observers differed in their
perceptions of actors’ mental acuity or abilities prior to
the experimental task. This analysis yielded no actor–

observer differences on estimates of how many items the
actor would answer correctly (F < 1), on initial ratings of
the actor’s mental acuity (F < 1), or on estimates of the
actor’s percentile standing (F < 1). Clearly, therefore,
actors and observers did not differ in their perceptions of
the actor’s ability prior to the administration of perfor-
mance feedback. Thus, subsequent findings cannot be
explained in terms of differences in initial performance
expectations.
Were actors and observers influenced by the feedback?
Before analyzing the main factors of interest, it was also
necessary to show that the positive and negative feedback
had their intended effects. We expected participants in the
positive feedback condition to increase their evaluations
of the actor following feedback administration, and those
in the negative feedback condition to decrease their evalu-
ations. To this end, a 2 (actor vs. observer) · 2 (positive vs.
negative feedback) · 2 (pre-feedback vs. post-feedback)
analysis was conducted with the first two factors measured
between subjects and the third measured within subjects.
Changes in actor evaluations in the positive and negative
feedback conditions are indicated by the interaction
between the repeated factor (before feedback evaluations,
after feedback evaluations) and positive vs. negative feed-
back. This interaction was significant on estimates of how
many items the actor answered correctly,
F(1, 109) = 65.62, p < .0001, g2 = .376, ratings of the
actor’s mental acuity, F(1, 109) = 124.81, p < .0001,
g2 = .534, and estimates of the actor’s percentile standing,
F(1, 109) = 247.92, p < .0001, g2 = .695. No other interac-
tions were significant. As Table 1 shows, both actors and
observers in the positive feedback condition increased their
evaluations when the initial feedback was received, while

Table 1
Means and standard deviations for actor-ratings: before
feedback, after
feedback, and after feedback is discredited
Measure Positive Negative
Actors Observers Actors Observers
Estimated number correct
Before feedback
M 17.00 17.89 17.50 17.39
SD 3.10 7.69 4.54 3.92
After discredit
M 19.16 19.68 15.00 13.04
SD 2.93 1.42 3.20 2.34
Ratings of mental acuity
Before feedback
M 6.39 6.07 6.50 6.04
SD 1.33 0.98 1.39 0.90
After feedback
M 7.55 8.46 4.69 4.21
SD 1.34 0.96 2.26 1.29
After discredit
M 7.10 7.86 6.15 5.00
SD 1.27 1.14 1.67 0.78
Percentile estimate
Before feedback

M 68.67 69.32 73.04 65.32
SD 12.83 13.46 12.41 12.12
After feedback
M 89.32 87.75 31.42 33.11
SD 11.78 17.50 15.10 15.25
After discredit
M 82.42 87.07 55.75 42.96
SD 12.85 8.54 20.85 16.26
Note. Estimations for number correct could range from 0 to 25.
Ratings of
mental acuity were made on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 to
10.
Estimations of percentile rank could range from 0 to 100.
Psychology 44 (2008) 706–712 709
those in the negative feedback condition decreased their
evaluations when the initial feedback was received. Thus,
the bogus feedback did have the intended effects of raising
evaluations of the actor’s ability in the positive feedback
condition and lowering them in the negative feedback
condition.
Did perseverance occur?
Our first primary research question was whether tradi-
tional perseverance was observed. Perseverance is usually
defined in terms of differences in evaluations between posi-
tive and negative feedback conditions even after research
participants are told that the feedback was bogus or erro-

neous. Following this traditional methodology, a 2 (actor
vs. observer) · 2 (positive vs. negative feedback) ANOVA
was conducted to compare post-discredit ratings made by
participants in the positive and negative feedback condi-
tions. Consistent with previous research, we expected par-
ticipants in the positive feedback condition to provide
significantly more favorable actor evaluations than those
in the negative feedback condition. Results supported this
prediction. A main effect of feedback was obtained
whereby participants given positive, discredited feedback
estimated that the actor got more items correct,
F(1, 109) = 125.14, p < .0001, g2 = .534, provided higher
ratings of actors’ mental acuity, F(1, 109) = 63.81,
p < .0001, g2 = .369, and estimated actors’ mental acuity
to lie at a higher percentile, F(1, 109) = 154.05, p < .0001,
g2 = .586, than did participants who had been given nega-
tive, discredited feedback, thus replicating the usual belief
perseverance findings.
Actor–observer perseverance differences in positive and
negative feedback conditions
The final and most important question we addressed
was whether actors persevered more on positive discredited
feedback than observers, and less on negative discredited
feedback, after controlling for initial evaluations. The fact
that there were no differences in initial evaluations, of
course, suggests that covarying these evaluations should
have little effect on the results.
As previously discussed, because self-enhancement is
generally stronger on negative than on positive response
dimensions (Alicke et al., 1995), we were more confident
of obtaining differential perseverance between actors and
observers in the negative feedback condition. Results of a
2 (actor vs. observer) · 2 (positive vs. negative feedback)

analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on post-discredit evalu-
ations, controlling for initial ratings, confirmed this
assumption. Significant interactions, each revealing a simi-
lar pattern, were obtained for estimates of how many items
the actor answered correctly, F(1, 108) = 6.30, p < .014,
g2 = .055, ratings of the actor’s mental acuity,
F(1, 108) = 21.24, p < .001, g2 = .164, and estimates of the
actor’s percentile standing, F(1, 108) = 7.02, p < .009,
g2 = .061. Following the receipt of positive, discredited
feedback, actors and observers provided virtually identical
estimates of the number of items the actor answered cor-
rectly and the percentile rank of his or her performance
(Fs < 1). There were actor–observer differences in ratings
of mental acuity, F(1, 108) = 11.99, p < .001, g2 = .100,
but it was the observer ratings that were more positive than
actor ratings. Thus, there was no evidence of self-enhance-
ment in positive feedback conditions.
By contrast, significant differences between actors and
observers for attributions regarding negative discredited
feedback were obtained on each measure. After controlling
for initial evaluations, actors who received negative feed-
back that was later discredited estimated that they had
answered more items correctly, F(1, 108) = 7.92, p < .006,
g2 = .068, that they possessed more mental acuity,
F(1, 108) = 9.14, p < .003, g2 = .078, and also estimated
that their performance fell at a higher percentile,
F(1, 108) = 6.39, p < .013, g2 = .056, than did observers.
Thus, differential perseverance was obtained in the negative
feedback condition, as actors tended to inflate their self-
evaluations and perseverate to a lesser extent than did
observers.
The present study, therefore, is the first of which we are
aware to demonstrate actor–observer differences in attribu-

