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Using Cyber Security 
Assessment Tools on 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) 
Dale Peterson 
Digital Bond, Inc. 
peterson@digitalbond.com 
Twitter: @digitalbond.com
ICS Security Assessments 
• Digital Bond performed our first ICS security 
assessment in 2000 … 15 years ago 
• Digital Bond performs assessments on live / 
operational / running critical infrastructure ICS 
– Power plants, pipelines, water treatment, chemical 
manufacturing, transportation 
• Digital Bond uses scanning tools 
• And we have never caused an unacceptable 
impact to operations
Assessment Types 
• Asset Owner / ICS End User Assessments 
– Is the ICS deployed and maintained in a good security 
practice configuration? 
– Are known vulnerabilities remediated / fixed? 
– This presentation covers Asset Owner Assessments 
• Assessments for Vendors / New Purchases 
– Attempts to find new, 0day vulnerabilities 
– Very advanced testing, uses some commercial and 
free tools, but also a lot of custom code 
– Digital Bond Labs does these, see more tomorrow
Asset Owner Assessments 
• Architecture Review 
• Configuration Inspection 
• Physical Inspection 
• Policy and Procedure Review and Audit 
• Interview (very important for determining risk) 
and 
• Online Scanning/Testing/Exploits
Current State of ICS Security 
• Many organizations are just beginning to worry 
about ICS security 
– They may have a poorly configured firewall 
– They may have some anti-virus running 
– Little else in the way of ICS cyber security 
• ICS protocols and PLC’s are insecure by design 
– They lack basic security such as authentication 
– Access = compromise 
– Impact is limited to engineering and automation skill
Efficient Risk Reduction 
What should I do next? 
Where should you spend your next ¥ or 
hour of time on ICS cyber security to 
get the maximum risk reduction or 
improvement in security posture? 
• Assessment should provide a list of actions 
prioritized by efficient risk reduction 
• Companies have limited ability to add security
Prioritization 
• Threat 
– Very difficult to determine 
– Typically look at the accessibility of the device/system 
• Vulnerability 
– Assessment can clearly identify this 
• Impact 
– This is the most important factor 
– Don’t waste time on small impact risks, eg serial 
connected panels 
– Talk to the Operations team, what would happen if …
Even the most basic, simple, 
non-intrusive scan of 
a PLC or ICS application can cause 
a denial of service condition. 
TRUE!
Example 1 
• Safety PLC 
– Simple port scan of a safety PLC caused it to crash, 
and it did not recover when rebooted 
– Additional scanning found a port that was used to load 
new firmware did not have authentication or even 
check parameters 
– Any activity on the port started a firmware update 
process 
– PLC needed to be completely reloaded to recover
Example 2 
• Redundant Pair of Real Time Servers 
– Issues read and write commands to PLC’s 
– Provides data and forwards commands from HMI / 
Operator Stations 
• Scan of Standby Server … no problem 
• Scan of Hot/Active Server … crash and failover
You cannot and should not use security 
scanning tools on an operational ICS 
because they can cause important 
things to crash. 
False!
How To Scan ICS 
• Staging area or lab 
– Some sites have non-operational systems to test 
• Leverage redundancy 
– An ICS should not have a single point of failure 
– Many operator stations / HMI 
– Hot and standby servers 
• Select best testing time 
– Many processes have key times weekly or daily were a 
computer or device outage is more difficult to handle
Questions For Operations: 1. Is it 
acceptable if computer x crashes during 
the testing window? 2. Can you recover 
the system in an acceptable time frame 
if it crashes. 
Answer: Yes … schedule scan
Answer: No … important security finding 
• You have a recovery issue 
– Don’t touch that because the guy who knew how it 
worked is no longer with the company 
– What is your Recovery Time Objective (RTO)? 
– Do you have a proven ability to meet your RTO? 
or 
• You have a single point of failure 
– Missing redundancy 
– We can never reboot or have an outage of a Windows 
NT, XP, 2003, 2008, 7 … FRAGILITY
Create Your Scan List 
• Work with Operations to identify one of each 
time of computer or device 
• Find a sample that you can scan, assuming it 
may go down, without having an unacceptable 
impact to Operations 
– Always assume it will go down 
– Things are much better than 10 years ago
Scanning Tool Categories 
• Basic Enumeration (what is it?) 
