geopolitics

1. NEO REALISM
• 1945 – 1975
• The UN and the Cold War
• The alliances and the balance of terror : the
mutual assured destruction (MAD)
• 1975 – 1991
• The theoretical enrichment : the anarchic
structure and proxy wars

2. A REALIST SECURITY ARCHITECTURE : THE UN
• In 1946 the United Nations (UN) architecture to handle the risk of conflict and another world
war was established
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3. A NEW WEAPON AND A NEW STRATEGY
• The main feature of this bipolar
confrontation is the nuclear weapons
• The doctrine evolved from full retaliation
in case of challenging the order, soviet
tanks invaded the european continent, to
incremental response and the use of
nuclear weapons in last resort.
• However, the core of these nuclear
weapons is there deterrence function.

4. THE « STAG HUNT » SOCIAL PHENOMENA
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Jean Jacques ROUSSEAU
(1712-1778)

5. THE GAME THEORY
Actor B
Actor A Cooperation Defecion
Cooperation (C,C) (C,D)
Defection (D,C) (D,D)
• In order to understand the security dilemma mechanism we used the game theory
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6. THE PRISONNER DILEMMA
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• If the four resulting gains possibilities are ordered :
D,C > C,C > D,D > C,D
Thief B
Thief A Silent Confess
Silent (1 year,1 year) (20 years, 0 year)
Confess (0 year, 20 years) (5 years,5 years)

7. THE ARM RACES STRUCTURE
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8. THE NEO REALISM DYNAMIC
• « Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability
to speak and to understand each other happen to come together
at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger of each
will be satisfied by the fifth part of stag. So they agree to
cooperate in a project to trap one. But also the hunger of any one
of them will be satisfied by a hare, so as a hare comes within
reach one of them grabs it. The defector obtains the means of
satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape.
His immediate interest prevails over consideration for his
fellows. »
• (the stag hunt paradox, K. Waltz)
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Kennet WALTZ

9. THE SECURITY DILEMMA
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DC > CC > DD > DC for each actor

10. THE SECURITY DILEMMA : INITIAL STATE
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4, 4
3, 1
1, 3
2, 2

11. THE SECURITY DILEMMA : THE TIPING POINT
Actor B
Actor A Cooperation Defect
Cooperation 3, 3 1, 4
Defect 4, 1 2, 2
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12. EXAMPLE : INDIA/PAKISTAN
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13. EXAMPLE : IRAN AND THE SEARCH FOR
DETERRRENCE
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14. OUT OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA DEAD END
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The american anti missil
system to mitigate the balistic
missil hazard from Iran and
North Korea

15. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
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16. TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS
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17. CUBA : A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY
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18. THE SOVIET CHRONOLOGY
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19. INTELLIGENCE : THE KEY TO SECURITY
A U2 spy photo of SS-4 MRBM base in San Cristobal, Cuba, with labels detailing various parts
of the base, displayed ,14 October of 1962.
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20. THE DECISION MAKING : EXCOMM
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21. THE AMERICAN
CHRONOLOGY
Oct. 16 : Awareness of the threat
Oct. 17 : To evaluate the challenge
Oct. 18 : The asymmetry of information
Oct. 19 : The inception of the strategy
Oct. 20 : The decision making
Oct. 21 : To institutionalize the process
Oct. 22 : To communicate the decision
Oct. 24 : To start bargaining
Oct. 25 : The UN stage
Oct. 26 : The coercive action
Oct. 27 : A new bargain
Oct. 23 : Set the int. law framework
Framework
inception
Decision
&
action Oct. 28 : To seal the deal
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22. CRISIS MANAGEMENT : BARGAINING
Sec. Of State D. Rusk : « we’re eyeball to eyeball, and I
think the other fellow just blinked. »
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23. THE FEATURE OF STRATEGIC DECISION AND
SECURITY : THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE
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24. THE FREEZING OF USSR
• The freezing of the soviet planned economy and its
inability to manage basic needs of its population, its
oever extension into central asia and the dissident
movement set the USSR into a dead end

25. THE LEVEL ANALYSIS
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26. WHERE IS CAUSALITY ?
Niveau Description Type de causalité
First image Human nature Immediate
Second image States Immediate
Third image International Anarchy Permissive
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27. THE QUEST FOR SECURITY
• At the third level, the international society K. Waltz
deduced :
• « in anarchy there is no automatic harmony. A state
will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the
prospects for success,it values those goals more than it
values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is
the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any
time use force to implement its policies. Because any
state may at any time use force, all states must
constantly be ready either to counter force with force
or to pay the cost of weakness. The requirements of
state action are, in this view, imposed by the
circumstances in which all states exists. »
John MEARSHEIMER
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28. NEO LIBERALISM
• The consumption society
• The Nixon-Mao meeting and the end of the
Cold War
• The unipolar moment : 1991 the Gulf war
• The hegemon : the keystone of global security
architecture
• The WTO and the globalization of markets
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29. THE END OF COLD WAR IN ASIA
• The foreign policy of H. Kissinger toward China under the direction of president Nixon
enabled the US to manage their retreat from the Vietnam conflict and to build an
agreement to separate China and the USSR on security matters. By the way it avoid the
domino effects of a communist Vietnam.
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30. THE END OF THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE
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•President Reagan understood very soon in the 1980s that USSR was an industrial military system
which could collapse under its own weight given pressure all around the soviet assets

