Paraguayan Civil-Military Relations- An Analysis of a Fraudulent State

Andrew Nelson
PSCI 4122
4/25/2014
Term Paper
Paraguayan Civil-Military Relations: An Analysis of a Fraudulent State
Introduction
Paraguay’s status as small landlocked country with a relatively feeble economy and
weak political institutions has enabled its elite class to establish a strong systemof social
control, characterized by fraudulent elections, turbulent transfers of power, non-representative
political institutions, and the continuous political involvement of the military1. Although the
military was directly responsible for facilitating Paraguay’s transition to democracy in 1989, the
continuous threat of military intervention in politics, along with the inability of the country’s
opposition parties to counteract the powerful elite-run Colorado Party, suggests that the future
of democracy in Paraguay is far from promised. Thus, in order to fully understand the current
pattern of civil-military relations in Paraguay, one must analyze the history of military
involvement in Paraguayan society. This paper will analyze the civil-military relations that
existed in Paraguay during the final years Alfredo Stroessner’s dictatorship and will evaluate the
evolution of Paraguayan civil-military relations in the post transition period. Although at specific
points in the post transition period civil-military relations in Paraguay exhibited signs of
conforming to democratic standards, the enduring legacy of the Stroessner dictatorship has had
a profound effect on the current pattern of civil-military relations, in which the military,
together with the Colorado party, have become the vehicles of power for president Horacio
1
Sondrol, P. C. "The Paraguayan MilitaryinTransition and the Evolution ofCivil-MilitaryRelations."Armed Forces &
Society 19.1 (1992): 105-22. Print.

Cartes. This paper will also examine the similarities and differences between the 2009 coup in
Honduras, and the situation the lead to the impeachment of Paraguay’s former president,
Fernando Lugo, in order to illustrate the unique status of Paraguay’s political culture.
Stronato
General Alfredo Stroessner’s rise to power in 1954 came about in the same manner that
eventually led to his demise, with a violent coup. Stroessner’s military takeover and subsequent
34 year rule was directly connected to his ability to use both the military, and the powerful
Colorado party as vehicles for opposition repression and mechanisms to legitimize his rule.
Stroessner’s rule is known as a personalist dictatorship that was brought to power by the
military, however, the collective military did not rule Paraguay2. Instead, the military and the
Colorado party became the mainstays of Stroessner’s rule, collectively supporting the Stronato
(Stroessner Regime) in exchange for political subsistence and financial rewards. According to
Donald Richards, Paraguayan society under Stroessner’s rule exemplified what he calls a
predatory state, or a state in which the leadership is exercised not in the best interests of
society, but rather, in the interests of the ruling group. In this predatory state the identification
or creation of opportunities to harvest rents, such as natural resources, manipulating market
imperfections, and illegal trades, was used to purchase loyalty from various individuals or to
finance repressive apparatuses that operated to control potential opposition groups (as cited in
Wintrobe 1998)3. Under Stroessner’s rule the military became thoroughly involved in politics,
exemplified by the fact that until 1992 officers and officer cadets were required to be members
2 Sondrol, P. C. "The ParaguayanMilitaryinTransitionandthe Evolutionof Civil-MilitaryRelations." Armed Forces & Society 19.1
(1992): 105-22. Print.
3 Richards, DonaldG. "Transition and Reform in a PredatoryState:The Case ofParaguay." Journal of Economic Policy
Reform 11.2 (2008): 101-14. Print.

