German Food Programs

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Juggling Spheres
Bradley Pierson Council
HIST 3113 Historical Research
Professor Bachhofer

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“Behavior which appears superficially correct but is intrinsically corrupt always irritates
those who see below the surface.” – James Bryant Conant (1893-1978)
The cold war marked a new era in American history. The United States came into
extraordinary conflict with the Soviet Union, an enemy that demonstrated just as much power,
force, and stubbornness. As the post-WWII era progressed, the recently defeated nation of
Germany turned into a focal point of each side’s frustration and concentration. In the summer of
1953, a series of worker uprisings took place outside Berlin within the Soviet’s east zone sector.
These men and women flooded the streets demanding lower working quotas and adequate
amounts of food to feed their families. The uprisings opened the door for the West German
government and its leader, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967), to take an active role in
alleviating the eastern population’s plea. Adenauer and his officials knew that their government
lacked the resources to provide the necessary aid, so they called on America for support.
The United States High Commissioner to Germany, James Bryant Conant (1893-1978),
played a vital role in communicating with American, German, and Allied officials to orchestrate
the United Sates course of action during the food program. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower
(1890-1969), under Conant’s advisement, agreed to subsidize a sufficient amount of food relief
to West Germany (FRG) for the emerging situation. Conant devised a plan to send the food
packages into Hamburg without marking the products as being provided by the US. Upon arrival
in Hamburg, the ownership of food converted to the control of the FRG, putting the distribution
process in the hands of Adenauer and his government. The German relief efforts, administered
by James Bryant Conant, at first glance, depicted American contribution as purely humanitarian,
but with a deeper examination, the programs ultimately provided a way for the United States to
achieve its political objectives.

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For the US to enter the cautious situation occurring in Germany, it needed to maintain the
position that the interference strictly provided fair and humane treatment for East German
workers. The United States’ record demonstrated that top officials took the necessary steps in
their approach to provide humans, from a variety of different cultures and backgrounds, with the
appropriate amount of charitable assistance needed. American involvement and determination to
give food relief to the East German worker signified one particular instance in which the US
acted upon their humanitarian impulse. The United States administration, under the leadership of
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1888-1959), and High
Commissioner James Bryant Conant, maintained that they could not stand idle and watch while a
vast majority of East German citizens suffered under Soviet leadership. Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer wrote a series of letters to President Eisenhower where he outlined the subjugation the
communist population fell under in recent months.1 The president and chancellor shared in their
enthusiasm to establish assistance to those citizens of the east crying for food. Adenauer and
Eisenhower released separate statements that explained each man’s position, detailing that they
understood the current situation in the Soviet east zone and held that each of their countries
intended on providing the proper assistance to ensure all people the right to eat. The president
and chancellor held that all humans possessed inalienable rights, consisting of access to food,
water, and healthcare. 2 After careful consideration, the US government developed an
arrangement that delivered West Germany $15,000,000 worth of American agricultural surplus
crops.3 However, the process of acquiring the food and protecting the East Germans provided
great controversy.
The attainment of relief supplies and the distribution process within West Berlin proved
challenging obstacles that both the US and FRG needed to overcome. The German government

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wanted assistance from the United States; however, the US preferred not to take a line of attack
that would scar their relations with the other three controlling powers in Berlin: Great Britain,
France, and the Soviet Union. Before American officials agreed to proceed with the transferring
of goods to the control of the FRG, they first went through a series of formalities and
bureaucratic procedures. President Eisenhower insisted that the United States initially needed to
reach out to the Soviet leadership and ask for their support in the programs.4 The assistance
requested included cooperative financial aid, matching or exceeding the US offer, as well as
allowing Soviet citizens the ability to venture into the West Berlin to obtain the food parcels
without retribution. In the correspondence, the Embassy of the United States in West Germany
wrote to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov (1890-1986), expressing American
concerns regarding the deteriorating food condition in the Soviet east zone.5 The US Embassy,
with the guidance from James Conant, detailed the amount, per dollar, of assistance allocated for
the food relief efforts while also including the commodities that would arrive from America:
sugar, grain, lard, soy beans, bread, and some meat.6 High Commissioner Conant assured
Molotov that the United Kingdom and France received details of the offer, but the US wanted to
wait for the Soviets’ acceptance before implementing the operation. This maneuver carefully and
rigidly left the questions of distribution and acquisition open for debate and consideration.
Conant demonstrated that each of their respective offices in Germany ought to have the means to
resolve those details concerning cooperation with due diligence.
With the openness of the projected relief efforts, the United States realized that the USSR
needed to make a decision to either contribute collaboratively with the Allied forces or explicitly
deny their population from basic necessities. After receiving word about the American
intentions, the Soviet government immediately rejected Conant’s correspondence asking for