31. THE END OF USSR
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•He also put financial revenues of the USSR coming
from its oil exportation under the pressure of a
declining barrel price with the help of Saoudi Arabia
•Without financial resources to support the Red
Army occupation of eastern europe, when people
defied their communist regims in 1989, the USSR
didn’t intervene.

32. OIL AND TRANSPORTATION INTERDEPENDENCE
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33. SENSIBILITY AND VULNERABILITY
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• For example, let consider 3 importing countries A, B, C. let suppose the price of oil is controlled
by a producer who decides to proceed to an increase for any political reason. If country C takes
measure to reduce the power and the size of its cars, to limit the maximum speed it will decrease
the financial burden of its oil importation as shown on the left graph. But it is still vulnerable to an
oil embargo or price increase

34. THE DAWN OF A NEW GLOBALIZATION ERA
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• At the same time a strategic event took place which revealed the transition to a new era of
international relations : the Gulf war in 1991. At the end, the strategic consequences were :

35. THE TRIGGERING EVENT
• Confronted with huge debt after 8 years of war with Iran, the iraqi leader S Hussein decided to
takeover his rich neighboor Kuweit.
• Iraq invaded Koweit on august 2nd, 1991. With such volume of oil reseve and the fourth army in
the world, S. Hussein was becoming a dangerous regional power. Iraq would have been an
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Saddam Hussein, 1979-2003
Georges H.W. Bush, 1989-1993

36. THE AIR AND THE GROUND CAMPAIGNS
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Day and night bombing in the desert and on Baghdad from CNN

37. THE MEDIA WAR
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Iraq's presentations of Saddam Hussein intimidated
Iraqi infants will remain the more comic moments in the
history of international communication.
Bombing of Iraqi army while retreating
from the Kuwaiti front toward Iraq

38. THE AMERICAN GLOBAL HARD POWER
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The discrepancy between armed forces were such that the US armies became the main global
security provider (the USSR quickly disappeared after the Gulf War)

39. THE GLOBAL OIL MARKET
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• As a consequence, there were no more threat on the oil imports because the main importer was the main
security provider

40. THE UNIPOLARITY STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
• To keep its hegemonic position, the US was condemned to deny to any country
the mean to challenge its strategic interests any where in the world :
• “First, the control over enormous oil revenues gives exporting countries the
flexibility to adopt policies that oppose US interests and values. Iran proceeds
with a program that appears to be headed toward acquiring a nuclear weapons
capability. Russia is able to ignore Western attitudes as it has moved to
authoritarian policies in part because huge revenues from oil and gas exports
are available to finance that style of government. Venezuela has the resources
from its oil exports to invite realignment in Latin American political relationships
and to fund changes such as Argentina’s exit from its International Monetary
Fund (IMF) standby agreement and Bolivia’s recent decision to nationalize its oil
and gas resources. Because of their oil wealth, these and other producer
countries are free to ignore U.S. policies and to pursue interests inimical to our
national security. ”
• J. Schlesinger, 2006, Council of Foreign Affairs
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41. THE UNIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY = THE
MONOPOLY OF HARD POWER
• The position of an hegemonic security provider for the sea lanes is a coercive tool to maintain the
international order : given the level of importation of oil to China, the Navy has the ability to deny to
Beijing any use of its APL armed forces by closing the choke point : the Ormuz and Malacca Straits
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42. THE MILITARY BUDGETS DISTRIBUTION
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The US defense budget became oversize in comparison of other budgets to maintain the
military and political leadership of the hegemon.

43. THE THEORETICAL VALUE OF NEO LIBERALISM
Néo réaliste Neo libéralisme
Int. Pol. is anarchical and
anarchy is the permissive
cause of war. Therefore,
war and conflict are
ultimately located at the
int level and cannot be
eliminated because anarchy
cannot be eliminated
Int. Pol. can be organized
around int society rather
than int anarchy,
potentially eliminating
problems like war and
conflict without replacing
int anarchy with hierarchy
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Joseph S. NYE
(1937)

44. THE INTERDEPENDENCES PERIOD
The era of
interdependence and
trade since the
beginning of the
consumption society
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45. THE MODEL DIFFUSION
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• In Asia, the consumption society diffused following the similar path of Japan after World War II
• At the end of the war ¼ of the japanese territory was leveled down. To avoid the collapse of the
country the US immediatly spent more than $2 billions in foods and raw materials

