This document provides definitions and context around the concept of targeted killing. It begins by defining targeted killing as the intentional killing of a specifically identified individual who is taking part in an armed conflict or terrorism and is not in the physical custody of those targeting them. It discusses different definitions provided by scholars and analyses their strengths and weaknesses. It also explores targeted killing as a method of warfare, particularly its use by states like the US and Israel against terrorist organizations. The document examines the ethics surrounding targeted killing and its future use as militaries increasingly utilize drones and other technologies. Overall, the document offers an overview of debates and perspectives regarding the controversial practice of targeted killing.
3. TARGETTED KILLING
Introduction:
Targeted killing is defined as a form of killing carried out by governments. Some analysts
believe that it is a modern euphemism for the assassination (prominent premeditated
killing) of an individual by a state organization or institution outside a judicial
procedure or a battle field.
The intentional killing by a government or its agents of a civilian or "unlawful combatant"
who is not in that government's custody, and who is taking part in an armed conflict or terrorism,
whether by bearing arms or otherwise, and is thus regarded by the government as having lost the
immunity from being targeted that he or she would otherwise have under the Geneva
Conventions.
The term “targeted killing,” though, implies that U.S. counterterrorism strikes are something
different something not covered by existing norms. The Suleimani killing, however, may put that
idea to rest while also demonstrating precisely why political murder is simply a terrible idea.
Targeted killing is a controversial practice. Indeed, it is sometimes referred to as extrajudicial
killing, thereby implying it is unlawful. Moreover, targeted killing needs to be distinguished
from assassination, a practice that is typically unlawful. Further, the contexts in which targeted
killing takes place need to be distinguished, as do the nature of the targets. For example, targeted
killing of civilians by police officers is both unlawful and morally impermissible.
Definition:
By definition, targeted killing is the premeditated, freely performed, intentional killing of a uniquely
identifiedindividual person.Moreover,atthe time of the killing the person in question does not pose
an imminent threat to life or limb. Further, the killing takes place in the overall context of an armed
conflict in which both the target and the person targeted are participants. Unlike the shooting by
combatants, including by snipers, of enemy combatants in a theater of war, the targets in targeted
killing are uniquely identified;
They are not simply anonymous enemy combatants identified by their uniform. A
uniquely identified individual in this sense is someone about whom there is prior detailed
4. information in respect of his or her role in the armed conflict, and someone who can be
reliably identified as such at the time of their killing.
Unlike in the standard cases of justified use of deadly force by police officers in law
enforcement contexts, the targets in targeted killing do not pose an imminent threat at the
time of their killing. For example, Osama bin Laden was killed in his domicile during the
night, Mahmoud l-Mabhouh was killed in a hotel room in neutral Dubai, and so on.
Unlike assassinations, such as that of President Kennedy, targeted killings take place in
the overall context of armed conflict.
Armed conflicts include conventional wars, nonconventional (so-called) wars of
liberation, and armed conflicts involving terrorist groups.
The potentially large-scale killing of individuals who merely exhibit a pattern of
suspicious behavior is not targeted killing in this sense. Thus the use of drones by the
United States to inflict relatively heavy casualties on the Taliban and al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan and FATA is not targeted killing, notwithstanding the US government’s use
of terms such as “targeted killing” and “surgical strike” in relation to their use of
drones.
According to a UN special report on the subject, targeted killings are premeditated acts of
lethal force employed by states in times of peace or during armed conflict to eliminate
specific individuals outside their custody. "Targeted killing" is not a term distinctly
defined under international law, but gained currency in 2000 after Israel made public a
policy of targeting alleged terrorists in the Palestinian territories. The particular act of lethal
force, usually undertaken by a nation’s intelligence or armed services, can vary widely from
cruise missiles to drone strikes to special operations raids. The primary focus of U.S.
targeted killings, particularly through drone strikes, has been on the al-Qaeda and Taliban
leadership networks in Afghanistan and the remote tribal regions of Pakistan. However, U.S.
operations have expanded in recent years to include countries such as Somalia and Yemen.
Definition & Explanation:
One such definition states that targeted killing is “the intentional killing of a specific civilian
who cannot reasonably be apprehended, and who is taking a direct part in hostilities, the
targeting done at the direction and authorization of the state in the context of an
international or non-international armed conflict.”
5. Although this definition does correctly limit the use of targeted killing to armed conflicts, it
falls short due to “it excluding targeting of combatants under all circumstances.” In this state, the
definition allows for combatants to be targeted at any point in time to include when they are
away from the conduct of hostilities as well as in the absence of military necessity. This
definition is the perfect showcase for one of the fundamental problems with contemporary IHL
and its inability to address “the territorial scope of armed conflict”, especially in the context of
targeted killing. Solis attempts to address this by stating that “targeted killing is not the
battlefield killing of combatants by opposing combatants,” however it does not fully address
the issue of what codifies a battlefield.
