The document discusses business models and economic growth. It provides definitions of key terms like sustainable growth and discusses new theories on business models. It also analyzes the increasing attention given to topics like money, products, and success in public discourse about business models from 2000-2012 based on a longitudinal study of Danish news articles. Specifically, it finds the strongest co-evolution between discussions of "business model" and "money".

1. Økonomisk vækst og
forretningsmodeller
Kasper Roldsgaard
Forsker, Fakultet for Ledelse
UPV - Polyteknisk Universitet i Valencia
kasrol@ade.upv.es
T: +34 960 710 848
M: +45 21 68 86 71
-­‐
Bæredyg*g
vækst
gennem
ledelse
Getting the terminology right:
“In economics, sustainable growth refers to
increases in profits, adjusted for changes in the
relationship between revenues and costs, that
can be sustained over long periods of
time” (author’s definition, 19-04-2012).

2. In Danish: Projekt sporskifte 2010
1. Expected track
(best case scenario)
2. Continuation track
(second best case scenario)
3. Unexpected track
(unprecedented scenario)
Year
2010
Year
2008
D e r a i l e d
curve
Straight crossing
Lead curve
(Turnout curve)
Year
2012
Connected
curve
Intro:
“Ud
at
rejse
med
DSB”

3. Indica6ve
trendline:
-­‐84.72x
+
1023.2
R²
=
0.3825
-­‐1000
-­‐800
-­‐600
-­‐400
-­‐200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Amounts
in
DKK
million
Financial
result
Best
case
scenario
a
b
d
e
c
Source: DSB Annual Reports
Financial highlights1999-2011
Spørgsmål:
Hvordan
kan
denne
kurve
forklares?

4. -­‐4000
-­‐2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Amounts
in
DKK
million
Total
revenues
Profit
for
the
period
(Or
loss)
Forskellen
mellem
vækst
på
top-­‐
og
bundlinje
Fig. 8. The growing gap of costs. Source: DSB Annual Reports 1999-2011. To close the growing gap, DSB suspends two contracts: a)
the Swedish coast line of the Oresund region in 2011 [contract period: 2009-2017] and b) the Väst region in 2012 [contract period:
from 2010 to 2018].
DSB Financial highlights1999-2011
Omkostninger
vokser
ud
af
kontrol.

5. Dagens
program
• Ny
teori
om
forretningsmodeller
• Uddrag
af
forskningsresultater
• Caseeksempler
• Osterwalders
kanvas

6. Hvor
naiv
kan
man
være?
Vi
har
at
gøre
med
et
kommercielt
foretagende,
som
store
amerikanske
venturekapitalister,
[…]
og
en
kinesisk
rigmand
har
investeret
millioner
af
dollar
i.
De
vil
se
en
forretningsmodel.
De
vil
se
et
acast.
[…]
Det
er
forretning
med
stort
F.
Kilde:
Føhns,
H.
”Julegave
ødelægger
forretningsmodel,
Facebook
fandt
en
smart
model,
men
en
diamantring
safe
sig
fast
i
forretningens
tandhjul”.
Informa6on,
publiceret
11-­‐12-­‐2007
”den
forretningsmodel
for
havmølleparker
[...]
er
så
smart,
at
DONG’s
store
tyske
konkurrent
på
det
europæiske
marked
[...]
annoncerede,
at
man
nu
vil
rejse
kapital
6l
sine
vindmølleprojekter
på
lignende
måde.
[Ekspert
udtaler:]
Den
største
kompliment,
du
kan
få,
det
er,
når
konkurrenterne
kopierer
dine
koncepter.”
Kilde:
Nielsen,
J.
S.,
"Schurs
show
mod
Eldrup
rammer
DONG",
16-­‐03-­‐2012.
1
2
En
model
(for
at
tjene
penge)
Et
koncept
(for
at
tjene
penge)

7. Forretningsmodel
krise
(44)
Forretningsmodel
investering
(43)
Forretningsmodel
finansiering
(13)
Forretningsmodel
penge
(127)
Forretningsmodel
succes
(48)
Kombineret
søgning
(april
2012)

8. Source:
Informa6on.dk,
2000-­‐2012.
Translated
from
Danish
into
English.
Observa6ons
1. 56%
of
the
ar6cles
about
‘business
model’
(n=259)
also
men6ons
‘money’
(n=145.
The
co-­‐evolu6on
pafern
between
‘Business
model’
AND
‘money’
is
surprisingly
clear.
2. Increased
afen6on
to
‘product’
and
‘success’
in
public
discourses
about
business
models.
Longitudinal
analysis,
2000-­‐2012
Financial
crisis
Internet
Bobble
burst
Post
crisis
Housing
bobble
burst
Con6nued
crisis
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2006
2012
Stock
crisis
5
10
15
20
25
0
30
35
40
“Business
model”
“Business
model”
AND
“money”
”Business
model”
AND
investment
(n=50)
Moderate
increase
2000
2001
2002
2003
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2
4
6
8
10
0
12
Financial
management
”Business
model”
AND
crisis
(n=51)
2000
2001
2002
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Moderate
increase
2
4
6
8
10
0
12
Nega;ve
consequence
[INPUT]
[OUTPUT]
”Business
model”
AND
success
(n=53)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2006
2012
Significant
increase
2
4
6
8
10
0
12
”Business
model”
AND
product
(n=58)
Significant
increase
Posi;ve
consequence
Supply
chain
management
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2006
2012
[OUTPUT]
[INPUT]
2
4
6
8
10
0
12