46. MARKETS AND POLITICS : JAPAN
• Between 1955-1973, the
commodities low prices
enabled the japanese
economy growth rate to
reach an annual level of
9%
• In 1968 it ranked at the
third position of the world
economy
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Mont Fuji

47. MARKETS AND POLITICS : THE DRAGONS
• The Dragons, followed
Japan : Hong Kong, Taiwan
and Singapor because
interdependences
contribute to a mutual
growth of these economies
• Each countries specialized
in the sectors where it had
comparative advantages
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Singapor

48. INTERDEPENCES AND WORLD
SPECIALIZATION
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49. TOYOTA,
2009
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50. THE CARS PRODUCTION
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51. THE SHIFT TOWARD EAST ASIA
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52. THE SEA LANES… STILL LIFE LINES
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53. FROM
THE
GATT
TO
THE
WTO
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54. THE ECONOMIC GRAVITY CENTER SHIFT
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Les impérialismes
L’hégémonie US
L’émergence Asie

55. THE RISING
ECONOMIC POWERS
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56. THE EMERGING COUNTRIES AND THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURING TREND
• They represent 40% of the world population, 15% of the world GDP
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57. THE BRICS : A CHANGE OF GOVERNANCE ?
• The BRIC meeting in 2009 at Ekaterinbourg gather : India, Russia, China and Brazil
• Their goal is to challenge the american hegemony within the internaitonal organizations
architecture and to introduce new institutions in the world governance
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58. A STRUCTURAL TREND
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59. THE
NEW
SILK
ROADS
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60. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE
CHALLENGE
• China creates the AIIB : Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank with a capital of $100
billions, 50% is coming from China, without
any veto power. Even if we can easily imagine
that China will exert its leadership over its
financial partners : the european banks joined
the AIIB contrary to Wall Street banks
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61. SCO : A REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION
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62. THE « WEIGHT » OF GEOPOLITICS IMAGINATION
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63. CONSTRUCTIVISM
• Norms and interests in international relations
• Public opinion, media companies and the
public sphere

64. CONSTRUCTIVISM
• This approach helps to clarify
the question on the origin of
the action’s State: is it
influenced whether by
structure or process ?
• Realist or Liberal frameworks
considered State’s interests at
the origin of its foreign policy
and it is exogenously given. It
is a structure.
Peter KATZENSTEIN
(1945)
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65. THE STRATEGIC IDEAS AND THE COLD WAR
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66. THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR PERCEPTION
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The « Long Telegram » from G. Kennan in 1946 explain the need for « containment » of the
USSR by the political identity of its leader who understood only « the use of force ». The « iron
curtain » speech from Churchill in Fulton in 1946 in front of president Truman reinforced the
political identity of USSR

67. THE SHARED COLD WAR IMAGINARY
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Stalin foreign policy at the same time in the north of Iran confirmed the american perception
of the USSR political identity, by refusing to retreat and his will to destabilize the country.
Secretary of State Byrnes and President Truman threaten the soviet with the use of the atomic
weapon to obtain the application of the agreement.

68. CODETERMINATION PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
• The identity process formation is
explained by the symbolic
interactionist process of the mirror
reflection metaphor.
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69. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC
REGIM
Jurgen Habermas (1929)
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• As a consequence, the
public sphere playied a key
role in the political analysis
of the international
relations

70. PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIETY
• In such place, the citizens is a public body arguing about matters of general interests which
impact a subset, large or small, of citizens.
• The argumentation confrontation is based on freedom of association for citizens group and
freedom of speech to express any argumented world view and opinions.
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71. PUBLIC OPINION AND MEDIA
• In the Middle Ages there were no public sphere distinct from the private sphere. The
modern State formation process result in a polarization of the society between the
authority and the private sphere.
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72. INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND THE FRAMING OF
PUBLIC OPINION
• Then, the State mass democracy and its social welfare extend the need of media
actors to structure and produce consent among a fragmented society. The
expansion of medias to reach masses decrease the level of coherence and it
enlarges the traditional audience of newspapers.
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73. REFERENCES
• Joshua S. Goldstein, Jon C. Pevehouse,
International Relations Brief, Pearson
• John BAYLIS et al., The Globalization of World
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations,
Oxford University Press
• Robert ART, Robert JERVIS, International Politics:
Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues
• Joseph NYE, Understanding Global Conflict and
Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History
• SENARCLENS Pierre de, La politique internationale :
théories et enjeux contemporains, A. Colin, 2006
• International Relations and World Politics, 2013,
Paul VIOTTI, Mark KAUPPI, 5ed, Pearson
• International Relations Theory, 2012, Paul VIOTTI,
Mark KAUPPI, 5ed, Longman
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