1. National Security Concepts Professor: Ephraim Kam
Tel Aviv University 26/9 - 2012
Spring Semester 2012
The Impact of the Iran-Iraq War on Iran’s
National Security Concept
Michael Lederman

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Table of Contents
Introduction 3
Background 5
The Iran-Iraq War 6
Analysis: Impact of the Iran-Iraq War on Iran’s National Security Concept 9
Threat perception, allies and international isolation 9
National Strategic Aims 12
Answers 13
Impact on Iran’s arms import and domestic weapons industry 14
Ballistic missiles program 18
Pursuit for special weapons capability 19
Nuclear Weapons 21
The rising power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 23
Deterrence 25
Conclusion 27
References 30

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Introduction
Over the years, there have been numerous attempts to locate the roots of the
Islamic Republic’s intentions and motivations in the realm of its national security concept,
given the distinctiveness of its political culture and strategic isolation. In spite of being a rich
and ancient nation historically, Iran has also come to embody the notion of being outsiders in
the international community, in particular after the Iran-Iraq war. This complexity, combined
with the external worlds lack of access to Iran since the Revolution in 1979, has produced a
peculiar view of the Islamic Republic and its seemingly aggressive tone in regards to its
security doctrine, a view defined by mystique and a superficial reading that often places
significant emphasis on Iran’s current regime’s unique and religious characteristics.
Since the Iranian Revolution molded and inspired the actions, conduct and
organization of the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), one can argue the
Revolution had as much, or if not more, of an impact on Iran’s national security concept, than
the war itself. However, I shall argue that the Iran-Iraq war was the defining moment for the
Iranian military and that it continues to underpin most aspects of the Iranian national security
concept. Few wars in history have changed a country’s perception of themselves, and its
relation to the outside world, more than the Iran-Iraq war did for Iran. Furthermore, it left Iran
increasingly isolated and with a deep feeling of victimization and abandonees. From being a
vibrant westernized state under the Shah with many allies and suppliers of sophisticated arms,
Iran was transformed during the course of the war to a nation in doubt, distress, widespread
poverty, religious zeal and international seclusion.
The question I intend to answer in this paper is: How did the Iran-Iraq war
impact on Iran’s national security concept? In the realms of Iran’s national security concept;
ranging from extreme self-reliance, the use of deterrence, the development of a domestic

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weapons production and ballistic missiles program to the covert chemical and nuclear
weapons program or the use of proxy terror organization, the Iran-Iraq war was by far the
principal influencing factor in changing the regime’s attitude and dedication to these
concepts. The aim of this study is not to defend the religiously driven authoritarian regime,
which has verbally threatened to eliminate other nations, but instead attempt to provide an
answer to the research question when viewing the issue from an Iranian perspective.
I consider war to be the most important factor that changes national security
concepts. Concerning which of the three notions of Iran's national security concept (threat
perception, national strategic aims and answers) that has been impacted most by the war, and
hence altered most radically, I shall argue throughout the paper that the answers are the notion
that was effected more than any other notion. Therefore, a large emphasis of this paper will
be put on analyzing the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on the answers Iran has been forced to
provide since the war. However, in order to understand the Iran’s motivations for changing its
answers, the beginning of the analysis contains a discussion of how the war impacted on
Iran’s threat perception and its national strategic aims.
Considering periods of time, the paper will focus on how the war impacted on
Iran’s national security concept in the years during the war and more specifically after its end,
but will also analyze how the legacy of the war has had long-term consequences for Iran’s
security doctrine. The paper is composed with a background part, entailing the build-up to the
Iran-Iraq war and the reason behind the outbreak of hostilities. The following section
describes the different characteristics of the war itself and its decisive moments. After this
introductory part, follows the analysis of the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Iran’s national
security concept, starting with threat perceptions, followed by national strategic aims, and
finally the answers. Lastly, a conclusion will discuss the paper’s findings in regards to the
research question.

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Background
The Iran-Iraq war was initiated over a border dispute in the vicinity of the Shatt
al-Arab river, a dispute originally dating back to the sixteenth century, while political and
economical antagonism between Arabs and Persians, in addition to Sunni and Shi’a Muslims,
can be traced even further. While the countries viewed each other as adversaries during the
greater part of the 1900s, it was in the late 1970s that the true animosity, which led up to the
war, started between the two oil rich nations. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 46) The road to the
Iran-Iraq war was facilitated in Saddam Hussein’s personal dissatisfaction with the 1975
Algiers Accords, concerning the border by the Shatt al-Arab river, in combination with his
fear for a spread of the Islamic Revolution, which took power in Iran 1979. Under the Algiers
Accords, Iraq ceded areas of the borderlands along the Shatt al-Arab river to Iran in exchange
for an Iranian agreement not to support the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. The loss of full
control of the river was humiliating for Saddam Hussein, since Iraq’s minor coastline is
unsuitable for major ports or naval traffic beyond that provided of the Shatt al-Arab river.
(Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 48) The Iranian ruler at the time, the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
signed the accord for the Iranians. In Iran, the continuing growth of discontent among most
parts of the Iranian population as the Shah’s repression grew in the 1970s, as promised
political and economic reforms failed to materialize, and economic difficulties grew despite
huge oil revenues, led to an outbreak of fierce opposition in the late 1970s. (Keddie, 214) The
Islamic revolution, led by the charismatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, overthrew the Shah
in February 1979.
Incidentally, Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini came to power the same
year in their respective states. The two leaders, Saddam Hussein, as the Iraqi President, and
Ayatollah Khomeini, as the Supreme Leader of Iran until his death, differed radically in
ideology and method, but were both insecure, ruthless men with a grand vision for their

