CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism. 2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya. 3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
November 29, 2016

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. The al Houthis’ response to Iran’s call for a future naval base in Yemen is an
indicator that the movement seeks to preserve its independence.
2. Russia may expand its influence into North Africa by providing direct military
support to the Libyan National Army.
3. The reported death of AQIM’s Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a senior al Qaeda leader in
the Sahara, would be a major loss to al Qaeda’s leadership in the region.
3
1
2

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
The U.S. continues to target al Qaeda central leadership in order to degrade it and disrupt active planning. A U.S. airstrike
killed al Qaeda senior leader Abu Afghan al Masri near Sarmada, Syria, on November 22. Al Masri was involved in attacks
against U.S. forces in Afghanistan and was responsible for planning external attacks.
Al Qaeda’s and ISIS’s rhetoric may have helped influence a Somali refugee, Abdul Razak Ali Artan, to carry out an attack at
the Ohio State University on 28 November. Artan called the late al Qaeda cleric Anwar al Awlaki a “hero.”
Outlook: Al Qaeda leadership will continue to push rhetoric to inspire “lone-wolf” attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s Wilayat Khorasan (ISIS-K) continues to expand into Pakistan. It is likely that ISIS-K is
cooperating with regional Salafi-jihadi groups, especially Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Pakistani security forces claimed to have
captured eight members of an ISIS-K cell in Lahore, Punjab Province, Pakistan. Salafi-jihadi organizations continued to
carry out fatal attacks against Pakistani security forces.
Outlook: ISIS-K will continue to expand into Pakistan by cooperating with local Salafi-jihadi organizations. Pakistani security
forces will continue to target Salafi-jihadi organizations and actors.
Security
Political and military tensions remained high between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Cross-border firing continued
along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, killing soldiers on both sides and prompting residents of border villages to
evacuate their homes. A five-day cessation of firing has occurred since 24 November, but there has been an uptick of
militant violence against security forces.
Outlook: Regular cross-border firing along the Line of Control will likely resume. High-level officials will seek to de-escalate
the conflict, despite inflammatory rhetoric.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
Political
The formation of an al Houthi-Saleh “National Salvation Government” in Sana’a will probably further complicate Yemen’s
peace talks. The al Houthi-Saleh faction seeks to increase political legitimacy and public support by promising a
representative government focused on resolving governance issues. Southern Yemenis continue protests for government
services from the internationally recognized Yemeni government in Aden and an independent South Yemen.
An al Houthi official responded to Iranian IRGC Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri’s statement that Iran would seek a naval
base in Yemen by saying that Yemen had not forfeit its land or waters to any foreign party.
Outlook: The al Houthi leadership will seek to preserve its autonomy from Iran even as Iran seeks to expand its influence.
Security
Al Houthi-Saleh forces launched multiple cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led coalition struck several al
Houthi-Saleh positions in northern Yemen in response. The Hadi government is preparing to seize territory surrounding the
Bab al Mandeb Strait in western Taiz, through which roughly 40 percent of the world’s oil transported by sea passes.
Outlook: Hadi forces will not secure the Bab al Mandeb Strait while it still struggles to hold territory elsewhere in Taiz.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP continues to reinforce safe havens in Yemen from which it disseminates propaganda to a global audience. It claimed
to destroy 13 vehicles belonging to Emirati-backed counterterrorism forces in near daily attacks in southern Yemen. AQAP
claimed multiple attacks against al Houthi-Saleh forces in neighboring Ibb governorate while ISIS Wilayat al Bayda
disseminated images of its fighters clashing with al Houthi-Saleh forces in neighboring al Bayda. AQAP’s al Masra
newspaper provided updates on al Qaeda affiliates and commented on Trump’s recent cabinet appointments.
Outlook: AQAP operations will allow al Qaeda to maintain a presence in the global Salafi-jihadi movement.

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 23 NOV: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces seized
positions in al Misrakh
district, south of Taiz
city.
2) 24 NOV: A U.S.
airstrike killed two
AQAP militants in al
Sawmah, al Bayda.
3) 24, 26, 28 NOV:
AQAP militants
attacked al Houthi-
Saleh forces in
northern Ibb.
4) 27 NOV: ISIS
militants attacked al
Houthi-Saleh forces in
western al Bayda.
5) 29 NOV: Hadi
government forces
repelled al Houthi-
Saleh forces in Maris,
al Dhaleh.
2
3
5
4
1

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali officials did not meet election deadlines because of controversies surrounding parliamentary contests. Lower House
elections were to conclude by November 23, but regional administrations have filled only 175 of 275 seats. The presidential
election cannot begin until Upper and Lower House contests are complete. Puntland State suspended its Lower House
elections after officials awarded the rival Somaliland administration additional representation. Election officials’ intention to
investigate accusations of fraud and intimidation may delay results further. The UN Special Envoy’s current estimate for the
presidential contest is mid-December 2016.
Outlook: Ongoing issues are likely to delay Somalia’s presidential contest into early 2017.
Security
Instability in Somalia’s central regions may allow al Shabaab to secure a stronger foothold in the area. Clashes between al
Shabaab fighters and local militia supported by regional security forces killed at least 20 individuals near Harardhere in
Mudug region on November 27 and 28. Ongoing confrontations between rival Galmudug and Puntland administrations in
Galkayo town has displaced thousands and may have led to an increase in al Shabaab forces in the area.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may exploit Mudug and Galgudud regions for recruitment and financing.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab may be improving its ability to produce improvised explosive devices (IED). An al Shabaab militant conducted a
remotely detonated vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack near a market in the Waberi district of
Mogadishu on November 26. The blast may have been targeting Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who passed
the area in his presidential convoy just 30 minutes prior. Shabaab’s IEDs are increasing in size, effectiveness, and lethality.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to use IEDs to target government and AMISOM targets in Mogadishu.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 25 NOV: Warplanes
struck an al Shabaab
training camp in
Dugulle, Lower
Shabelle region.
2) 26 NOV: Al
Shabaab militant
detonated VBIED in
Waberi district,
Mogadishu.
3) 27 NOV: Al
Shabaab conducted
IED attack on SNA
outpost between
Jowhar and Mahaday
towns, Middle
Shabelle region.
4) 27-28 NOV: Al
Shabaab clashes with
militia and local
security forces in
Dumaye area, Mudug
region.
4
2
3
1