Another author that attempts to address the complexity of targeted killing states that it is “the
intentional slaying of a specific alleged terrorist or group of alleged terrorists undertaken
with explicit governmental approval when they cannot be arrested using reasonable
means.”
The biggest problem with this definition lies the use of the term ‘terrorist’, due to the continual
debates surrounding the definition of the term ‘terrorist’. Although by focusing on the targeting
of terrorists the definition attempts to provide a sense of moral acceptability, it simply lacks the
necessary distinction in determining who is targetable. Similar to the above definition from Solis,
this definition fails to make it clear as to “whether the inability to arrest using reasonable means
is a condition or a description.” Until a definition for ‘terrorist’, that is universally acceptable,
along with a truly objective process of identifying a terrorist is found then this targeted killing
definition stays problematic.
While the definitions above limited the scope of what constitutes a targeted killing, other
scholars have the problem of making the definition too broad. One such definition is as follows:
targeted killing is the “pre-meditated, pre-emptive and deliberate killing of an individual or
individuals known to represent a clear and present threat to the safety and security of a
State through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals.”
Although the ‘pre-emptive’ clause causes killings after prior attacks to not be covered, the truly
unsettling part of the definition is the ‘affiliation’ clause allowing a swath of individuals to be
targeted. This definition takes a look at the topic through jus ad bellum and because of this it has
the ability to cast a broad net as to who may be targeted.
Although the above definition is broad, it still maintains a sense of focus in comparison to how
“David simply defines targeted killing as the ‘intentional slaying of a specific individual or
group of individuals undertaken with explicit governmental approval.’
This definition covers everything from genocide to legitimate military operations to abortion
provided domestic law exists covering that. Aside from the few definitions stated above, multiple
others exist making it difficult to address the lawfulness of targeted killings under IHL.
Though this difficulty exists, the following definitions and their subsequent elements provide the
platform from which a truly comprehensive description could be crafted. The following
definition provided by Melzer.
6. Melzer’s definition:
Melzer states that targeted killing is “the use of lethal force attributable to a subject of
international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill individually
selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting them.”
Although this definition is already more holistic when compared to the previous ones, Melzer
further breaks it up by discussing it piece by piece. As such use of lethal force includes “any
forcible measure, regardless of the means employed, which is capable of causing death of a
human being” or in other words the object must only be used in a lethal capacity. The next
section pertaining to intent, premeditation, and deliberation to kill explain three important
factors of his overall definition.
1) Intent and premeditation is met with the fact that any action “be carried out with intent
to kill the targeted person” and that “this intent be based on a conscious choice” rather
than the use of impulsive/reckless force.
2) Attention to operational detail continues in Melzer’s description of deliberation, which
states that “the death of the targeted person be the actual aim of the operation.”
3) The third element, targeting of individually selected persons, is very similar to
deliberation in that only individuals may be targeted as opposed to a collection of random
targets.
4) When compared to the previously discussed definition the forth element, lack of physical
custody, offers an explanation into the difference between targeted killing and
extrajudicial killing. Although this element in necessary in the determination of what is
taking place, it delves into a paradigm different from traditional IACs or NIACs in which
law enforcement if the key rather than militaries.
5) The final element, attributable to a subject of international law, is one of the limiting
factors of Melzer’s definition as it limits, outside of certain situations, the use of targeted
killings to States. Although these definitions, along with its subsets, provide an in-depth
explanation of targeted killings, it has a few redundancies and built in deviations from the
military paradigm.
Casis’s Definition:
Due to its deviations and redundancies within Melzer’s definition, it will be sidelined in favor of
the definition provided by Casis stating that:
“Targeted killing is defined simply as the intentional use of lethal force by a party to an
armed conflict against a specific individual while the latter is not in the physical custody of
the former.”
Modeling it off of Melzer, Casis also provides an itemized explanation of the chosen definition.
1) The first element, intentional, states that attacks must be performed deliberately with a clear
target and must follow IHL
7. 2) The next subset, use of lethal force, states that only methods sufficient to terminate the target
be used.
3) One of the biggest differences in the definitions can be found in the third section, attack by a
party to an armed conflict, where Casis specifically limits the use of targeted killing to
armed conflicts. This section leaves the possibility for targeted killing to be applied to non-
State actors actions , within an armed conflict, such as the issue of ‘smart munitions’ and
the classification of suicide bombs as such.
4) The fourth section pertains to identification of the target as being a specific individual, as
only then can it be possible to “determine whether the principles of distinction, military
necessity, and proportionality are complied with.”
Casis closes out with the section pertaining to not in the physical custody of the attacker which
solidifies targeted killing’s distinction from extrajudicial killings. Overall, this definition
maintains a simple straight forward and holistic approach to determining what constitutes
targeted killing, thus making it possible to determine the lawfulness of its use in contemporary
IHL.