of the Colorado Party, in which Stroessner retained overall control of promotions4. The
politicization of the Paraguayan military also occurred at a time when external security threats
were practically non-existent. Thus, an important control mechanism that was used to
incentivize the military’s loyalty to Stroessner was simply to employ them. This meant
reorienting the military’s missions away from traditional external defense and more towards
internal security and regime support, specifically stressing their role as anti-subversion agents5.
Although a key military mission under Stroessner was internal security, the Paraguayan military
forces were notorious for being relatively small and underequipped. For example, the
Paraguayan air force could only put into the skies eight Brazilian-built, propeller driven
counterinsurgency aircraft, constituting a force significantly smaller than what Brazil or
Argentina could bring about individually (as cited in Dept. of Defense 1988)6. The technical
inferiority of the Paraguayan military reflects the notion that the military’s internal security
mission during this time may have taken a back seat to supporting the regime and reinforcing
the legitimacy of the Colorado Party. Towards the end of Stroessner’s rule the highly politicized
Paraguayan military acted as a preventative mechanism for repression of autonomous groups
before they could gain sufficient support to directly challenge the government. The Stroessner
regime moved swiftly against opposition groups, arresting and exiling mass numbers of people,
and using torture and disappearances as a means of deterring dissension7. In 1986 the United
Nations cited Paraguay as the country in Latin America with the largest amount of un-
4 Zagorski, P. W. "Democratic BreakdowninParaguayandVenezuela:The Shape of Things to Come for LatinAmerica?" Armed
Forces & Society 30.1 (2003): 87-116. Print.
5 Sondrol, P. C. "The ParaguayanMilitaryin Transitionandthe Evolutionof Civil-MilitaryRelations." Armed Forces & Society 19.1
(1992): 105-22. Print.
(1992): 105-22. Print.

sentenced political prisoners8. Although the Paraguayan military was involved to some degree
in these anti-subversion tactics, Stroessner was able to shield the military from controversy by
emphasizing the role of Paraguay’s secret police in being the practitioners of arrests and torture,
which fell under the authority of the ministry of the interior, not defense9. The fact that
Stroessner was so willing to shield the Paraguayan military from controversy suggests that the
legitimacy of the military, combined with their perpetual loyalty to Stroessner, was central to
the survival of his dictatorship. The Paraguayan state, controlled by Stroessner, in unison with
the Colorado Party, and the Paraguayan Armed forces, collectively enabled Stroessner’s
personalist dictatorship to survive for over 34 years. However, as the once prominent dictator’s
health began to erode with age, questions of succession threatened the unification of both the
Colorado Party and the Military, eventually leading to a military coup that deposed Stroessner
and created an opening for democracy in Paraguay.
Transition to Democracy
On February 3rd 1989, General Andres Rodriguez deposed Stroessner, stating that the
reason why the Paraguayan armed forces left its barracks in contention of Stroessner’s rule was,
“to defend the dignity and honor of the Armed Forces, for the total and complete unification of
the Colorado Party in government, for the initiation of the democratization of Paraguay, for
respect for human rights, and for respect for our Christian, apostolic, Roman Catholic religion”
(1992): 105-22. Print.
9 Sondrol, Paul C. "The Emerging New Politics of LiberalizingParaguay:Sustained Civil-MilitaryControl without
Democracy." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 34.2 (1992):127-63. JSTOR. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/166031

(as cited in FBIS 1989)10. While Rodriguez indicated his support for the initiation of democracy
in Paraguay, the people had little role in ending Stroessner’s rule, suggesting that the coup was
nothing more than a power play by Rodriguez to reestablish and legitimize his influence11. The
coup of 1989 significantly increased the political role of the Paraguayan military, in which they
assumed a moderator role, characterized by the oversight of the systemic liberalization of
Paraguayan society12.
The increased politicization of the Paraguayan military in the post-transition period,
which directly threated the consolidation of democracy, is most amply exemplified in the civil-
military crises that characterized the Wasmosy, Cubas, and Macchi presidencies. Leading up to
the 1993 Paraguayan presidential elections, the Colorado Party continued to diverge,
separating into different factions. One faction of the Colorado Party, led by Luis Argana, was
able to successfully construct a constitutional ban on the re-election of General Rodriguez,
which was met by the interference of the Paraguayan military, led by General Lino Oviedo, in
the vote counting process of the Colorado Party’s nomination convention13. In turn, the military
backed candidate, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, won the Colorado Party’s nomination, and eventually
went on to win the 1993 presidential election. The result of Wasmosy’s presidential victory
ensured a continual threat of military interference and intervention, and also exacerbated the
10 Sondrol, P. C. "The ParaguayanMilitaryinTransitionandthe Evolutionof Civil-MilitaryRelations." Armed Forces &
Society 19.1 (1992): 105-22. Print.
12 Sondrol, P. C. "The ParaguayanMilitaryinTransitionandthe Evolutionof Civil-MilitaryRelations." Armed Forces &
Society 19.1 (1992): 105-22. Print.
Reform 11.2 (2008): 101-14. Print.