tions following discredited feedback. These differences were
obtained, however, primarily following negative feedback.
Specifically, actors showed less perseverance on negative
feedback that was discredited than did observers. From
the standpoint of self-enhancement, one might question
why actors didn’t also show an increased tendency to per-
severe on positive feedback relative to observers. One pos-
sibility is a simple ceiling effect. After positive feedback was
discredited, the perseverance effect led both actors and
observers to give the actor high ratings, leaving little room
on the respective scales for actors to elevate their ratings
above those of observers. Another explanation is that
self-enhancement tendencies tend to be stronger on nega-
tive response dimensions than on positive ones (Alicke &
Govorun, 2005; Chambers & Windshitl, 2004; Sedikides
& Gregg, 2003). After the discrediting manipulation, actors
and observers in the positive feedback condition gave
actors relatively high ratings on mental acuity, estimated
that the actor was correct on about 20 of 25 trials, and also
estimated the actor’s percentile rank to lie near the 85th
percentile, so there was relatively little need for actors to
exhibit further self-enhancement.
The experimental design of the present study also
allowed us to eliminate a possible alternative explanation
for the observed actor–observer differences. In virtually
all published belief perseverance studies, participants’
responses are obtained only after the initial feedback is dis-
credited. The finding that actors evaluate themselves more
favorably than observers after unfavorable feedback is dis-
credited could simply reflect initial attributional differences.
According to this interpretation, participants essentially
ignore the feedback after it is discredited and revert to their

initial expectations, which are higher than those of observ-
ers. The present study, however, refutes this interpretation.
No actor–observer differences were obtained before the
feedback was administered, and therefore, controlling for
initial evaluations did not influence the results. The absence
of initial differences is consistent with the general finding
that self-enhancement is minimized when actors expect to
be evaluated on highly objective tasks (Alicke & Govorun,
2005).
Thus, the results of the study reported in this paper sug-
gest that people do show decreased perseverance when the
experimental task is described as one that measures an
important self-component, which in the present studies,
was represented as mental acuity—a purportedly vital
aspect of intelligence. We believe that the data make a com-
pelling argument that when the task is an important one,
the desire to maintain a relatively favorable self-image
leads actors to perseverate less than observers on unfavor-
able feedback. This is a potentially important self-evalua-
tion maintenance mechanism. Everyone receives negative
feedback, and while it would be unwise simply to ignore
objective evaluations, it is equally unwise to subscribe to
negative feedback whose validity is questionable. Of the
numerous mechanisms that people use to help maintain
positive self-views, knowing how to handle negative feed-
back effectively may be among the most important.
People learn about themselves from various sources—by
testing their skills vs. the environment or other people, by
receiving scores on objective tests, and via verbal feedback
provided in relatively formal (e.g., performance evalua-
tions) or informal (e.g., comments by an acquaintance)

circumstances. A difficult, but indispensable, aspect of
self-evaluation requires people to assess the validity of
these data sources. Some feedback is almost impossible
to challenge, such as reading a stop watch to calculate one’s
running time, whereas other feedback, such as a perfor-
mance evaluation from a non-expert source, may be
eschewed as worthless.
In the belief perseverance paradigm, information that
initially appears to be highly credible is subsequently called
into question. It is important to note that although exper-
imenters tell participants that the feedback was erroneous,
the feedback may still provide the baseline from which they
estimate their true performance. Thus, participants may
believe that they are discarding the feedback without real-
izing that they are using it as a judgmental anchor. In our
view, the main cause of belief perseverance is not that peo-
ple fail to appreciate the invalidity of the initial feedback,
or that they make new inferences in seeking to make sense
of it, but rather, that they inadvertently use this feedback
as an anchor from which to rate their abilities at the task.
The present findings add to the research literature that
examines the interplay between cognitive and motivational
factors in social judgment and behavior (Kunda, 1990).
While there may be some aspects of judgment and behavior
that are purely habitual or automatic, most interesting
social phenomena contain chronic or situational goals that
the actor is trying to achieve, as well as cognitive processes
by which those goals are pursued. In belief perseverance,
actors’ have to assess their ability at the task, and the
way they do this is heavily influenced by the initial, invali-
dated feedback that they received. The present research is
the first to show that this process is alterable when the task
is described as an important one for the self-concept and

actors, therefore, have the goal of maintaining a reasonable
favorable self-view on the performance dimension.
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Self-enhancement and belief perseveranceThe present
studyMethodParticipantsProcedureFeedback
manipulationDiscrediting of feedbackResponse measuresResults
and discussionWere there initial actor-observer
differences?Were actors and observers influenced by the
feedback?Did perseverance occur?Actor-observer perseverance

differences in positive and negative feedback
conditionsReferences
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 233–240
www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp
0022-1031/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.01.010
The perseverance eVect in the debrieWng paradigm:
Replication and extension !
Cathy McFarland a,¤, Adeline Cheam a, Roger Buehler b
a Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby,
BC, Canada V5A 1S6
b Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ont., Canada N2L 3C5
Received 9 November 2005; revised 11 November 2005
Available online 29 March 2006
Abstract
A classic study conducted by Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975)
revealed a perseverance eVect wherein people who received
positive
performance feedback on an alleged social perceptiveness test
reported more favorable self-perceptions in this domain than
those who
received negative feedback despite the fact that they had
received standard outcome debrieWng (i.e., been informed
about the false, prede-
termined, and random nature of the feedback) prior to reporting

self-assessments. The present studies extend this past research
by reveal-
ing that (a) there is a form of outcome debrieWng (i.e.,
informing participants about the bogus nature of the test as well
as the bogus nature
of the feedback) that eVectively eliminates the perseverance
eVect, (b) the perseverance eVect that occurs after standard
outcome
debrieWng is limited to perceptions of speciWc task-relevant
skills rather than more global abilities, and (c) aVective
reactions do not
underlie the perseverance eVect that occurs in the false
feedback paradigm.
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: The perseverance eVect; DebrieWng; Self-
perception; False feedback
In a study investigating how threats to self-esteem aVect
social perceptions, Charlotte received feedback indicating
that she performed at the 30th percentile on a test that pur-
portedly measured intellectual ability. Shortly thereafter, she
evaluated a target person, and was then thoroughly
debriefed. The experimenter explained why it was necessary
to present a cover story, stressed that her score was randomly
determined in advance, and highlighted that her score
reXected nothing about her true intellectual ability. Nonethe-
less, as she headed home, Charlotte found herself wondering
about her ability to succeed in university, and seriously con-
templated whether she really has what it takes to be a lawyer.
This perseverance eVect, wherein people cling to newly
formed beliefs even when the evidential basis for those beliefs
is completed refuted, was demonstrated convincingly in a
classic study conducted by Ross et al. (1975). Their research
revealed that participants who were provided with false feed-

back indicating that they performed well on a test of social
perceptiveness ability provided more favorable self-evalua-
tions after debrieWng than did participants who were told that
they performed poorly. In other words, the self-perceptions
of task-relevant skills that were elicited by the feedback “per-
severed” despite extensive debrieWng. Presumably, such
beliefs persist because subjects attempt to generate explana-
tions for the initial outcome (e.g., I am a pretty outgoing per-
son and that is why I did so well), and the causal factors they
identify continue to predict the outcome even when the out-
come that prompted the explanation is invalidated (Ander-
son, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Ross, Lepper, Strack, &
Steinmetz, 1977).
Although conducted over a quarter century ago, Ross
et al.’s research continues to have important ethical
implications for researchers in social psychology. The false
! This research was supported by SSHRC standard research
grants
awarded to the Wrst and third authors. We thank Celeste
Alvaro, Paul
Conway, Vivian Hsing, and Diane Lines for their assistance
with the
research.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: [email protected] (C. McFarland).
234 C. McFarland et al. / Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology 43 (2007) 233–240
feedback paradigm has been used to study many social psy-
chological phenomena, including reactions to social compar-