Method of Warfare
Targeted killing refers to a method of warfare whereby individuals are selected and confirmed as
so called ‘High Value Targets’, followed by a separate and individual targeting process which
ultimately leads to the execution of military operation aimed at killing these individuals. This
definition is reiterated in one of the leading academic texts on the subject of armed conflict, the
Handbook of International Law of Military Operations, whereas:
“Targeted killing refers to military operations involving the use of lethal force with the aim of
killing individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting
them”.
Example:
An early example of targeted killing in the history of armed conflict can be found in the military
tactics applied mainly by snipers. Prominent and well-documented examples of sniper warfare
can be found in the annals of the Eastern Front during World War II: German and Soviet forces
used snipers to annihilate systematically the enemy’s mid-level military leadership: German
losses to Soviet snipers were so severe during the battle for Stalingrad in autumn of 1942 that
officers as well as non-commissioned officers had to adapt means of camouflage to blend in with
their (enlisted) men and in order to avoid being targeted by enemy snipers.
8. Operation ‘Neptune Spear’ as well as the alleged Israeli Mossad Operation to kill the Hamas
official Mahmud al-Mabhuh in Dubai in 2011 involved the use of Special Forces on the ground,
or intelligence operatives/assets respectively, constitute commando operations as well targeting
operations in the wider sense. Such tactical capture and kill operations executed by Special
Forces assets are not the focus of this short contribution: its focus is solely on targeted killing, as
a means of warfare which is executed by using remotely piloted aircraft, UAVs or drones
respectively, as weapons platform.
Targeted killing as a means of killing enemies of a state has been employed most frequently by
the USA as part of its overall military strategy against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. While the
USA did not ‘invent’ this form of warfare it has taken the lead in advancing its development and
overall design in respect of targeting processes, command and control as well as the use of
increasingly sophisticated technology. The use of drones for executing kinetic, lethal, strikes
against hostile and enemy targets has its tangible military benefits in terms of operational
capabilities, readiness and its overall availability as a defensive as well as offensive form of
warfare. Targeted killing by UCAS can be executed at very short notice and does not require
the deployment of and the presence of substantial own forces in the theatre of operations. This
availability and flexibility of using drones as a platform for the execution of targeted killings
makes this form of warfare (without own casualties) so formidable when responding to present
threats at an ad hoc basis. Consequently, both proliferation and expansion of the use of UCAS
are increasing.
Examples hereof are the present discussions in the UK to increase the availability of
UAV systems for reconnaissance and combat, the RAF’s decision to relocate its UAV
assets from the US to RAF Waddington near Lincoln and to establish a new Unmanned
Air Systems Capability Development Centre (UASCDC) there.
The overall capabilities of such airborne weapon platform systems has also found
supporters among nations who were initially opposed to this form of warfare, such as
Germany which for historical as well as political reasons has been known to be more
reluctant to the use of force and to participate in combat operations in a more active role.
9. Drones and the Ethics of Targeted Killing
Drones have become an essential part of U.S. national security strategy, but most
Americans know little about how they are used, and we receive conflicting reports
about their outcomes. Ethicist Kenneth R. Himes provides not only an overview of the
role of drones in national security but also an important exploration of the ethical
implications of drone warfare from the impact on terrorist organizations and civilians
to how piloting drones shapes soldiers. Targeted killings have played a role in
politics from ancient times through today, so the ethical challenges around how to
protect against threats are not new. Himes leads readers through the ethics of targeted
killings in history from ancient times to the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
and then looks specifically at the new issues raised through the use of drones.
The use of UCAS as a method of warfare
The use of UCAS as a method of warfare (together with Special Forces capture and kill
operations) will increase in the future. The overall potential military benefit of using drones as a
method of warfare on the battlefield of the future is not disputed and with the USA having
become a key player in the use of this form of warfare, other nations are set to follow its lead.
The use of drones and targeted killing operations will remain a means of warfare of first choice
to counter Asymmetric and Hybrid Threats. It seems certain that targeted killing will continue to
be an important element of future US long-term counterterrorism and security strategies. It also
seems likely that in light of defense budget cuts, troop reductions as well as a growing
unwillingness to scarify the lives of soldiers of Western countries, more states will consider
10. turning utilizing armed drones as a means of show of force in the future. Combat capabilities can
be significantly enhanced when the uses of UAV’s are available:
This reflects directly on the dual use nature of such airborne systems, which allow for an
unarmed use for reconnaissance as well as armed for combat. The recent call by the UN
Secretary General to deploy UAVs to Congo to support the African peacekeeping forces of
MONUSCO in their attempt to fight rebels in the east of the country highlights the potential use
of UAVs outside targeted killing operations.
This ‘dual use nature’ of UAVs, unarmed versus armed, has been recognized for the use in
policing and monitoring roles with the potential of further proliferation and use.
The use of drones for executing targeted killing in Afghanistan and Pakistan might well increase
in the next years, a forecast which is partly founded in the fact that the USA is moving already
now in a transitional role in Afghanistan and plans to end major combat operations there this
spring. The withdrawal of combat troops will necessitate the increased use of targeted killing in
future, executed by both drones and special forces, in order to close existing combat capability
gaps during and after the transition of operational control to the Afghan National Army. In
addition, Obama’s decision to appoint John Brennan, his former Security Advisor and key
promoter of the use of drones for targeted killing, to the top job of CIA director may likely result
in an increase reliance on this means of warfare by the USA.
