Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.
Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets
OECD Workshop for
Competition Officials
Session III – Abuses in the Digital Age
Mode...
OECD Workshop for
Competition Officials
Session III – Abuses in the Digital Age Introduction
• Digital platforms are not a...
OECD Workshop for
Competition Officials
Session III – Abuses in the Digital Age Conclusion
• Antitrust tools can still pla...
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in …5
×

New Technology – Old Theories of Harm? – Andrea Minuto Rizzo, AGCM Italy - October 2019 OECD-AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets

104 views

Published on

This presentation by Andrea Minuto Rizzo, AGCM Italy, was made during the panel III “New Technology – Old Theories of Harm?” held at the OECD/AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets on 10-11 October 2019. More information on this event can be found at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/oecd-agcm-workshop-on-abuse-of-dominance-in-digital-markets.htm

Published in: Government & Nonprofit
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

New Technology – Old Theories of Harm? – Andrea Minuto Rizzo, AGCM Italy - October 2019 OECD-AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets

  1. 1. Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets OECD Workshop for Competition Officials Session III – Abuses in the Digital Age Moderator: Andrea Minuto Rizzo, AGCM Katarzyna Tosza, European Commission Ryan Struve, Department of Justice (US) Mario Denni, AGCM
  2. 2. OECD Workshop for Competition Officials Session III – Abuses in the Digital Age Introduction • Digital platforms are not all quite the same (product features, business models, monetization) • some platforms (Google, Facebook) offer free services and are funded through advertising.. • …others intermediate between two/more sides and take a commission when a deal is concluded and are sometimes (Amazon) also involved as retailers • Exclusionary abuses • traditional theories of harm - like tying and exclusivity - are still used and seem to work well also in relation to digital markets (EU Android case similar to old EU Microsoft case) • new theories of harm • dual role of digital platforms both as marketplaces and retailers (self-preferencing in the EU Google Shopping and Italian Amazon cases) • cases involving data (EU Amazon and Italian Google cases) • new ideas, can a pattern of dominance-facilitating acquisitions qualify as anticompetitive behavior?
  3. 3. OECD Workshop for Competition Officials Session III – Abuses in the Digital Age Conclusion • Antitrust tools can still play a major role also in the digital world • The increased awareness of the existence of significant market power has led to a more interventionist approach, especially in Europe • Caution is needed, Authorities should rely on sound theories of harm • Traditional exclusionary theories of harm have been already extended to digital platforms • tying and exclusivity have been applied to a zero-price world in the EU Android case • Authorities can also pursue a wider catalogue of potential harms, like self-preferencing • theories of harm should fit with the conduct • incentives to foreclose have to be taken into consideration (vertical integration does not necessarily create incentives to foreclose rivals) • The application of exploitative theories of harm to data seems still unchartered legal territory

×