9. Nye
teorier
om
forretningsmodeller
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
Teece,
2010
Doz
&
Kosonen,
2010
Baden-­‐Fuller
&
Morgan,
2010
Wirtz
et.
al.,
2010
Itami
&
Nishino,
2010
Casadesus-­‐Masanell
&
Ricart,
2010
Saba6er
et.
al.,
2010
Williamson,
2010
Dahan
et.
al.,
2010
Smith
et.
al.,
2010
Gambardella
&
McGahan,
2010
Sosna
et.
al.,
2010
Thompson
&
MacMillan,
2010
McGrath,
2010
Chesbrough,
2010
Demil
&
Lecocq,
2010
Zof
&
Amit,
2010
Yunus
el.
al.,
2010
Svejenova
et.
al.,
2010
Dunford
et.
al.,
2010
Hienerth
et.
al.,
2011
Rou6ne
Change
Strategy
Process
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
Teece,
2010
Doz
&
Kosonen,
2010
Baden-­‐Fuller
&
Morgan,
2010
Wirtz
et.
al.,
2010
Itami
&
Nishino,
2010
Casadesus-­‐Masanell
&
Ricart,
2010
Saba6er
et.
al.,
2010
Williamson,
2010
Dahan
et.
al.,
2010
Smith
et.
al.,
2010
Gambardella
&
McGahan,
2010
Sosna
et.
al.,
2010
Thompson
&
MacMillan,
2010
McGrath,
2010
Chesbrough,
2010
Demil
&
Lecocq,
2010
Zof
&
Amit,
2010
Yunus
el.
al.,
2010
Svejenova
et.
al.,
2010
Dunford
et.
al.,
2010
Hienerth
et.
al.,
2011
Social
Culture
Resource
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
Teece,
2010
Doz
&
Kosonen,
2010
Baden-­‐Fuller
&
Morgan,
2010
Wirtz
et.
al.,
2010
Itami
&
Nishino,
2010
Casadesus-­‐Masanell
&
Ricart,
2010
Saba6er
et.
al.,
2010
Williamson,
2010
Dahan
et.
al.,
2010
Smith
et.
al.,
2010
Gambardella
&
McGahan,
2010
Sosna
et.
al.,
2010
Thompson
&
MacMillan,
2010
McGrath,
2010
Chesbrough,
2010
Demil
&
Lecocq,
2010
Zof
&
Amit,
2010
Yunus
el.
al.,
2010
Svejenova
et.
al.,
2010
Dunford
et.
al.,
2010
Hienerth
et.
al.,
2011
Innova6on
Experiment
Evolu6on
0,000
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
Teece,
2010
Doz
&
Kosonen,
2010
Baden-­‐Fuller
&
Morgan,
2010
Wirtz
et.
al.,
2010
Itami
&
Nishino,
2010
Casadesus-­‐Masanell
&
Ricart,
2010
Saba6er
et.
al.,
2010
Williamson,
2010
Dahan
et.
al.,
2010
Smith
et.
al.,
2010
Gambardella
&
McGahan,
2010
Sosna
et.
al.,
2010
Thompson
&
MacMillan,
2010
McGrath,
2010
Chesbrough,
2010
Demil
&
Lecocq,
2010
Zof
&
Amit,
2010
Yunus
el.
al.,
2010
Svejenova
et.
al.,
2010
Dunford
et.
al.,
2010
Hienerth
et.
al.,
2011
Business
model
Social

10. 0,000
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
Teece,
2010
Doz
&
Kosonen,
2010
Baden-­‐Fuller
&
Morgan,
2010
Wirtz
et.
al.,
2010
Itami
&
Nishino,
2010
Casadesus-­‐Masanell
&
Ricart,
2010
Saba6er
et.
al.,
2010
Williamson,
2010
Dahan
et.
al.,
2010
Smith
et.
al.,
2010
Gambardella
&
McGahan,
2010
Sosna
et.
al.,
2010
Thompson
&
MacMillan,
2010
McGrath,
2010
Chesbrough,
2010
Demil
&
Lecocq,
2010
Zof
&
Amit,
2010
Yunus
el.
al.,
2010
Svejenova
et.
al.,
2010
Dunford
et.
al.,
2010
Hienerth
et.
al.,
2011
Business
model
Failure
TeoreHsk
gap
i
liIeraturen
Fiasko:
”handling,
projekt
eller
lignende,
som
fuldstændig
mislykkes”
–
ordbogen.com
Fejlslagen:
”som
ikke
er
gået
ePer
hensigten”
–
ordbogen.com
forfejlet
mislykket
Kilde:
Roldsgaard
(2013).

