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The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
1. The
WTO
Agreement
on
Sanitary
and
Phytosanitary
Measures
Simon Lacey | Last Updated on 21 October 2013
2. Overview and Structure
2
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Objective and Scope of Application
Principles of the SPS Agreement
Risk Analysis
Other Provisions
Transparency Provisions
Developing Countries
SPS Committee
Dispute Settlement
SPS and Doha
SPS And Indonesia
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4. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
4
Two-Fold Objective of the SPS Agreement
§
§
To recognize the sovereign right of WTO Members to
provide the level of health protection they deem appropriate;
and
To ensure that SPS measures do not represent
unnecessary, arbitrary, scientifically unjustifiable, or
disguised restrictions on international trade.
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5. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
5
Scope of the SPS Agreement
Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement defines the scope of application
of the Agreement and provides that:
“This Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures
which may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade. Such
measures shall be developed and applied in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement.”
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6. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
6
What is an SPS measure?
To fall under the SPS Agreement’s scope and coverage, a measure
must:
§ Be a sanitary or phytosanitary measure; and
§ Directly or indirectly affect international trade.
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7. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
7
What is an SPS Measure? – cont.
A sanitary or phytosanitary measure or “SPS measure” is defined in para. 1 of Annex A to
the SPS Agreement as any measure applied:
(a)
to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks
arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying
organisms or disease-causing organisms;
(b)
to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks
arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods,
beverages or feedstuffs;
(c)
to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising
from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests; or
(d)
to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests.
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8. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
8
What is an SPS Measure? – cont.
Paragraph 1 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement provides a non-exhaustive list of
SPS measures. Among them:
§ End product criteria;
§ Processes and production methods;
§ Testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures;
§ Quarantine treatments including those associated with the international
transport of animals or plants (or those concerning the materials necessary
for their survival during transport);
§ Provisions on relevant statistical methods;
§ Sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment and packaging and
labeling requirements that are directly related to food safety.
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9. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
9
Entities Covered by the SPS Agreement
Article 13 of the SPS Agreement provides:
Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of all
obligations set forth herein. Members shall formulate and implement positive
measures and mechanisms in support of the observance of the provisions of this
Agreement by other than central government bodies. Members shall take such
reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that non-governmental
entities within their territories, as well as regional bodies in which relevant entities
within their territories are members, comply with the relevant provisions of this
Agreement.
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10. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
10
Temporal Scope of Application
§ In spite of the fact that the SPS Agreement came into force on 1
January 1995, all SPS measures in existence before this date are
also subject to its provisions, provided they are still in force.
§ This was confirmed by the Panel and Appellate Body decisions in the
EC – Beef hormones dispute.
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11. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
11
Relationship with Other WTO Agreements
§ SPS Agreement is not the only WTO agreement of
relevance to measures for the protection of human, animal
or plant life or health. The GATT 1994 and the TBT
Agreement also contain rules applicable to such measures.
§ Within their respective spheres of application, all three
agreements are relevant in determining the WTOconsistency of health measures.
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12. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
12
Relationship with the TBT Agreement
§ As set out in Art. 1.5 of the TBT Agreement, the TBT
Agreement does not apply to SPS measures.
§ When a measure is an SPS measure as defined in Annex
A(1) to the SPS Agreement, the SPS Agreement applies to
the exclusion of the TBT Agreement, even if the measure
would otherwise be considered a “technical regulation,
standard or conformity assessment procedure” for purposes
of the TBT Agreement.
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13. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
13
Relationship with the GATT 1994
§ No relationship of mutual exclusivity with the GATT 1994
§ However, Article 2.4 of the SPS Agreement states that
“Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant
provisions of this Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance
with the obligations of the Members under the provisions of GATT 1994
which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in
particular the provisions of Article XX(b).”
§ Article 2.4 thus provides for a (rebuttable) presumption of GATT
1994 consistency of all measures that are in conformity with the
SPS Agreement.
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14. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
14
Relationship with the Agreement on Agriculture
§ Both the Agreement on Agriculture and the SPS Agreement were
negotiated as part of an “agriculture package,” which aimed at
ensuring that the benefits of liberalized agricultural trade would
not be reduced by disguised restrictions or other non-tariff
barriers to trade.
§ The Agreement on Agriculture reminds WTO Members of this
goal when it provides that “Members agree to give effect to the
Agreement on the Application of SPS Measures.”
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15. SPS Agreement
1. Objective and Scope of Application
15
Examples of TBT and SPS Measures
TBT measures typically deal with:
SPS measures typically deal with:
§ Labeling of composition or quality of
food, drink and drugs;
§
Additives in food or drink;
§
Contaminants in food or drink;
§
Certification: food safety, animal or plant
health;
§
Processing methods with implications for
food safety;
§
Other sanitary requirements for imports;
§
Labeling requirements directly related to
food safety and others.
§ Quality requirements for fresh food;
§ Volume, shape and appearance of
packaging;
§
Testing vehicles and accessories;
§ Regulations for ships and ship
equipment;
§
Safety regulations for toys.
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17. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
17
Basic Rights and Obligations under the SPS Agreement
Article 2 of the SPS Agreement states that WTO Members have the right
to adopt appropriate SPS measures that they consider necessary to
protect health, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of
the SPS Agreement.
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18. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
18
The right to adopt an SPS measure is qualified in three ways
(Art. 2.2):
§ SPS measures should only be applied to the extent necessary;
§ They should either be based on international standards or on
scientific principles and not maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence (except as provided by Article 5.7); and
§ SPS measures may not be applied in a manner which would
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.