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cooperative assistance. Molotov swiftly denounced that any part of the Soviet region needed
support, especially by the United Sates, contending that the US only acted in a humanitarian
fashion to gain political leverage. Commissioner Molotov went on to explain that American
officials stood misinformed concerning the status of the Soviet foodstuff conditions, continuing
to accuse American representatives of espionage and stating that US spies caused the burning of
food warehouses in the communist zone. 7
Vyacheslav finished his letter by stating that the governments of the USSR and the
German Democratic Republic (East Germany) already provided food assistance to the German
population, and remained eager to supply aid into the future.8 American intelligence took
Molotov’s reply as a blatant insult towards the United States and led many in the US
administration to carry out the programs as planned. Although top officials assumed that mutual
aid from the communist government would never happen, many remained convinced that the
decision provided an opportunity for a positive outcome regardless of the Russian decision. If the
USSR agreed to offer financial support, the world would deem the Soviets’ socialist policies as
ineffective, because of the failure to supply food to its people. All the while, if the communist
officials decided to reject the American proposal, it then validated the assertion that the
communists concerned themselves more with political positioning than the general welfare of the
Soviet people. Therefore, the US remained dedicated in allocating the resources and refused to
withdraw after the Soviets’ failed to act.
Adenauer, throughout his correspondence with US officials, stayed persistent with the
assertion that he and his government remained dedicated to supply the population with all
available resources. On July 20, 1953, President Eisenhower sent a letter to Adenauer reassuring
Americas’ involvement and pledge to the East Germans. He sent his regret that the US-Soviet

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cooperation failed, but declared, in spite of the obstacles; shipments headed towards Hamburg
already left New York harbors. Upon the influx of American products into German ports, the
food fell under the direct ownership of the FRG without labels recognizing US involvement.9
That stipulation came after an emphatic request from High Commissioner Conant. James Conant
asserted that the chancellor needed to start using German stockpiles for immediate infiltration,
assuring Adenauer that the German products would return to the present levels upon the arrival
of American goods.10 Adenauer carried out the American proposal when he initiated the
establishment of distribution centers and the means by which east zone citizens could obtain the
parcels. The FRG decided to open up six distribution points to disperse the food within allied
sectors of Berlin.
Top United States representatives in Bonn, particularly High Commissioner Conant,
understood that in order to achieve their political objectives, the US needed to remain dedicated
to portraying strictly humanitarian impulses, even though the entire east zone population
understood the aid received came at the cost of the American government.11 Conant also
recognized that the best methods to release the food would go by way of a third party, in this
case West Germany, through discreet means. He argued that publicity in Europe needed to
remain limited; however, he acknowledged that the US press wanted access and the ability to
share information regarding the programs back in the States’.12 In a statement to the State
Department on July 30, 1953, Conant alleviated direct American involvement and placed
responsibility for the bulk of the relief action on the back of Adenauer’s West German
government.13 Commissioner Conant’s statement reassured the American public that the entire
program’s success depended on the generous gifts offered by them and also by the immediate
actions carried out by President Eisenhower.14

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The German and American officials knew that the locations of the distribution centers
served beneficial in supplying strong public relations with all Germans. Chancellor Adenauer
proposed the spreading of food should take place in Protestant and Catholic churches and
through other charitable organizations.15 Through his ploy, he intended to display that the
western governments’ motives remained pure, free from political tactics. The east zone
population rapidly gained knowledge of the West’s eagerness to supply aid relief through a series
of dispersal centers throughout Berlin. American and Allied officials argued that the success of
the food operation relied on the acceptance and support on the part of the Soviet population. If
the German people assumed that the US acted in an extreme manner to forcefully display their
dogmatic stance against communism, while also boosting its own political advantages, America
would lose the residents trust.
The central fear of the operation among the western governments and their populations
persisted with the idea that if provoked, the Soviet officials would eventually take radical steps to
close off the East sector from western temptations.16 Adenauer originally hoped that the forms of
distribution for the food parcels would come from charitable organizations, such as churches and
synagogues, however the religious institutions stood skeptical concerning the violent nature of
the Soviet governments. 17 East Germany warned that harsh penalties would accrue to those who
openly violated the USSR stance. Communist sentiments about the American intrusion in East
Germany progressively grew more unpredictable. The Soviet High Commissioner in Germany,
Vladimir Semenov (1911-1992), issued a note to the Commissioner Conant where he demanded
that the US immediately relinquish the food order.18 Semenov’s statements left little doubt that
counter actions would certainly occur upon the operations implementation.19 Mr. Semenov
inferred that the United States’ efforts directly insulted those West Germans citizens who also