The future use of drones will not only affect national security strategies and policies, but
eventually also impact on how we perceive interstate war within its legal contexts of
the jus ad bellum as well as the law of conflict, the jus in bello.
11. These future developments will challenge the international legal fraternity for some time to
come: it will be a key responsibility for the international lawyer to discuss and scrutinize these
developments within their wider political, legal and military context, and to shape this process.
This concludes with a sobering warning that while targeted killing operations may be an
effective means of achieving short-term tactical goals within the scope of a wider operational
objective, the unregulated and increased use of targeting killings by the USA (and others) in the
‘war on terror’ may be both immoral as well as illegal in the long run.
Two relatively recent events have placed the ethics of targeted killing at the fore:
The killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and the bombing by NATO forces of Colonel
Gaddafi’s compound in Tripoli in the context of the civil war in that Libya. In May 2011,
Osama bin Laden was killed by US Special Forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan. US officials said
bin Laden resisted and was shot in the head; it has also emerged that he was unarmed. US
officials also said that three other men were killed during the raid, one believed to be bin Laden’s
son and the other two his couriers; in addition, a woman was killed when she was used as a
shield by a male combatant. There were no American casualties. Bin Laden’s death came nearly
ten years after al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked and crashed American passenger airplanes into the
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon outside Washington, killing some three
thousand people. Since Abbotabad is a medium-sized city, fairly close to Pakistan’s capital,
Islamabad, and home to a large Pakistani military base, questions have been raised as to how bin
Laden could have lived there undiscovered for so many years without alerting the Pakistan
security agencies. Significantly, the US operation to kill bin Laden was evidently carried out
without the knowledge of the Pakistani government.
In February 2011, major political protests broke out in Libya against Gaddafi’s
government. Subsequently, these turned into a civil war in which evidently Gaddafi was
responsible for the killing of unarmed civilians by Libyan forces loyal to him.
In March 2011 the United Nations declared a no-fly zone in Libya and authorized air
strikes by NATO forces to be undertaken for the purpose of protecting the civilian
population of Libya. A NATO air strike in April in Tripoli apparently killed the youngest son of
12. Gaddafi and three of his grandsons. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that NATO was
not targeting Gaddafi specifically, but rather his command and control facilities including a
facility inside Gaddafi’s sprawling Tripoli compound. However, it remains unclear whether or
not NATO was attempting to kill Gaddafi; this is especially so given that Gaddafi was a key
element of the Libyan government’s armed forces command-and-control center. It is also unclear
whether under UN resolution 1973 it is permissible for NATO forces to bomb command-and-
control facilities in order to protect civilians; the wording of the resolution is vague, speaking as
it does of using “all necessary measures to protect civilians.” Certainly, it did not authorize
Gaddafi’s removal from power by military means. On the other hand, the destruction by NATO
of Gaddafi’s military forces in the course of NATO’s efforts to protect the civilian population, if
this is a correct account of what happened, did lead to Gaddafi’s demise. I note that in addition to
being responsible for civilian deaths in this conflict, Gaddafi had a long history of human rights
violations to his name. Moreover, Gaddafi was responsible for the assassination of dozens of his
“enemies” around the world. In May 2011 the International Criminal Court issued a request for
an arrest warrant against Gaddafi for “crimes against humanity.”
MORALITY OF TARGETED KILLING
The targeted killing in question takes place in either
(1) A theatre of war, albeit war against a non-state actor
(2) A jurisdictional setting in which there is not effective enforcement of the law in relation
to terrorists perpetrating ongoing, serious terrorist attacks against the liberal democratic
state in question
(3)A well-ordered, liberal democratic state in peacetime or, indeed, in wartime if the
territory in question is enjoying effective law enforcement against terrorism.
13. Jurisdictional settings
In relation to jurisdictional settings, we can distinguish two kinds of cases. There are those
settings that are more or less well-ordered, but in which the authorities are nevertheless unable or
unwilling to successfully enforce the law against the terrorists in question.
The killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in Pakistan by US Special Forces
illustrates this kind of case. The other kind jurisdictional setting is one that is not well-
ordered. The FATA in Pakistan is a case in point.
The FATA are nominally under the authority of Pakistan, but in fact Pakistani law
enforcement agencies have not been able to effectively exercise their authority.
Moreover, Pakistan security agencies have evidently engaged in military as opposed to
law enforcement operations in these areas, creating at times de facto theatres of war. Of
particular importance to us here, Pakistani security agencies have been unable to dislodge
al-Qaeda from its bases in these areas.
Hence the United States has resorted to military action apparently with the tacit consent
of the Pakistan government and the extensive lethal use of drones in particular.