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19. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
19
The Scientific Imperative
§ Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement also introduces new scientific
disciplines for the use and maintenance of SPS measures. It requires
that:
“any sanitary or phytosanitary measure … [be] based on scientific
principles and … not [be] maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.”
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20. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
20
No Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination
§ Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement states that
“Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do
not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where
identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own
territory and that of other Members. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised
restriction on international trade”
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21. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
21
No Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination - cont.
§
Three cumulative requirements that must be met for a violation of
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement to be established, namely, that:
1. The measure discriminates between the territories of Members other
than the Member imposing the measure, or between the territory of
the Member imposing the measure and another Member;
2. The discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable; and
3. Identical or similar conditions prevail in the territory of the Members
compared.
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22. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
22
Use of International Standards
Under Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, Members have three
autonomous options with regard to international standards, each
with its own consequences. Members may choose to:
1) Base their SPS measures on international standards according to
Article 3.1;
2) Conform their SPS measures to international standards under Article
3.2; or
3) Impose SPS measures resulting in a higher level of protection than
would be achieved by the relevant international standard in terms of
Article 3.3.
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23. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
23
Use of International Standards - cont.
Art. 3.1 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:
“To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a
basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or
recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided
for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3.”
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24. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
24
Use of International Standards - cont.
§
§
Article 3.1 obliges Members to base their SPS measures on
international standards where they exist, except as provided for in
Article 3.3.
The ‘international standards’ to which Article 3.1 refers are standards
set by international organisations, such as:
1.
2.
3.
The Codex Alimentarius Commission with respect to food safety;
The World Organisation for Animal Health (formerly called the
International Office of Epizootics (OIE)) for animal health; and
The Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)
with respect to plant health.
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25. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
25
Use of International Standards - cont.
Art. 3.2 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:
“To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a
basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or
recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided
for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3.”
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26. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
26
Use of International Standards - cont.
§ Article 3.2 provides that SPS measures, which ‘conform to’ international
standards, are presumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement and
the GATT 1994.
§ This presumption of consistency is rebuttable. However, the
presumption of consistency is designed to create an incentive for
Members to conform their SPS measures to international standards,
rather than to base them on those standards.
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27. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
27
Use of International Standards - cont.
Art. 3.3 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:
“Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary
measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a
scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate in
accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of
Article 5 ”
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28. SPS Agreement
2. Principles of the SPS Agreement
28
Use of International Standards – cont.
§ This right to choose measures that deviate from international standards is not
an ‘absolute or unqualified right’, as confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC –
Hormones (1998).
§ Two alternative conditions are laid down in Article 3.3, namely, that:
1.
Either there must be a scientific justification for the SPS measure (defined
in a footnote as a scientific examination and evaluation in accordance
with the rules of the SPS Agreement); or
2.
The measure must be a result of the level of protection chosen by the
Member in accordance with Articles 5.1 to 5.8.
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30. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
30
WTO Members do not always base their measures on
internationally-agreed standards, for several reasons:
§ The three sister organizations may have not elaborated international
standards for every aspect of food safety, animal and plant health;
§ Members may desire to adopt SPS measures that achieve a higher
level of health protection than that achieved by the relevant
international standards.
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31. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
31
Risk Assessment and Risk Management
§
§
Risk assessment refers to the scientific process of identifying the existence
of a risk and establishing the likelihood that the risk may actually
materialise according to the measures that could be applied to address the
risk.
Risk management’, by contrast, is the policy-based process of determining
the level of protection a country wants to ensure in its territory and
choosing the measure that will be used to achieve that level of protection
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32. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
32
Art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:
“Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures
are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of
the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account
risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations. ”
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33. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
33
Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement recognizes two distinct
types of risk assessment:
§ The first applies to SPS measures the aim of which is to protect
against the establishment or spread of a pest or disease.
§ The second applies to any measures designed to protect humans
and animals from so-called ‘food-borne’ risks.
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34. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
34
A cumulative three-part test has developed from the case law on the
proper way to conduct a risk assessment for ‘disease or pest
related’ risks:
§ WTO Members should identify the specific diseases or pests that they want to
keep out, as well as the potential biological and economic risks involved;
§ WTO Members should evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or
spread of these diseases, along with the potential economic and biological
cost; and
§ WTO Members should evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or
spread of pests or diseases according to the SPS measures which might be
applied.
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35. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
35
Furthermore, eight general observations can be made with respect to the
requirements for risk assessments, as identified by the Appellate Body in its case law:
1. A risk assessment must show proof of an actual risk, not just a theoretical uncertainty;
2. A risk assessment does not require the risk assessed to be quantified (i.e. expressed numerically), so that the risk
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
may be expressed either quantitatively or qualitatively;
A risk assessment may go beyond controlled laboratory conditions and take account of the actual potential for
adverse effects in the ‘real world where people live and work and die’;
The risk assessment must be specific to the particular type of risk at issue in the case and not merely show a
general risk of harm;
Article 5.1 does not oblige Members to carry out their own risk assessments. Instead, they may rely on risk
assessments carried out by other Members or an international organisation;
The phrase ‘as appropriate to the circumstances’ in Article 5.1 does not alleviate the obligation of Members to base
their SPS measures on a risk assessment, but relates to the way such risk assessment is carried out;
Ttaking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organisations’ in Article
5.1 does not mean that a risk assessment must be based on or conform to such techniques, nor does it mean that
compliance with such techniques alone suffices to show that the risk assessment is consistent with the
requirements under the SPS Agreement
since Article 5.1 is to be read together with Article 2.2, which requires that SPS measures not be ‘maintained’
without sufficient scientific evidence.