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countries. A vision that far exceeded their military means. Iran’s former secular dictatorship,
under the Shah, had sought stability in relations with its neighbors. However, soon after
taking power, Khomeini and his Islamic clerics, began to call for exporting the Islamic
revolution to other parts of the Muslim world. (Miller & Mylroie, 1990: 106) It is important to
note that Khomeini’s vision was not just aimed for the future Iran or the Shi’a Muslim world;
instead he openly called for a revolution extending throughout the entire Islamic world that
would erase all existing borders. Iraq was an ideal target for expansion because of its large
majority Shi’a population, and Saddam feared that they might rise against him. Driven by fear
for the spread of the Islamic Revolution, and ambition to regional become a new regional
hegemony, Saddam and his Iraqi forces attacked Iranian territory on September 22, 1980.
(Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 49-50)
The Iran-Iraq war
The Iran–Iraq War was one of the longest and most costly conventional wars of
the twentieth century. Iraq, responding to Iranian provocations of exporting the Revolution,
and with ambition of expanding its role in the region, had started what it thought would be a
short, victorious war against a Iran, which was in a turmoil in the aftermath of the Islamic
Revolution. Iran’s army was in chaos and disarray, lacking trained and experienced officers as
the Ayatollah brutally restructured it from within through executions, demotions and coerced
emigration. Saddam Hussein expected a quick easy victory within two or three week, but this
was a mistake of historic proportions. Instead, Iranians rallied behind their new Supreme
Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and repelled the Iraqi invaders, prolonged the war to eight years
and paid a massive cost in human lives. The war settled into a bloody stalemate between the
smaller but heavily armed Iraq and Iran, which was abandoned and isolated by the

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international community. After its failed invasion, the Iraqi army was able to rebuild and
resurrect itself through economic aid and arms sales, thereby building effective defenses and
hence being able to repel an Iranian invasion initiated in 1982. The result was a military
balance, which facilitated Iraq’s ability to stem Iran’s attempts for advancement on the
battlefield. The most prominent factor that kept Iran fighting and even allowed it to go on the
offensive in 1982 was the permeation of religious zeal and ideological fervor in the Iranian
soldiers, officers and commanders. (Potter & Sick, 2004: 1-2)
The Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers was one of the
gravest crimes committed in the war, a conflict which the Iranians refer to as “the Holy
Defense” or “the Imposed War”. Overall international preference for an Iraqi victory was
evident in the failure to react to these war crimes, and Iraq’s chemical weapons program was
allowed to flourish, and hence, Iraq’s deployment of chemical weapons in the battlefield
continued throughout the war. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 61) This showed to Iran how utterly
isolated they were internationally. This realization in addition to the western arms embargo
implemented against Iran pushed the Revolutionary regime to adopt a security doctrine based
on self-reliance. In the “the war of the cities” Iran had an upfront experience of ballistic
missiles fired at civilian population centers, in particular Teheran and major cities along the
border with Iraq. Saddam began launching air strikes and SCUD surface-to-surface missiles
in 1982 and Iran responded in kind, with the limited capabilities they had at the time. “The
war of the cities” would continue intermittently for the entire conflict (Dodds & Wilson,
2009: 60) and was a representation of the stalemate and the military balance between the two
nations. While Iran lacked adequate counter-measures until the late 1980s, this experience
shaped Iran’s perception of themselves and their initial lack of defensive capabilities in this
realm pushed Iran to develop ballistic missiles of their own.

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A new development in the end of the war was “the war of the Tankers,” which
entailed that each side attacked oil tankers and merchant ships in the Gulf in a bid to deprive
the other of trade, in particular revenue from export of petroleum. This part of the war served
to internationalize the conflict (Keddie, 259), as the Untied States and the Soviet Union
wanted to secure their own interest, namely regional influence and the steady import of oil.
In the latter years of the war, the Iranian economy was collapsing, enthusiasm
for prolonged hostilities had completely faded and the US was increasing its financial and
military support for Iraq. On July 20, 1988, Khomeini agreed to an UN-brokered ceasefire,
which he likened to drinking a cup of poison, but according to the Ayatollah “it was needed to
save the Revolution.” (Keddie, 259) In a struggle that pitted Iranian religious zealots against a
smaller, but modernized Iraqi army, discipline and modern arms prevailed. (Pelletiere &
Johnson, 1991: 3) The Iran-Iraq war ended after eight years of brutal fighting and with broad
estimates between 400.000 and one million casualties combined on both sides. The failure to
achieve the aims of the war is vividly reflected in Iran’s terms of peace, where they fell short
on almost all levels. Khomeini demanded the removal of the Ba’th party in Iraq as well as
large payment of war reparations. However, neither of these sizeable terms was granted in the
ceasefire agreement. Over the course of the war, Khomeini’s ambition was to prove his divine
power to the Muslim world by gaining a decisive military victory over Iraq. Instead, the
failure on the battlefield, in addition to the prolonged war efforts that resulted in incalculable
numbers of widows and the feeling of ultimate sacrifice without sufficient reward among
Iranians, effectively halted the initial glory and advance of the Islamic Revolution.
Consequently, the Supreme Leader had to abandon the idea of spreading the Revolution, and
focus shifted to safeguarding the Revolutionary regime’s survival domestically. (Dodds &
Wilson, 2009: 67) The war became one of the longest conventional wars in modern history,