8
did not have adequate amounts of food.20 On July 21, the Soviets responded to the American
gifts when they also announced that they would provide nearly $57,000,000 to the East German
and Soviet citizens.21 The move made by communist officials demonstrated their attempt to
maintain loyalty among the socialist population. The new allotment of money added 231,000,000
rubles, to the already assigned amount of money in 1953, to 1,130,000,000 rubles equaling
$280,000,000.22 This inflated amount contributed to the sentiment among the east zone
population that the communist governments did not reasonably understand the immediate
concern.
The Federal Republic of Germany decided to open up six distribution points to disperse
the food within Allied sectors of Berlin. In the beginning of the delivery process, each district
used various approaches in its handling and allocating of the supplies; all regions prepared for an
eventual large-scale program.23 The district of Kreuzberg, the largest of the six, implemented the
first steps when it held a special sale of fruit and vegetables.24 This action popularized the
impending events across Eastern Europe. The eventual system applied consisted of specified
food coupons equaling a total of five Deutschemarks each. The tickets held validity at designated
shops throughout the district, with the FRG subsidization. Shop owners acquired the vouchers
and returned them to a pre-selected bank that repaid the merchant for the equal value of each.25
The plan devised by Kreuzberg received the most popularity and became the blueprint for how
the districts would distribute the food. The Berlin Senate released estimates that the relief effort
provided by the FRG would cost nearly five million Deutschmarks each month.26 The Berlin
Mayor, Bürgermeister Ernest Reuters’ (1889-1953) ambition for the project lay in an eventual
large-scale effort. The German public argued that the programs inclusively endorsed Reuter’s
political agenda.27 Regardless, the Senate established Monday, July 27, 1953, as the starting

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point toward opening distribution centers and making the food available for the eastern German
workers.28
Another important factor in America’s involvement consisted of the anti-communist
sentiment coming from the states’ and across the western world. During the beginning stages of
the cold war, the United States made a concerted effort to shape people’s minds regarding their
outlook on communism. Western leaders wanted to prove that capitalistic incentives allowed for
the advancement of societies while socialistic structure only destroyed them. In the food
programs of 1953, the US wanted to show all nations their perseverance in creating a
communist-free zone outside the western sphere of influence.29 The process of supplying the
food in coalition with the FRG illustrated the United States’ dedication. To triumph in its efforts
meant that America first needed to gain a psychological victory. Conant even stated that the
maximum psychological benefits emerged by the process of painting the picture that the
communist indecision to act came out of cruelty and spite.30 High Commissioner Conant
assumed this tactic in turn would popularize American and western capitalist incentives as a
necessary step to remove power from a ruling elite that showed little sign of sympathy towards
its own population. The success of the unpublicized propaganda efforts rested with the American
decision to use the programs as a way to display the message that even under persecution, a
capitalistic society demonstrates humanitarian impulse and willingness to act.
The East German worker uprisings of June 17 enabled the operation to provide food for
East Germany.31 The riots reminded the western world that people behind the iron curtain
remained repressed by their communist government.32 This particular instance, under Soviet
occupation, marked the first time that the communist work force rioted, took to the streets, and
demanded fair treatment.33 Conant remained hopeful in his plea for a psychological war because

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of the attitude coming forth from the east zone residents. With the overwhelming acceptance of
American involvement, the eastern population’s response came as an initial surprise.34 Not only
did people from the East German sector of Berlin travel to take part in the relief programs, but
people from deep inside the Soviet controlled satellites arrived as well. Many of those who took
the courageous pilgrimage into the western sector saw it as their chance to flout the communist
regime. With the implication of the programs, the distressed communist subjects flooded the
streets of the city. People covered the roads in every direction. These men and women clearly
stood out as dejected looking people that carried suitcases, bags, and paper boxes all packed tight
with food.35 Even in the early morning hours, East German residents lined up at the train stations
for their transportation back home.36 One of the fears that occurred in the western zone rested
with the possibility that the West German citizens would start rioting with the infiltrating eastern
population. Those who waited in lines for large amounts of time often grew increasingly
impatient and started to fight among each other.37 With the obvious form of defection among a
large part of the east zone population, US officials recognized that serious counter measures on
the part of the Soviets, including; railroad blockades, confiscation of goods, military insurgency,
forceful beatings, imprisonment and forged documents, eventually would ensue.38
Commissioner Conant made countless efforts to ensure a unified approach and
cooperation among the other western powers within Berlin. He relayed a message back to the
state department about how the British and French ambassadors showed initial apprehension
towards American interests in offering a considerable amount of aid relief.39 Allied forces feared
that the Soviet authorities might stop all traffic from traveling into Berlin, and more importantly,
they worried about the possible consequences taken against those people caught with food or
even with the coupons.40 The threat of border blockades also developed as a vital concern for the