isons (e.g., Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987;
McFarland & Buehler, 1995; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988);
the impact of threats to self-esteem on self-evaluation (e.g.,
Brown & Smart, 1991; Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman,
1995), social comparison judgments (e.g., Brown & Galla-
gher, 1992), aggression (Stucke & Sporer, 2002), and preju-
dice (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997); the role of individual
diVerences in emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions
to performance feedback (e.g., Baumeister, Heatherton, &
Tice, 1993; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Di Paula & Campbell,
2002; McFarlin, 1985; Wood, Giordano-Beech, Taylor,
Michela, & Gaus, 1994, 1999); the relation between mood
and cognition (e.g., Forgas, 2000; Schwarz & Clore, 1996);
and the nature of emotions and emotional regulation in the
aftermath of distressing events (Brown & Dutton, 1995;
Brown & Marshall, 2001; Dodgson & Wood, 1998; Forgas &
Ciarrochi, 2002; McFarland & Buehler, 1998; Nummenmaa
& Niemi, 2004). Given the continued and widespread use of
the false feedback paradigm, it is essential that researchers
have at their disposal debrieWng techniques that can eVec-
tively eliminate the perseverance phenomenon. The goal of
our research was to critically examine the debrieWng process
and further clarify the precise features that make for an eVec-
tive debrieWng in this paradigm.
The current research
We conducted two studies that were designed to extend
Ross et al.’s (1975) Wndings regarding the nature of an eVec-
tive debrieWng. Before presenting our precise goals, it is
important to consider their research in greater detail. In their
main study, participants were Wrst informed that the research
was examining “physiological responses during decision
making.” Next, while attached to a recording device, they
completed a decision-making task (i.e., distinguishing real
from fake suicide notes) that purportedly assessed social per-

ceptiveness ability.1 After receiving either success or failure
feedback, they were assigned to one of three groups. In the
outcome debrieWng condition, participants were informed of
the “true” purpose of the study (“to examine physiological
reactions to feedback”), and that their feedback was false,
randomly assigned, predetermined, and non-reXective of
their actual ability. In the process debrieWng condition, partic-
ipants received the same information as that provided to out-
come debrieWng participants, with one important addition:
they were informed about the perseverance phenomenon and
encouraged to avoid engaging in this cognitive process. In the
no debrieWng condition, participants did not receive a
debrieWng at this point in the session. Participants then com-
pleted three assessments of belief perseverance: (1) estimates
of current performance and predictions regarding future per-
formance on an equally diYcult set of notes, (2) evaluations
of ability on the speciWc task (i.e., identifying real suicide
notes), and (3) ratings of abilities presumably related to
social perceptiveness (i.e., recognizing falsehood, sensitivity
to others’ feelings, and test-taking skills). A perseverance
eVect would be revealed if post-debrieWng self-perceptions in
the success group were more favorable than those in the fail-
ure group. The results indicated that although process
debrieWng was eVective in eliminating perseverance on all
measures, outcome debrieWng yielded a perseverance eVect
on both performance estimates and ratings of ability on the
speciWc task.2
Our research had four objectives. First, we assessed the
possibility that there is a form of outcome debrieWng that
can be eVective in eliminating perseverance. One notewor-
thy feature of the original Ross et al. (1975) research is that
although debriefed participants were told that their score
on the test was bogus, they were led to believe that the test
itself was a valid test of an important underlying ability,

and that therefore, a “real” score on the test actually
existed. It seems possible that this feature of the debrieWng
might make the perseverance eVect more likely. Presum-
ably, participants who have received outcome debrieWng
might Wnd themselves wondering what their real score on
the test is, and might even use the fake score as an anchor
with which to estimate their real score (Cervone & Palmer,
1990; Mussweiler, Strack, & PfeiVer, 2000; Wegner, Coul-
ton, & WenzlaV, 1985).3 In essence, curiosity about one’s
real score could engender a train of thought that leads par-
ticipants to construct a scenario or image of their actual
performance that is consistent with their randomly
assigned performance. This, image, in turn, might engender
further self-relevant thoughts (e.g., attributions to stable
qualities, self-praise or criticism) that ultimately create per-
severance in self-perceptions. In our research, we developed
a revised form of outcome debrieWng that included infor-
mation indicating that the test itself was not a real validated
test of social perceptiveness ability. We expected that the
addition of this feature would eliminate the perseverance
eVect that is normally obtained with outcome debrieWng.
Second, we explored the generality of the perseverance
eVect that occurs after standard outcome debrieWng. In Ross
et al. (1975), perseverance was strongest on self-perceptions
that were speciWc to the test-domain (i.e., performance esti-
mates and ratings of the ability to identify real suicide notes).
However, although they assessed perceptions of a few “related
1 Dr. Lepper (personal communication, August, 1997) has
conWrmed
that participants were told that the decision-making task
assessed general
social perceptiveness ability. The original (1975) report did not
mention
this point explicitly.

2 We focused our discussion on Study 2 of the Ross et al.
(1975) report
because it included a “no debrieWng” control group and a
process de-
brieWng group. The results of their Study 1, which included
only the out-
come debrieWng condition, were comparable to those of Study
2, except
that perseverance was obtained on the “related abilities”
measure.
3 Some anecdotal support for this assumption can be found in
the spon-
taneous comments made by participants from other studies in
our lab. We
regularly use false feedback, and have found that it is not
uncommon for
participants to ask for information about their “real” score after
being de-
briefed. Indeed, it is these comments that sparked the current
research.
C. McFarland et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
43 (2007) 233–240 235
skills,” they did not ask participants to rate themselves on the
precise global dimension allegedly assessed by the suicide note
task—social perceptiveness ability. In our research, we
included several items to assess participants’ perceptions of
their global social perceptiveness skills. Based on Ross et al.’s
Wndings, we expected that perseverance would likely be lim-
ited to speciWc ratings. However, it seemed worthwhile to
assess the generality of the perseverance eVect because their