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36. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
36
Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement explains what kinds of information
shall be taken into account when undertaking a risk assessment:
§ Available scientific evidence;
§ Relevant processes and production methods;
§ Relevant inspection, sampling and testing protocols;
§ Prevalence of specific diseases or pests;
§ Existence of pest- or disease-free areas;
§ Relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and
§ Quarantine or other treatment.
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37. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
37
Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement identifies the economic
factors which shall be taken into account when undertaking a
risk assessment for animal or plant health:
§ The potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in
the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or
disease;
§ The costs of control or eradication in the territory of the importing
Member; and
§ The relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to
limiting risks.
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38. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
38
The Appropriate Level of Protection
§ From the outset, risk management involves a decision on the
“appropriate level of protection” defined in paragraph 5 of Annex A to
the SPS Agreement as:
The level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a
sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life
or health within its territory.
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39. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
39
Art. 5.4 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:
“Members should, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary
or phytosanitary protection, take into account the objective of
minimizing negative trade effects ”
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40. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
40
Art. 5.5 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:
“With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the concept
of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks to
human life or health, or to animal and plant life or health, each Member shall
avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be
appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade. Members shall cooperate in the
Committee, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, to develop
guidelines to further the practical implementation of this provision. In
developing the guidelines, the Committee shall take into account all relevant
factors, including the exceptional character of human health risks to which
people voluntarily expose themselves ”
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41. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
41
The Panel in the EC-Hormones dispute adopted (and the Appellate
Body later accepted) a three-part test outlining the elements of a
violation of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement:
§ Whether the Member concerned has set different levels of protection in
different situations; ;
§ Whether these different levels of protection show arbitrary or unjustifiable
differences in their treatment of different situations; and ;
§ Whether these arbitrary or unjustifiable differences lead to discrimination
or disguised restrictions on trade.
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42. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
42
Art. 5.6 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:
“Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when establishing or
maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve the
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, Members
shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive than
required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.”
Footnote:
A measure is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is another measure,
reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that
achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is
significantly less restrictive to trade.
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43. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
43
Not more trade-restrictive measures than necessary:
On the basis of this footnote, the panel in Australia – Salmon (1998) identified
a three-tier test, which was later upheld by the Appellate Body.
Pursuant to this test, an SPS measure is more trade-restrictive than required
(and thus inconsistent with Article 5.6) only if there is an alternative SPS
measure which:
1. Is reasonably available, taking into account technical and economic feasibility;
2. Achieves the Member’s appropriate level of protection; and
3. Is significantly less trade-restrictive than the contested measure.
Only when all three of these cumulative requirements are satisfied will an SPS
measure be inconsistent with Article 5.6.
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44. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
44
Precautionary Principle
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:
“In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of
available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international
organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by
other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and
review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable
period of time. “
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45. SPS Agreement
3. Risk Analysis
45
Precautionary Principle and Provisional Measures
Based on Art. 5.7, four cumulative requirements for provisional measures were
identified by the panel, and confirmed by the Appellate Body, in Japan –
Agricultural Products II (1999) and US/Canada – Continued Suspension
(2008), namely, that the measure must:
(1) Be imposed in respect of a situation where relevant scientific evidence is
insufficient;
(2) Be adopted on the basis of available pertinent information;
(3) Not be maintained unless the Member seeks to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk; and
(4) Be reviewed accordingly within a reasonable period of time.
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47. SPS Agreement
4. Other Provisions
47
Equivalence in the SPS Agreement
§ Because different SPS measures may reasonably address the
same risk to human, animal or plant life or health, the principle of
equivalency is central to the SPS Agreement.
§ Article 4 of the SPS Agreement provides that WTO Members must
accept the SPS measures of other Members as equivalent, even if
these measures differ from their own or from those used by other
WTO Members trading in the same product, if the exporting Member
objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that they achieve
the importing Member’s appropriate level of SPS protection.
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48. SPS Agreement
4. Other Provisions
48
Equivalence in the SPS Agreement - cont.
§ In October 2001, the SPS Committee adopted the Decision on the
Implementation of Article 4 of the SPS Agreement (G/SPS/19). The
Decision was last revised on 23 July 2004.
§ This Decision provides guidance for governments negotiating the
recognition of equivalent measures or products, for example
regarding information exchange.
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49. SPS Agreement
4. Other Provisions
49
Mutual Recognition Agreements
§ Article 4.2 encourages the conclusion of equivalence agreements
by obliging WTO Members to enter into consultations, upon
request, with the aim of achieving bilateral and multilateral
agreements on the recognition of equivalence of specified SPS
measures.
§ However, there is no obligation to actually conclude such
agreements and in practice negotiation is difficult and few
agreements have been reached so far.
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50. SPS Agreement
4. Other Provisions
50
Examples of Equivalency Agreements
Country
Type
EC - US
Veterinary Equivalence Agreement
EC Switzerland
EC - Canada
Agreement on Trade in agricultural
products
1999
Veterinary Equivalence Agreement
1998
EC – New
Zealand
Veterinary Equivalence Agreement
1997
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Year
1999
51. SPS Agreement
4. Other Provisions
51
Adaptation to Regional Conditions
§ As a recognition that climate, pest prevalence and risks from
diseases differ from place to place, Article 6 of the SPS
Agreement provides that WTO Members must ensure that their
SPS measures are adapted to the sanitary and phytosanitary
characteristics of given areas.