11. Randomized
controlled
trials
Trail
1
Clinical
study
1
–
Internal
origin
Opera;onaliza;on
Clinical
study
2
–
External
origin
Clinical
study
3
–
Underlying
challenge
Trail
2
Trail
3
Producing
knowledge
about
past
prac6ce
Producing
knowledge
about
best
prac6ce
Rela6onship
between
the
elements
of
the
leadership
agenda
Rela6onship
between
the
barriers
and
opportuni6es
Rela6onship
between
the
core
product
and
commercial
periphery
Strengths
and
weaknesses
for
developing
the
business
model
through
a
series
of
mul6variate
analyses
of
the
leadership
agenda
Opportuni6es
and
threats
for
developing
the
business
model
through
analysis
of
a
series
of
single
and
mul6ple
choice
baferies
Founda6on
for
developing
the
business
model
through
frequency
analyses
of
the
basic
forces
in
play
Declara6ve
memory
Procedural
memory
Opera6onal
planning
Detailed
execu6on
plan
Preparing
emails
to
arose
an
interest
Logis6cal
distribu6on
of
the
survey
Follow-­‐up
to
boost
the
response
rate
Approval
of
the
research
inves6ga6on
Planning
Trail
4
Trail
5
Trail
6
Producing
knowledge
about
barriers
Producing
knowledge
about
opportuni6es
Declara6ve
memory
Procedural
memory
Trail
7
Trail
8
Trail
9
Producing
knowledge
about
the
forces
in
play
Producing
knowledge
about
the
strategy
Declara6ve
memory
Procedural
memory
Measurement
15
items
15
items
15
items
28
items
28
items
28
items
2
items
2
items
2
items
a
b
c
a
b
c
a=autobiographic
memory,
b=cogniHve
memory,
c=ability
memory
Fig
1
Flow
chart
of
randomized
controlled
trials
Fokus
i
dag.

12. Managers
assessed
for
eligibility
(n=476)
Excluded
(n=108)
Not
mee6ng
the
inclusion
criteria
(n=5)
Declined
to
par6cipate
(n=75)
Discon6nued/incomplete
answers
(n=24)
Excluded
from
analysis
(n=4)
Randomized
valid
ques6onnaires
(n=368)
Representa6on:
77.8%
M/F:
67/33%
Age:
48
Seniority:
9
Employees:
15
Group
1
(n=27)
Not
eligible
(n=0)
Non
response
(n=4)
Incomplete
(n=2)
Excluded
(n=0)
Representa6on:
59.1%
M/F:
62/38%
Age:
45
Seniority:
7
Employees:
41
Group
2
(n=88)
Not
eligible
(n=1)
Non
response
(n=23)
Incomplete
(n=8)
Excluded
(n=4)
Representa6on:
84.2%
M/F:
74/26%
Age:
47
Seniority:
19
Employees:
53
Group
3
(n=165)
Not
eligible
(n=1)
Non
response
(n=21)
Incomplete
(n=4)
Excluded
(n=0)
Representa6on:
81.4%
M/F:
75/25%
Age:
49
Seniority:
13
Employees:
27
Group
4
(n=44)
Not
eligible
(n=1)
Non
response
(n=1)
Incomplete
(n=6)
Excluded
(n=0)
Representa6on:
80.6%
M/F:
48/52%
Age:
47
Seniority:
11
Employees:
29
Group
5
(n=36)
Not
eligible
(n=0)
Non
response
(n=6)
Incomplete
(n=1)
Excluded
(n=0)
Representa6on:
83.0%
M/F:
77/33%
Age:
47
Seniority:
10
Employees:
52
Group
6
(n=47)
Not
eligible
(n=0)
Non
response
(n=7)
Incomplete
(n=1)
Excluded
(n=0)
Representa6on:
81.2%
M/F:
91/9%
Age:
49
Seniority:
21
Employees:
92
Group
7
(n=69)
Not
eligible
(n=1)
Non
response
(n=9)
Incomplete
(n=3)
Excluded
(n=0)
Sample
representaHon:
77.3%.
Rounded
average
numbers
for
age,
seniority
and
employees
per
manager.
Valid
ques6onnaires
Analyzed
(n=21)
Valid
ques6onnaires
Analyzed
(n=51)
Valid
ques6onnaires
Analyzed
(n=139)
Valid
ques6onnaires
Analyzed
(n=36)
Valid
ques6onnaires
Analyzed
(n=29)
Valid
ques6onnaires
Analyzed
(n=39)
Valid
ques6onnaires
Analyzed
(n=56)
Fig
2
Parallel
randomized
study
of
seven
groups
Summary
Selec;on
Sample
Characteris;cs