preliminary study (see Footnote 2) did reveal an eVect on the
“related skills” measure. Moreover, given that the test is por-
trayed as assessing a general ability, it seems plausible that
perseverance could occur on more global perceptions. The
generality of the perseverance eVect is an important issue. If
the phenomenon extends to perceptions of global abilities
then the prescription that researchers conduct debrieWngs that
completely eliminate perseverance is rendered ever more
pressing.
Finally, we examined the possibility that the persever-
ance eVect occurring after standard outcome debrieWng
might be due to “aVective perseverance” (e.g., Sherman &
Kim, 2002). Ross et al. discussed, but were not able to test,
the possibility that perseverance in self-perceptions could
derive from mood reactions that are not completely elimi-
nated through debrieWng. Presumably, participants’ post-
debrieWng moods could inXuence self-perceptions via
mood-congruent processing (e.g., Brown & Mankowski,
1993; Sedikides & Green, 2001). We included a post-
debrieWng mood assessment to evaluate this notion.
Study 1
Using a procedure closely modeled after that used by
Ross et al. (1975), participants were exposed to either suc-
cess or failure feedback on an alleged test of social percep-
tiveness that involved distinguishing real from fake suicide
notes. They then received one of four debrieWng inductions:
(1) standard outcome debrieWng (i.e., participants were told
about the “true” purposes, and that their score was false,
predetermined, and randomly assigned), (2) revised out-
come debrieWng (i.e., participants received standard out-
come debrieWng and learned that the test was bogus), (3)
process debrieWng (i.e., participants received standard out-
come debrieWng and information regarding perseverance),

or (4) no debrieWng. After the debrieWng variation, partici-
pants provided current and future performance estimates,
ratings of their speciWc and global abilities, and mood rat-
ings. We predicted that perseverance would occur in only
the standard outcome debrieWng condition, and that it
would be limited to ratings of performance and speciWc
task-relevant skills. We also evaluated whether aVective
reactions mediated the perseverance eVect.
Method
Participants and design
The participants were 67 female and 61 male SFU
undergraduates who took part individually and were pro-
vided with course credit for participating. They were ran-
domly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (feedback: success
vs. failure) £ 4 (debrieWng condition: no debrieWng vs. stan-
dard outcome debrieWng vs. revised outcome debrieWng vs.
process debrieWng) between-subjects factorial design. Males
and females were distributed approximately equally across
the conditions. Preliminary analyses indicated that there
were no interactions involving gender; thus, the primary
analyses do not include gender as a factor.
Procedure
Participants were Wrst provided with a cover story indi-
cating that the researchers were exploring “personality
traits and physiological responses during decision-making.”
Accordingly, they Wrst completed a personality survey, after
which they were attached to physiological recording equip-
ment. During a “baseline assessment of arousal,” they read
an information sheet indicating that the decision-making
task involved reading 15 pairs of suicide notes, and select-

ing the one “real” note from each pair. The task was
described as a widely used measure of social perceptiveness-
“the ability to make accurate judgments about other peo-
ple’s behaviors and motives.” This ability was depicted as
an important attribute that is linked to a wide variety of
positive outcomes. Participants then completed the test,
after which they were told to sit still while a “post-task
reading” was obtained. At this time, the experimenter left
the room brieXy to “score the test.”
Feedback manipulation
The experimenter returned and presented the participant
with a feedback sheet tucked inside the test booklet. The
feedback sheets were prepared in advance, ensuring that the
experimenter remained blind to condition. Participants
were told that their score was either 14/15 (success) or 4/15
(failure), and that the average was 9/15.
DebrieWng manipulation
After a few minutes, the experimenter removed the elec-
trodes, and delivered one of the debrieWng variable induc-
tions. Participants in the no debrieWng condition were told
that while their credit form was being prepared they were to
complete a Wnal “thoughts and reactions” questionnaire
(see below). In the debrieWng conditions, the experimenter
explained that the study was actually examining “the eVects
of feedback on physiological responses,” and that it had
therefore been necessary to provide false test feedback. Par-
ticipants in the standard outcome debrieWng condition were
informed that their score was a fake score that had been
randomly assigned to them prior to their arrival. Addition-
ally, they were shown a “random assignment schedule,”
and the experimenter emphasized that the score contained
absolutely no information about the participant’s actual

performance or underlying abilities.
Participants in the revised outcome debrieWng condition
were provided with the same information as that provided
to those in the standard outcome debrieWng group.
Psychology 43 (2007) 233–240
Importantly, however, they were also told that the suicide-
note test was a fake test that had been made to look like a
real test. The experimenter explained that all of the suicide
notes in the test were fake notes, and that the test did not
measure any underlying abilities.
Participants in the process debrieWng condition were also
provided with the same information as that provided to stan-
dard outcome debrieWng participants. Additionally, however,
they were informed about the nature of the perseverance
eVect and how it might have personal relevance for them in
this context. The experimenter highlighted that people’s
beliefs sometimes persist even after debrieWng because they
generate independent evidence that explains the feedback,
and urged participants to avoid thinking in this way.
Dependent measures
Next, the experimenter asked participants to complete a
“thoughts and reactions” questionnaire. They were assured
of anonymity and asked to place the completed question-
naire into a sealed unmarked envelope and place it amongst
other unmarked envelopes. The Wrst section consisted of
Wller questions (e.g., clarity of instructions) that validated
the cover story. Participants then completed two items

assessing their perceptions of performance on the suicide
note task. One item requested that they estimate their score
on the suicide note test out of 15. The wording of this ques-
tion was carefully tailored to each debrieWng condition to
ensure that the question made sense in light of the details of
each condition. Participants in the no-debrieWng condition
were asked to recall the score they had just been assigned.
Participants in the standard outcome debrieWng and process
debrieWng conditions (who were told that their score was
fake) were asked to estimate their “actual score on the sui-
cide note test (/15).” Participants in the revised outcome
debrieWng condition, who were told that the test was not
real, were asked the following: “Even though you now
know that the task was not actually a real test of your abil-
ity to distinguish genuine from Wctitious suicide notes,
imagine for a moment right now that it had been a real test
(i.e., one including real and fake notes). If you took this test
now, what would you estimate to be your score on the
test?.” Participants also estimated their future performance
on a diVerent, but equally diYcult, set of genuine and fake
notes. As well, they evaluated the speciWc ability to distin-
guish real from fake suicide notes (1 D much lower ability
than average; 11 D much higher ability than average).
Next, participants responded to 8 scales (range 1–11)
assessing their perceptions of their global abilities: good at
detecting another’s distress (extremely poor-extremely
good); good at understanding why people behave in
certain ways (extremely poor-extremely good); likelihood of
pursuing a job requiring social perceptiveness skill
(extremely unlikely-extremely likely); good at being a
psychologist (extremely poor-extremely good); socially percep-
tive (extremely low-extremely high); sensitive to others’ feel-
ings (extremely insensitive-extremely sensitive); good at
taking tests under pressure (extremely poor-extremely