§ Article 6 of the SPS Agreement also instructs WTO Members to
recognize the concepts of pest or disease free areas and areas
where these risks are very minimal.
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52. SPS Agreement
4. Other Provisions
52
Control, Inspection and Approval Procedures
§ Article 8 provides that WTO Members must follow certain rules
(found in Annex C to the SPS Agreement) with respect to any
procedures to check and ensure the fulfillment of SPS measures.
§ The basic requirement of the Annex C of the SPS Agreement is that
any procedures to enforce the SPS Agreement should not be less
favorable for imported products than they are for domestic goods,
and should be no more burdensome than what is necessary to
ensure compliance.
§ The provisions of Annex C oblige WTO Members to be fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory.
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54. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
54
Transparency
§ The transparency obligations of the SPS Agreement are
contained in Article 5.8, Article 7 and Annex B.
§ In addition, the SPS Committee has elaborated
recommended procedures for implementing the
transparency obligations of the SPS Agreement (G/
SPS/7/Rev.3).
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55. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
55
Explanation of SPS Measures under
Article 5.8 of the SPS Agreement
§ When a WTO Member is concerned that an SPS measure
adopted by another Member is not based on an international
standard and might constrain its exports, it may ask the WTO
Member adopting the measure for an explanation.
§ Such explanation must be provided, although no time-limit or
format is prescribed by the SPS Agreement.
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56. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
56
Publication of SPS measures (Art. 7 and Annex B)
§ All SPS measures that have been adopted have to be published
promptly, so that interested WTO Members may become
acquainted with them.
§ Except for urgent situations, WTO Members have to allow a
reasonable period of time between the publication of a measure
and its entry into force in order to allow exporters, particularly
Developing Countries, to adapt their products and methods of
production to the new requirements.
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57. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
57
Notifications by Members
§
§
§
§
As of 30 September 2011, 102 out of then 153 Members (or 67 per cent) had submitted
at least one notification to the WTO.
While the number of notifications circulated by Members has increased significantly in
recent years, the failure to notify (or notify correctly) new, or changes to, SPS measures
is still a frequently raised concern at meetings of the SPS Committee.
In response, in 2011, the WTO Secretariat launched a new online SPS Notification
Submission System. During 2011, 1,388 notifications were submitted, bringing the total
number of notifications since the entry into force of the SPS Agreement in 1995 to
13,644.
Members, which had not submitted any notification, included nineteen developing
countries, twenty-one least-developed countries, and one developed country.
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58. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
58
Obligation of WTO Members to Notify:
§ SPS Measures;
§ National Notification Authorities;
§ Enquiry Points.
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59. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
59
Notification of SPS Measures:
Members have the obligation to notify SPS measures if they:
§ Are new or changed; and
§ Are not based on an existing international standard or no relevant
international standard exists; and
§ Have a significant effect on trade.
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60. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
60
National Notification Authorities
§ Annex B(3) and (4) of the SPS Agreement oblige WTO Members to create the necessary
infrastructure to carry out their transparency obligations by establishing a National
Notification Authority, responsible for the implementation of notification procedures, and an
‘Enquiry Point’, responsible for answering all reasonable questions and providing relevant
documents upon request
§ Members have to designate a single central government authority responsible for the
implementation of the notification obligations. This includes:
- Notifying draft measures;
- Providing copies of the proposed regulations;
- Receiving comments and discussing them upon request;
- Taking the comments and the results of discussions into account.
§ The WTO Secretariat regularly updates and circulates lists of these authorities, under
official document numbers G/SPS/NNA/– and G/SPS/ENQ/–.
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61. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
61
Enquiry Points
§ In addition to the ‘publication’ and ‘prior notification’
requirements Annex B also provides for an ‘Enquiry Point’
requirement.
§ Each WTO Member has to ensure that an Enquiry Point
exists which is responsible for the provision of answers to all
reasonable questions related to SPS measures from other
WTO Members.
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62. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
62
The Enquiry Point is responsible for the provision of answers to all
reasonable questions regarding:
§ All existing and proposed SPS measures;
§ Control and inspection procedures, production and quarantine
treatment, pesticide tolerance and food additive approval procedures;
§ Risk assessment procedures, factors taken into consideration, as well
as the determination of the appropriate level of protection;
§ Membership and participation in international and regional sanitary and
phytosanitary organizations, as well as in bilateral and multilateral
agreements and arrangements (including on equivalence), and the
texts of such agreements and arrangements.
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63. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
63
SPS Information Management System
§
To assist Members in the formidable task of managing the flow of information
regarding notified SPS measures, in 2007, the WTO Secretariat launched the SPS
Information Management System, which has since remained available on a
dedicated website.
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65. SPS Agreement
5. Transparency Provisions
65
SPS Information Management System
In addition to the ‘publication’ and ‘prior notification’ requirements Annex B also
provides for an ‘enquiry point’ requirement.
§
Annex B(3) and (4) of the SPS Agreement oblige WTO Members to create the
necessary infrastructure to carry out their transparency obligations by establishing a
National Notification Authority, responsible for the implementation of notification
procedures, and an ‘Enquiry Point’, responsible for answering all reasonable
questions and providing relevant documents upon request
§
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67. SPS Agreement
6. Developing Countries
67
Provisions of the SPS Agreement concerning
Developing Countries
Articles 9 and 10 of the SPS Agreement contain provisions related to
Developing Countries:
§ Article 9 of the SPS Agreement, which deals with technical
assistance, recognizes the difficulty of Developing Countries to
adjust to, and comply with, the SPS measures necessary to
achieve the appropriate level of protection in export markets.