13. Kilde:
Doz,
Y.
L.
&
Kosonen,
M.,
Embedding
Strategic
Agility,
A
Leadership
Agenda
for
Accelera6ng
Business
Model
Renewal,
Long
Range
Planning
43
(2010)
370
–
382.
TeoreHsk
ramme
som
udgangspunkt
Ledelsesdagsorden
for
udvikling
af
forretningsmodeller
A.
B.
C.
13

14. VAR Beskrivelse
Situa6on
Std.
Afv.
Mål
Std.
Afv.
Afstand
Sig.
Signifikant
1 Forudsige
–
Evne
6l
at
forudsige
for
at
kunne
forme
markedet
4.56
.98601
6.02
1.005
1.462
0.000
Signifikant
2 Eksperimentere
–
Eksperimentere
med
teknologi
samt
probe
for
at
få
indsigt
i
hvad
markedet
e{erspørger
5.04
.95370
5.16
1.203
0.117
0.144
Ikke
Signifikant
3 Distance
–
Distance
gennem
et
udefra-­‐ind
perspek6v
4.35
.94461
5.99
.951
1.635
0.000
Signifikant
4 Abstrahere
–
Nytænke
forretningsmodellen
4.99
1.04593
5.87
1.067
0.875
0.000
Signifikant
5 Redesigne
–
Se
behovet
for
forandring
i
et
posi6vt
perspek6v
4.41
1.20891
5.88
1.087
1.470
0.000
Signifikant
6 Afstemme
–
Afdække
stemning
for
at
afstemme
antagelser
og
forventninger
4.51
1.17671
5.92
1.072
1.404
0.000
Signifikant
7 Åbenbare
–
Klarlægge
mål,
synliggøre
udfordringer
for
at
indfri
disse
mål
4.22
1.52879
6.36
.826
2.132
0.000
Signifikant
8 Integrere
–
Skabe
fælles
engagement
og
commitment
3.99
1.39009
5.33
1.261
1.344
0.000
Signifikant
9 Forene
–
Skabe
rammerne
for
en
dagsorden
der
forener
3.96
1.19828
6.10
.916
2.133
0.000
Signifikant
10 Mo6vere
–
Tryghed,
pleje
og
mo6vere
4.16
1.50932
4.88
1.487
0.717
0.000
Signifikant
11 Omorganisere
–
Omorganisere
e{er
kundesegmenter
4.96
.89563
5.60
1.078
0.636
0.000
Signifikant
12 Modularisere
–
Udvikle
system
hvor
komponenterne
kan
udski{es,
sammenkobles,
genbruges
5.22
.96346
5.08
1.315
0.136
0.110
Ikke
Signifikant
13 Dissociere
–
Adskille
ressourceejerskab
fra
brug
samt
genforhandle
adgang
6l
og
placering
af
ressourcer
3.90
1.08208
5.82
1.116
1.923
0.000
Signifikant
14 Switche
–
Lade
kunden
ski{e
mellem
grundprodukter
4.65
1.06296
4.66
1.610
0.003
0.978
Ikke
Signifikant
15 Transformere
–
Bryde
med
status
quo
4.74
1.13822
5.79
1.090
1.053
0.000
Signifikant
4.51
5.63
1.12
Vi
skal
stå
her
Vi
står
her
Gap
14
1.
Mul6variat
gap
analyse
Kilde:
Roldsgaard
(2012)

15. 1. Forudsige – Evne til at forudsige for at
kunne forme markedet
2. Eksperimentere – Eksperimentere med
teknologi samt probe for at få indsigt i
hvad markedet efterspørger
3. Distance – Distance gennem et udefra-
ind perspektiv
4. Abstrahere – Nytænke
forretningsmodellen (fx gøre det bedre
med mindre, omorganisere, anvendelse af
teknologi)
5. Redesigne – Se behovet for forandring i
et positivt perspektiv
6. Afstemme – Afdække stemning for at
afstemme antagelser og forventninger
(også med transportministeriet)
7. Åbenbare – Klarlægge mål, synliggøre
udfordringer for at indfri disse mål (også
overfor transportministeriet)
8. Integrere – Skabe fælles engagement
og commitment (også med
transportministeriet)
9. Forene – Skabe rammerne for en
dagsorden der forener (også
transportministeriet)
10. Motivere – Tryghed, pleje og motivere
11. Omorganisere – Omorganisere efter
kundesegmenter (hjælp kunden med at
blive succesfuld)
12. Modularisere – System hvor
komponenterne kan udskiftes,
sammenkobles, genbruges
13. Dissociere – Adskille
ressourceejerskab fra brug samt
genforhandle adgang til og placering af
ressourcer
14. Switche – Lade kunden skifte mellem
grundprodukter (fx F&R, s-tog, metro)
15. Transformere – Bryde med status quo
(performanceudvikle, omorganisere,
anvende ny teknologi)
16. Samlet vurdering (gennemsnit)
Mål Ledernes vurdering af situationen i 2011
15
1.
Mul6variat
gap
analyse
Kilde:
Roldsgaard
(2012)

