1. 200681793
PIED 3565 Terrorism: Concepts, Debates, Cases
“Critically assess the effectiveness of Israel’s policy of targeted killings”
Word Count: 3282
Seminar Tutor: Dr Lars Berger
2. The increasing casualty rate amongst Palestinian civilians, and the continued
terrorist presence in Israeli controlled territory, has understandably called into
question the effectiveness of Israel’s counter-terrorism policy of targeted
killing. However, it would be too simplistic to declare this practice as either
effective or ineffective as much of the literature over the part two decades has
tended to do. This is because there is a far broader debate to be had over
efficacy than that purely based on statistical analysis of loss and gains, and
indeed evidence shows that targeted killing has both weakened and
strengthened the operational capacity of Palestinian terrorist organisations
(Goldings, 2011). In analysing arguments on both sides of the polarised
spectrum, this essay will seek to show that whilst targeted killing cannot be
said to be an effective measure on its own, as part of a wider counter -
terrorism mandate, it’s effectiveness is reliant on a range of factors.
Although not a unique phenomenon of Israeli counter-terrorism measures
before the advent of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (or Second Intifada), the level of
violence that erupted following the visit of Ariel Sharon to Temple Mount on
28th September 2000 resulted i n Israel “openly pursui ng” (David, 2003, p.111)
a policy of targeted killing to curb the threat posed by Palestinian terrorism
(Boyden et al., 2009). Although no official definition of targeted killing exists
under international law (Alston, 2010), it can be understood as “premeditated
acts of lethal force employed… to eliminate specific individuals outside their
custody” (Masters, 2013). The pursuance of this policy was first
acknowledged by Israel following the successful assassination of senior Fatah
Tanzim activist Hussein Abayat on 9th November 2000, and since then such
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3. state sanctioned operations have become a prominent feature of the Arab-
Israeli conflict (Blum and Heymann, 2010; Lesh, 2007).
To understand why it is that Israel has so consistently and openly relied upon
targeted killing as a method of counter terrorism, we must consider the type of
terrorist threat that the state faces. For many Palestinian groups, such as
Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the
Islamic Jihad, suicide bombings have predominantly been their “weapon of
choice” (Landau, 2007, p. 10) in attacks against Israel. For example, between
the years 2000-2007, 140 suicide bombings resulted in the deaths of 542
people (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Rather unsurprisingly,
Kaplan, Mintz and Mishal have asserted suicide bombings to be the “leading
cause of death from terrorism in Israel” (2006, p. 557), and thus targeted
killing is essentially used as a pre-emptive strike against those suspected of
planning to carry out suicide missions on Israeli soil (Jacobson and Kaplan,
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2007).
Issues surrounding the definition of ‘effective’
The crux of this debate arguably boils down to a question of definition; how
are we to define effectiveness, and does the practice of targeted killing align
with our perceptions of this definition. According to the Oxford Dictionary,
‘effective’ can be defined as “successful i n produci ng a desired or i ntended
result” (Oxford Uni versity Press, 2014). What then is the desired or intended
result of targeted killing? Is it, for example, simply the assassination of those
4. suspected of planning to carry out acts of terrorism in the near future, or is
there a longer-term aim of reducing terrorist groups’ operational capabilities.
Depending on the definition favoured by any given academic, politician,
military leader or journalist, their perception of the effectiveness of Israel’s use
of targeted killing will differ accordingly, and it is because of this that opinion
200681793 4
remains resolutely polarised.
Looking first at the assumption that the intended result of targeted killing is the
death of suspected terrorists planning imminent attacks, as is the criterion of
the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in permitting such operations (Harel and Alon,
2002), it is arguably hard to deny that the practice is effective. Even if the
individual (or individuals) targeted do not die as a result of the attack but are
seriously injured, then it could be said that the immediate threat posed to
Israel’s national security has been negated, at least on a tactical level
(University of Surrey, 2012). However, this presupposes that every instance
of targeted killing produces the desired result. Targeted killing by nature is
not a precise science, as it involves a certain degree of the unknown.
Although stringent rules set out by the Israeli judicial authority require a
considerable amount of intelligence to be gathered before an operation is
sanctioned (Jacobson and Kaplan, 2007), there is no guarantee that the ‘hit’
will be successful.
