1. Centrum vyzkumu Rez
CZECH COUNTRY REPORT Part I: CZECH SNF HEU SHIPMENT NO. 2
Jiri Rychecky
05 June 2013
2. 1
CZECH COUNTRY REPORT: CZECH SNF HEU SHIPMENT NO. 2 The 2nd CZ HEU SNF shipment has been made from March 22nd to April 10th The preparation of the shipment was started on 2011 by calculation of burn up, fission products, decay heat, activity, etc. Due to the short time of delay after the last fuel unloading from the reactor core, the loading of the casks was divided into 2 parts (Part I. – 2 casks on May – June 2012 and Part II. – 4 casks on February – March 2013) and the number of SFAs in each cask was decreased to 24 SFAs at Part I. and to 16 FAs at Part II There is no HEU fuel in Czech Republic after this shipment.
3. 2. Project Management, Administrative Preparation Unified Project for importing and handling the Czech Republic HEU-SNF into the RF Russian Reviews and Technical Support - Czech HEU-SNF Shipment No. 2 Foreign Trade Contract Licenses: 8 CZ, 3 RF, 2 PL
4. 2. Project Management, Administrative Preparation LL Co-signatory of ESA is obligatory. Remarks (rather formal) to the FTC from ESA were obtained after FTC signature between FCNRS and ÚJV. FCNRS was not able to sign the new FTC version without a new evaluation process; ESA was not able to co-sing the existing contract without the revision. The solution was a Memorandum of Understanding between FCNRS and ÚJV containing the necessary statements according to the ESA requirements The FTC was negotiated very long. Mainly it was a discussion among lawyers – place of arbitrary, legislation used, etc. It is necessary to start the contract preparation early The administrative preparation need the same or more time as at the first SNF shipment. .
5. 3. Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Preparation for Transport Calculations of fission products, decay heat, activity, etc., for each fuel assembly have been made by program ORIGEN on September – October 2011. Calculations of burn up for each fuel assembly have been made by program NODER. Spectrometric water activity measurements after each SFAS sipping test were performed to identify damaged fuel assemblies, if any, which has been removed from the LVR-15 reactor. No damaged fuel assembly was detected. Visual Inspection of all FAs has been done on 14. - 18. May 2012. The new Radiation tolerant TV inspection system STS- 40M (Manufacturer: DIAKONT) for TV inspection was used for visual inspection of irradiated fuel.
6. 3. Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Preparation for Transport - TV inspection system STS-40M
7. 3. Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Preparation for Transport LL The careful manipulation with fuel assemblies and the good quality of water at spent fuel storage pools prevented of fuel leaking. There was no leaking fuel assembly in fuel which has been shipped to Russia under the 2nd Czech SNF Shipment. The new Radiation tolerant TV inspection systems STS-40M, ( DIAKONT St. Petersburg) have been bought for visual TV inspection of irradiated fuel during preparation and loading. The TV systems are very effective, reliable and easy to use for underwater TV inspections under high dose rate conditions. There was no failure or systems instability during operation. The systems enabled to decrease the time for inspections, and to considerable simplify the process of monitoring conditions.
8. 4. HLWSF Dry Run LL (1) Dry Run was held in order to verify knowledge of cask handling and operability of various tools and equipment before transportation of the loaded ŠKODA VPVR/M packages between the LVR-15 reactor and the Building 211/8 - HLWSF. The Dry Run was connected with transportation of two casks from HLWSF to the LVR-15 reactor site for SNF loading. The dry run is necessary and useful. The last manipulation for some workers was 5 years ago (in 2007). Many workers manipulated with the casks during preparation for shipment to other countries, but there were new workers without any experience too.
9. 4. HLWSF Dry Run cont.
ISO container being loaded
VPVR/M cask being loaded into the ISO Container
10. 4. HLWSF Dry Run LL (2) There were two textiles cords (shorter and longer). The shorter one was delivered to the reactor site and there were doubts whether it was not too long. So there was a risk of delay caused by delivering of the shorter cord from the reactor site. Nevertheless, the shorter one was tested and was fine. Even seemingly little things are of great importance. There was a truck with trailer parking on the road going to the entrance to ÚJV site – to HLWSF. The truck partially blocks the road. At last, the DMS truck was able to use the road. The problem was anticipated and a guard was there, but left early. The solutions applied during the shipment of SNF to the railway station was that there were marks that the parking is not allowed.
11. 5. LVR-15 Reactor Dry Run LL
The dry run is necessary because the last manipulation for some workers was 5 years ago (in 2007); there were new workers too. The basket was stuck inside the cask. The basket was removed from the top of the cask – this operation has never been tested before. Another problem was higher preload of manipulation rods when retracting the basket inside the cask due to less operator attention. The crane has a little faster movements including micro lifting. Broken video camera for loading and dry run recording.