16. Rotated
Component
Matrixa
Fortolkning
Component
Korrek;on
Korrek;on
Uforandret
Korrek;on
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1.
Være
på
forkant
med
udviklingen
af
markedet
,234
,627
,125
,207
1.
Forudsige
2.
Eksperimentere
med
nye
kundeløsninger
i
markedet
,066
,775
,063
,181
2.
Eksperimentere
3.
Lyfe
6l
kunders
kri6k
og
bearbejde
forslag
fra
kunder
,500
,362
,128
,178
3.
Distance
4.
Udtænke
nye
koncepter
6l
at
bane
vejen
frem
6l
nye
indtægtskilder
og
nytænke
omkostningstunge
processer
,260
,639
,228
-­‐,099
4.
Abstrahere
5.
Nytænke
rodfæstede
processer
og
modeller
for
at
drive
forretning
,325
,568
,220
-­‐,056
5.
Redesigne
6.
Føre
en
åben
dialog
for
at
skabe
fælles
fodslag
,572
,230
,139
,512
6.
Dialog
7.
Fremlægge
klare
mål
og
synliggøre
de
udfordringer
der
skal
6l
for
at
overleve
på
sigt
,754
,211
,126
,070
7.
Åbenbare
8.
Inddrage
fællesskabet
i
den
strategiske
udvikling
,418
,137
,053
,714
8.
Inddrage
9.
Kommunikere
klare
mål
der
be6nger
succes
for
den
langsigtede
strategi
og
kortsigtede
opera6onelle
tak6k
,734
,135
,122
,157
9.
Forene
10.
Skabe
personlig
sikkerhed
for
den
enkelte
medarbejder
,077
,040
,255
,814
10.
Bekymre
11.
Investere
i
processer
og
systemer
for
at
frigøre
ressourcer
,144
,162
,546
,258
11.
Omorganisere
12.
Udvikle
en
modulær
produk6onssstruktur
med
togopera6on,
produkter
og
ydelser
der
kan
af-­‐
og
6lkobles
-­‐,033
,239
,737
,258
12.
Modularisere
13.
Forhandle
vilkår
med
kunder,
medarbejdere,
fagforeninger,
transportministeret
og
kommercielle
forretningspartnere
,363
,110
,542
,132
13.
Dissociere
14.
Operere
med
selvstændige
virksomhedsstrukturer
for
at
kunne
introducere
nye
kommercielle
6ltag
i
forskellige
tempi
-­‐,154
,417
,480
,297
14.
Ski]e
15.
Forny
togdri{en
gradvist
for
at
lede
udviklingen
af
markedet
for
at
bryde
med
status
quo
,345
,051
,697
-­‐,267
15.
Oms;lle
Extrac6on
Method:
Principal
Component
Analysis.
Rota6on
Method:
Varimax
with
Kaiser
Normaliza6on.
a.
Rota6on
converged
in
21
itera6ons.
A.
Strategi
B.
Ledelse
C.
Resource
2.
Principal
komponent
analyse
Source:
Roldsgaard
(2013)