§ Article 10 instructs WTO Members to take account of the special
needs of Developing Countries and to give them longer time
frames for compliance.
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68. SPS Agreement
6. Developing Countries
68
Article 9.1 of the SPS Agreement specifies that SPS
technical assistance may be in the areas of:
§ Processing technologies,
§ Research and infrastructure, and
§ In the establishment of national regulatory bodies.
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69. SPS Agreement
6. Developing Countries
69
Technical assistance of importing WTO Members
§ Article 9.2 of the SPS Agreement encourages importing WTO
Members to provide technical assistance especially when
substantial investments are required for an exporting Developing
Country Member to fulfill its SPS requirements.
§ The aim is to permit the Developing Country WTO Member to
maintain and expand its market access opportunities for the
product involved.
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70. SPS Agreement
6. Developing Countries
70
SPS technical assistance may take the form of:
§ Advice;
§ Credits;
§ Donations and grants, including for the purpose of seeking
technical expertise;
§ Training; and
§ Equipment.
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71. SPS Agreement
6. Developing Countries
71
Article 10 of the SPS Agreement contains specific provisions on
“special and differential treatment” in sanitary and phytosanitary
measures:
§ Article 10.1 urges to take account of special needs of Developing
Countries;
§ Article 10.2 provides longer time-frames for compliance;
§ Article 10.3 provides time-limited exceptions;
§ Article 10.4 encourages participation in the relevant international.
In addition, Article 14 provides for a delay (transition period) in
application of the SPS Agreement.
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72. SPS Agreement
6. Developing Countries
72
The SPS Committee adopted a Decision on Special
Treatment (document G/SPS/33 of 2 November 2004)
strengthening importing countries’ commitments to provide an
opportunity for exporting Developing Countries to seek
revisions or ask for technical assistance when new or revised
measures affecting imports are proposed or introduced.
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74. SPS Agreement
7. SPS Committee
74
§ The SPS Committee meets three times per year at the
WTO headquarters in Geneva.
§ The SPS Committee takes its decisions by consensus.
At the WTO, consensus is reached “if no Member,
present at the meeting when the decision is taken,
formally objects to the proposed decision.”
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75. SPS Agreement
7. SPS Committee
75
Specific Trade Concerns – issues raised at the SPS Committee
Food Safety 25%
Animal Health 40%
Plant Health 30%
Others 5%
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80. SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
80
§ Since the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement
system, 40 alleged violations of the SPS Agreement have
been referred to the WTO for adjudication.
§ Most disputes have been settled by the parties or have
become inactive, but in certain cases they have resulted in
landmark decisions which have provided authoritative
interpretations of the SPS Agreements.
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81. SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
81
To date, WTO Members have been found to have acted inconsistently with
their obligations under the SPS Agreement in nine disputes.
§
EC – Hormones (1998);
§
Australia – Salmon (1998) and Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) (2000);
§
Japan – Agricultural Products II (1999);
§
Japan – Apples (2003); Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 – US) (2005);
§
EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (2006);
§
US – Poultry (China) (2010);
§
Australia – Apples (2010).
§
US/Canada – Continued Suspension (2008)
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82. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
82
EC – Hormones (DS26, DS48)
Measure at Issue
EC prohibition on the placing on the market and the importation of meat and meat products
treated with certain hormones
Product at Issue
Meat and meat products treated with hormones for growth purposes.
www.uph-‐analy=cs.com
83. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
83
EC – Hormones (DS26, DS48) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings
SPS Art. 3.1 (international standards): The AB rejected the Panel’s interpretation and said that the requirement
that SPS measures be “based on” international standards, guidelines or recommendations under Art. 3.1 does not
mean that SPS measures must “conform” to such standards.
Relationship between SPS Articles 3.1/3.2 and 3.3 (harmonization): The AB rejected the Panel’s interpretation
that Art. 3.3 is the exception to Articles 3.1 and 3.2 assimilated together and found that Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
apply together, each addressing a separate situation. Accordingly, it reversed the Panel’s finding that the burden
of proof for the violation under Art. 3.3, as a provision providing the exception, shifts to the responding party.
SPS Art. 5.1 (risk assessment): While upholding the Panel’s ultimate conclusion that the EC measure violated
Art. 5.1 (and thus Art. 3.3) because it was not based on a risk assessment, the Appellate Body reversed the
Panel’s interpretation, considering that Art. 5.1 requires that there be a “rational relationship” between the
measure at issue and the risk assessment.
SPS Art. 5.5 (prohibition on discrimination and disguised restriction on international trade): The Appellate
Body reversed the Panel's finding that the EC measure, through arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions, resulted in
"discrimination or a disguised restriction of international trade" in violation of Art. 5.5, noting: (i) the evidence
showed that there were genuine anxieties concerning the safety of the hormones; (ii) the necessity for
harmonizing measures was part of the effort to establish a common internal market for beef; and (iii) the Panel's
finding was not supported by the "architecture and structure" of the measures.
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84. SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
84
US/Canada – Continued Suspension (DS320, 321)
Measure at Issue
The continued suspension of WTO concessions by the United States and Canada resulting
from the EC – Hormones disputes.