good); ability to recognize falsehood (extremely poor-
extremely good). The latter three items constitute Ross et al.’s
(1975) “related skills” measure. Finally, participants rated their
current moods (happy, satisWed, pleased, disappointed, sad,
proud, and competent; 1Dnot at all; 9Dextremely).
Final debrieWng
Participants in all conditions received a Wnal “process”
debrieWng. The experimenter explained the exact hypothe-
ses, the necessity for the elaborate deception, and the fake
nature of the test.
Results and discussion
Creation of indexes
We Wrst constructed several indexes: (1) performance
estimate index (i.e., the average of current and future score
estimates, ! D .81), (2) global abilities index (i.e., the average
of the 8 global ratings, ! D .80), and (3) mood (i.e., the aver-
age of the 7 mood ratings with the 2 negative items reverse
scored, ! D .85).
Performance estimates
We predicted that a perseverance eVect on performance
estimates would occur in only the standard outcome
debrieWng condition. Revised outcome and process debrieWng
were expected to eliminate perseverance. A 2 (feedback)£ 4
(debrieWng) ANOVA performed on this index revealed two
main eVects (debrieWng: F (3, 120)D8.90, p < .0001; feedback:
F (1, 120)D48.90, p < .0001) that were qualiWed by a
signiWcant
interaction eVect (F (3, 120)D57.76, p < .0001) that supported
the prediction (see Table 1). Not surprisingly, among those

who were not debriefed, participants who received success
feedback reported higher estimates (M D13.18) than those
who received failure feedback (M D4.46), t (120) D15.03,
p < .001. Importantly, though, even among those who received
standard outcome debrieWng, recipients of success feedback
reported higher estimates (MD9.33) than recipients of failure
feedback (MD7.96), t (120) D2.49, p < .05 (i.e., a perseverance
eVect). The success–failure diVerence was not signiWcant
(ts < 1) in the revised and process debrieWng groups, indicating
that perseverance was eliminated in these conditions.4
4 On the performance estimate measure, the variability in the
control
groups was lower than that found in the debrieWng groups,
probably be-
cause control participants found it relatively easy to recall the
score they
received a short while before. Consequently, the overall error
term may be
somewhat lower than it would be if these control groups were
not included
in the analysis. To assess whether the perseverance eVect
obtained in the
standard outcome debrieWng group would remain signiWcant if
an alterna-
tive error term was used, we conducted an independent-groups t
test that
used the two pertinent cell variances to represent error
variability. The per-
severance eVect was maintained, t (30) D 2.40, p < .05. As
well, we assessed
whether the signiWcant interaction eVect would be preserved if
a more
stringent critical F value were used. We conducted the
conservative Box
test for heterogeneous variances outlined in Howell (2002), and

the inter-
action eVect remained signiWcant, p < .05. In sum, the Wndings
on the per-
formance estimate measure are not attributable to the lower
variances in
the control conditions.
43 (2007) 233–240 237
SpeciWc ability rating
Again, a perseverance eVect was anticipated in only the
standard outcome debrieWng condition. A 2 £ 4 ANOVA
performed on the speciWc ability rating revealed two main
eVects (debrieWng: F (3, 120) D 4.72, p < .01; feedback:
F (1, 120) D 39.62, p < .0001) that were qualiWed by a signiW-
cant interaction eVect (F (3, 120) D 50.59, p < .0001) that
supported the prediction (see Table 1). As expected, non-
debriefed participants who received success feedback
reported a greater ability to distinguish real from fake sui-
cide notes (M D 9.36) than those who received failure feed-
back (M D 3.07), t (120) D 13.97, p < .001. Consistent with
predictions, recipients of standard outcome debrieWng
revealed a marginally signiWcant perseverance eVect (suc-
cess: M D 7.20; failure M D 6.47), t (120) D 1.78, p < .08. Per-
severance did not occur in the revised or process debrieWng
groups (success vs. failure ts < 1, ns).
Global ability ratings
One goal of our research was to examine whether perse-
verance occurs on the more global dimension purportedly
assessed by the suicide note task. A 2 £ 4 ANOVA per-

formed on the global ability index revealed that the perse-
verance eVect was not obtained on evaluations of general
social perceptiveness skills. Although a signiWcant interac-
tion was obtained (F (3, 120) D 2.63, p < .05), it occurred
solely because non-debriefed “success” participants
reported greater global ability (M D 7.84) than non-
debriefed “failure” participants (M D 6.82), t (120) D 2.62,
p < .01. No evidence for perseverance was obtained within
any debrieWng condition (i.e., all ps > .20). Separate analyses
of the individual items that were included in the overall
global index revealed a similar pattern of eVects—no evi-
dence of perseverance in any debrieWng group (again, all
relevant ps > .20). Thus, it appears that when the persever-
ance eVect occurs, it is limited to perceptions of speciWc
task-relevant features (i.e., score estimates, and ratings of
task speciWc ability). It is worth noting as well that although
failure feedback decreased global ability ratings (relative to
the combined failure debrieWng condition means) it does
not appear that positive feedback increased global ratings.
The debrieWng condition averages can be interpreted as
representing a “baseline” global ability rating, and the
mean in the no debrieWng/success group did not diVer from
the mean of the combined success (or failure) debrieWng
groups. It seems, then, that participants had rather
Table 1
Dependent variables as a function of type of performance
feedback and debrieWng technique
Note. Higher scores on the performance estimate index reXect
higher performance (/15). Higher scores on the ability measures
indicate greater ability (1–
11). Within rows and columns for each measure, means not
sharing a common subscript letter diVer at the .05 level (two-
tailed). There is one exception: on

the speciWc ability rating, the success vs. failure diVerence is
marginally signiWcant within the standard debrieWng condition
(p < .08).
Measure and type of feedback Type of debrieWng
No debrieWng Standard outcome debrieWng Revised outcome
debrieWng Process debrieWng
Performance estimates
Failure
M 4.46a 7.96b 10.38c 8.85b
N 14 17 17 17
SD .49 1.40 1.81 2.11
Success
M 13.18d 9.33c 10.08 c 8.03b
N 14 15 17 17
SD .99 1.79 1.66 1.50
SpeciWc ability rating
Failure
M 3.07a 6.47c 7.53d 7.12c, d
N 14 17 17 17
SD .83 1.17 1.55 1.49
Success
M 9.36 b 7.20d 7.24 d 6.65d
N 14 15 17 17
SD 1.08 1.08 1.30 .93
Global ability ratings
Failure