17. Korrelationer mellem afhængig og uafhængige variabler
Spørgsmål: Hvor vigtig mener du grundproduktet er for at
kunne udvikle DSBs forretningsmodel?
Grundproduktet er "Ikke
vigtigt" [1,2,3,4] (n=8)
Grundproduktet er
"Vigtigt" [5,6,7] (n=360) Total (n=368)
Andel af samlede betydning
(sammenhæng) i procent
1. Forudsige - udvikling af markedet Pearson Correlation ,236 ,082
Sig. (2-tailed) ,574 ,118
N 8 360
2. Eksperimentere - opnå indsigt gennem probing og udforskning Pearson Correlation ,000 ,052
Sig. (2-tailed) 1,000 ,328
N 8 360
3. Distancere - få en distance gennem et udefra-ind perspektiv Pearson Correlation ,251 ,125*
Sig. (2-tailed) ,548 ,018
N 8 360
4. Konceptualisere - udvikle en begrebsmæssig forståelsesramme
for forretningen
Pearson Correlation -,289 ,033
Sig. (2-tailed) ,488 ,538
N 8 360
5. Redesigne - se behovet for fornyelse Pearson Correlation ,000 ,105*
Sig. (2-tailed) 1,000 ,048
N 8 360
6. Dialog - udforske antagelser udvikle et fælles grundlag Pearson Correlation ,838**
,125*
Sig. (2-tailed) ,009 ,018
N 8 360
7. Åbenbare - afsløre personlige motiver for at opnå gensidig
respekt, tillid og forståelse af bevæggrunde
Pearson Correlation ,000 ,149**
Sig. (2-tailed) 1,000 ,005
N 8 360
8. Inddrage - lav en dagsorden der forener Pearson Correlation ,650 -,028
Sig. (2-tailed) ,081 ,601
N 8 360
9. Forene - skab en fælles interesse for forandring ved at give en
dybere mening udover økonomiske incitamenter
Pearson Correlation ,316 ,134*
Sig. (2-tailed) ,445 ,011
N 8 360
10. Bekymre - sætte enkeltes behov i fokus Pearson Correlation ,000 -,061
Sig. (2-tailed) 1,000 ,252
N 8 360
11. Omorganisere - opnå fleksibilitet ved at organiserer sig efter de
mest indbringende kunder
Pearson Correlation ,000 ,087
Sig. (2-tailed) 1,000 ,100
N 8 360
12. Modularisere - udvikle et system hvor komponenterne let kan
adskilles og sammensættes
Pearson Correlation -,615 ,080
Sig. (2-tailed) ,105 ,128
N 8 360
13. Dissociere - adskille ressourceejerskab fra ressourcebrug og
forhandle adgangen til adgang og placering af ressourcerne
Pearson Correlation -,697 ,135*
Sig. (2-tailed) ,054 ,010
N 8 360
14. Skifte - veksle mellem forskellige forretningsmodeller Pearson Correlation ,309 -,061
Sig. (2-tailed) ,457 ,251
N 8 360
15. Omstille - få folk at omstille sig til en ny praksis Pearson Correlation -,306 ,206**
Sig. (2-tailed) ,461 ,000
N 8 360
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
,116*
,026
368
-,002
,964
368
,161**
,002
368
,004
,937
368
,051
,334
368
,170**
,001
368
,176**
,001
368
,071
,171
368
,142**
,006
368
-,017
,745
368
,127*
,015
368
,086
,100
368
,193**
,000
368
,027
,599
368
,206**
,000
368
34,04 9,78 7,68
- 6,14 (0,16)
36,29 14,83 10,66
(41,69) (34,25) 0,26
- 12,46 3,34
121,01 14,83 11,25
- 17,68 11,65
93,79 (3,28) 4,73
45,66 15,90 9,40
- (7,18) (1,13)
- 10,29 8,41
(88,74) 9,54 5,68
(100,72) 16,02 12,77
44,56 (7,19) 1,82
(44,21) 24,44 13,63
+
,
+
-­‐
,
+
-­‐
,
+
+
,
+
Source:
Roldsgaard
(2013)

18. 3.
Ranking
STAGE&1&(&RANKING&(Converged)
Variable Marginal&mean Ranking
c.&Modularising 5,22 1
a.&Experimenting 5,05 2
a.&Abstracting 5,00 3
c.&Decoupling 4,96 4
c.&Grafting 4,74 5
c.&Switching 4,66 6
a.&Anticipating 4,56 7 Most&important&element&from&a&strategic&perspective
b.&Dialoguing 4,52 8
a.&Reframing 4,41 9
a.&Distancing 4,36 10
b.&Revealing 4,23 11 Most&important&element&from&a&political&perspective
b.&Caring 4,17 12
b.&Integrating 3,99 13
b.&Aligning 3,96 14
c.&Dissociating 3,90 15 Most&important&element&from&a&resource&perspective
Marginal&mean 4,51
STAGE&2&(&RANKING&(Impact)
Variable Mean Ranking
b.&Revealing 6,36 1 Most&important&element&political&perspective
b.&Aligning 6,10 2
a.&Anticipation 6,02 3 Most&important&element&strategic&perspective
c.&Dissociating 5,82 4 Most&important&element&resource&perspective
c.&Grafting 5,79 5
a.&Distancing 5,99 6
b.&Dialoguing 5,92 7
a.&Reframing 5,88 8
a.&Abstracting 5,87 9
c.&Decoupling 5,60 10
b.&Integrating 5,33 11
a.&Experimenting 5,16 12
c.&Modularising 5,08 13
b.&Caring 4,88 14
c.&Switching 4,66 15
Marginal&mean 5,63
Op6mal
focus
for
the
development
of
current
prac6ces
in
a
chao6c
situa6on.
Source:
Roldsgaard
(2013).
Leadership/
Leadership/
What
describes
the
observed
situa6on?
(“recipe
of
failure?”)
v.
What
describes
the
op6mal
situa6on?
(“required
for
success”)