divisions within the Colorado Party to the point that governing the country was nearly
impossible14.
Another crises that reflects the increased politicization of the Paraguayan military in the
post-transition period is the attempted coup by General Lino Oviedo in 1996. This coup attempt
came as a result to President Wasmosy’s efforts to reduce the influence of General Oviedo,
who had become increasingly powerful ever since Paraguay’s dubious transition to democracy.
When presented with the demand for his resignation, Oviedo denied this order and retreated
to a local garrison where he consolidated a force that applied pressure on the president15. In
the end, General Oviedo was captured and sentenced to ten years in prison, while his loyal
followers in the officer corps of the military were removed. The ability of the Wasmosy
government to successfully deter the power play of General Oviedo suggests an increased
capacity of the civilian authorities to check and control the power of the Paraguayan Armed
forces. However, the intensely corrupt political culture of Paraguay made prosecuting Oviedo
extremely difficult. In 1998, Raul Cubas won the presidential elections despite his close
relationship with Oviedo. Upon being elected president, Cubas issued a decree that negated
General Oviedo’s sentence, and purged the armed forces of officers who had supported
Wasmosy against Oviedo in the 1996 coup16. The situation that ensued could be described as a
cycle of power plays between the anti-Oviedo opposition and the Cubas regime, in which the
opposition, along with the Supreme Court, attempted on numerous occasions to annul the
Reform 11.2 (2008): 101-14. Print.

president’s decree. However, each attempt was met by Cubas sending the trial to a military
court, in which the cases were subsequently dismissed. In March of 1999, Vice President Argana
was assassinated by unidentified assailants believed to be associated with Cubas and Oviedo17.
The assassination, combined with the declining economy, provoked public outcry and set the
stage for Cubas’s impeachment. Although Cubas was never officially impeached, his voluntary
resignation marked a significant victory for Paraguay’s delicate democracy.
In March of 1999, Luis Macchi, a Colorado Party member, succeeded to the office of
President following Cubas’s resignation. With Cubas out of the picture Macchi began picking up
the pieces of Paraguay’s damaged government. Macchi’s restoration efforts were
overshadowed in May of 2000, as former General Lino Oviedo, who had recently emerged from
hiding, attempted to overthrow president Macchi. According to witness accounts, Oviedo’s
coup attempt was a disaster in that many of his supporters abandoned his campaign at the last
minute, and those who remained accomplished little more than firing a couple tank shots at the
legislative palace before being scared off by the Paraguayan Air Force18. During the short-lived
battle, members of Macchi’s military were uncertain as to which tanks were theirs and which
belonged to Oviedo’s supporters19. This confusion reflects the notion that the
institutionalization of civilian control of the armed forces had not yet occurred in Paraguay20.
However, according to Samuel Fitch, one of the keys to establishing civil-military relations that
18 Carter, Miguel. "Paraguay:A Caudillo's Long Goodbye."NACLA Report On The Americas 34.1 (2000): 57. Academic Search
Premier. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.
19 Carter, Miguel. "Paraguay:A Caudillo's Long Goodbye."NACLA Report On The Americas 34.1 (2000): 57. Academic Search
Premier. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.