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due to military ineptitude, strong ideological and political influences, and finally geopolitical
factors. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 47)
Analysis: Impact of the Iran-Iraq War on Iran’s National Security Concept
Threat perception, allies and international isolation
The largest threat to the pre-war Revolutionary Iran was the collapse and fall of
the new regime and hence the Revolution. Khomeini’s hope was to turn the attention of the
Iranian people outward, rather than focusing on domestic political uncertainty and economic
difficulties inside Iran. (Dobbs & Wilson, 49) In spite of this, opposition elements against the
Revolutionary regime and the power of the Supreme Leader were still prevalent. However,
Khomeini was able to rally support and unite the Iranian nation, mainly through the sudden
war with Iraq and the emphasis of religious zeal, sacrifice and martyrdom as the means to be
triumphant in the war. Since the Shah’s alignment with the Untied States ended on the eve of
the Revolution, the United States posed one of the gravest threats against the regime’s
survival. However, it was still the neighbor in the west, Iraq, who posed the most severe threat
against Iran in the year between the Revolution and the outbreak of the war.
With the eruption of hostilities, Iran’s situation changed drastically. During the
war, Iraq received extensive arms and military support from the Soviet Union, France, China
and, most importantly, the United States. The US provided economical, intelligence and
military support for Iraq, particularly in the latter years of the war. Iran found itself
abandoned by its former allies and arms suppliers, and completely isolated from the Arab
world, with the rare exception of alignment with Syria, from 1980, followed by Libya in
1985. (Lotfian, 1997: 21) Teheran had to scrounge the world for new sources of arms, finding

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suppliers in China, Soviet Union, North Korea, Libya and elsewhere. When it comes to the
two Superpowers of the world, both declared neutrality in beginning of the war, only to
eventually restore relations with Iraq, (Dobbs & Wilson, 58-59) and simultaneously
neglecting Iran and its Islamic regime. Once again, Iran found themselves alone in a hostile
world without any real friends or allies. This experience and feeling of victimization of being
deserted in the midst of a national crisis, in addition to the effect of the relative international
silence on Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, made Iran reevaluate their threat perception, and
its ever shrinking list of allies.
The war ended when Khomeini agreed to an UN-brokered ceasefire, which he likened
to drinking a cup of poison, but according to the Ayatollah “it was needed to save the
Revolution.” (Keddie, 259) This highlights the regime’s highest priority threat, namely
security of the regime and the Revolution. Moreover, the threat of potential secessionist
movement in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan was also prevalent in the post-war period.
Since Iran came out of the war as the defeated power, Iran consequently gained in
threat level in Iranian eyes. Therefore, the threat perception against future military incursions
from regional states such as Iraq or Saudi Arabia was high, in particular the fear for reignited
hostilities against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which came out of the war somewhat of a Arab
regional hegemony. However, Chubin argues that in the aftermath of the war, Iran had no
pressing regional threats. Iraq, despite its dangerous ambitions and clandestine progress, was
not an immediate threat. (Chubin, 1994: 81)
When it comes to superpower support, the impact of the war for Iran was that it found
itself without significant allies, especially the lack of superpower allies. Therefore, the US
presence after the war in the Persian Gulf was seen as a potential threat that Iran would prefer
to neutralize, or in worst-case scenario, eliminate through its own means. In other words, with

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a mounting US presence in the early 1990s, combined with the uncertainty about continuity of
conventional arms supplies, or future oil revenues to fund them, and the general sense of
embattlement and isolation; Iran’s legacy of the Iran-Iraq war concerning the notion of threat
perception was higher, more volatile and less assuring than before the war.
The Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, were also seen as a threat in the eyes of
the Iranians, in particular when we examine their action and alignment during the Iran-Iraq
war. The Gulf States feared the expansion of Iran’s Revolution, which threatened to
overthrow the monarchial regimes of the Gulf. For them, Iraq was the first line of defense
against the spread of the Islamic Revolution and hence received substantial economic and
political assistance from them. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, Iran had engaged in
irresponsible rhetoric and in actions that appeared to threaten the stability and to bring into
question the legitimacy of the Arab regimes of the Gulf. Once the tide of war turned in Iran’s
favor in 1982, the Gulf States were alarmed by the implications for themselves of an Iranian
victory. At the height of Iran’s military successes, Khomeini gave an indication of his future
vision of the region. He predicted that after Saddam’s defeat, the Iraqi people “will set up
their own government according to their wishes; an Islamic one. If Iran and Iraq merge and be
amalgamated, all the smaller nations of the region will join them.” The prospect of a merger
of Iran and Iraq, with the small states of the Gulf being drawn into the union was hardly a
reassuring one. (Bakash, 2004: 24) Israel poses a severe threat to Iran today over its nuclear
weapons program, however in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war this was not the case.
Nevertheless, the very close relationship between Israel and the Shah’s regime, in particular
in the realms of military and intelligence cooperation, (Bar, 2004: 14) has always help
permeate a deep suspicion against the Jewish state within the echelon of Iran’s top brass.

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National Strategic Aims
Iran’s national strategic aim in the years of the Shah was primarily stability of
the regime, securing oil revenue and regional security. The Shah’s ultimate aim was to mould
Iran into a superpower on the level of the great powers of the world in the mid 1970s.
Furthermore, keeping good relations with the West, in particular the US, was an important
part for enabling these aims. With the Islamic Revolution came a radical change in the
strategic aims of Iran. Before the Iran-Iraq war, exporting the Revolution was the primary aim
of the regime. Survival of the regime was another aim, but since the Islamic regime was
riding high on popularity and status in 1979, amongst other factors for defying the United
States in the hostage taking of the US embassy in Teheran, hence survival of the regime was
an implicit aim; the Ayatollah felt during the post-war period that his regime was invincible
and that God would protect it, and furthermore bring them glory and regional influence.
Becoming a regional hegemony and the leader of the Islamic world was yet another strategic
aim before the war.
With the Iran-Iraq war, came a realization and a following shift in the regime’s
national strategic aims. Regime security, or the security of the Revolution, now became the
top priority aim. (Chubin, 1994: 84) Over the commencing period of the war, Khomeini’s
ambition was to prove his divine power to the Muslim world by gaining a decisive military
victory over Iraq. Instead, the failure on the battlefield, in addition to the prolonged war
efforts that resulted in incalculable numbers of widows and the feeling of ultimate sacrifice
without sufficient reward, effectively halted the initial glory and advance of the Islamic
Revolution. Consequently, the Supreme Leader had to abandon his strategic aim of spreading
the Revolution, and focus shifted to safeguarding the Revolutionary regime’s survival
domestically. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 67) As Michael Connell comments, “after the war,
Tehran gradually scaled back its efforts to export its Revolution.” (Connell, 2010: 2) The