Product at Issue
A number of products affected by the suspension of concessions by the United States and
Canada.
www.uph-‐analy=cs.com
85. SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
85
US/Canada – Continued Suspension (DS320, 321) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings
Risk assessment and provisional measure (SPS Arts. 5.1 and 5.7): The Appellate Body reversed the Panels'
findings that the import ban relating to oestradiol-17ß was not based on a risk assessment as required by Art. 5.1,
and that the provisional import ban relating to the other five hormones did not meet the requirements of Art. 5.7.
However, the Appellate Body was unable to complete the analysis and therefore made no findings as to the
consistency or inconsistency of the definitive and provisional import bans with Arts 5.1 and 5.7.
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86. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
7.8. Dispute Settlement
Dispute Settlement
86
Australia – Salmon (DS18)
Measure at Issue
Australia's import prohibition of certain salmon from Canada.
Product at Issue
Fresh, chilled or frozen ocean-caught Canadian salmon and certain other Canadian
salmon.
www.uph-‐analy=cs.com
87. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
87
Australia – Salmon (DS18) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings
SPS Art. 5.1 (risk assessment): The Appellate Body, although reversing the Panel's finding because the Panel
had examined the wrong measures (i.e. heat-treatment requirement), still found that the correct measure at
issue – Australia's import prohibition – violated Art. 5.1 (and, by implication, Art. 2.2) because it was not based on
a "risk assessment" requirement under Art. 5.1..
SPS Art. 5.5 (prohibition on discrimination and disguised restriction on international trade): The Appellate
Body upheld the Panel's finding that the import prohibition violated Art. 5.5 (and, by implication Art. 2.3) as
"arbitrary or unjustifiable" levels of protection were applied to several different yet comparable situations so as to
result in "discrimination or a disguised restriction" (i.e. more strict restriction) on imports of salmon, compared to
imports of other fish and fish products such as herring and finfish..
SPS Art. 5.6 (appropriate level of protection): The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that the heattreatment violated Art. 5.6 by being "more trade-restrictive than required", because heat treatment was the wrong
measure. The Appellate Body, however, could not complete the Panel's analysis of this issue under Art. 5.6 due
to insufficient facts on the record. (In this regard, the Appellate Body said that it would complete the Panel's
analysis in a situation like this "to the extent possible on the basis of the factual findings of the Panel and/or of
undisputed facts in the Panel record".)
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88. SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
88
Australia – Salmon (DS18 – Article 2.15 Canada)
Measures taken to Comply with DSB Recommendations and Rulings
Australia published the "1999 Import Risk Analysis" which included additional analyses that considered
the health risks associated with the importation into Australia of fresh, chilled and frozen salmon.
Australia also modified its legislation on the quarantine of imports by allowing, pursuant to permits, nonheated salmon to be imported and released from Australian quarantine facilities in cases where the
salmon was in a "consumer-ready" form. Similar regulations were adopted, around the same time,
regarding imports of herring and finfish.
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89. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
89
Australia – Salmon (DS18 – Article 2.15 Canada) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel Findings
SPS Art. 5.1 (risk assessment): The Panel found that Australia was in violation of Art. 5.1 and by
implication, therefore, of the general obligations of Art. 2.2. Reiterating the three requirements laid down previously by the
Appellate Body that are essential to constitute a "risk assessment", the Panel noted that for a measure to be "based on" a
risk assessment there needs to be a "rational relationship" between the measure and the risk assessment, and that none of
the experts consulted by the Panel could find any justification in Australia's risk assessment measure for the requirement
that salmon be "consumer-ready". Based on the same rationale, the Panel found that the ban on the imports of salmon
enacted by the Tasmanian Government was also in violation of Arts. 5.1 and 2.2.
SPS Art. 5.5 (prohibition on discrimination and disguised restriction on international trade): The Panel
concluded that Australia was not in violation of Art. 5.5, as it found that although Australia was employing different levels of
protection to different, but sufficiently comparable, situations, the different treatment was scientifically justified, and not
arbitrary or unjustifiable and the different treatment was thus not a disguised restriction on international trade.
SPS Art 5.6 (appropriate level of protection - alternative measures): Upon examining the Australian
measure in light of the three elements needed to demonstrate an inconsistency with Art. 5.6, the Panel found that Australia
had acted inconsistently with Art. 5.6. The Panel found that, taking into account the technical and economic feasibility of
alternative measures (first element), there were other less-trade restrictive measures available to Australia that would
provide the appropriate level of protection (second element), and these alternative measures (i.e. requirement for "special
packaging" as an alternative to the current "consumer-ready" requirement) would lead to significantly more imported
salmon in the Australian market (third element).
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90. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
7.8. Dispute Settlement
Dispute Settlement
90
Japan – Agricultural Products (DS76)
Measure at Issue
Varietal testing requirement (Japan's Plant Protection Law), under which the import of
certain plants was prohibited because of the possibility of their becoming potential hosts of
codling moth.
Product at Issue
Eight categories of plants originating from the United States, namely, apricots, cherries,
plums, pears, quince, peaches (including nectarines), apples and walnuts.
www.uph-‐analy=cs.com
91. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
91
Japan – Agricultural Products (DS76) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings
SPS Art. 2.2 (sufficient scientific evidence): The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that Japan's varietal
testing requirement was maintained without sufficient scientific evidence in violation of Art. 2.2.
SPS Art. 5.7 (provisional measure): The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the varietal testing
requirement was not justified under Art. 5.7 because Japan did not meet all the requirements for the adoption and
maintenance of a provisional SPS measure as set out in Art. 5.7.