• Full featured scan (1000’s of tests) 
• Basic, random data fuzz testing 
• Secondary application testing 
– Web servers, databases 
• Exploit proof of concept
Basic Enumeration 
• Almost all recommend Nmap 
– It’s free and fast 
– Many claim it is more accurate 
– The results are reasonable size and good for reference 
• Nmap tells you 
– What TCP/UDP ports are open 
– What application and version is running on a port 
– What operating system is running 
• When not to run Nmap
Project Redpoint 
• Digital Bond research project (free) 
– https://github.com/digitalbond/Redpoint 
– Also being integrated into Nmap download 
• Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE) scripts 
– Send legitimate ICS commands to enumerate specific 
ICS devices and applications 
– Identify ICS on the corporate network 
– Great for creating and maintaining inventory 
– Digital Bond tries to create new script whenever we 
encounter a new ICS computer or device
BACnet
Broad Based Security Scanner 
• Nessus from Tenable Network Security 
• Nexpose from Rapid 7 
• Retina from Beyond Trust 
• DeepDiscovery from Trend Micro 
Or 
• Scanning as a service, Qualys
Example: Nessus 
• Credentialed Scanning 
• Learn the Product 
• Security Audit
Broad Based Security Scanner 
• New plugins (tests) are created for each 
vulnerability or patch 
• Nessus has over 75,000 plugins 
– Not all will be applicable 
– Not all will run in default config
Credentialed Scanning 
• Inspect system with the same rights as an 
Administrator or root user 
• More accurate 
– Patches: registry check vs. response to packet 
• Less intrusive / less likely to crash computer 
– Port scan vs netstat 
• A lot more information 
– Installed software, running services, users, group 
policy info, USB usage, … 
– Look at the information level results
Adding Credentials
Security Patching 
• ICS scans often identify many missing patches 
– Microsoft security patches 
– 3rd party / application software security patches 
– Security software security patches, eg anti-virus 
– Even ICS security patches 
Question: What is the security finding? 
Answer: Ineffective security patching program
Security Patching in ICS 
• Good security practice is to apply patches in a 
reasonable time after available 
– IT / corporate network typically 30 days 
– Best in ICS is typically quarterly / 90 days 
Question: Can you go from little or no security 
patching to applying all patches every 90 days? 
Think Efficient Risk Reduction
Prioritized Security Patching 
• Priority 1 – Computers accessible from corporate 
or external network 
– Monthly … should be a small number of computers 
that are not required for operation 
• Priority 2 – Computers accessible from Priority 1 
computers 
– Quarterly … attackers will compromise Priority 1 
computers and pivot 
• Priority 3 – Everything else 
– Annual … maintain supported system
Controversial 
• If you can do better, great 
– Shorter patching windows are better security, but 
– We see many owner/operators fail in patching 
• Select some achievable plan, succeed, and then 
shorten patching window 
• Also … if an attacker can reach a Priority 3 
computer he can compromise the ICS even if it is 
patched … ICS is insecure by design
Know Your Scanner 
• These are complex, full feature products 
• Default scan configurations will miss a lot of 
what you want to know in an assessment 
• Take a class from the vendor or skilled teacher
Nessus Example 1 
• Oracle Default Passwords
Nessus Example 2 – USB Usage 
• USB Drive Usage
Compliance Audit 
• Identify an optimal security configuration for OS 
and all ICS applications 
• Develop an audit file for the scanner 
• Use the compliance plugin 
• Digital Bond Bandolier Project 
– Funded by US Department of Energy
Adding the Audit File 
• About 200 operating system (OS) audit tests 
• Number of ICS application tests vary
Audit File Example 
• Folder Permissions 
• ICS applications install software in one or more 
folders 
– Read, write and execute permissions for the folders 
should be least privilege 
– Permissions are often set to Everyone 
• Vendor should define optimal security config 
– Ideally provide a document and audit file 
– Modify as necessary for your policies & environment
Random Data Fuzzing 
• ICS vendors historically only performed positive 
testing 
– Does the application or device perform properly when 
receiving a legitimate command or packet 
• Hackers, scanners, new applications may send 
something unexpected 
– Will the application/device handle the “error” properly 
– Or will it crash 
• This is a crude test 
– Not intelligent fuzzing that the vendor should perform
Secondary Testing 
• May not be necessary 
– Usually required after an ICS security program has 
been running for 2 to 3 years 
– An attacker will take the easiest path to success 
• Specialized tools and techniques 
– Web application testing 
– Database testing 
– Password cracking 
– Man-in-the-middle / ARP spoofing
Proof of Concept Exploits 
• If assessor is uncertain if vulnerability can be 
exploited 
– Should be attempted to accurately determine risk 
– Denial of service vs. remotely run code 
• Prove the danger of missing security patches / 
default credentials / other vulnerabilities 
– Show the Operator Station on your laptop 
– Attack compromise and pivot
How Many Assessments? 
What if you have 50 or 100 factories or plants? 