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second strategic aim of exporting its own model of the Islamic Revolution was not prioritized,
but was still relevant, which in turn created a threat perception among other Muslim countries.
Another important aim after the war was national security, meaning the maintenance of
territorial integrity and regional influence. This is a direct legacy of the war, since for the first
time in decades, the Iranians were invaded by a foreign army, and struggled over eight years
to come out victorious at the end of the hostilities. Therefore, territorial integrity is a top
priority for the Islamic regime to this day. Moreover, becoming a regional hegemony and a
leader of the Muslim world is still a national strategic aim. (Chubin, 1994: 84) The imperative
need for self-reliance as a strategic aim is also a consequence of the war with Iraq, where
domestic weapons production, the development of chemical and nuclear weapons, and the
increasingly advanced ballistic missile program are essential components. This entails
securing a self-dependent way of life for the nation. Iran’s clerical leaders have acknowledged
that they have been making a major, even asymmetric, investment in defense, defending it as
a prudent policy. They say that the weapons systems are “intended to protect the Revolution”.
Former President Rafsanjani, who also was the commander in chief of the armed forces
during the last years of the Iran-Iraq war, summarizes Iran’s experience and lesson from the
war adequately: “We live in a world in which one cannot afford to neglect one’s defensive
capability.” (Chubin, 1994: 86)
Answers
As mentioned before, the gravest impacts on Iran’s national security concept
came in the realm of the answers Iran has provided as a product of its experience during the
war. This section will start by discussing the wars impact on Iran’s arms imports and domestic
weapons industry, followed by its ballistic missile program and its pursuit for special weapons

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capability. After, a analysis of the wars impact on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the rising power
of the IRGC, and finally discuss the use of deterrence as a part of Iran’s national security
concept.
The wars impact on Iran’s arms imports and weapons industry
The arms embargo and sanctions implemented against Iran during and after the
war gave it experience in utilizing the black market and highlighted the need to expand the
sources for arms. But what it taught Iran more than anything else, was the imperative and
impending need for an increase of self-reliance, mainly through the development of a
domestic weapons production, in order to reduce the vulnerability to a surprising halt in
supply of arms, weapons system and supplies. In addition, the need for utter self-reliance was
enhanced when Iran saw its former international allies and the United Nations unwilling to
condemn Iraq for its initial aggression in starting the war, but more importantly, for using
chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and ballistic missiles against city centers. This
reinforced the Iranians’ resolve to shift its national security doctrine to a pillar of self-
reliance. (Chubin, 1994: 70) The legacy of the Iran-Iraq war has steered Iran’s view on arms
and weaponry to notions such as domestic production, development of chemical and nuclear
weapons, ballistic missiles used for deterrence, and above everything else, no self-deception
concerning the reliance on the international community to defend its position, or any powerful
ally that could work to deter any future aggressor. (Chubin, 1994: 71) Most of Iran's weapons
before the Islamic Revolution were imported from the United States and Europe. For instance
between 1971 and 1975, the Shah went on a shopping spree, ordering $8 billion in weapons
from the US alone. (Keddie, 165) While Iranian urban society was becoming increasingly
westernized under the Shah, the rising revenues from oil exports provided a massive resource

15. 15
bank for arms purchases from western countries, especially the US. At the time of the
Revolution and the overthrow of the Shah, Iran had a modern arsenal of state of the art
weapons systems, an advanced air force and an overall sophisticated military establishment.
After the Islamic Revolution and the start of the Iran-Iraq war, economic
sanctions and an international arms embargo led by the United States, coupled with a high
demand for military hardware, required Iran to rely on its domestic arms industry for repair
and spare parts. When the war ended in 1988, Iran was confronted with a military in extreme
distress, suffering from losses over eight years of war, and turmoil in the ranks of its armed
forces. Furthermore, during the course of the war Iran had lost its’ previously reliable arms
supplier, mainly the US and Western nations, leaving it’s regime and military forced to seek
arms from alternative markets. Under the pressures of war, most Iranian western military
supplies were quickly exhausted and replacements became increasingly difficult to come by.
Consequently, the replacing supply and arms providers were improvised, since
Iran was not in a position to choose its sellers any longer, leaving the country with military
equipment from over 20 countries. As Chubin puts it: “given the US, and later Western, arms
embargo, Iran primarily sought East bloc sources. From 1985-88 Europe accounted for 41
percent and China 34 percent, with North Korea also an important supplier. From 1988-92
Russia accounted for 64 percent, China 16 percent and Europe only 8 percent.” (Chubin,
1994: 72) The radical shift in markets, as the numbers clearly shows, made Iran pursue a
complete switchover for its defense needs from the US and Europe to countries like Russia,
North Korea and China. The reorientation extracted a heavy price in terms of professionalism
and growth of the Armed Forces. In sharp contrast to the regime under the Shah, the
Revolutionary Iran saw grave dangers in dependence on foreign sources of supplies; reliance
in ourselves, and no one else, was the motto of the future Revolutionary regime.