Jacobson and Kaplan (2007) have identified two prominent reasons as to why
targeted killing operations will not always work to counteract an imminent
threat. Firstly, it is entirely possible for a targeted killing to “miss the terrorists
5. targeted altogether” (Jacobson and Kaplan, 2007, p. 776), as was the case
when the IDF launched a fai led attempt on the life of Hamas militant Ashraf
Ferwana in October 2006 (Myre, 2006). Furthermore, whi lst you may be
successful in preventing an individual from carrying out a specific attack, the
“chance of thwarting others is much lower” (Jacobson and Kaplan, 2007,
p.775). This is because if the planning of an attack was in its final stages, it is
likely that the act can be performed without the deceased (Jacobson and
Kaplan, 2007, p.776). It is also unlikely that the target would be the only
person planning to execute an attack over a specific period, and so their
death may do little to reduce the immediate threat (Jacobson and Kaplan,
2007, p.776). Thus the effectiveness of targeted killings in countering an
impending attack is wholly dependant on the success of the mission itself, and
the hope that any planned attack is isolated and in its primitive stages.
Proponents of targeted killing have also asserted that the effectiveness of the
tactic can be measured in its ability to undermine terrorist groups operational
capabilities. The removal of key players within a terrorist organisation has
been identified by some as being fundamental to a group’s demise, with
Goldings describing this as the “i ncapacitation effect” (2011, p. 6). By
eliminati ng the “upper echelons” (Goldings, 2011, p. 8) of a terrorist group, not
only do they “lose effectiveness and focus (and) become prone to i nfighting”
(Mannes, 2008, p. 40), but they also lose their organisational and financial
epicentre (Byman, 2006). However, according to an empirical study
conducted by Jordan, in order for this incapacitation effect to take hold, these
targeted killings must be directed at those at the highest level and not low
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6. level commanders or militants (Jordan, 2009). Where high-ranking leaders
were the targets of lethal force, the terrorist organisation crumbled 54% of the
time as opposed to 33% when the targets were low to mid ranking leaders
(Jordan, 2009, p. 736). Israel’s targets have largely been low-mid level
members of terrorist groups as they are most likely to be the ones to carry out
attacks. Thus targeted killings could be of far greater benefit in terms of
effectiveness if a greater number of the terrorist elite were targeted.
Many sceptics of targeted killing argue that it is not an effective counter-terrorism
measure at all, and that instead it is counterproductive; instead of
reducing the terrorist threat, targeted killing actually increases the risk posed
to Israeli citizens through the unintentional promotion of revenge attacks and
recruitment of new extremists (Jacobson and Kaplan, 2007). For instance, at
the height of the Second Intifada, whilst the number of targeted killings
increased to prevent terrorist attacks, the number of Israeli deaths from
terrorist acts also increased. Ganor has described this link between offensive
action and revenge attacks as the ‘boomerang effect’, as terrorists may justify
future attacks by li nking them with “the offensi ve actions carried out against
200681793 6
them” (2005, p.143).
The so called ‘martyrdom effect’ also suggests the same outcome; the death
of a terrorist at the hands of the enemy is likely to lift them to “near mythic
status” (Hunter, 2009, p.64), triggeri ng a desire for vengeance and “fosteri ng
an on-going cycle of violence” (Hunter, 2009, p.64). The prospect of this
deadly repercussion was highlighted by the senior Palestinian security official
7. Muhuammed Dhalan, who stated that those who sanction the killing of the
terrorist elite should “turn the page and should si gn off on killi ng 16 Israeli’s”
(Byman, 2006). However, whilst the number of suicide bombings may
increase, it does not necessarily follow that the number of Israeli deaths will
also increase. For example, following the targeted killing of former Hamas
founder Ahmed Yassin in 2004, Stahl calculated that although the number of
attacks increased by 299, the “total number of deaths decreased severely” by
27 (Stahl, 2006, p.63). Therefore, whilst Israel should not shy away
completely from a policy targeted killing, as this may render them passive and
invite a bombardment, decision makers must take into account whether any
benefit gained will be undermined by an appetite for revenge (Ganor, 2005).
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The impact of law and morality
The question over the morality of targeted killing has long troubled the Israeli
administration. Should a counter terrorism policy be seen as effective at
achieving its aims despite the risk that civilian casualties may result?
Unsurprisingly, the response from the international community has largely
been that of condemnation and outrage when innocent civi lians have become
victim to targeted killings. Although this is an unintentional result, it
nevertheless questions whether these tactics are precise enough in their
application to merit the name ‘targeted’ killi ng. At the height of the Second
Intifada in 2002 and 2003, Harel calculated the ratio of civilians to targets
killed to be 1:1, and thus named this particularly bloody era in the Palestinian-
8. Israeli conflict as the “dark days” due to its high civilian death rate (Harel,
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2007).