19. 3.
Ranking
Lead%unit%
(mean;%rank)
Global%score
(mean;%rank)
Entity
(I,g.%distance)
Age
(I.g.%distance)
Seniority%
(I.g.%distance)
Ranking Impact
Revealinga
6,59%(%1%) 6,36%(%1%) 0,1251873 0,1049742 0,1463422 1 ***************
Dialoguingb
6,18%(%2%) 5,92%(%5%) 0,1610791 0,1275115 0,2484602 2 **************
Aligninga
6,15%(%3%) 6,10%(%2%) 0,1038011 0,1193702 0,1074506 3 *************
Graftingc
6,13%(%4%) 5,79%(%9%) 0,1498108 0,1694359 0,1503928 4 ************
Anticipationb
6,10%(%5%) 6,02%(%3%) 0,2016147 0,1320735 0,1707475 5 ***********
Abstractinga
5,95%(%6%) 5,87%(%7%) 0,1631489 0,1539632 0,1556621 6 **********
Decouplingb
5,92%(%7%) 5,60%(10) 0,2329061 0,1260596 0,1640803 7 *********
Dissociatinga
5,91%(%8%) 5,82%(%8%) 0,3005730 0,1177621 0,0985004 8 ********
Reframingb
5,90%(%9%) 5,88%(%6%) 0,1884228 0,2201384 0,1587829 9 *******
Distancingc
5,77%(10) 5,99%(%4%) 0,1142899 0,1416585 0,1875705 10 ******
Integratinga
5,44%(11) 5,33%(11) 0,1965574 0,1390460 0,1794920 11 *****
Switchingb
5,31%(12) 4,66%(15) 0,7393910 0,2771549 0,1586237 12 ****
Experimentationa
5,28%(13) 5,16%(12) 0,2743308 0,1773721 0,0960609 13 ***
Caringa
5,03%(14) 4,88%(14) 0,5327671 0,3095283 0,3297396 14 **
Modularisingb
4,72%(15) 5,08%(13) 0,3194892 0,2619854 0,1707263 15 *
Dispute(
Dispute(
Correc-ve(view(
Agenda
a=concensus:*difference;*0,1.
b=corrective*view:*difference;*2,3,4.
c=incommensurability:*difference;*5,6.
Subgruppeanalyse.
Korrigeret
op6mal
ledelsesfokus.
Kilde:
Roldsgaard
(2013)
Successful
Unsuccessful

20. 6,51
3,82
3,88
,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
Hvor
vig6g
er
grundproduktet
for
at
kunne
udvikle
DSB’s
forretningsmodel?
Inddrage
fællesskabet
i
den
strategiske
udvikling
Forhandle
vilkår
med
kunder,
medarbejdere,
fagforeninger,
transportministeret
og
forretningspartnere
Målepunkter=51
Respondenter=368
Overblik
over
målinger
Resume
20

21. Fluid
model-­‐
adapt
to
the
situa;on
Expert
domain
Execu;ve
domain
Outside-­‐in
perspec;ve
Inside-­‐out
perspec;ve
Expert
panel
Railway
management
Railway
regula6on
Agile
tac;c:
Act,
then
probe.
Collect
informa;on
from
the
market.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Cynefin
framework
(Snowden,
2007) Correlated
logic
If
a
chao;c
situa;on
emerges,
then
act.
Analyze.
U;lize
data
and
expert
knowledge.
Dis;nc;ve
logic
Knowable
Probe.
Adapt
prior
expecta;ons
of
how
things
work.
Radical
logic
Complex
Act.
Then
revise
if
required.
Just
don’t
do
nothing.
Disrup;ve
logic
Chao;c
Define
laws.
Categorize
and
codify
standards.
Incremental
logic
Known
Analysis:
Star;ng
point
If
chao6c
situa6on
emerges,
then
act
Fig. 18. Fluid model - adapt to the situation. The Cynefin framework is to designed to evaluate complexity science from new and different viewpoints based
on the assumption that design choices are influenced by multiple factors in our environment and our past experiences (Snowdon & Boone, 2007). The scheme
provides an initial overview to protect the Spanish railway against some of the pitfalls observed in the Scandinavian railway market, while developing
forward-looking disruptive ideas.
Proposal:
Dri]
with
the
environment
(but
if
a
crisis
emerges
then
act)
21

22. Business
model
iner*a
“Many
companies
fail
not
because
they
do
something
wrong,
but
because
they
keep
doing
what
used
to
be
right
thing
for
too
long
-­‐
and
thus
suffer
from
the
rigidity
of
their
own
business
models.”
(Doz
and
Kosonen,
2010)

23. DSB
S-trainDSBFirst
Downward slope
Upward slope
Stability fallacy
Fig. 15. The stability fallacy. Published in Roldsgaard (2012). Source: Based on Reputation Institute 2011, pp. 33-34.
The
stability
fallacy