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Under the Shah, Iran had established a relatively small but effective weapons
industry, which mainly produced small arms, ammunition, batteries, tires, explosive and
mortar rounds. However, the Revolution halted all activities and by 1981 the industry had lost
almost its entire managerial staff and thus the regime had no control of its facilities. This
situation changed radically in the early years of the Iran-Iraq war. The eruption of hostilities
with Iraq, in addition to the arms embargo implemented by the West, worked as a catalyst for
reorganizing and expanding Iran’s defense industries. In 1981, the Revolutionary regime
merged the country's military industrial units and placed them under the Defense Industries
Organization (DIO), which would supervise production activities and was under the auspices
of the chairman of the Supreme Defense Council (SDC), namely Iran’s President. By 1986, a
large number of infantry rifles, machine guns, and mortars were being manufactured
domestically. By 1987, Iran claimed to have manufactured an undisclosed number of ballistic
missiles, the Oghab rockets, presumably an attempt to plagiaries the Soviet-made Scud-B
surface-to-surface missiles. (FAS, 2000) Domestic arms production was however not seen as
a universal remedy from the weapons suppliers lost in the Iran-Iraq war. This kind of industry
could replace imports of items such as small arms and spare parts and serve as a base to
develop Iran’s own technology, but in the long run it could not be a substitute for imports of
completed weapons system such as aircrafts or tanks, neither in economical nor qualitative
terms. In the three years after the war, Iran accelerated its military effort between 1988-91,
importing military equipment for an average two billion dollars a year. (Chubin, 1994: 73) Its
emphasis during those years, as a direct impact of the war, was to rebuild or replace forces
and equipment lost in the war, rather than efforts of expansion.
The main focus for imports was laid on air force and navy, the latter through the
procurement of submarines, shore-to-sea missiles, mines and a large number of fast patrol
boats. The navy was organized and structured after Iran’s experience during the latter years of

17. 17
the Iran-Iraq war, when the "war of the tankers" materialized. In fact, the “war of the tankers”
served to internationalize the conflict. After repeated Iranian attacks on its vessels, Kuwait
appealed to outside powers for protection, as both the US and the Soviet Union stepped in. In
response to Iranian attacks on US-flagged Kuwaiti vessels, the US destroyed a number of
Iranian ships and oil platforms. (Keddie, 259) This development increased the suspicion and
antagonism against the US and the west, in the post-war period and this suspicion is prevalent
even until the present day. Furthermore, it became more evident for Iran that it ought to
develop its own ability in an attempt to mirror the technology of its likely enemies, the US
and the west, and hence provide a stable and self-reliant source of military equipment for the
future.
Today’s conventional weapons defense industry includes the production of
ships, aircraft, missiles, tanks and rifles. However, the quality of this industry is highly
questioned, depending much on the brain drain that Iran suffered in the post-Revolution
period, its deficiency in technological knowhow as well as the international sanctions it has
suffered for its refusal to declare clear intentions over its nuclear program.
Moreover, the Iran-Iraq war was the definite starting point of Iran’s ballistic
missile program, developed and manufactured domestically. In the "war of the cities", both
sides pounded their adversary's civilian population from the air with missiles, resulting in
devastation of infrastructure and a overall feeling of terror among the population in each
country. The experience of the “war of the cities”, which saw hundreds of rockets targeting
civilians in Iran’s capital Teheran and other major cities, pushed Iran’s regime to pursue its
own ballistic missile production.

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Ballistic missiles program
Once Iran could repel Iraq’s initial advances from the beginning of the war, a
new form of war of attrition evolved. From 1982-1988, one of the most devastating aspects of
the Iran-Iraq war was Iraqi and Iranian air and missiles attacks on each other’s population
centers, known as the “war of the cities”. These relentless attacks against Teheran, Baghdad
and other major cities took out a huge cost in human lives and city infrastructure. But above
anything else, it had a devastating impact on the national morale in the two countries. (Karsh,
2002: 41) Hence, the legacy of the war in Iranian eyes was more than many other
consequences; an upfront experience of ballistic missiles fired at civilian population centers in
the “war of the cities,” in addition to the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranian
soldiers. This experience shaped Iran’s perception of themselves and their lacking defensive
capabilities in this realm, as for years Iraqi missiles crashed through day and night to spread
terror among Iranian city dwellers hundreds of miles from the front, while Iran lacked
adequate counter-measures until the late 1980s. Relentless Iraqi and Iranian shelling
practically destroyed each other’s cities and towns near the international border during the
latter part of the war. (McNaugher, 1990: 5) Iran’s ballistic missile program dates back to this
period and its initial encounter with the “war of the cities.” For the regime in Tehran, Iraq’s
use of ballistic missiles against Iranian strategic targets highlighted a critical vulnerability in
Iran’s defenses. As a step to deter Iraq from further attacking its population centers and
strategic industries, Iran initiated its own ballistic missile program, beginning with the first
shipment of a limited number of SCUD-B missiles, purchased from Libya. By the conclusion
of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had successfully launched over 100 ballistic missiles at Iraqi targets,
varying from Baghdad to military installations. (Connell, 2010: 5)
With the end of hostilities with Iraq, Iranian officials, drawing on recent
experience, viewed ballistic missiles as a means of defense that was easily accessible to them.

