How to Structure Remedies in Abuses of Dominance in Digital Markets – Chris Jenkins - UK CMA - October 2019 OECD-AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets
This presentation by Chris Jenkins - UK CMA, was made during the panel IV “How to Structure Remedies in Abuses of Dominance in Digital Markets” held at the OECD/AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets on 10-11 October 2019. More information on this event can be found at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/oecd-agcm-workshop-on-abuse-of-dominance-in-digital-markets.htm
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How to Structure Remedies in Abuses of Dominance in Digital Markets – Chris Jenkins - UK CMA - October 2019 OECD-AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets
1. Remarks on UK approach
to remedies
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Chris Jenkins
Economics Director
2. Context
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● UK market study/investigation powers as complement to
antitrust enforcement
● Several recent reviews of digital markets in the UK
- Competition issues (Furman Review)
- Wider concerns (online harms, press sustainability, privacy)
● Digital advertising market study follows on from these reviews
- Enables overall assessment of competition issues relating to
advertising-funded platforms
- Part of the motivation is to assess possible remedy ideas in a specific
market context
● Parallel CMA policy work on wider platform issues
3. Objectives of remedies in digital markets
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● Important to be clear on objectives, evidence and potential unintended
consequences
● Possible objectives
- Addressing market failures from exercise of market power – prices, quality and
innovation
- Protecting / increasing the scope for competition – including tackling exclusionary
practices and/or leveraging of market power
- Preserving competition in markets which have not yet ‘tipped’
- Addressing other market failures – eg information asymmetries and coordination
failures
● Distinguish between (i) exercise of market power, (ii) potential market
power and (iii) wider market failures
4. Ex post enforcement and ex ante regulation
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● Complements rather than substitutes
● Forward vs backward-looking
● Principles-based vs specific conduct
● Potential roles for regulation
- Pre-emptive action to protect competition for the market – eg data mobility and
open standards
- Reducing ability to leverage market power – eg limiting self-preferencing
● Possible ex ante framework
- Furman Review – proposal for statutory code of conduct to apply to platforms
with ‘Strategic Market Status’, to be overseen by a Digital Markets Unit
● Need to recognise diversity of platforms – details matter
5. Areas we are exploring in the market study
● Five potential remedy areas in Statement of Scope
- Increasing competition through data mobility, open standards and
open data
- Giving consumers greater protection in respect of data
- Limiting platforms’ ability to exercise market power
- Improving transparency and oversight for digital advertisers and
content providers
- Institutional reform
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