conform to a democratic standard is that military personnel must be subject to the rule of law21.
Thus, the ability of the Paraguayan public to oust Oviedo and Cubas in 1999, and defend the
country against Oviedo’s coup attempt in 2000, reflects the increased adaptation of civil-
military relations in Paraguay towards a democratic standard.
In the post-transition period, Paraguay exhibited an increased effort to consolidate and
legitimize its delicate democracy. While elected civilian officials were in charge of running
Paraguay’s government, its military retained significant political influence, exemplified by
Oviedo’s coup attempts in 1996 and 2000, and the dual political interference by Cubas and
Oviedo in 1999. At specific points in Paraguay’s post transition period, such as the public
ousting of Cubas and Oviedo in 1999, civil-military relations exhibited signs of conforming to
democratic standards, however, during this time the Paraguayan military did not internalize a
traditional role belief, such as a constitutional role belief, or an arbiter role. Instead, the
Paraguayan military was more devoted to the pursuit of power and wealth via contraband
smuggling, stakes in private enterprises, and narcotics trafficking, which was all made possible
by its endless support for Paraguay’s hegemonic Colorado Party22. Thus, with the victory of
Fernando Lugo, a member of the Patriotic Alliance for Change party (APC), in the Paraguayan
presidential elections of 2008, the question becomes: “How have civil-military relations in
Paraguay changed as a result of the Colorado Party losing its grip on power?”
Post-Colorado Period
21 Fitch, JohnSamuel. "ContemporaryPatterns ofCivil-MilitaryRelations." The Armed Forces and Democracyin Latin America.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1998. 36-60. Print.
22 Pion-Berlin, David. "WillSoldiers Follow?Economic IntegrationAndRegional SecurityInThe Southern Cone."Journal Of
Interamerican Studies & World Affairs 42.1 (2000): 43. Academic Search Premier. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.

Fernando Lugo’s presidential victory marked the end of six decades of Colorado Party
rule in Paraguay, in which the government has alternated between authoritarian, transitional,
and democratic regimes, yet, the Colorado Party has always remained on top23. Lugo’s victory
can be accredited to his ability to accumulate massive support from Paraguay’s marginalized
groups through his commitment to progressive social, economic, and agrarian reforms, with the
latter being particularly important considering Paraguay’s highly unequal distribution of land24.
Initially, Lugo’s presidency was characterized by a feverous public sense of hope for the future,
however, as Lugo attempted to enact his promised reforms he was met with strong opposition
from legislators in the Colorado party, who controlled congress25. It is clear that during this time
the Colorado Party was in a vulnerable state because the proposed reforms by Fernando Lugo
directly threatened the established social systemin which Paraguay’s elite class reaped the
benefits of social control, largely at the expense of the country’s impoverished majority. In 2009,
president Lugo responded to allegations that high-ranking military officials and Colorado Party
members were plotting a coup against him by removing the leaders of the army, navy and air
force26. This situation bared a striking resemblance to the forced resignation of General Lino
Oviedo by President Wasmosy in 1996. However, in the latter case, Oviedo responded to this
call for his resignation by rounding up his supporters and attempting to overthrow the
president. Conversely, in the former case, the forced removal of the leaders of the Paraguayan
23 Abente-Brun, Diego. "PARAGUAY:THE UNRAVELINGOF ONE-PARTY RULE." Journal of Democracy 20.1 (2009):143-
56.ProQuest. Web. 21 Apr. 2014
24 Lambert, Peter. "A New Era For Paraguay." NACLA Report On The Americas 41.4 (2008):5-8. Academic Search Premier. Web.
20 Apr. 2014.
25 Barrionuevo, Alexei. "Paraguayan President Replaces Military Leadership." The New YorkTimes. The New YorkTimes, 05 Nov.
2009. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
26 Barrionuevo, Alexei. "Paraguayan President Replaces MilitaryLeadership." The New YorkTimes. The New YorkTimes, 05 Nov.
2009. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.

armed forces by president Lugo, while disputed, was accepted by these leaders who did not try
to gather support in their various branches and attempt to overthrown the president.
According to Samuel Fitch, one of the keys to establishing civil-military relations that conform
to a democratic standard is that the military must be politically subordinate to the democratic
regime27. Thus, the differences between these two situations suggests that in the post-Colorado
Party period, democratic consolidation of the Paraguayan armed forces was extended, and civil-
military relations in Paraguay changed substantially, further advancing toward a democratic
standard.
During Lugo’s presidency the Paraguayan military assumed a greater role with regards
to internal security measures, exemplified by the mobilization of military forces against the
Paraguayan People’s Army, a leftist insurgent group believed to be responsible for numerous
acts of violence. In both 2010 and 2011 president Lugo issued a state of exception, which
granted him increased power to deploy Paraguay’s military forces to dismantle the guerilla
insurgency28. Lugo’s increased control over Paraguay’s Armed Forces reflects the enormous
political pressure that he faced from opposition forces who were disillusioned by the lack of
social order in Paraguay during this time. This disillusionment culminated with Lugo’s
impeachment in June of 2012, in which both the Colorado Party and the Liberal Party turned
against the president, citing Article 225 of the 1992 Constitution, which allows impeachment in
27 Fitch, JohnSamuel. "ContemporaryPatterns ofCivil-MilitaryRelations." The Armed Forces and Democracyin Latin America.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1998. 36-60. Print.
28 Stone, Hannah. "ParaguayHas Nothing to Show for State of Emergency, Again.” Organized Crime in the Americas. Organized
Crime in the Americas, 9 Nov. 2011. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.