13. 6. Loading of IRT-2M from the Reactor Pool and Transport of the VPVR/M Casks to HLWSF LL (1) Before the shipment of the ŠKODA VPVR/M casks loaded with spent fuel from the LVR-15 reactor site to the HLWS storage facility, the shipment documentation was prepared. The new Radiation tolerant TV inspection systems STS-40M was used for visual inspection of fuel assemblies during loading and for checking the ID numbers. The systems enabled to decrease the time for inspections, and to considerable simplify the process of monitoring. The calculations of the activities and dose rates were in very good conformity with the dose rates values detected on the surface of casks after fuel loading.
14. 6. Loading of IRT-2M from the Reactor Pool and Transport of the VPVR/M Casks to HLWSF LL (2) It was very useful to divide the cask loading into two parts. Smaller changes of FAs positions at the casks baskets could be made after Part I for minimize the dose rates. The verification of calculations dose rates also had been made. Possibility of loading fuel after only 1.5 year of decay, if the number of fuel assemblies at cask was decreased also was verified. The distribution of fuel assemblies to 6 casks (decreasing of the number of FAs to 24 resp. 16) kept to minimize of the dose rate during loading and transport. The accurate preparation of documents and good communication with the SONS, IAEA and EURATOM kept the inspection activities effective and without problems.
15. Manipulation with VPVR/M Cask
Cask prepared for basket lowering
Manipulation with the cask
Transfer Cask from ISO
16. Loading of IRT-2M from the Reactor Pool and Transport of the VPVR/M Casks to HLWSF
Cask prepared for loading
Drying and He leaking testing
Loading of spent fuel into the basket
17. 7. Final Shipment Operation The transport carrier and equipment, e.g., trucks, trailers, mobile cranes, and etc., physical security, safety, customs, and regulatory inspectors, and etc., as appropriate were arranged and coordinated. The ISO containers were prepared for transport, customs inspection and seal were performed, and the loaded trucks were removed from the facility and prepared for the shipment. The casks were transported to the railway station. Six ŠKODA VPVR/M casks loaded with spent fuel were successfully loaded and prepared for transportation to the Russian Federation. Cooperation with all participants of the shipment was effective and without problems.
19. 8. Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel Road transport from ÚJV to the rail freight yard took place in one batch (three trucks, one ISO container with two ŠKODA VPVR/M casks in each). The rail transport route was laid out in accordance with documentation; the version selected led from the Czech Republic to Poland via a selected border station, and then to the Gdynia port. Timetables were compiled by the department of special transport of ČD Cargo and PKP Cargo. At Gdynia Port, the containers were transferred from the train onto the “Mikhail Dudin” ship. At Murmansk Port, the containers were transferred from the ship to train sent out from FGUP Mayak. The train was delayed and that was why the load was reload on April 3.
22. 8. Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel LL The above transport of SNF through the Czech Republic and Poland was prepared by the transporter in cooperation with affected organizations and officials of the Czech Republic and Poland from the beginning of 2011. During transport, no deviations from plan occurred. The transport documentation had been prepared 3 months before the shipment, and several times accordingly checked. Transport, as a whole, occurred smoothly and safely, and all conditions set out in the decision of SONS and the PAA, both of whom issued permission for transport, were met. All bodies and organizations concerned proceeded in absolute conformance with permits from relevant authorities, planning documentation, their commitments, and with directives.
23. 8. Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel - Dates The last four days before the shipment, the representative of FGUP Mayak and SOSNY worked at ÚJV to check the completeness of the documentation from the point of view of the SNF receiver. This checking is very important. Czech Republic: March 22 to March 23, 2013 Poland: March 23 to March 24, 2013 Marine transport: March 24 to April 1, 2013 Russian Federation: April 3 to April 10, 2013
25. 8. Organizations and Government Bodies Directly Concerned with Transport Czech Republic ÚJV Řež, a. s. Centrum výzkumu Řež s.r.o. State Office for Nuclear Safety (SÚJB – SONS) DMS s.r.o. (DMS) – transport organization, road transport Police of the Czech Republic – security (PČR) ČD Cargo, a. s. – operator of railway infrastructure Czech Fire Department (HZS ČR) Radioactive Waste Repository Authority (RAWRA – SÚRAO) Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT)
26. 8. Organizations and Government Bodies Directly Concerned with Transport International Organizations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) EURATOM of the European Commission Poland Państwowa Agencja Atomistyki (PAA – Polish regulatory body) PKP CARGO S.A. with its subcontractors – PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. and Straż Ochrony Kolei (rail transportation via Poland) Zakład Unieszkodliwiania Odpadów Promieniotwórczych (RWMP), Swierk
27. 8. Organizations and Government Bodies Directly Concerned with Transport Russian Federation J/S ASPOL Baltic Corporation (marine transportation) Federal State Unitary Enterprise «Mayak» Production Association (FSUE «Mayak» PA (consignee) Federal State Unitary Enterprise «Federal Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety» (FSUE «FCNRS») R&D Company “Sosny” (transport documentation support) THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