Should you perform an assessment at each 
factory or plant?
Recommendation 
• Pick 3 to 5 different sites 
– Pick a variety of size and types of plants 
– Select a representative sample 
– Perform assessments on the samples 
• Identify the common high priority findings 
• Define a common set of required security controls 
– Not too much in the first year 
• Define how the controls will be audited 
• Add additional controls in years 2, 3, …
Questions

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Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)

  • 1. Using Cyber Security Assessment Tools on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Dale Peterson Digital Bond, Inc. peterson@digitalbond.com Twitter: @digitalbond.com
  • 2. ICS Security Assessments • Digital Bond performed our first ICS security assessment in 2000 … 15 years ago • Digital Bond performs assessments on live / operational / running critical infrastructure ICS – Power plants, pipelines, water treatment, chemical manufacturing, transportation • Digital Bond uses scanning tools • And we have never caused an unacceptable impact to operations
  • 3. Assessment Types • Asset Owner / ICS End User Assessments – Is the ICS deployed and maintained in a good security practice configuration? – Are known vulnerabilities remediated / fixed? – This presentation covers Asset Owner Assessments • Assessments for Vendors / New Purchases – Attempts to find new, 0day vulnerabilities – Very advanced testing, uses some commercial and free tools, but also a lot of custom code – Digital Bond Labs does these, see more tomorrow
  • 4. Asset Owner Assessments • Architecture Review • Configuration Inspection • Physical Inspection • Policy and Procedure Review and Audit • Interview (very important for determining risk) and • Online Scanning/Testing/Exploits
  • 5. Current State of ICS Security • Many organizations are just beginning to worry about ICS security – They may have a poorly configured firewall – They may have some anti-virus running – Little else in the way of ICS cyber security • ICS protocols and PLC’s are insecure by design – They lack basic security such as authentication – Access = compromise – Impact is limited to engineering and automation skill
  • 6. Efficient Risk Reduction What should I do next? Where should you spend your next ¥ or hour of time on ICS cyber security to get the maximum risk reduction or improvement in security posture? • Assessment should provide a list of actions prioritized by efficient risk reduction • Companies have limited ability to add security
  • 7. Prioritization • Threat – Very difficult to determine – Typically look at the accessibility of the device/system • Vulnerability – Assessment can clearly identify this • Impact – This is the most important factor – Don’t waste time on small impact risks, eg serial connected panels – Talk to the Operations team, what would happen if …
  • 8. Even the most basic, simple, non-intrusive scan of a PLC or ICS application can cause a denial of service condition. TRUE!
  • 9. Example 1 • Safety PLC – Simple port scan of a safety PLC caused it to crash, and it did not recover when rebooted – Additional scanning found a port that was used to load new firmware did not have authentication or even check parameters – Any activity on the port started a firmware update process – PLC needed to be completely reloaded to recover
  • 10. Example 2 • Redundant Pair of Real Time Servers – Issues read and write commands to PLC’s – Provides data and forwards commands from HMI / Operator Stations • Scan of Standby Server … no problem • Scan of Hot/Active Server … crash and failover
  • 11. You cannot and should not use security scanning tools on an operational ICS because they can cause important things to crash. False!
  • 12. How To Scan ICS • Staging area or lab – Some sites have non-operational systems to test • Leverage redundancy – An ICS should not have a single point of failure – Many operator stations / HMI – Hot and standby servers • Select best testing time – Many processes have key times weekly or daily were a computer or device outage is more difficult to handle
  • 13. Questions For Operations: 1. Is it acceptable if computer x crashes during the testing window? 2. Can you recover the system in an acceptable time frame if it crashes. Answer: Yes … schedule scan
  • 14.
  • 15. Answer: No … important security finding • You have a recovery issue – Don’t touch that because the guy who knew how it worked is no longer with the company – What is your Recovery Time Objective (RTO)? – Do you have a proven ability to meet your RTO? or • You have a single point of failure – Missing redundancy – We can never reboot or have an outage of a Windows NT, XP, 2003, 2008, 7 … FRAGILITY
  • 16. Create Your Scan List • Work with Operations to identify one of each time of computer or device • Find a sample that you can scan, assuming it may go down, without having an unacceptable impact to Operations – Always assume it will go down – Things are much better than 10 years ago
  • 17. Scanning Tool Categories • Basic Enumeration (what is it?) • Full featured scan (1000’s of tests) • Basic, random data fuzz testing • Secondary application testing – Web servers, databases • Exploit proof of concept
  • 18. Basic Enumeration • Almost all recommend Nmap – It’s free and fast – Many claim it is more accurate – The results are reasonable size and good for reference • Nmap tells you – What TCP/UDP ports are open – What application and version is running on a port – What operating system is running • When not to run Nmap
  • 19. Project Redpoint • Digital Bond research project (free) – https://github.com/digitalbond/Redpoint – Also being integrated into Nmap download • Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE) scripts – Send legitimate ICS commands to enumerate specific ICS devices and applications – Identify ICS on the corporate network – Great for creating and maintaining inventory – Digital Bond tries to create new script whenever we encounter a new ICS computer or device
  • 20.