cases of poor performance of duties29. Critics of Lugo’s impeachment described the situation as
a “parliamentary coup”, in which Lugo, who controlled no party of his own, became a victim of
the machine politics that has characterized Paraguay’s political culture since the times of
personalist dictator, Alfredo Stroessner30. Although Lugo’s impeachment was technically legal,
the motivations behind his removal from office were political in nature and not grounded on
any real instances of Lugo poorly performing his duties as President. Following Lugo’s
impeachment several South American countries condemned the Paraguayan Congress,
equating the impeachment to an institutional coup, and temporarily suspended Paraguay from
the MERCOSUR trade agreement for having violated their democracy clause31. The lack of
military participation in this institutional coup suggests that the Paraguayan military was less
involved in politics during this time, signifying an increased institutionalization of civilian control
over the Armed Forces. However, the feverous sense of optimism that once encapsulated the
Paraguayan public had been deflated, marking a reversal of previous advances made towards
consolidating Paraguay’s delicate democracy.
Horacio Cartes
In April of 2013, tobacco mogul Horacio Cartes, won the Paraguayan presidential
elections in a decided victory that returned the presidency to the hegemonic Colorado Party. A
week after being sworn in as president, the Paraguayan Senate passed reforms to the National
Defense Law that grant enormous control of the military to the president’s office, allowing
29 Marsteintredet, Leiv, Mariana Llanos, andDetlef Nolte. "Paraguayandthe Politics of Impeachment." Journal of
Democracy 24.4 (2013): 110-23. Print.
30 HETHERINGTON, KREGG. "Paraguay's Ongoing Struggle Over LandAndDemocracy." NACLA Report On The Americas 45.3
(2012): 8-10. Academic Search Premier. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.
31 Marsteintredet, Leiv, Mariana Llanos, andDetlef Nolte. "Paraguayandthe Politics of Impeachment." Journal of
Democracy 24.4 (2013): 110-23. Print.

Cartes to deploy soldiers anywhere in the country with relative ease, and without the approval
of the legislative body32. These reforms to the Paraguayan National Defense Law came as a
result of increased violence on the part of the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP). Although the
leftist EPP insurgency had been increasingly active during this time, the group constituted a
meager threat to social order, and was rumored to have less than 100 fighters33. During this
time the most crucial threat to Paraguay’s delicate democracy was drug trafficking, institutional
corruption, contraband smuggling, and organized crime groups, all of which could be traced
back to the “Triple Frontier” area along the converging borders of Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay34. According to Jeffrey Robinson the epicenter of the Tri-Border Area is the
Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este, described as, “The anus of the earth is cut into the jungle on
the Paraguay side of the Parana River—a home-away-from-home for the South American drug
cartels, Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza, Italian gangsters, Russian gangsters, Nigerian
gangsters and Hezbollah terrorists—and is called Ciudad del Este. . . . A city of 200,000 hustlers,
whores, hoodlums, revolutionaries, thugs, drug traffickers, drug addicts, murderers, racketeers,
pirates, mobsters, extortionists, smugglers, hitmen, pimps and wannabes” (as cited in Robinson
1999)35. To a large degree, this lawless region existed, and continues to exist, because of the
corrupt political and military officials who are financially invested in the survival of this system.
Thus, the fact that president Cartes chose to use his increased control over the Paraguayan
32 Bargent, James. "ParaguayGrants President SweepingMilitaryPowers.” Organized Crime in the Americas. Organized Crime in
the Americas, 23 Aug. 2013. Web. 24 Apr. 2014.
33 Bargent, James. "ParaguayGrants President SweepingMilitaryPowers.” Organized Crime in the Americas. Organized Crime in
the Americas, 23 Aug. 2013. Web. 24 Apr. 2014.
34
Sverdlick, Ana R. "Terrorists andOrganized Crime Entrepreneurs inthe “triple Frontier” among Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay." Trends in Organized Crime 9.2 (2005): 84-93. Print.
35 Sverdlick, Ana R. "Terrorists andOrganizedCrime Entrepreneurs in the “triple Frontier” among Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay." Trends in Organized Crime 9.2 (2005): 84-93. Print.