24. Business
model
innova*on
There
are
many
reasons
why
the
incremental
innovaHon
doesn’t
just
grow
into
the
[disrupHve]
world.
The
strategy
is
a
hindrance
to
free
thinking,
at
least
for
the
grant
porHon
of
the
innovaHon,
but
perhaps
also
for
the
development
of
new
business
models
for
exisHng
services.
We
can
also
see
that
the
risk
picture
becomes
much
more
diffused
in
the
[disrupHve]
innovaHon
world
because
we
have
no
experience
in
these
new
areas.
(p.
616)
(Elkjær,
2011)
Tabula
rasa
ra*onality
“[Disrup;ve]
innova;on
requires
a
product
or
service
in
terms
of
tabula
rasa,
which
mentally
can
be
an
almost
insurmountable
barrier
in
the
innova;on
process.”
(p.
616)
(Elkjær,
2011)

25. Mostly this design leads to loss of
competitiveness over time
Examples: Spanair, DSBFirst, Nokia
Nearly always
problematic
design option
à
OUTPUTINPUT
Transforms industry structure
and/or shifts behavioral trends
Examples: Ryanair, AVE, Apple.
Often under-
estimated or
overlooked
design option
à
Nearlyalwayswins
designbattle
Nearlyalways
losesdesignbattle
Evolu*on
of
the
dominant
logic
Possible
problem
Exis*ng
focus?
à
Incremental
fallacy
Fig. 13. The incrementality fallacy. Source: Based on Hobcraft (2012) “Your dominating innovation
design is?”, The Agility Innovation Specialists, Online: http://paul4innovating.com/2012/02/01/
your-dominating-innovation-design-is, Published 2012-02-01, Retrieved 2012-04-03.

26. 1.
2.
3.
4.
Track 1 Track 2 Track 3
Fig. 14. Dominant design logic. Source: Based on Hobcraft (2012) “Your dominating innovation design is?”,
The Agility Innovation Specialists, Online: http://paul4innovating.com/2012/02/01/your-dominating-
innovation-design-is, Published 2012-02-01, Retrieved 2012-04-03.
Incremental
fallacy

27. Fig.
16.
Visualizing
the
disrup6ve
curve.
Source:
Based
on
Hobcra{
P.,
2012b,
“The
pathway
curve
methodology”,
The
Agility
Innova6on
Specialists,
Online:
hfp://innova6onfitnessdynamics.com/2012/02/14/the-­‐pathway-­‐curve-­‐
methodology,
Published
2012-­‐02-­‐14,
Retrieved
2012-­‐04-­‐03.
Visualizing
the
curve
Searching
for
an
innova;on
hotspot
“The business
environment itself is a
choice variable: firms
can select a business
environment or be
selected by it: they can
also shape it.”(Teece,
2010)
1.
2.
3. 4.

28. MP3-­‐player/iPod?

29. “Game
changing
value
rated
by
the
market”
Disrup6ve/game-­‐changing
system

30. Challenging
the
normal
way
Why
do
we
exist?

31. Periferi
ydelser
Kerne
ydelse
Service6lbud
Basispakke
Tillæg
(mere
dynamisk
for
at
Hlpasse
sig
omgivelserne)
Koncept
(udvikling
kræves
for
at
skabe
stabilitet)
Existence
–
example
1
Source:
Roldsgaard
(2011)

32. Kommercielle
;ltag2
Grundprodukt1
1
Transport
fra
A
6l
B
2
Værdiskabende
ak6viteter
rundt
om
grundproduktet
Grundlag
for
bæredyg6g
vækst,
dynamisk
pla}orm
for
at
drive
forretning.
Salgs-­‐
og
væks}remmende
ini6a6ver,
salg
og
service,
påvirkning
af
interessenter.
Defini;on
Ra;onale
Kerneservice,
Kerneforretning
Periferiservice,
Periferiforretning
Logik
Teknologi
Rela6oner
Ledelse
af
Existence
–
example
2
Source:
Roldsgaard
(2011)

33. 4,7$
6,5$
4,3$
5,6$
3$
4$
5$
6$
7$
Autobiographic$ Ability$
Record$of$accumulated$knowledge$
Inferior$
Superior$
Service$$
Quality$
The$rail$service$from$a$to$b$is$
absolutely$essenDal.$
The$related$commercial$acDviDes$
are$important,$too.$
Corporate$failure$ Corporate$success$
The$rail$service$is$absolutely$essen2al$for$success.$
3,9$ Expected(curve(
(Hypothesis(rejected)(
Number$of$observaDons$=$1472.$
Note:$The$rail$service$was$defined$as$transport$from$a$to$b,$while$the$commercial$acDviDes$
were$defined$as$value$creaDng$acDviDes$to$support$the$rail$service.$
Result:
Confirmed.
Source:
Roldsgaard
(2013)

34. MANAGEMENT
EXERCISE
Handouts
+
posters
34

35. Business
model
canvas
35 35

36. 36
One
big
idea,
mul;ple
perspec;ves