Other things being equal, targeted killing cannot be morally justified in such contexts. The law
enforcement option is the default option when it comes to combating terrorism. This is not to say
that moral dilemmas in relation to the use of lethal force might not arise for police engaged in
counterterrorist operations against suicide bombers in particular.
For example, in 2005 Jean Charles de Menezes an innocent Brazilian student was shot dead
by members of a UK counterterrorism squad in a London underground station. This was a case
of mistaken identity in which the police falsely believed Menezes was a suicide bomber about to
trigger a bomb. The dilemma arose because the normally available option of arresting Menezes
was highly problematic.
Importantly, this was not a case of targeted killing, since the threat or, at least, believed threat
was imminent. The point to be stressed here is that police use of lethal force, even against suicide
14. bombers, in well-ordered liberal democratic states is rightly constrained by the above-mentioned
principles of necessity and imminent threat to life constitutive of the law enforcement model.
The targeted killing of known combatants or their leaders in theaters of war is morally
permissible, at least in principle. Arguably, the armed conflict that provides the overall context
in which such killings takes place needs to be morally justified perhaps by recourse to some
appropriately revised version of the jus ad bellum of just war theory applicable to such conflicts.
Further, it may well be that the principles of jus in Bello need to be complied with if such
targeted killing is to be morally justified. But there does not seem to be any in-principle reason
why the principles of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination could not be complied with.
Indeed, it would be a good deal easier for targeted killings in theatres of war to comply with the
principles of discrimination and proportionality than for non-targeted killings to do so a point
often made by supporters of targeted killing.
Targeted killings, other things being equal, are more discriminating than non-targeted killings,
and, for the same reason, they are less likely to require justification on the grounds of
proportionality, there being less loss of innocent life. Naturally, it is important to ensure that
lethal actions being called targeted killings by those performing them are in fact targeted
killings. Israeli aerial bombing of buildings in Gaza known to house children as well as members
of Hamas is not targeted killing. As for the principle of necessity, again compliance is eminently
possible, at least in principle. Surely the killing of “high value” terrorist leaders in a theatre of
war might well be justified on grounds of military necessity.
Targeted killings are sometimes referred to as extrajudicial killings. Here the assumption is
not only that they are unlawful, but that, being unlawful, they are morally impermissible. No
doubt some targeted killings are unlawful in some jurisdictions and, moreover, morally ought to
be unlawful, notably those that take place in well-ordered jurisdictions.
Killing of Terrorists
The killing of terrorists in theaters of war does give rise to moral problems not necessarily
present in killing conventional combatants in such theaters. One important problem arises from
the difficulty of distinguishing terrorist combatants from innocent civilians. However, in the case
of targeted killing, as opposed to, say, combatants responding with lethal force to a current
15. terrorist attack in a firefight in a civilian area, there has been a prior investigative process that has
resulted in a description of the role of the target in the terrorist organization and a unique
identifying description of the target.
Moreover, the target is to be killed only if he or she can be reliably identified as such at the time
of the killing. Further, the targeted killing is discriminating only the target is to be killed. It
follows, therefore, that, at least in principle; the problem of distinguishing terrorists from
innocent civilians is substantially reduced by the tactic of targeted killing. This is, of course,
not to say that some investigations are not sloppy, that mistaken identity does not happen, or that
all targeted killings are as discriminating as they ought to be. For example, there is evidence of
faulty intelligence in relation to the targeted killing of Taliban leaders in Afghanistan by NATO
forces. But it is to say that the tactic of targeted killing, insofar as it lives up to its own standards,
is not morally impermissible and, therefore, ought not to be legally impermissible on the
general grounds of the difficulty of distinguishing terrorists from innocent civilians.
Further arguments against targeted killing rely on appeals to various practical and
essentially consequentialist considerations, such as ineffectiveness.
For example, it can be argued that the targeted killing of some terrorists might not reduce
terrorist attacks, since others take their place. However, these kinds of arguments rely on the
truth of empirical claims that might turn out to be false under certain circumstances.
Accordingly, they do not show that targeted killing is necessarily morally unjustified. The
targeted killing of terrorists is, in principle, morally permissible. This is consistent, of course,
with the actual policies and practices of targeted killing on the part of, for example, the United
States and Israel in specific contexts being morally impermissible. The principles of necessity
and proportionality are far more permissive in military conflict than in law enforcement contexts.
For example, the use of lethal force by a military combatant is not necessarily in defense of
an imminent threat to that combatant, his fellow combatants in that encounter, or, for that matter,
any other individual person present at that time and place. Thus it is morally permissible in
military conflict, but not in law enforcement, to use the tactic of ambush, whereby enemy
soldiers are attacked and killed without warning and notwithstanding the fact that they do not
16. constitute an imminent threat to anyone at that time and place. At the risk of overstating the
point, in a theatre of war there is a presumption in favor of using lethal force against enemy
combatants, if it serves a military purpose, whereas, in law enforcement there is a presumption in
favor of arresting offenders.
