This presentation by Serbia was made during the discussion “Alternatives to Leniency Programmes” held at the 22nd meeting of the OECD Global Forum on Competition on 7 December 2023. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/atlp. This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.

1. Experience of the Serbian CPC
in detecting concerted practice
in non-bidding markets
(without relying on leniency, whistleblower
programs, sophisticated software or cooperation
with other public authorities)
OECD Global Forum on Competition
Alternatives To Leniency Programmes
Paris, 7.12.2023.
Maja Dobrić*
Senior Adviser, Restrictive Practices Division, Commission for Protection of
Competition, Serbia
*The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the institution

2. Premises of the screening method
 Applied in oligopolistic markets and can potentially
differentiate between tacit collusion and concerted
practice.
 From the perspective of undertakings:
 Engaging in cartels is a business decision (like any
other).
 Decisions are made by managers trained to solve
problems efficiently.
 Collusion eliminates the risks of market uncertainty
and can stabilize the market in crisis.
 Cartels are fast and efficient “solutions” to market
problems.
To find the “solution”, look for the problem it was
trying to solve.

3. Structure of the screen
 The screen has two parts:
 Structural part - market conditions conducive
to collusion
 Behavioural part - three sets of indicators:
 Did the market have different dynamics before
the period of potentially collusive stability?
 Put the data in a (linear) timeframe
 Expand the period of observed data as much as
possible.
Cartel “triggering”
events
(cause/problem)
“the space in
between”
(contact, how the
problem was solved)
Cartel symptoms
(outcome/solution)

4. Initiation of the “Coffee” case* in Serbia
* The case was initiated in September 2021 and is still ongoing in December
2023.
 The CPC analysed publicly available information
 press releases – on the likelihood of price changes
 financial reports (description on doing business in
Serbia) - significant change in the profitability of one
of the observed companies which did not correspond to
the market conditions explained in the same report.
 Economic analysis prior to initiation
 Public statement: “raw coffee makes up for 90% of the
production costs”
 The CPC compared the changes of retail prices with
changes of prices of raw coffee on the global
commodities market. The analysis showed that the
prices movement in Serbia are not driven by price
changes in the global raw coffee market.

5. Transferring the method to technology-
led screening – future plans
 Overall idea: flag potential markets where
collusion could arise and monitor for signs of
potential collusion in these markets as it arises
 Identify (oligopolistic) markets with past or current
“triggering events” + monitor for symptoms as they
arise
 Step 1: expand the indicative list of events and
patterns in each part of the screen
 Step 2: adapting the screen to a digital tool - a
software solution which would scan publicly
available information.
Expected impact: a credible threat of detection to
incentivise leniency.