SPS Art. 5.6 (appropriate level of protection - alternative measures): Having found that the United States, as
a complainant, did not claim and, therefore, could not have established a prima facie case of Japan's
inconsistency with the existence of an alternative measure (determination of sorption levels) under Art. 5.6, the
Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that Japan acted inconsistently with Art. 5.6.
Then, as to the alternative measure proposed by the United States – i.e. testing on a product-by-product basis,
the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the United States failed to prove that Japan's measure was
"more trade-restrictive than required" in relation to the alternative measure proposed by the United States (testing
by product) and thus that it had violated Art. 5.6 because testing by product did not achieve Japan's appropriate
level of protection.
SPS Art. 5.1 (risk assessment): As the Appellate Body found that the Panel improperly applied judicial economy
to the US claim under Art. 5.1 in relation to apricots, pears, plums and quince – the four products that were not
examined by the Panel, it completed the legal analysis and found that Japan's measure violated Art. 5.1 for these
four products as it was not based on a proper risk assessment.
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92. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
92
Japan – Apples (DS245)
Measure at Issue
Certain Japanese measures restricting imports of apples on the basis of concerns about
the risk of transmission of fire blight bacterium..
Product at Issue
Apples from the United States.
www.uph-‐analy=cs.com
93. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
93
Japan – Apples (DS245) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings
SPS Art. 2.2 (sufficient scientific evidence): The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the
measure was maintained "without sufficient scientific evidence" inconsistently with Art. 2.2, as there was a
clear disproportion (and thus no rational or objective relationship) between Japan's measure and the
"negligible risk" identified on the basis of the scientific evidence.
SPS Art. 5.7 (provisional measure): The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the measure was
not a provisional measure justified within the meaning of Art. 5.7, as the measure was not imposed in
respect of a situation "where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient". Having noted that the pertinent
question under Art. 5.7 is whether the body of available scientific evidence does not allow, in quantitative
or qualitative terms, the performance of an adequate assessment of risks as required under Art. 5.1 and as
defined in Annex A of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body found that in light of the Panel's finding of a
large quantity of high-quality scientific evidence describing the risk of transmission of fire blight through
apple fruit, there was "the body of available scientific evidence" in this case that would allow "the
evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread" of fire blight in Japan through apples
exported from the United States.
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94. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
94
Japan – Apples (DS245) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings
SPS Art. 5.1 (risk assessment): The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the measure was not
based on a risk assessment as required under Art. 5.1 because the pest risk analysis relied on by Japan
(i.e. "1999 PRA") failed to evaluate (i) the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of fire blight
specifically through apple fruit; and (ii) the likelihood of entry "according to the SPS measures that might
be applied". In this regard, the Appellate Body noted that the obligation to conduct an assessment of "risk"
under Art. 5.1 is not satisfied merely by a general discussion of the disease sought to be avoided by the
imposition of the SPS measure, rather an evaluation of the risk must connect the possibility of adverse
effects with an antecedent or cause (i.e. in this case, transmission of fire blight "through apple fruit"). Also,
the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's view that the definition of "risk assessment" requires that the
evaluation of the entry, establishment or spread of a disease be conducted according to the sanitary or
phytosanitary measures which might be applied, not merely measures which are being currently applied.
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95. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
95
EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (DS291, DS292, DS293)
Measure at Issue
(i) Alleged general EC moratorium on approvals of biotech products; (ii) EC measures
allegedly affecting the approval of specific biotech products; and (iii) EC member State
safeguard measures prohibiting the import/marketing of specific biotech products within
the territories of these member States.
Product at Issue
Agricultural biotech products from the United States, Canada and Argentina
www.uph-‐analy=cs.com
96. SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
96
EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (DS291, DS292, DS293) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings
SPS Arts. 5.1 (risk assessment) and 2.2 (sufficient scientific evidence): The Panel found that the EC decision
to apply a general moratorium was a decision concerning the application/operation of approval procedures, i.e., a
procedural decision to delay final substantive approval decisions. It was not applied for achieving the EC level of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection and, hence, was not an "SPS measure" subject to Arts. 5.1 or 2.2.
SPS Annex C(1)(a) and Art. 8 (control, inspection and approval procedures): The Panel found that the general
moratorium led to undue delay in the completion of the EC approval procedure conducted in respect of at least one
biotech product at issue and thereby to the European Communities acting inconsistently with Annex C(1)(a) and,
by implication, Art. 8.
SPS Annex C(1)(a) and Art. 8 (control, inspection and approval procedures): The Panel found that in 24 of the 27
product-specific approval procedures it examined, the procedure had not been completed without undue delay. In
respect of these procedures, the European Communities had, therefore, acted inconsistently with Annex C(1)(a)
and, by implication, Art. 8.
SPS Arts. 5.1, 2.2 and 5.7 (provisional measure): According to the Panel, the record did not indicate that there
was insufficient evidence to conduct a risk assessment within the meaning of Art. 5.1 and Annex A(4) for the
biotech products subject to safeguard measures. As a result, Arts. 5.1 and 2.2 were applicable. In this regard, the
Panel found that none of the safeguard measures at issue were based on a risk assessment as required under Art.
5.1 and defined in Annex A(4). By maintaining measures contrary to Art. 5.1, the European Communities had, by
implication, also acted inconsistently with Art. 2.2.
