Ekaterina Krivonos, FAO. Materials of the workshop: Trade Policy, WTO and Development of Agricultural Markets in the Post-Soviet Countries, organized by FAO 5 October, Tbilisi, Georgia http://www.fao.org/economic/est/est-events-new/tpps/en/

1. 1
State of Play of WTO negotiations – MC11
Ekaterina Krivonos, FAO
Tbilisi, Georgia
October 5, 2017

2. Three “Pillars” of the Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)
Market Access Domestic Support Export Competition
Tariffs
Tariff Rate Quotas
Special Safeguards
Amber Box
• De minimis
• Commitments
Green Box
Blue Box
Development Box
Export Subsidies
Anti-Circumvention
• Food aid
• Export credits
2

3. 3
The Doha Development Round
Article 20 of the WTO Agriculture Agreement recognizes that the long-term objective of
substantial progressive reductions in support and protection in agriculture is an ongoing
process. It says agriculture negotiations should restart in 2000
Source: WTO Agreement on Agriculture and WTO WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1
DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION - 20 November 2001
Paragraph 13: Building on the work carried out to date and without prejudging
the outcome of the negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive
negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of,
with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.

4. 4
Ministerial Conferences
Source: WTO Agreement on Agriculture and WTO WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1
2001 - Doha Negotiations launched
2003 – Cancun Ministerial Conference
2005 – Hong Kong Ministerial
2009 – Geneva Ministerial Conference
2011 – Geneva Ministerial Conference
2013 – Bali Ministerial Conference
2015 – Nairobi Ministerial Conference
2017 – Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference
2019 – (?) Ministerial Conference
From Doha to Buenos Aires

5. 5
Negotiating Groups in Agriculture
Source: WTO

6. WTO negotiations: Market Access
Source: WTO JOB/AG/93, JOB/AG/95
o No outcome if no parallel progress in non-
agriculture market access and services market
access negotiations
o Little time to achieve substantive outcome on
this topic at MC11
Two main proposals under discussion
Paraguay and Peru
To agree on a detailed post-MC11 work programme
and to present revised tariff schedules by the
MC12, with the objective of:
 Simplifying the tariffs
 Tackling tariff peaks and tariff escalation
 Reducing in-quota tariffs
Russia
o No SSG elimination without other outcomes in
market access
o SSG elimination is linked to a successful
outcome on a Special Safeguard Mechanism
(SSM)
MAINFEATURESMEMBERS’CRITICS
To phase out the special agriculture safeguard (SSG)
mechanism:
 Immediate elimination for developed
countries
 3 years phasing out period for developing
countries
To seek for an outcome by the MC12 on:
 Tariff reduction (parameters for
reduction)
 TRQs (parameters for revision)
6

7. 7
WTO negotiations: Special Safeguard Mechanism - SSM
Source: WTO WT/MIN(15)/43, JOB/AG/109 and JOB/AG/111
2015 Nairobi WTO Ministerial Decision: “developing countries would have the right to have recourse
to the SSM, as envisaged in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration”
o Difficult to achieve any concrete result on the SSM at the MC11 in the absence of meaningful
outcomes on other market access negotiations
MAINFEATURES
MEMBERS’
CRITICS
G-33
Volume-based SSM
1. Right to levy an additional
duty when volumes of
import > 110% or 115% or
135% of the moving average
of imports in the preceding
3-year period
2. Additional tariffs can be
higher than bound duties
3. Use of different triggers for
LDCs and certain developing
members and limitations of
the use of SSM against them
Price-based SSM
1. Right to levy an additional
duty when import prices of
the shipment entering the
custom territory of a
developing country < 90%
of a price trigger, based on
the average monthly price
of imports of the preceding
3-year period
2. The duty shall not exceed
the difference between
import and reference price
 Available for all developing
countries
 No products limitation
 No simultaneous use of
volume and price SSM, or
other WTO safeguards

8. 8Source: WTO JOB/AG/99, JOB/AG/100 and Job/AG/102
o Variable VoP limits are
unpredictable, and
change every year
o No “discount” for “blue
box” measures
EU, BRA, PER, COL, URY
To cap overall trade distorting
domestic support (OTDS)
through a floating limit,
expressed as a percentage of
the Value of Production (VoP)
NZL, AUS, CAN, PRY
o An overall limit should
not be introduced, or
should be introduced at a
later stage
o Developed members
should eliminate AMS
To cap OTDS through a fixed
limit, expressed in monetary
terms
MAINFEATURESMEMBERS’CRITICS
Three main proposals under discussion
CHN, IND
o Commitments to reduce
domestic support should
be undertaken by all
countries
To eliminate AMS
entitlements of developed
countries
OTDS as a sum of “amber
box”, de minimis support and
“blue box”. However, “blue
box” would be accounted
differently than “amber box”
No capping or reduction of
support for developing
countries
WTO negotiations: Domestic Support 1/2