The implications of this for targeted killing are clear. If armed force A is acting in justified
collective self-defense against armed force B, then it may well be morally permissible in
accordance with the principles of military necessity and proportionality for members of A to
engage in the targeted killing of members of B, such as the killing of B’s commanders. Such
action might well be morally justified self-defense at the collective level in the context of
ongoing armed conflict even though, at the individual level:
1. The aim is to kill (rather than capture or arrest);
2. There is no imminent deadly threat from the target to any individual (e.g., target is asleep or
unarmed); and
3. It is not necessary for personal self-defense or defense of other individual person in that place at
that time to kill the target (e.g., an attempt to poison Hitler when he was eating his food).
Indeed, consistent with the above-mentioned description of military necessity, it may well be
morally permissible to engage in such targeted killing, notwithstanding that even at the collective
level it is not strictly necessary to do so in order to further the immediate, medium, or long-term
military goals in question.
Targeted Killing by States and International Organizations
Targeted killing is transforming the global international order and provides the conceptual
ground for the individual contributions to the special issue. It develops a two-dimensional
concept of political order and introduces a theoretical framework that conceives the maintenance
and transformation of international order as a dynamic interplay between its behavioral
dimension in the form of violence and discursive processes and its institutional dimension in the
form of ideas, norms, and rules. Targeted killing has been a perennial feature of human history.
Sayler, 2015) constitute a technological revolution for targeted killing that enables states to
engage in the long-term surveillance and targeted killing of individuals with comparatively little
risk. So targeted killing has moved from the fringes of undercover activity to the very core of
policy-making in national security.
17. This transformation is unfolding against the background of ideas, norms, and rules that
constitute the global international order. Existing scholarship on the relationship between
targeted killing and international order predominantly focuses on the extent to which current
practices of targeted killing comply with existing legal and moral ideas, norms, and rules, as well
as on whether these principles should be adapted to meet the realities of armed conflicts in the
21st century (e.g. This scholarship essentially analyzes the impact of the current international
order on targeted killing and partially advocates changes to this order. Thomas, 2005) have
focused on the flipside of the relationship between targeted killing and international order, that
is, on the question of whether and how the current transformation of targeted killing is
transforming the global international order.Targeted killing has also been used by the USA in
theatres of actual combat operations, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as outside these
theatres of war and as part of CIA and US military run covert operations in Pakistan. The USA is
using drone strikes and Special Forces there to conduct pre-emptive as well as defensive targeted
killing operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The argument is brought forward that such
operations are necessary to protect US forces and its allies in Afghanistan and to disrupt the
existent terrorist infrastructure. The focus of such operations is on the so-called ‘Tribal Areas’ of
Pakistan, Waziristan, where the Taliban have effectively established an autonomous sphere of
influence to the exclusion of the central government in Peshawar. Other such covert operations
have seen CIA operated drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia as well Sudan, where a lack of
cooperation and/or relative capabilities of the respective governments have created areas which
are outside effective state control.
Targeted Killing in the Context of Political
Assassinations and Terrorism
A historical example can be found in the practices of the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War,
whose policy of large-scale assassinations of South Vietnamese government officials willing to
work for the US supported government of the Republic of Vietnam was so effective that the US
military had to counter this threat by the use of targeted killing operations against the Viet Cong
(as well as covert operatives from the North Vietnamese Army, NVA) under the controversial
but successful Phoenix program, which used a mix of both targeted killing and assassination for
the neutralization of threats. Targeted killing operations, executed outside the context of
hostilities and directed against political leaders are often executed by intelligence agents and are
usually referred to as ‘assassinations’. Sometimes, the boundaries between such assassinations
and targeted killing within hostilities are overlapping. Such operations are now prohibited in
Western democratic States. The USA after years of employing such acts changed tack when in
the aftermath of a congressional committee, the Church Committee, investigated and condemned
earlier CIA led political assassinations by the USA. The official US position banning such
practices was clarified by President Ford in 1976 when he issued Executive Order (EO) 11905
which officially banned any USA complicity in political assassinations and reigned in excessive
powers of the CIA.39 Confirmed and extended under President Carter, this policy had been used
18. by subsequent US Administrations, including President Bush, who issued EO 13470 in 2008.