M 6.82a 7.69c 7.48c, a 7.47c, a
N 14 17 17 17
SD 1.45 1.07 1.23 1.15
Success
M 7.84c 7.45c 7.86c 7.01c
N 14 15 17 17
SD 1.10 1.09 1.08 .85
Psychology 43 (2007) 233–240
favorable preexisting views of their global social perceptive-
ness abilities, and that positive feedback did not further ele-
vate these self-views.
Mood ratings
To test whether post-debrieWng mood reactions engender
perseverance in self-perceptions through mood-congruent
processing, we Wrst conducted a 2 £ 4 ANOVA on the mood
index. This analysis revealed a marginally signiWcant interac-
tion eVect (F (3, 120) D 2.41, p < .07) wherein the diVerence
between the success and failure conditions was signiWcant
only among non-debriefed participants (success M D 6.77;
failure M D 5.47; t (120)D 3.25, p < .001). If aVective reactions
underlie the perseverance eVect obtained in the standard out-
come debrieWng condition, participants in this group who
received success feedback should have reported more posi-
tive moods (M D 6.33) than those who received failure feed-
back (M D 6.42), and they did not, t < 1, ns. As an additional
test, we reran the ANOVAs conducted on the performance
estimate and speciWc ability measures (i.e., the measures that
revealed perseverance) using mood as a covariate. Both inter-

action eVects were maintained when mood was controlled
(estimates (F (3, 119) D 53.23, p < .0001); speciWc ability
rating
(F (3, 119)D 46.83, p < .0001)). Thus, the perseverance eVect
occurring on these measures does not appear to be due to
aVective perseverance.
Study 2
Study 1 revealed that a slightly revised form of out-
come debrieWng can be as eVective as process debrieWng in
eliminating perseverance. When participants were
informed not only that their score was false, but also that
the test was not a valid measurement tool, their post-
debrieWng self-perceptions were uninXuenced by false
feedback. In Study 2, we explored the possibility that
revised outcome debrieWng may be more eVective than
standard outcome debrieWng because it preempts a pat-
tern of thought that occurs in the latter form of debrieWng.
When participants receive standard outcome debrieWng,
they probably Wnd themselves contemplating or ruminat-
ing about their “real score” on what they have been led to
believe is a valid test. This curiosity about their real score
may lead them to use their assigned score as a subjective
anchor point with which to estimate their real score (Weg-
ner et al., 1985), and the constructed score representation
could lead to further thoughts that reXect explanations of
the hypothetical score (Fleming & Arrowood, 1979; Ross
et al., 1975). These types of thoughts would be expected to
yield perseverance in self-perceptions. In contrast, in
revised outcome debrieWng, participants learn that the test
is bogus, and thus they should be much less likely to rumi-
nate about what their real score might be. Study 2
explored this reasoning. Recipients of failure feedback
received one of three forms of debrieWng: standard out-
come, revised outcome, or process debrieWng. Immedi-

ately after debrieWng, we obtained several measures
reXecting the degree of contemplation regarding actual
performance levels. We expected that recipients of revised
outcome debrieWng would ruminate less about their real
performance than participants in the other conditions.
Method
Participants
Participants were 6 male and 24 female SFU undergrad-
uates who received course credit.
Procedure
The procedure closely paralleled that used in the fail-
ureEdebrieWng conditions of Study 1 up to the point at
which the initial debrieWngs were completed. At this point,
the experimenter left the room for 4 min, and returned with
the “thoughts and reactions questionnaire.” After a couple
of Wller questions, participants were informed that we were
interested in the thoughts that people have after learning
about our true purposes, and that they should indicate the
degree to which they had certain thoughts during the past
few minutes. On a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (a
great deal), they indicated the degree to which they found
themselves (a) wondering about or contemplating what
their real score on a test of social perceptiveness might be,
(b) wondering about what their actual ability level is in the
domain of social perceptiveness, and (c) thinking that the
score they were given on the test might be a useful starting
point for estimating their actual performance/ability on a
test of social perceptiveness. They were then fully
debriefed.5

Results
We predicted that participants in the revised outcome
debrieWng condition would think less about their real score
or ability level than participants in the other debrieWng con-
ditions. A one-way ANOVA performed on an index reXect-
ing the average of the three contemplation items (! D .76)
revealed support for this prediction, F (2, 27) D 5.56, p < .01.
Immediately after debrieWng, recipients of revised outcome
debrieWng reported thinking about their score and ability
level signiWcantly less (M D 5.16) than did recipients of stan-
dard outcome debrieWng (M D 7.56; t (27) D 2.75, p < .01) or
process debrieWng (M D 7.76; t (27) D 2.98, p < .01).
5 We did not include the perseverance measures because we
reasoned
that they would be tainted by the previous act of completing the
contem-
plation measures, and thus would not yield the typical
perseverance eVect
(i.e., lower ratings in the standard outcome debrieWng
condition than the
other conditions). We reasoned that even participants who
reported think-
ing little about their real score during the previous few minutes
(i.e., those
in the revised outcome debrieWng group) would be prompted to
think
about it after completing items that inquired explicitly about
this score.
Thus, the contemplation measures are reactive in the sense that
completing
them would likely create perseverance in most participants.

43 (2007) 233–240 239
General discussion
Prior to the publication of Ross et al.’s research in 1975,
it seems likely that most social psychologists simply
assumed that their debrieWngs were eVective. After all, why
would research participants who are told that they lack an
important intellectual or social skill not embrace informa-
tion conveying that the feedback is invalid? By demonstrat-
ing the perseverance eVect, and revealing a strategy to
eliminate this phenomenon, Ross and colleagues provided
the Weld with both a “wake-up call” and a solution. In the
past quarter century, process debrieWng has become the
most widely accepted protocol for the proper conduct of
debrieWngs (e.g., Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonza-
les, 1990) and authors often mention explicitly that this is
the form of debrieWng that they delivered.
The current studies build upon this classic early work
in several ways. First, our Wndings revealed that there is a
form of outcome debrieWng that is as eVective as process
debrieWng in eliminating perseverance. It appears that the
addition of one piece of information (i.e., information that
the test is invalid or bogus), is suYcient to prevent perse-
verance in performance-related self-perceptions. Based on
our Wndings, one might be tempted to suggest that
researchers use revised outcome debrieWng in lieu of pro-
cess debrieWng. This position is not without merit. Revised
outcome debrieWng appears to work because it preempts
the ruminative processing that normally serves to solidify
feedback-based self-perceptions. Successful process
debrieWng, in contrast, probably requires that participants
engage in a more eVortful or controlled corrective process
(e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1997) wherein they adjust rumina-

tion-inspired self-perceptions in a direction that opposes
the feedback. Study 2 oVered some indirect support for
this possibility: Participants in the process debrieWng con-
dition were as likely as those in the standard outcome
debrieWng condition to report ruminating about their per-
formance; nonetheless, they managed to avoid persever-
ance (see Study 1). If this general reasoning is correct, it
could be argued that revised outcome debrieWng will be
more eVective than process debrieWng among participants
who are less motivated or able to engage in an eVortful
correction process. Despite this advantage, however, we
believe that a “combined” debrieWng would be most
eYcacious [i.e., one that incorporates the best features of
both revised outcome (i.e., information about test invalid-
ity) and process debrieWng (i.e., information about perse-
verance)]. This form of debrieWng would not only preempt
perseverance among participants who are less inclined to
engage in correction, but also provide a long-term strat-
egy for all participants to use in the event that they experi-
ence feedback-consistent self-thoughts after leaving the
laboratory. Combined debrieWng does require that
researchers use test items that do not actually represent
valid measures of underlying ability (e.g., that they use
word completions rather than GRE test items as measures
of “intellectual aptitude”); however, this should not gen-
erally pose a problem because studies incorporating the
false feedback paradigm rarely call for the use of vali-
dated tests of underlying abilities. Participants need only
believe that a test measures important abilities for this
paradigm to be eVective.
Our research also extends Ross et al.’s research by
conWrming that the perseverance eVect is restricted to
people’s perceptions of speciWc performances and abili-
ties. This lack of perseverance on evaluations of global