9. 9
WTO negotiations: Domestic Support 2/2
Source: WTO JOB/AG/99, Job/AG/109 and EU-Brazil WTO proposal on domestic support (A. Matthews, 2017)
Focus: EU-Brazil-Peru-Colombia-Uruguay proposal
EU, BRA, PER, COL, URY
To cap overall trade distorting
domestic support (OTDS)
through a floating limit,
expressed as a percentage of
the Value of Production (VoP)
MAINFEATURES
OTDS as a sum of “amber
box”, de minimis support and
“blue box”. However, “blue
box” would be accounted
differently than “amber box”
Developing countries would only be
allowed a higher limit for a transitional
period, following which they would be
expected to adhere to the same limit as
developed countries
2 OPTIONS
1
2
In both cases: no limits for LDCs
OR
“Blue box” support does not
have the same trade-distorting
effect of the amber box
Further negotiations to
define precisely how
“blue box” will account
VoP: calculated for the 3 most
recent years for which domestic
support notifications have been
submitted and examined by the
Committee on Agriculture
Developing members would have a
permanent right to a higher limit on
trade-distorting domestic support of 2
percentage points

10. 10Source: WTO WT/MIN(15)/44 and JOB/AG/109
Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes (PSH) is a priority issue for MC11.
Many differences in views expressed by members in respect of core provisions:
• Exempting the support provided under PSH programmes for food security purposes from the AMS
calculation?
• Exempting this support from both AMS calculation and a new overall limit to Trade-Distorting Domestic
Support?
• Exempting certain programmes from the AMS calculation?
WTO negotiations: PSH 1/2
HOWEVER
2015 Nairobi WTO Ministerial Decision: Members shall engage constructively to negotiate and make all
concerted efforts to agree and adopt a permanent solution on the issue of public stockholding for food
security purposes

11. 11Source: WTO JOB/AG/99, JOB/AG/105 and JOB/AG/109
Two main proposals under discussion
EU, BRA, PER, COL, URY
1. LDCs
2. Developing countries if the value of the stocks
procured does not exceed a certain threshold
of the average value of production
3. Members with existing programmes (at the
time of the Bali Ministerial Decision - BMD),
provided the requirements of the BMD are
fulfilled
G-33
All developing countries
COUNTRY
COVERAGE
WTO negotiations: PSH 2/2
Primary agricultural products that are predominant
staples in the traditional diet of a developing
Member
Not Specified
PRODUCT
COVERAGE
Governmental programmes for food security,
including programmes under which stocks of
foodstuffs for food security purposes are acquired
and released at administered prices
1. Acquisition of foodstuffs at administered prices
with the objective of supporting low income or
resource poor producers
2. Acquisition of foodstuffs at administered prices
and distribution at subsidized prices with the
objective of meeting food security
requirements, availability and/or food price
stability
PROGRAMME
COVERAGE

12. 12
EXPORT COMPETITION
International Food Aid
Disciplines to prevent commercial
displacement
Exporting STEs
No circumvention of other disciplines
Export Finance
Maximum repayment term
& self financing
 Special and differential treatment
 Cotton
 Monitoring and surveillance
Export subsidies
Elimination timeline
& attached conditions
2015: the Nairobi WTO Ministerial Decision
WTO negotiations: Export Competition

13. 13
Export restrictions
WTO negotiations: Other Issues
Export prohibition or restriction notification should
be submitted at least 30 days prior to the coming into
force of the measure. Not applicable in cases of
urgent problems of critical shortage of foodstuffs
Exemption for LDCs from any additional obligations
New rules for :
 Consultation
 Reporting
 Monitoring
 Surveillance
SINGAPORE
MAINFEATURES
Members shall not impose export prohibitions or
restrictions on foodstuffs purchased for non-
commercial humanitarian purposes by the World
Food Program.
Source: WTO JOB/AG/101 and JOB/AG/109
A Member which intends to institute
temporary export prohibitions or
restrictions on foodstuffs shall consult,
upon request, with any other Member
having a substantial interest as an
importer with respect to any matter
related to the proposed measure

14. 14
MC11 – Outcome?
Source: WTO JOB/AG/107
“Many delegations consider that a substantial outcome at MC11 is within reach for Public
Stockholding for Food Security purposes, Domestic Support, […] and Export Restrictions. The
same cannot be said of the other topics.
[…] Some other delegations express doubts about the possibility of reaching substantial
outcomes on any of the topics under consideration.”
Ambassador Stephen Ndung’u Karau of Kenya,
Chair of the Committee on Agriculture in Special Session
19 July, 2017

15. 15
Thank you!