Critics of such forms of killings compare these with punitive killings and compare the notion of
‘assassination’ with operations executed solely for ‘vengeance’.40 The USA tries to avoid such
criticism by arguing that targeted operations against leaders of Al-Qaeda do not fall under this
prohibition as its forces were engaged in an ongoing armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and its
targeting of enemy leaders and commanders constituted acts of combat in execution of state self-
defence. The ongoing strategy by the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan to systematically
target and kill personnel of international and local NGOs involved in health care and social
development programmes, constitutes an own category of ‘targeted terrorism’, ‘assassinations’
or targeted killings in a wider sense
The Future Use of Targeted Killing
Current criticism continues to evolve around the following main points: that targeted killing is
illegal as such, that it is inefficient and that it is immoral. There is the possibility that some of
this critique might be justifiable and that only strict observance of the existing legal and
operational frameworks, applicable to targeting and outlined above, can avoid instances where
targeted killing might raise such questions. This includes US Targeted Killing, which is executed
as a manifestation of the US right to individual self defence or as a means of warfare used within
an existing UN SC mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Targeted killing operations
which are planned and executed in accordance with the legitimate targeting process employed by
the US military and its allies (and not the CIA or other Private Military Contractors) as part of
hostilities can be considered lawful and legitimate as long as in compliance with the fundamental
LOAC principles of military necessity, distinction and proportionality and aimed at avoiding
‘collateral damage’. The need to adhere to law is being acknowledged in recent examples in US
military academe. This legality argument is, however, seriously in doubt when the operations are
executed by non-combatants, such as the CIA, not restricted to ‘enemy’ targets alone, as it is the
case in instances where civilian non-combatants become ‘collateral’ damage and the affected
state as Pakistan is a neutral state which does not consent to such strikes.
This affirmative legal assessment does not cover scenarios outside hostilities and in the context
of implementing existing security strategies, such as counterterrorism operations as part of a
national COIN policy, as well as entwined, hybrid operations as e.g.
Counternarcotics operations, or hostage release operations, where legal scrutiny has to be
applied.
The legality of the above-mentioned signature drone strikes are also debatable as
potential violations of the principles of proportionality, imminence and proportionality
Conclusion
Targeted killing is only justifiable within the context of an armed conflict and thus IHL governs
its use which in turn forces States to have to prove the existence of an armed conflict. In
conjunction with proving the existence of an armed conflict, States must denote whether it is an
19. international armed conflict, involving two or more States regardless if one side denies the
existence of a state of war, or a non-international armed conflict, where a state of protracted
armed violence exists between organized armed forces not of an inter-State character. Due to the
existence of only two forms of armed conflict, as stated in IHL, the notion of a ‘war on terror’
can only be utilized if it complies with the conditions of a NIAC, but the utilization of the term
terrorist is not a sufficient justification for the application of IHL. As stated, if engaged in an
armed conflict, a State may engage in targeted killing provided it complies with IHL.
EXERCISE
Q.NO.1
How does the targeted killing program operate?
Answer:
There is very little information available to the public about the U.S. targeting of people far from
any battlefield, so we don't know when, where and against whom targeted killing can be
authorized. According to news reports, names are added to a "kill list," sometimes for months at
a time, after a secret internal process. In effect, U.S. citizens and others are placed on "kill lists"
on the basis of a secret determination, based on secret evidence, that a person meets a secret
definition of threat.
Q.NO.2
Explain targeted killing and the law.
Answer:
Targeted killing assumes frequently position inside an operational setting which is here
and there 'half breed', which requires reactions which join components of battle and law
authorization, counterinsurgency or a digit of both. This potential 'double utilization' of focused
executing prompts the materialness of various lawful principles, as perceived in a new assertion
by Human Rights Watch, whereby he purposeful utilization of deadly power against a particular
objective can be lawful in activities against a warrior on a certified front line, or in a law
implementation circumstance in which there is an inevitable danger to life and there is no
sensible other option. The use of targeted killings as Combat during hostilities as well as Law
Enforcement and highlight briefly the legal implications of both.
20. A. Targeted Killings as Combat
B. Targeted Killing as Law Enforcement
C. Extraterritorial Targeted Killing
Q.NO.3
What challenges are founded on combat morality and efficiencyin
TargetedKilling?
Answer:
Targeted killing may have some direct implications for the overall morality of armed conflict and
combat as such: the evolving drone technology removes the soldier from the actual battlefield
and with it the closeness and ‘intimacy’ of war. UAV technology has created a mechanical and
factual distance between operator and his ‘target’, which acts like a moral distance: targeting
killings may have removed any remnants of ‘humanity of combat’ and produced the factual
dehumanization of the enemy. This dehumanizing distance between the protagonists of this new
form of armed conflict, thoroughly asymmetric in terms of weapon technologies and capabilities,
has led to a growing criticism of the Obama Administration’s use of drones. This concern is
aptly summarized by the US Army Chaplain and military ethics teacher, Keith Shurtleff, when
he states ‘that as war becomes safer and easier, as soldiers are removed from the horrors of war
and see the enemy not as humans but as blips on a screen, there is very real danger of losing the
deterrent that such horrors provide’.
Q.NO.4
Elaborate the term, “Targeted killing as a means of killing enemies.”
Answer:
Targeted killings as a method for murdering foes of a state has been utilized most
oftentimes by the USA as a component of its general military procedure against Al-Qaeda and
the Taliban. While the USA didn't 'concoct' this type of fighting it has started to lead the pack in
propelling its turn of events and by and large plan in regard of focusing on cycles, order and
control just as the utilization of progressively complex innovation. The utilization of drones for
executing motor, deadly, strikes against antagonistic and adversary targets has its unmistakable
military advantages as far as operational abilities, status and its general accessibility as a cautious
just as hostile type of fighting. Directed murdering by UCAS can be executed at short
notification and doesn't need the sending of and the presence of generous own powers in the
performance center of activities. This accessibility and adaptability of utilizing drones as a stage
21. for the execution of focused killings makes this type of fighting so impressive when reacting to
introduce dangers at an impromptu premise. Subsequently, both multiplication and extension of
the utilization of UCAS are expanding.