ability cannot be easily attributed to methodological fac-
tors. The global ability index included multiple items,
was internally consistent, and was sensitive to negative
feedback. Moreover, the cover story delivered to partici-
pants stressed that the test measured important general
abilities. We can only speculate, but the absence of perse-
verance on this index may reXect the operation of self-
enhancement or self-veriWcation motives. Much past
research has revealed that the average person processes
information in a manner that conWrms a generally posi-
tive stable self-view (e.g., Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989;
Taylor & Brown, 1988). The results on the global ability
index are consistent with this general Wnding. “Failing”
participants appear to have been quite willing to relin-
quish negative global perceptions that were formed tem-
porarily in reaction to the feedback. Additionally,
“succeeding” participants appear to have been unwilling
to modify (in response to either feedback or debrieWng)
the highly positive self-views that they “brought with
them” to the experiment. Overall, the Wndings on the
global ability index can be taken as “good news” for
researchers who use false feedback. In an attempt to cap-
ture the strong motivational forces and threatening emo-
tions that aVect people in everyday life, researchers often
portray their tests as measuring highly important and
global abilities. Our results imply that when researchers
use this strategy, their participants are unlikely to suVer
long-term negative consequences.
Finally, our results revealed that the perseverance
eVect obtained in the debrieWng paradigm is not due to
“aVective perseverance.” Participants’ aVective reactions
revealed no evidence of perseverance, and perseverance
in self-perceptions occurred even when mood reactions
were controlled. Thus, debrieWng of any kind appears to
be eVective in eliminating the mood changes produced by

false feedback. Although some researchers have obtained
evidence for aVective perseverance in other paradigms
(Sherman & Kim, 2002), perseverance in the debrieWng
paradigm appears to be due to more cognitive (e.g., rumi-
native) processes.
In conclusion, our research highlights that there are sev-
eral critical features of an eVective debrieWng in the false
feedback paradigm. In particular, the distinction between
“debrieWng about the false nature of the feedback” and
“debrieWng about the false or unvalidated nature of the test
itself” appears to be an important one, and we hope that
future researchers will construct debrieWngs that reXect
both of these components.
Psychology 43 (2007) 233–240
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The perseverance effect in the debriefing paradigm: Replication
and extensionThe current researchStudy 1MethodParticipants
and designProcedureFeedback manipulationDebriefing
manipulationDependent measuresFinal debriefingResults and
discussionCreation of indexesPerformance estimatesSpecific
ability ratingGlobal ability ratingsMood ratingsStudy
2MethodParticipantsProcedureResultsGeneral
discussionReferences
I Don’t Believe It! Belief Perseverance in Attitudes
Toward Celebrities
Ngoc H. Bui
University of La Verne
The persistence of beliefs and feelings regarding a favorite
celebrity were investigated.
Source credibility was not expected to influence belief
perseverance and emotional
belief (feelings) perseverance toward favorite celebrities. Also,
when asked to consider
reasons why others would not like the celebrity, perseverance of
beliefs and feelings
were expected to decrease. Participants (N ! 201) from a
Southern California private
university completed an online survey. Contrary to the
hypotheses, participants were
more likely to believe the information when the media caught

the celebrity and when
the celebrity displayed the behavior. Also, using the consider-
the-opposite strategy did
not change beliefs or feelings. However, as predicted,
perseverance of feelings about
celebrities did vary by the source of information. The practical
implications are that,
although difficult, changing beliefs may be possible depending
on the source of
information. Limitations in the study are also discussed.
Keywords: belief perseverance, celebrities, attitudes
Interest in celebrities has been well docu-
mented in research (Giles, 2000; Maltby, Day,
McCutcheon, Houran, & Ashe, 2006; McCutch-
eon, Lange, & Houran, 2002). According to
Giles and Maltby (2004), a normal part of ad-
olescence is developing admiration for and fas-
cination with celebrities. This admiration and
interest can impact the way we view our favor-
ite celebrities in that existing positive beliefs
about the celebrities may persist into young
adulthood and influence behavior. For example,
Boon and Lomore (2001) found that young
adults are inspired by their idols (favorite ce-
lebrities) to pursue creative activities and
change their lifestyle in some way akin to the
celebrities’ interests and lifestyle. However,
headlines in the media today are filled with
reports of a celebrity acting inappropriately or
saying something inappropriate. Are fans’ af-
fections for their favorite celebrity influenced
by these bad behaviors? Or, are fans subject to
the belief perseverance phenomenon?

Emotional Beliefs Framework: Why We
Can’t Let It Go
Holding on to one’s beliefs, despite contra-
dictory evidence, is known as belief persever-
ance (Jelalian & Miller, 1984). Several theories
have been used to explain belief perseverance.
For example, according to Anderson, Lepper,
and Ross (1980), belief perseverance is a func-
tion of the causal or explanatory scripts (i.e.,
cognitive schemas) that people generate to
make sense of a social situation. However, these
scripts are difficult to change once they are
formed because they persist independent of the
data that they were derived from (Anderson et
al., 1980; Smith, 1982), and they continue to be
accessed but never revised (Ross et al., 1975).
Although the cognitive schema explanation
has been used to understand the persistence of
beliefs about the self, the theoretical framework
that appears to be most useful for understanding
belief perseverance in attitudes toward celebri-
ties is the Emotional Beliefs Framework (Mer-
cer, 2010). Because beliefs related to person
perception (e.g., perceiving a favorite celebrity)
may have more to do with how a perceiver feels
about the target person, the Emotional Beliefs
This article was published Online First December 23,
2013.
Ngoc H. Bui, Department of Psychology, University of
La Verne.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Ngoc H. Bui, Department of Psychology, Uni-
versity of La Verne, 950 Third Street, La Verne, CA 91750.
E-mail: [email protected]rne.edu
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Psychology of Popular Media Culture © 2013 American
Psychological Association
2014, Vol. 3, No. 1, 38 – 48 2160-4134/14/$12.00 DOI:
10.1037/a0034916
38
mailto:[email protected]
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0034916
Framework can help explain why celebrity at-
titudes may persevere.
According to Mercer (2010), an emotional
belief is a belief that is made up of and strength-
ened by emotions. Emotional beliefs are based
on an individual’s internal inferences, not on
objective comparisons. Thus, having an emo-
tional belief can mean that the belief could be