One such attack carried out during 2002 was that against Hamas official
Salah Shahada. Whilst Shahada was indeed assassinated, and thus the
mission in terms of its desired result was clearly a success, the one tonne
bomb used to carry out the targeted killing also took the lives of thirteen
Palestinian civilians, ten of those chi ldren and infants (Stein, 2003, p.132) .
Although an extreme statistic, Stein argues that civilian casualties is a “natural
consequence” (2003, p.132) of this form of lethal force. However, this is not
to say that the civi lian death rate has been at a constant throughout the last
two decades of the conflict. Although 175 of the 251 Palestinians killed by
targeted attacks up until December 2011 were civi lians (Goppel, 2013, p.34),
Dershowitz has highlighted how there are peaks and troughs in the number of
civilians killed throughout different points of the conflict (2011).
Using statistics published by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Dershowitz
stresses how the number of civi lians hurt by targeted killings decreased to
one in every 30 operations carried out by the IDF in 2011, a significant
improvement from the figures seen in 2002-2003 (2011). Dershowitz is
critical of the lack of reporting of these instances of improvements in the
media, stati ng that “silence i n the face of improvement is misleading”, and that
disproportionate criticism of Israel’s policy of targeted killing is unfounded
(2011). Indeed, compared to the targeted killing practices of the United
Kingdom, the United States and Russia, fewer civilians have died as a result
9. of Israel’s policy than that of the three superpowers (Dershowitz, 2011).
However, whilst there have been improvements in the precision of targeted
killings throughout the course of the conflict, this does not absolve the policy
of the indiscriminate lethal force it can wage on civilians. ‘Target’ by definition
means “a person… selected as the aim of the attack” (Oxford University
Press, 2014); if civilians who are not selected as the aim of the attack die as a
result of the targeted killing, then the exercise cannot be said to be truly
effective in achieving the desired end, regardless of whether the target of the
200681793 9
operation has died.
Criticism has also centred on the legality of Israel’s policy of targeted killing.
This largely revolves around the debate as to whether terrorists should be
defined as civilians or combatants, as for targeted killing to be legal, they must
be the latter (David, 2003). David argues unequivocally that if terrorists pose
a legitimate threat to Israeli security, they should be considered as
combatants, “regardless of whether they wear a uniform” (David, 2003,
p.114). Indeed, the Unites States seems to share this stance, as a Pentagon
official commenting on targeted killing operations carried out on al -Qaeda
operatives stated that “if we fi nd an enemy combatant, then we should be
able… to take military action against them” (Risen, 2002).
However, many reject the notion that terrorists can be combatants, and
instead believe that they must be considered as civilians. This argument is
more convincing, as by definition, terrorists do not fully align with the
characteristics required to be categorised as combatants; although there is
10. undoubtedly a chain of command within terrorist groups and members are
likely to be armed, they are not an armed force of a state or a militia of a
political group, and do not possess uniforms. This is not to say that terrorists
should enjoy the same protection under international law as those who do no
wrong. Instead, once a civilian participates in hostilities, they then become
“legitimate targets under Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol” (Stein,
2003, p.129). Stein argues that as targeted killings are carried out against
civilians, Israel must provide evidence that they were “participating i n
hostilities” at the time of the attack (Stei n, 2003, p.130). Without such
evidence, which the Human Rights Council has stated has never been
publicly disclosed by the Israeli government (Alston, 2010), then one can
arguably assume that Israel’s policy of targeted killings are illegal (Stein,
2003). By blurring the line between justifiable and illegal, Israel continues to
show itself in an unfavourable light in the eyes of the world, and thus targeted
killing cannot be seen as effective in promoting Israel as a moral beacon in
200681793 10
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Socio-political considerations
Social and political factors can be seen as key in driving the effectiveness of
Israel’s policy of targeted killi ng. For Israeli citizens who have long had to
endure relentless attacks by Palestinian mi litants, targeted killing may provide
a sense of retribution and revenge. David (2003) has developed a
sophisticated reasoning as to why targeted killing is an effective method of
appeasing the Israeli population. Although the IDF declared in 2002 that no
11. targeted killing can be carried out as an act of vengeance, since targets are
decided upon by the government accordi ng to certai n standards, the “issue of
arbitrary revenge is resolved” (David, 2003, p.122); it is those who plan and/or
have carried out attacks on Israeli citizens, so i n killing them the “desire for
revenge from both families of the victims and the society at large is met”
(David, 2003, p.122). This also satisfies a desire for retribution, as those who
carry out atrocious crimes against Israeli civilians receive the ultimate
punishment. Furthermore, Hafez and Hatfeld (2006) discuss how targeted
killing placates Israeli citi zens at times of intense conflict by “signal(li ng) the
state’s determination to fight terrorism” (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006, p.378).