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97. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
97
US – Poultry (China) (DS392)
Measure at Issue
Section 727 of the Agriculture Appropriations Act of 2009 which prohibited the use of funds
to establish or implement a rule allowing poultry products from China to be imported into
the United States.
Product at Issue
Poultry products from China.
www.uph-‐analy=cs.com
98. SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
98
US – Poultry (China) (DS392) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings
SPS Articles 1, 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 (scope of SPS measures, risk assessment, sufficient
scientific evidence): The Panel found that Section 727 satisfied the two conditions in Art. 1 for a
measure to be considered an SPS measure under the SPS Agreement. The Panel concluded that
Section 727 was inconsistent with Arts. 5.1 and 5.2 because it was not based on a risk assessment
that took into account the factors set forth in Art. 5.2. It was also found inconsistent with Art. 2.2
because it was maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.
SPS Arts. 5.5, 2.3 (prohibition on discrimination) and 8 (control, inspection and
approval procedures): The Panel found that Section 727 was inconsistent with Art. 5.5 because the
distinction in the appropriate levels of protection for poultry products from China and for poultry
products from other WTO Members was arbitrary or unjustifiable and that such a distinction resulted in
discrimination against China. The inconsistency of Section 727 with Art. 5.5 necessarily implied its
inconsistency with Art. 2.3. The Panel concluded that Section 727 was inconsistent with Art. 8 because
it had caused an undue delay in the Food Safety and Inspection Service approval procedures.
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99. SPS Agreement
SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
7. Dispute Settlement
99
Australia – Apples (DS367)
Measure at Issue
Certain Australian measures restricting the importation of New Zealand apples based on
concerns about the risk of entry, establishment and spread of the fire blight bacterium
(Erwinia amylovora), the fungus European canker (Neonectria galligena), and apple
leafcurling midge ("ALCM") (Dasineura mali).
Product at Issue
Apples from New Zealand.
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100. SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
100
Australia – Apples (DS367) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings
SPS Annex A(1) (SPS measures): The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the 16 measures
at issue, both as a whole and individually, constituted SPS measures within the meaning of Annex A(1) to
the SPS Agreement.
SPS Arts. 2.2, 5.1 and 5.2 (risk assessment): The Panel found that specific measures regarding each of
the three pests at issue, as well as the "general" measures relating to these three pests, were inconsistent
with Arts. 5.1 and 5.2, and that, by implication, these measures were also inconsistent with Art. 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement. Australia appealed these findings only in regard to two of the three pests (fire blight and
ALCM). The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's above findings regarding the two pests and the general
measures relating to these two pests.
SPS Arts. 5.5 and 2.3 (prohibition on discrimination and disguised restriction on international trade):
The Panel found that New Zealand failed to demonstrate that the measures at issue were inconsistent with
Art. 5.5 and, consequently, also failed to demonstrate inconsistency with Art. 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
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101. SPS Agreement
8. Dispute Settlement
101
Australia – Apples (DS367) – cont.
Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings
SPS Art. 5.6 (appropriate level of protection - alternative measures): The Panel found that Australia's
measures relating specifically to the three pests at issue were inconsistent with Art.5.6, and that New
Zealand failed to demonstrate that the three "general" measures are inconsistent with Art. 5.6. Australia
appealed these findings only in regard to two of the three pests (fire blight and ALCM). The Appellate Body
reversed the Panel's findings of inconsistency in regard to the measures relating to these two pests, but
was unable to complete the legal analysis of New Zealand's claim.
SPS Art. 8 and Annex C(1)(a) (control, inspection and approval procedures): The Appellate Body
reversed the Panel's finding that New Zealand's claim under Annex C(1)(a) and its consequential claim
under Art. 8 fell outside of the Panel's terms of reference. In completing the analysis, the Appellate Body
found that New Zealand had not established a violation of Annex C(1)(a) and Art.8.
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103. SPS Agreement
10. Doha and SPS Agreement
103
Doha and SPS issues:
§ There is no specific mandate in the Doha Declaration
with respect to negotiations on the SPS Agreement.
§ However, implementation of various WTO Agreements
by Developing Countries has been addressed by the
Doha Decision WT/MIN(01)/17.
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104. SPS Agreement
10. Doha and SPS Agreement
104
Doha and SPS issues
§ Doha Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns
(WT/MIN(01)/17) dated 14 November 2001:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Longer time-frame for developing countries to comply with other countries’ new
SPS measures;
“Reasonable interval” between publication of a country’s new SPS measure
and its entry into force;
Equivalence;
Review of the SPS Agreement;
Developing countries’ participation in setting international SPS standards;
Financial and technical assistance
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106. SPS Agreement
11. SPS and Indonesia
106
Trade Policy Review 2013
Over the review period, specific concerns have been raised in the SPS Committee
about:
§ Import restrictions on pork products due to influenza A/H1N1 (raised by Mexico
and supported by Australia, Brazil, Canada, the Dominican Republic, and the
United States);
§ New meat import conditions (raised by the European Union); import restrictions on
poultry meat (raised by Brazil);
§ Import restrictions on beef and recognition of the principle of regionalization (raised
by Brazil); and
§ Indonesia's port closure (raised by the United States and supported by Australia,
Canada, Chile, the EU, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and South
Africa).
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107. Want to Know More?
107
Peter van den Bossche &
Werner Zdouc
UNCTAD
The Law and Policy of the
World Trade Organization
Cambridge University
Press 2013
Chapter 14
Australian Department
of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Forestry
Michael Friis Jensen
Reviewing the WTP
Agreement A
Developing Country
Perspective
2002