Q.NO.5
Is there any future for Targeted Killing? Briefly explain the answer in your
words.
Answer:
There is a future to be expected from targeted killing, because it is an effective, relatively cost-
effective military strategy that from the perspective of the American model in practice enjoys a
proven record of success.
The world financial state encourages cheaper strategies; now that the era of austerity
measures and public spending cuts are taking hold of western states it has to be
expected that protracted counterinsurgency missions like Iraq and Afghanistan will
not represent the short- to medium-term future. The reduction of personnel deployed
as well as the financial benefits of targeted killing programs over personnel-heavy
occupations will be attractive to austere policy makers seeking affordable solutions to
difficult problems.
OBJECTIVE TYPE QUESTIONS
(1)Targetedkilling is a form of killing which is carried out by:
(a)International laws (b) Armed conflicts
(c) Government (d) UNO
(2)“Intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals
undertaken with explicit governmentalapproval.” Is Proposedby:
(a)Alfred (b) David (c) Melzer (d) Casis
(3)Which of the following factors Melzerused in his definition:
(a)Intent, premeditation, deliberation
22. (b) The use of lethal force, random targets, war strategies
(c) Unpremeditated, discerning, methodical
(d) Embroilment, agitation, war
(4)Directedkilling as a method for slaughtering adversaries ofa state has
been utilized most habitually by the USA as a feature of its generalmilitary
system against:
(a) Abu Sayyaf & Abdullah Azzam Brigades
(b) Al-Qaeda and the Taliban
(c) Aden-Abyan & Al-Haramain
(d) Al-Itihad & Al-Nusra
(5) …………closes out with the section pertaining to not in the physical custody of
the attacker which solidifies targeted killing’s distinction from extrajudicial
killings.
(a)Alfred (b) David (c) Melzer (d) Casis
(6) What does UCAS stands for?
(a)Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems
(b)University and College Admissions Services
(c)Unit Cost Analysis System
(d)Universal Conditional Analysis System
(7)Increased use of targeting killings by the USA in the ‘war on terror’ may
be both____________
(a)Moral & legal (b) Chaste & warranted
(c)Immoral & Illegal (d) Permitted & Licentious
(8) Event that has placed the ethics of targeted killing at the fore…….?
23. (a) The killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan
(b) The extrajudicial killings in the Philippines
(c) Major political protests in Libya against Gaddafi’s government
(d) Both a & c
(9) The major political protests broke out in Libya against Gaddafi’s
government was held in:
(a)In Feb, 2010
(b)In Feb, 2011
(c)In Feb, 2012
(d)In Feb, 2013
(10) The targetedkilling of known combatants in theaters of war is…..
(a) Disreputable illegal (b) Impropriety & unlawful
(c) Morally permissible (d) immoral &illegal
(11) OSAMA BIN LADEN was killed in _____by ______.
(a)Waziristan, Al-Qaeda (b) Abbottabad, US special forces
(c) Abbottabad, Pak Army (d) Waziristan, Al-Itihad
(12) The transformation of targeted killing is unfolding against the
background of ___________that constitute the global international order.
(a) Warfare, conflict & struggle (b) reconciliation, concord & accord
(c) Ideas, norms & rules (d) peace, unity & armistice
(13) The use of _____for executing targeted killing in Afghanistan and
Pakistan might well increase in the next years
(a) strategies (b)drones (c)operations (d)machine guns
(14)What does the term IHL means in the context?
(a)International Humanitarian Law (b) Institutions of Higher Learning
24. (c)Intelligence Handover Line (d) Imprisonment with Hard Labour
(15)Which notion can only be utilized if it complies with the conditions of a
NIAC?
(a)Warfare by era (b) War by death toll (c) War on terror (d) None of these
References
Patterson, Eric (2009) Just War Thinking: Morality and Pragmatism in the
Struggle against Contemporary Threats, Lexington Books, →ISBN page 74
Morgan, Matthew J. (2009) The Impact of 9/11 and the New Legal
Landscape: The Day that Changed Everything?, Palgrave
Macmillan, →ISBN pages 227-228
Guiora, Amos N. (2008) Constitutional Limits on Coercive Interrogation,
Oxford University Press, USA, →ISBN, page 150
https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article/18/2/259/821647#14250568
Teacher, Law. (November 2013). Targeted Killing and International
Humanitarian Law. Retrieved from https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-
essays/human-rights/targeted-killing-international-law-7821.php?vref=1
Seumas Miller Shooting to Kill: The Ethics of Police and Military Use of
Lethal Force (Oxford University Press, 2016) Chapter 9