This, as Plaw describes, gives the Israelis a “sense of efficacy i n the face of a
relentless threat”, and thus targeted killing can be seen as an effective
method of reassurance (Plaw, 2008, p. 182).
According to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the ultimate aim is to
“make peace” (Sales, 2014) with the Palestinians. Why then are targeted
killings continuing to be used when this offensive strategy runs contrary to this
desired end in two ways; firstly, using lethal force in Palestinian territory is
likely to encourage retaliation and lesson any appetite for peaceful discussion,
and secondly, any subsequent increase in attacks on Israeli soil is equally
likely to dent any enthusiasm for negotiation with the Palestinians. This can
be seen as a cyclical phenomenon, as when the level of violence increases
on both sides of the border, appetite for political process simultaneously
decreases. For example, during the Second Intifada where targeted killing
featured prominently and terrorist attacks in Israel remained high (Fisher,
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12. 2014), those who “strongly oppose & somewhat oppose” negotiations
between Israel and Palestine rose from 18.1% in October 1999 to 51.9% in
October 2002 (Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, 2014). This is a
staggering statistic, and it highlights the fragility of public aspirations for
negotiation. Thus in a situation where there is a ultimate desire to open a
political dialogue, targeted killing with not be effective in helping gather public
200681793 12
support for this notion.
Israel’s wider counter terrorism mandate
Given the notoriety of targeted killing, it is unsurprising that this particular
aspect of Israel’s counter terrorism policy has come under such scruti ny. For
the reasons outlined throughout this essay, when one considers targeted
killing as a policy on its own, it cannot be said to be particularly effective.
However, it would be a mistake not to consider, albeit briefly, targeted killing
within the context of Israel’s wider counter terrorism mandate. Whereas
targeted killing provides an offensive measure of “last resort” (Byman, 2006),
the arrest and detention of terrorists can be seen as a more placid defensive
method of intervention. Indeed the tactics of targeted killing and arrest go
hand in hand, as before any hit can be authorised, all reasonable steps must
have been taken to exhaust non-lethal measures first (Alston, 2010).
The arrest and detention of terrorists is preferable as it allows the Israelis the
opportunity to gather intelligence from those apprehended. Furthermore, if
the terrorist elite are captured and sentenced, the martyrdom effect is less
13. likely to take place due to the demoralising effect that incarceration can have
on terrorist groups. However, as Goldings (2011) points out, arresting
suspects is not always as easy as it seems. At times the Palestinian
Authority “refuses to gi ve us suspected terrorists”, sometimes going so far as
to inform them of the impending arrest (Goldings, 2011, p.4). Furthermore, in
trying to arrest a suspect in an urban area there is a risk that riots and
violence may result (Goldings, 2011, p.4). This is why these counter terrorism
methods marry so well, as they can compensate for the others flaws. If
attempts to arrest an individual yield no positive results, targeted killing may
be used as a final resort in order to prevent further terrorist activity. The
effectiveness of targeted killing increases within the context of a broader
framework of less lethal means, as it provides the Israeli government with an
alternative should defensive counter terrorism measures fail.
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Conclusion
Given the continuing level of violence between Israel and militant groups
operating from within Palestinian territory, the widespread use of targeted
killing by Israel has certainly not achieved strategic success in combatting
terrorist attacks against its citizens or enabling an environment in which
political dialogue can proceed. At the tactical level, specific operations have
probably degraded the mi litary capability of individual organisations but this
effect has been both limited and short term, particularly where the targets
were not members of the terrorist “elite”. Whilst Israel’s use of targeted killing
has domestic support, indiscriminate strikes leading to high casualty rates
14. amongst “non-combatants” has certainly affected Israel’s standing within the
wider International community, even amongst her closest friends, this is a
very significant negative. Although Israel can justify the use of targeted killing
when less lethal means have failed, the policy is a barrier to any meaningful
political dialogue without which a longer term negotiated solution cannot be
developed and the cycle of violence will therefore continue.
200681793 14
.
15. 200681793 15
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