  • 22.
  • 23. Broad Based Security Scanner • Nessus from Tenable Network Security • Nexpose from Rapid 7 • Retina from Beyond Trust • DeepDiscovery from Trend Micro Or • Scanning as a service, Qualys
  • 24. Example: Nessus • Credentialed Scanning • Learn the Product • Security Audit
  • 25. Broad Based Security Scanner • New plugins (tests) are created for each vulnerability or patch • Nessus has over 75,000 plugins – Not all will be applicable – Not all will run in default config
  • 26. Credentialed Scanning • Inspect system with the same rights as an Administrator or root user • More accurate – Patches: registry check vs. response to packet • Less intrusive / less likely to crash computer – Port scan vs netstat • A lot more information – Installed software, running services, users, group policy info, USB usage, … – Look at the information level results
  • 28. Security Patching • ICS scans often identify many missing patches – Microsoft security patches – 3rd party / application software security patches – Security software security patches, eg anti-virus – Even ICS security patches Question: What is the security finding? Answer: Ineffective security patching program
  • 29. Security Patching in ICS • Good security practice is to apply patches in a reasonable time after available – IT / corporate network typically 30 days – Best in ICS is typically quarterly / 90 days Question: Can you go from little or no security patching to applying all patches every 90 days? Think Efficient Risk Reduction
  • 30. Prioritized Security Patching • Priority 1 – Computers accessible from corporate or external network – Monthly … should be a small number of computers that are not required for operation • Priority 2 – Computers accessible from Priority 1 computers – Quarterly … attackers will compromise Priority 1 computers and pivot • Priority 3 – Everything else – Annual … maintain supported system
  • 31. Controversial • If you can do better, great – Shorter patching windows are better security, but – We see many owner/operators fail in patching • Select some achievable plan, succeed, and then shorten patching window • Also … if an attacker can reach a Priority 3 computer he can compromise the ICS even if it is patched … ICS is insecure by design
  • 32. Know Your Scanner • These are complex, full feature products • Default scan configurations will miss a lot of what you want to know in an assessment • Take a class from the vendor or skilled teacher
  • 33. Nessus Example 1 • Oracle Default Passwords
  • 34. Nessus Example 2 – USB Usage • USB Drive Usage
  • 35. Compliance Audit • Identify an optimal security configuration for OS and all ICS applications • Develop an audit file for the scanner • Use the compliance plugin • Digital Bond Bandolier Project – Funded by US Department of Energy
  • 36. Adding the Audit File • About 200 operating system (OS) audit tests • Number of ICS application tests vary
  • 37. Audit File Example • Folder Permissions • ICS applications install software in one or more folders – Read, write and execute permissions for the folders should be least privilege – Permissions are often set to Everyone • Vendor should define optimal security config – Ideally provide a document and audit file – Modify as necessary for your policies & environment
  • 38. Random Data Fuzzing • ICS vendors historically only performed positive testing – Does the application or device perform properly when receiving a legitimate command or packet • Hackers, scanners, new applications may send something unexpected – Will the application/device handle the “error” properly – Or will it crash • This is a crude test – Not intelligent fuzzing that the vendor should perform
  • 39. Secondary Testing • May not be necessary – Usually required after an ICS security program has been running for 2 to 3 years – An attacker will take the easiest path to success • Specialized tools and techniques – Web application testing – Database testing – Password cracking – Man-in-the-middle / ARP spoofing
  • 40. Proof of Concept Exploits • If assessor is uncertain if vulnerability can be exploited – Should be attempted to accurately determine risk – Denial of service vs. remotely run code • Prove the danger of missing security patches / default credentials / other vulnerabilities – Show the Operator Station on your laptop – Attack compromise and pivot
  • 41.
  • 42. How Many Assessments? What if you have 50 or 100 factories or plants? Should you perform an assessment at each factory or plant?
  • 43. Recommendation • Pick 3 to 5 different sites – Pick a variety of size and types of plants – Select a representative sample – Perform assessments on the samples • Identify the common high priority findings • Define a common set of required security controls – Not too much in the first year • Define how the controls will be audited • Add additional controls in years 2, 3, …