19. 19
Unlike an air force (which would inevitably be foreign-supplied, costly to train and maintain,
need frequent upgrading and involve dependence on foreign powers), missiles could become
the future foundation of a domestic defense industry, given Iran’s relative autonomy in
security planning after the war. (Chubin, 2002: 54) Today, Iran develops its ballistic missiles
and strategic missile program to be a key in its deterrence strategy, in part since it is widely
perceived to be an integral part of Iran’s chemical and nuclear weapons programs. (Connell,
2010: 7) In 2010, estimates showed that Iran had the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in
the Middle East. Iran continues its efforts to expand the range and improve the performance
of its ballistic missiles, several classes of which can reach Israel and US military installations
in the Persian Gulf. However, many Western experts question the accuracy of these surface-
to-surface missiles. Furthermore many assess that they are, besides its deterrent factor, likely
to be intended for strategic target such as cities, oil production facilities, ports and water
desalination plants. (Connell, 2010: 6) According to Shmuel Bar, this ballistic missile
capability serves Iran threefold in the aftermath of the war: first, as a substitute for long-range
modern aircraft, which Iran cannot purchase due to American sanctions and pressures;
second, as a deterrent vis-à-vis Iraq, Israel, and the United States; and third, as a national
symbol of pride for Iran's membership in the club of regional powers possessing a long arm,
and thus, a country that should be suitably respected. (Bar, 2004: 49)
Pursuit for special weapons capability
Iran’s emphasis on rebuilding, reorganizing and pursuing its independent
domestic arms production for both conventional weapons and special weapons capabilities
was not only driven from, but rested its foundations on, its experience and feeling of
victimization during the Iran-Iraq war. In this case, special weapons capabilities mainly entail

20. 20
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. During the war, Iran found itself in a position
where it lacked the capabilities to respond effectively to the Iraqis' use of chemical weapons
and ballistic missiles, and furthermore understood how lonely and helpless it was in the arms
realm through the international arms embargo initiated by the West. (FAS, 2000) I argue that
the absence of a tough and unambiguous response or condemnation from the international
community of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in the war, and the relative Western support of
Iraq generally throughout the war, gave the incentive for the Iranians to initiate programs of
weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, I argue that the use of chemical weapons and gas
against soldiers and civilians was the most serious war crimes committed during the war.
Because of the severity of the war crime, the use of chemical weapons was the war’s only
feature over which the international community had a moral, and possibly legal, obligation to
intervene militarily. In addition, the great powers of the world also had a security interest
because of the threat of proliferation of these heinous weapons of mass destruction. In the
eyes of Iran, who was the victim of most these attacks, the fact that the international
community had the opportunity and perhaps even the interest to intervene, yet failed to do so,
(Hiltermann, 2004:152) once again showed how utterly isolated and friendless Iran was, and
that self-reliance was the only viable solution to this problem.
Consequently, the effect of the relative international silence on Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons and gas was the decision by the Iranian regime to launch its own chemical
weapons program, in addition to the development of biological and nuclear weapons. As Joost
R. Hiltermann suggests: “the Iranian chemical weapons program is thus a direct result of the
Iraqi chemical weapons program, Iraq’s repeated chemical weapons use in the war, and the
failure of the international community to put an end to it, or even give it the serious and
sustained attention it was due.” (Hiltermann, 2004: 159) This implies that Iran’s initial pursuit
for and most of its active, or inactive, existing programs for special weapons capabilities

21. 21
today, would thus be a direct result of this failure, resting upon the international communities
shoulders. Furthermore, in the perception of the Islamic regime, the reluctance of the
international community to point out Iraq as the aggressor to the war or to condemn its use of
chemical weapons also demonstrated to the regime and the its protector, the IRGC, the West’s
determination in bringing down the Islamic Republic. (Samuel, 2012: 9) Today, Iran is a
signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which allows for relatively intrusive
inspection. Upon signing, Iran officially confessed that it had a chemical weapons program
developed towards the end of the Iraq-Iran war. However, they claim that it was later
dismantled, which western expert highly doubt, (Bar, 2004: 50) in particular because of their
close alignment with the al-Assad regime in Syria, widely known to have one of the largest
chemical weapons stockpiles in the world.
The permeated sense of victimization due to having been attacked by chemical
weapons in the war has enabled Iran to emphasize the importance of possession of arms that
are equivalent to those of its enemies. This assertion relates to the Iranian concept of “like for
like deterrence.” Therefore, the possession of chemical weapons is dictated by the fact that
these weapons were in the hands of Iraq and used against Iran. Therefore, the future
acquisition of nuclear weapons will eventually be justified by the fact that Israel, Pakistan and
India have such weapons. (Bar, 2004: 45)
Nuclear Weapons
The pursuit for nuclear weapons capability would be consistent with Iran’s
perception of the world and themselves, including the role they aspire to play in it. The Iran-
Iraq war left Iran with an overall feeling of siege and hostility from the international
community, and a strong permeated sense of victimization and unfair treatment of itself. In

22. 22
turn, Iran has aspired to achieve recognition as a regional hegemonic power with equal
influence as the great nations of the world. (Chubin, 1994: 80) The apparent primary
motivation for Iran’s decision to develop its nuclear weapons program was the Iraqi threat and
its embodiment in the Iran-Iraq War, which effectively illustrated to Iranian regime the
meaning of the chemical threat and the devastation ballistic missiles can cause. (Kam, 2007:
25) The decision to develop nuclear weapons was taken as a direct impact and legacy of the
war and Iran’s experience during it, in addition to a determination that in a future conflict
never again stand alone without an efficient deterrent against the country’s enemies. In
particular, the war exposed Iranian military and strategic weakness and vulnerability, for
which a nuclear weapons capability could function as compensation. Iran's emphasis on
pursuing nuclear weapons production was therefore driven by its encounters throughout the
war with Iraq, during which it was unable to respond adequately to Iraqi chemical and missile
attacks, and suffered the effects of an international arms embargo.
Moreover, acquiring nuclear weapons capability would serve the Islamic regime
in many other aspects, besides being a reaction the Iran-Iraq war: first, it would further assert
Iran’s self reliance and demonstrate the progress and advancement of its technology; second,
it would enable the Iranian regime to divert attention from domestic issues and failures, as it
would affirm the success of the Islamic Revolution; third, it might reduce the high need for
conventional military expenditure in the future; fourth, it would provide Iran with a tool
through which they could play a more assertive regional and international role. Nuclear
weapons would make Iran a contender, a nation that no other state can push around, but
instead be coerced to take seriously. (Chubin, 1994: 80)
Foreign attempts to deter Iran from achieving this goal, whether it has been
through economic sanctions or threat of military intervention, have been seen by the regime
as an affront to Iran’s national pride and have resulted in stronger patriotic support of its