wrong (Mercer, 2010). For example, profes-
sional cyclist, Lance Armstrong, began the
LiveSTRONG Foundation after he successfully
battled testicular cancer (Lance’s Story, n.d.).
His experiences inspired many people to con-
tinue battling cancer and to help others suffering
from the disease through donations and advo-
cacy. However, in January 2013, Armstrong
admitted to illegal doping while competing (and
winning) in the Tour de France cycling compe-
titions and the Olympics (Albergotti &
O’Connell, 2013). Despite his admission, and
the testimonies from teammates, his friends,
and his staff regarding his illegal doping, many
devoted fans of Armstrong did not waiver in
their support for him, and some still view Arm-
strong as an inspiration for those fighting cancer
(Lopresti, 2013). These fans choose to see his
positive contributions to cancer research, rather
than his cheating behavior or his ban from the
sport of cycling. This demonstrates that at least
some fans continue to have positive emotional
beliefs for Armstrong, despite his tainted repu-
tation.
An emotional belief also implies that an
individual has a particular point of view, and
this point of view is biased by his or her
emotions for that target (Mercer, 2010). How
a person feels about something serves as a
useful measure of his or her values or beliefs
(Mercer, 2010). Therefore, if someone feels
strongly about a favorite celebrity, then his or
her emotions will influence what he or she
believes about the person. Although no cur-
rent studies have examined perceptions of

celebrities using the emotional belief perse-
verance model, the present study explores
whether attitudes toward celebrities persist in
beliefs and feelings in the face of negative or
discrediting information.
Belief Perseverance and Person Perception
Belief perseverance has been shown in stud-
ies on self-perception of math abilities (Lepper,
Ross, & Lau, 1986) and intelligence (Guenther
& Alicke, 2008); however, there is limited re-
search on belief perseverance in regard to per-
son perception. Person perception involves in-
terpreting and understanding others in terms of
their intentions and motives, which are often
unknown (Fiske, 2010). Of the few published
studies that have investigated belief persever-
ance and person perception, the research is over
30 years old and no studies have examined the
phenomena in regard to attitudes toward celeb-
rities. For example, the classic study on belief
perseverance study with regard to perceptions
of others asked participants to generate reasons
to explain the relationship between the occupa-
tional success of firefighters and the firefighters’
scores on a preference for risk measure (Ander-
son, Lepper, & Ross, 1980). Even after the
researchers discredited the evidence that relates
occupational success and risk preference, par-
ticipants continued to hold on to their explana-
tions that the two variables were linked.
Belief Perseverance and Attitudes Toward
Celebrities

Currently, no research to date has given
attention to how our beliefs about celebrities
persevere in the face of undesirable or nega-
tive information from the media or other
sources. Based on the Emotional Belief
Framework proposed by Mercer (2010), it
could be predicted that individuals would
demonstrate belief perseverance about celeb-
rities, even when damaging or discrediting
information is presented. Mercer states that
for things we care about (in this case, celeb-
rity figures) we may interpret ambiguous be-
haviors in ways that we prefer them to be,
based on our emotions. Perhaps when our
favorite celebrities are “caught” doing some-
thing harmful or bad (e.g., abusing drugs,
assaulting someone, or stealing) we may in-
terpret the situation in a way that is based on
the positive emotions we have for our favorite
celebrity, which would be to try to persist in
believing the celebrity did no wrong, or was
“set up” by the media. Thus, according to
Mercer’s (2010) Emotional Beliefs Frame-
work, individuals may see or hear of their
favorite celebrity’s wrongdoings but deny this
information because of the strong feelings
39BELIEF PERSEVERANCE AND CELEBRITIES
T
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rs
.
T

hi
s
ar
ti
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e
is
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te
nd
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so
le
ly
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r
th
e
pe
rs
on
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e

of
th
e
in
di
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us
er
an
d
is
no
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br

oa
dl
y.
they have previously developed for their ce-
lebrity.
Measuring Perseverance
Many studies on belief perseverance use a
debriefing procedure to inform the participants
that the feedback or information they received
before reporting their beliefs was false (Ander-
son et al., 1980; Lepper et al., 1986; Ross et al.,
1975). However, Wegner, Coulton, and Wen-
zlaff (1985) examined belief perseverance com-
paring both the traditional debriefing procedure
and a briefing procedure, in which researchers
informed participants before receiving feedback
that the information they would obtain was in-
correct. Wegner et al.’s findings show that both
briefing and debriefing conditions produced be-
lief perseverance effects. Wegner et al. posited
that beliefs not only persevere (as seen in the
debriefing condition), but also pervade later be-
liefs, evidenced by the briefing condition. In the
present study, a procedure similar to briefing
was used. Before asking participants about
whether they believed negative information
about a celebrity, they were asked to consider
the opposite about their celebrity. That is, they
were asked to think of reasons why others
would not like their favorite celebrity.

Factors Influencing Belief Perseverance
Considering the Opposite
Although belief perseverance has been
demonstrated consistently in other studies
(Lepper et al., 1986; Ross et al., 1975), hav-
ing individuals consider opposing opinions or
possibilities can reduce belief perseverance
and improve judgments by reducing bias. For
example, Ross et al. (1975) randomly as-
signed participants to determine whether sui-
cide notes were real or fake. The researchers
gave participants one of three types of feed-
back regarding their abilities: successful, av-
erage, or failure. Ross et al. then randomly
assigned participants to either a traditional
debriefing procedure or a “process debriefing.
” In the traditional debriefing condition, sub-
jects were told after the task that their initial
feedback about their success or failure was
false. Then participants were asked to esti-
mate past and future performances in deter-
mining the validity of notes. Estimates corre-
sponded with participants’ initial feedback,
despite the discrediting of this feedback by
the researchers. Specifically, those who were
first told they were “successful” at identifying
the suicide notes, continued to think so, and
those who were first told that they were “fail-
ures” at identification continued to think so.
However, in the “process debriefing” condi-
tion, the researchers told the participants that
they received false feedback and also ex-

plained to participants how belief persever-
ance can influence erroneous impressions.
Results showed that participants in the tradi-
tional debriefing condition continued to per-
sist in their beliefs more than those in the
process debriefing condition.
Thoughtful processing of the information
one receives can help to also reduce biased
judgments. Lord, Lepper, and Preston (1984)
posited that when students were asked to con-
sider how an alternative outcome might be
possible they would correct their view and
exhibit less biased perspectives. Proponents
and opponents of capital punishment were
asked to consider how convincing an argu-
ment was in supporting or not supporting
capital punishment. Lord et al. (1984) found
that when students were asked to be objective,
they did not weigh the arguments objectively.
However, when students were asked to con-
sider the opposite, specifically that the argu-
ment they heard had merit and could be pos-
sible, participants believed the arguments to
be more convincing, which demonstrated less
judgment bias.
Findings from Ross et al. (1975) and Lord
et al. (1984) show that considering the oppo-
site helps to reduce belief perseverance and
judgment bias. Though the strategy has not
been tested on belief perseverance and person
perception, in the present study it was ex-
pected that considering the opposite might
also influence attitudes toward celebrities.
Specifically, instead of briefing individuals

regarding how their beliefs are wrong (as it
would be nearly impossible to dissuade each
individual about the merits of liking their
particular celebrity), participants were asked
to think about whether there could be reasons
not to like their favorite celebrity. In having
participants consider the opposite, or think of
reasons why others would not like the favorite
40 BUI
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py
ri
gh
te
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by
th

e
A
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er
ic
an
P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
A
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
or
on
e
of
it

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