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The ongoing stalemate between the UN-supported Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Central Bank of
Libya continues to fuel a liquidity crisis in Tripoli. The GNA is pushing for the devaluation of Libyan currency, for which the
Central Bank has yet to announce a plan. The GNA, Central Bank, and Libyan National Oil Corporation agreed to provide a
plan for currency devaluation, oil production, and institutional coordination by December 1. The execution of a credible
economic program would cause a surge in support for the GNA.
Outlook: Political polarization and the lack of popular support for the GNA will likely delay the decision for the economic
plan. Unrest will continue in Tripoli without an immediate solution to the liquidity crisis.
Security
Russia may begin providing military support to the Libyan National Army (LNA), which would undermine the GNA and
violate the UN arms embargo on Libya. The LNA supports a rival government to the GNA. It is backed by Emirati air support
and is conducting a counterterrorism campaign in eastern Libya, especially in Benghazi. A local Islamist coalition with ties to
al Qaeda, possibly coordinating with ISIS, retains control over a tenth of Benghazi. The coalition, the Benghazi
Revolutionary Shura Council, is recruiting fighters from outside Libya. Clashes between the LNA and anti-LNA forces over
control of eastern Libyan oil sites remain possible.
Outlook: Foreign support may bolster the LNA sufficiently to expand its control over parts of eastern Libya.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
U.S.-backed forces are close to seizing ISIS’s remaining stronghold in Sirte city as they continue to advance in al Jiza
neighborhood in Sirte. French airstrikes on November 14 in southwestern Libya likely killed AQIM emir Mokhtar Belmokhtar.
Outlook: ISIS will wage a campaign of ambushes and explosive attacks to disrupt security operations in central Libya.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 23-24 NOV: ISIS
used 40 militants and
children as human
shields in al Jiza,
Sirte.
2) 25 NOV: Suspected
ISIS militants killed a
family of four in Suq al
Khamis, Khoms.
3) 25-28 NOV: The
U.S. conducted 52
airstrikes on ISIS in al
Jiza, Sirte.
4) 27 NOV: Tripoli
residents protested
the liquidity crisis in
Algeria Square and
blocked main roads.
5) 28 NOV: Militants
detonated an IED that
killed seven LNA
fighters in Qanfouda,
Benghazi.
31
4
5
2

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
AQIM may have lost a key leader. A French airstrike targeted AQIM senior leader and al Murabitoun emir Mokhtar
Belmokhtar in southern Libya. Al Murabitoun, an al Qaeda-associated group, operates across the Maghreb and the Sahel.
U.S. and French officials believe the airstrike was successful. Belmokhtar has survived previous strikes. An al Qaeda eulogy
would be sufficient evidence to assess his death.
Outlook: AQIM and al Murabitoun would probably need to reset after the loss of Belmokhtar and his role in their operations.
Tunisia
Tunisia-based Salafi-jhadi groups may be attracting foreign, non-combat support networks.Tunisian forces arrested 12
people from three sleeper cells on November 27 in Gafsa governorate in central Tunisia, working to recruit fighters for the
conflict in Syria. The cells included a Saudi computer science professor from Saudi Arabia, a student who received weapons
training in Libya, and a Qatari national.
Outlook: Tunisian militants will continue to integrate with foreign networks seeking to destabilize the country.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
The trial of the leader of the 2012 coup in Mali may stir tensions in the aftermath of violent municipal elections. It is
scheduled to begin on November 30. The coup leader may receive the death penalty.
Boko Haram is increasing operations in Cameroon. The militant organization conducted a series of attacks in Cameroon’s
Extreme-Nord Province including a suicide vest (SVEST) attack on a market and a raid on a MNJTF base on the coast of
Lake Chad. The Cameroonian government is bogged down with responding to clashes between the English-speaking
minority and the French-speaking majority in the southwest.
Outlook: AQIM’s Ansar al Din may seek to exploit unrest stoked by the trial of the coup leader. Boko Haram will probably
take advantage of unrest in Cameroon to increase its footprint in Extreme-Nord Province.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 24 NOV: The
Tunisian National
Guard discovered a
weapons cache in Ben
Guerdane, Medenine
governorate.
2) 27 NOV:Tunisian
forces broke up three
sleeper cells in Gafsa
governorate recruiting
people to fight in
Syria.
3) 27 NOV: The
Tunisian National
Guard arrested
Taoufik Houimdi, a
participant in the 2015
Sousse Resort Attack,
in Chorbane, Mahdia
governorate.
1
2
3

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 21 NOV: Boko
Haram attacked a
MNJTF base on Dakar
Island, Lake Chad,
Extreme-Nord
Province, Cameroon.
2) 23 NOV: A Malian
Army vehicle struck a
landmine near
Taboye, Gao region,
killing two soldiers and
injuring seven others.
3) 24 NOV: Malian
soldiers detained
Ansar al Din
commander Attaher
Ag Ihadou, who is
responsible for
ordering an attack on
a convoy carrying
ballot boxes during
municipal elections, in
Gao city, Gao region.
2
3
1

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569