23. 23
nuclear weapons efforts. The fact that the United States attacked Iraq in 2003, despite Iraq
having chemical and biological weapons, only strengthened the Iranian resolve to achieve
nuclear capability. This capability is, in the perception of the Iranian regime, the only non-
conventional capability that effectively can deter the US or any other nation from attacking
Iran’s nuclear facilities. (Bar, 2004: 49-50)
The rising power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
In the year of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the loathing of the Ayatollah and
his clerics toward the former Shah’s Imperial army was profound. He viewed it as the
principal agency whereby secular ideas were spread into Iranian civil society. Furthermore,
Khomeini saw it as a remnant of imperialist and American influence, and would have most
likely disbanded and destroyed the army, had not the Iran-Iraq war forced him to concede and
instead utilize what was left of its structure. During the course of the war most of the former
Shah’s prominent officers were executed. All in all, over 10 000 military personnel of all
ranks were purged during the first year of the Islamic Revolution. When the war started Iran’s
army was in disarray, lacking officers with military experience and adequately trained
soldiers to handle its western supplied sophisticated weapons system. (Schahgaldian, 1987:
17ff) Khomeini needed a force he could trust, in addition to safeguarding the survival of the
regime and thus ensuring the endurance of the Revolution. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC) was the military and political organization that helped consolidate the Islamic
Republic under Khomeini in the wake of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and was therefore
the natural choice for the Ayatollah. The IRGC, which has been charged with guarding the
Revolution ever since, has played an imperative part in defending the new regime. (Samuel,
2012: 1-2) It was during Iran’s counter-offensive against Iraq in 1982, that the IRGC gained

24. 24
in reputation and popularity, and became the primary fighting arm of the Iranian forces.
(Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 54) The importance of the war for the IRGC, or Pasdaran as they are
often referred to, cannot be understated. They went from being, in the early days of the war, a
small force with limited resources and personnel, to the primary Iranian military
establishment with their own bases, facilities, businesses, intelligence and weapons
production facilities.
The IRGC is almost a parallel-armed force to the regular army, enjoying greater
proximity and trust of the dispensation than the regular Armed Forces. It is a reflection of the
distrust toward the regular Armed Forces that the IRGC has not only been allowed to develop
its own Navy and Air Force, but has also been allowed to set up and run its own defense
industries. The IRGC was most effective in its operation during the war in the invaded
Khuzestan, as the numerically superior Iranians overcame technologically superior Iraqi
forces at the cost of heavy casualties. However, the Revolutionary convinced and zealous
IRGC commanders and troops were willing to accept this price. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 55)
The Iran-Iraq war taught the Revolutionary Guards that strength in numbers and commitment
to Jihad are not enough for national defense. Many of them were personally affected by Iraq’s
superior weaponry and chemical weapons capabilities, and recognized their destructive force
on Iranian moral and consequently war fatigue. Ensuring that Iran possessed a quantity and
quality of armaments more equal to that of its enemies thus became a top priority for the
IRGC. Possessing such destructive power would deter most enemies from attacking Iran in
the first place, and it would make an attack costly for any state that chose to initiate a conflict.
(Samuel, 2012: 15) A way for the IRGC to sustain their heightened position is to continue
exaggerate the threats against the Islamic Republic. However, they see the Iraqi invasion in
1980 and the actions of the United Stated and western powers during the war, as proof that the
threats are real, and this have shaped their actions and conduct ever since. Furthermore,

25. 25
keeping the “Holy Defense” alive allows the IRGC to shape the historical and contemporary
significance of the war and to secure their position as Iran’s main defenders and provider of
the country’s most inflammatory rhetoric. (Samuel, 2012: 20) The international isolation of
Iran in the post-war period enabled the IRGC to further enhance military and financial support
for Islamic terrorist groups elsewhere in the Middle East, in particular Hezbollah in Lebanon
and Islamic Jihad in Gaza. It is believed that the IRGC is also responsible for the Iranian
ballistic missile stockpile and its operations, in addition to essential elements of Iran’s nuclear
weapons program. (Bar, 2004: 30)
Deterrence
After the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian strategic doctrine took a primarily defensive
nature and was instead based on deterring perceived adversaries. Given the costs and the
difficulty of catching up conventionally after the war to more superior states and armies, it
made sense for Iran to examine other means to deter these advanced states. As for Iraq, it was
clear that Iran could not afford any similar surprises in the future; it would need chemical
weapons for deterrence; ballistic missiles to supplement an air force that would be weak for
many years, and to deter the use of an adversary's missiles or other means of attack. (Chubin,
1994: 71) For instance, Iran’s ballistic missile program is now key to its deterrence strategy,
in part because it is implicitly linked to Iran’s weapons of mass destruction programs.
(Connell, 2010: 7) Iran makes no apologies for seeking ballistic missile capability,
considering it an essential part of its deterrent strategy. Iran therefore equates missiles with
advanced weapons, precision, and most importantly deterrence. It seeks a deterrent force and
arms with effective deterrent capabilities, which, together with defense preparedness, have
become the basis of Iran’s strategic strategy after the Iran-Iraq war. (Chubin, 2002: 53)