military to target and dismantle a small leftist guerilla group over using this force to clean up
the lawless Tri-Border Area, suggests that president Cartes is either completely oblivious to the
internal problems facing Paraguay, or the president is simply using this area as a means to buy
the patronage of political and military officials in order to solidify his control over Paraguayan
society. The consolidation of the Colorado Party, the Paraguayan Military, and the State under
president Cartes undoubtedly resembles the structure of Alfredo Stroessner’s dictatorship, just
in a slightly more democratic context. In an elite-dominated country such as Paraguay, the
military, much as it always has, constitutes a tool used by politically powerful individuals to
reinforce and legitimize their control over society, in which the elite benefit at the expense of
the poor majority. Therefore, the current pattern of civil-military relations in Paraguay is
characterized by this inability of the Paraguayan military to internalize a role belief that seeks to
bring about any positive changes to Paraguay’s feeble political culture, choosing instead to stay
in the background, silently supporting and participating in the same corrupt social systemthat
granted them this elite status.
Comparative Analysis
In June of 2009, Honduran president Manuel Zelaya and his government were deposed
in a military coup that was directly connected to the disillusionment of Honduras’s powerful
elite class with Zelaya’s populist tendencies36. Throughout his presidency Zelaya embarked on a
continuous shift towards more left-leaning, populist policies, such as an increased minimum
wage, lower interest rates on home loans, and increased public participation in government
36
Joyce, RosemaryA. "LegitimizingThe Illegitimate:The Honduran ShowElections AndThe Challenge Ahead. (Cover
Story)." NACLA Report On The Americas 43.2 (2010):10-17. Academic Search Premier. Web. 25 Apr. 2014.

activities, with the latter being seen as the primary pretext for the coup37. These populist
tendencies were perceived by Honduras’s elite class as a direct threat to their powerful status,
and in partnership with the military, decided that in order to preserve their elite status they
must overthrow the president. Following the coup, the de facto government ushered in a
period of public repression in Honduras, characterized by the suspension of constitutional
rights, government control over the media, police and military brutality, and repression of
groups that opposed the coup38. The 2009 Honduran coup is similar to the impeachment of
president Lugo in that both cases reflect a concerted effort by the elite class in each country to
protect their powerful social and political status. Both Honduras and Paraguay have historically
retained a small unified elite class of individuals that use their connections to the military and
powerful political parties, such as the Colorado Party in Paraguay, and the Liberal Party in
Honduras, to influence the political culture in their respective countries, allowing for the
fortification of their elite status. While the similarities between these two situations are
obvious, the primary difference between them relates to the participation of the military in
each case. With regards to Lugo’s impeachment in 2012, the Paraguayan military sat in the
background as Paraguay’s elite driven politicians effectively used the political process to
overthrow Lugo. Conversely, in the Honduran cases, the military was the primary vehicle for the
elite class to overthrow Zelaya. Thus, in Honduras, the presence and relative strength of
opposition groups would have made it incredibly difficult for the elite class to depose president
37
38

Zelaya without the participation of the military. However, in Paraguay, the presumed legality of
Lugo’s impeachment, along with the non-participation of Paraguay’s military, suggests that the
political culture in Paraguay is structured in such a way that regardless of the strength of
opposition groups, the elite class is universally in control.

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