26. 26
Hence, Iran argues that the ballistic missiles are both for defense and deterrence, and
occasionally state that they are for the benefit of the wider Islamic and Arab world, thereby
reflecting their quest for regional influence and ultimately hegemony. Iranian officials have
often referred to ballistic missiles as intended for deterrence and reserved for defense and
retaliation, rather than for initiating any hostile action. (Chubin, 2002: 58) However, the
parallel development of chemical and nuclear weapons programs raises the question of
whether missiles will be armed with such weapons of mass destruction in the future. (Chubin,
2002: 58) This ambiguity and unpredictability increases Iran’s deterrence level towards its
enemies, since it is becoming ever more difficult to make a reliable military assessment about
these programs.
Furthermore, Iranian deterrence is based on threatening any aggressor with the
capability to withstand a first strike and consequently enjoy the capacity to deliver a “like for
like” second strike, a non-proportional response and escalation. Moreover, Iran experience
from the Iran-Iraq war is indicative that they have a willingness to prolong a potential war and
accept casualties, widening the scope of the war to other theaters, escalation of means,
including the use of terrorist organization. Terrorism, in particular the use of Hezbollah and
Islamic Jihad, has served Iran as a deterrent tool towards its enemies since the late 1980s.
Despite formal denials of involvement in terrorism, Iran's reputation also serves as part of its
deterrent image. (Bar, 2004: 2) Hence, when pending the development of reliable long-range
ballistic missiles in the aftermath of the war, or a potential nuclear weapon, Iran had the
capacity to arrange a interim deterrent by using Hezbollah as a strategic ally and launching
pad, providing capabilities to commit terror acts world wide and arming it with missiles with
enough range to reach deep into Israel. (Chubin, 2002: 59)
In building their deterrent power, the IRGC seem to have learned from their
experiences in the Iran-Iraq war. When Jafari, commander-in-chief for the IRGC, stated in

27. 27
2008 that Iranian forces would strike U.S. bases in the Gulf if they were used for an attack on
Iran, he warned that Iran would defend itself “with all its might and that this might is far
greater than its strength at the time of the war against Saddam Hussein’s regime.” (Samuel,
2012: 15) The rhetoric used by Iranian leaders is often inflammatory, provocative and used as
an instrument to garner domestic support, while simultaneously the harsh language is
intended to deter foreign elements from confronting the Islamic Republic.
Conclusion
I have argued that Iran’s war with Iraq has been the defining moment for
Iranian strategic thinking and that it continues to underpin most aspects of the Iranian national
security concept. As a direct impact of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran was left increasingly isolated
and with a deep feeling of victimization and abandonees, which completely altered their
thinking concerning their security doctrine. With a mounting US military presence in the early
1990s in the Persian Gulf, combined with the uncertainty about continuity of conventional
arms supplies, and the general sense of embattlement and international isolation, Iran’s legacy
of the Iran-Iraq war concerning the notion of threat perception was higher, more volatile and
less assuring than before the war. Iran’s threat perception after the war was primarily focused
domestically to survival of the regime and the Revolution, and externally toward Iraq, the
United States, the Gulf States and Israel. The Islamic regimes initial national strategic aims
were halted after the war by the fact that the regime had to abandon its primary aim of
spreading the Revolution, and focus instead shifted to safeguarding the Revolutionary
regime’s survival domestically. Another important aim after the war was national security,
meaning the maintenance of territorial integrity, securing oil revenue and gaining regional

28. 28
influence. The overall need for self-reliance as a strategic aim had its consequences in Iran’s
concept of answers, to its threat perception and national strategic aims.
The experience in the Iran-Iraq war taught Iran above anything else, the
imperative need for a drastic increase in self-reliance, mainly through the development of a
domestic weapons production, in order to reduce the vulnerability to a surprising halt in
supply of arms and weapons systems. The need for utter self-reliance was enhanced when
Iran saw its former international allies and the United Nations unwilling to condemn Iraq for
its initial aggression in starting the war, but more importantly, for using chemical weapons
against Iranian soldiers and ballistic missiles against population centers. The Iran-Iraq war
was therefore the definite starting point of Iran’s ballistic missile program, developed and
manufactured domestically. Iran has developed its ballistic missiles and strategic missile
program to be the foundation of its deterrence strategy, in part since it is widely perceived to
be an integral part of Iran’s chemical and nuclear weapons programs. Iran’s emphasis on
rebuilding, reorganizing and pursuing its independent domestic arms production for both
conventional weapons and special weapons capabilities was not only driven from, but rested
its foundations on, Iran’s experience and feeling of victimization during the Iran-Iraq war.
Furthermore, the Iraqi use of chemical weapons gave the incentive for the Iranians to initiate
programs for weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, I have argued that the absence of a
tough and unambiguous response or condemnation from the international community of
Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, in addition to the severe Iraqi threat and its embodiment in
the Iran-Iraq war, was the primary motivation for Iran’s decision to develop its nuclear
weapons program. The importance of the war for the IRGC cannot be understated, who
ascended in power and influence due to its expanded fighting role during the war and its close
connection to the regime’s security and the survival of the Revolution.

29. 29
Few wars in history have changed a country’s perception of themselves, its relation to the
outside world and its national security concept more than the Iran-Iraq war did for the unique,
revolutionary Islamic regime in Teheran. The aim of this study was not to defend the
religiously driven authoritarian Iranian regime, but instead attempt to offer an Iranian
perspective into why, by what catalysts and how the Iran-Iraq war impacted on Iran’s national
security concept. With a wider comprehension of the Iran's perspective we may or may not
yield greater empathy for their cause, but it will provide us with a tool to improve
understanding of Iran’s motivations, incentives and likely behavior in the future.

30. 30
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