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western officials. The ambassadors warned that if people could not enter the western sectors, the
US needed to devise an alternative method to deliver the materials;41 the most obvious means by
way of air lift. The Allied circles started to grow increasingly apprehensive of the political
backlash if the programs continued.42 Soviets’ insisted that American efforts held no concern for
the dire situation but rather strictly a political analysis. British and French officials thought that
over time, as the operation continued, propaganda properties would start to overshadow the
perceived humanitarian impulses.43 Western diplomats continued to push fears that the obvious
neglect to the primary objectives, would force the communists to start implementing dramatic
measures against East Germans. However, Allied executives eventually agreed to support US
efforts. Conant attributed the smooth transactions during the last second difficulties to the British
High Commissioner to Germany, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick (1897-1964), who understood
collaborative western interests could cause either political backlash or social improvement.44
After careful considerations regarding the positives and the negatives, examining the
psychological benefits against significant long term obstacles, France and Great Britain chose to
support the relief effort. Following the first days of the program both the English and French
praised the United States for its modesty. The FRG’s pledge to support the operation and to take
complete responsibility for the distribution of goods, took immense pressure off of the western
coalition.
Causes for concern also came streaming from the United States Congress and the
American public. Congressmen argued against a bureaucratic bottleneck which would certainly
lose US momentum. Representative Harry R. Sheppard (1885-1969) noted that the East
Germans’ insolence towards the Soviets’ demonstrated their eagerness for a revolution.45
Sheppard explained the actions that took place, on the part of the eastern population, revealed

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German willingness to take drastic measures in order to get any form of nutrients; however, he
also stated his apprehension towards the future after the completion of the program.46 House
Representative H.R. Gross (1899-1987) also addressed the House floor where he blamed
American authorities for its failure to choose not to identify the foodstuffs place of origin.47
Gross accused that the un-labeling of American goods on the Mutual Security Agency (MSA).
He held that the MSA “controlled the liberty to do whatever it wanted with the taxpayers’ dollar,
however unable to give any credit to the US taxpayer for the supplied food relief.”48 Mr. Gross
followed his remarks by inserting a news article from the Baltimore News Post, which detailed a
story of nine crewmembers leaving New York to deliver the food packages to Hamburg.49 The
men and other crewmembers interviewed complained about how the cases did not have any
labels recognizing that the products provided originated in the United States. The captain of the
cargo ship, Kenneth Levi (birth and death date unknown), stated that “the food shipments were a
good idea, but it definitely should be marked. If this is a propaganda campaign, let’s go all the
way.”50 While the third mate, James W. McMaster (birth and death date unknown) said “It’s a
good idea, but look at the cargo. There is no sign that it comes from us. I’m sorry to say I don’t
think it will accomplish its purpose.” The American population felt as if the program’s success
relied on the fact that all East Germans knew the food came from the US, but would not benefit
either side if the packages remained unmarked.51
In response to American efforts, East German newspapers released stories that the Soviet
government would start sending additional resources “over and beyond” the allied gifts.52 The
communist press discredited US actions as propaganda, and even warned the public that the
wests’ activities ensued due to their need for recruiting western agents and spies.53 With the
success of the food operations, communist officials devised a plan to infiltrate a series of forged

13
documents, coupons, and letters to the West German population, particularly the unemployed.54
Forged newsletters and West Berlin newspapers started to circulate throughout the western zone.
The documents encouraged the people to go to the distribution centers and line up for food
gifts.55 Soviet Union officials assumed that the counter-actions taken place would disrupt the
western zone and cause people to demand aid for themselves. To stop a dangerous situation from
arising, West Berlin authorities immediately discredited the inaccurate reports and set aside a
special aid package for nearly 203,000 unemployed workers.56 In a statement to the US State
Department, Conant addressed the fact that Germans of all factions, from conservatives to
socialists, seemed to approve of Adenauer’s food programs. With their approval and hope for
success, the operation helped Chancellor Adenauer position himself for re-election in September,
according to Conant, “one of the objectives we had in mind, but could not possibly proclaim.”57
US tensions between the state department and High Commissioner Conant, regarding
excessive political stances as propaganda, ultimately played a vital role in structuring the
operation. The state department fell under serious pressure from congress to emphasize
American involvement abroad. Secretary of State Dulles understood congresses approach for a
full blown publicity effort, and feared that attempts to understate US involvement could lead to a
series of different avenues that would result in negative press and public relations.58
Commissioner Conant related his frustration over the agreed food relief policy he thought he had
established with the state department. He presumed that the American course of action rested
with a psychological strategy and apart from obvious propaganda maneuvers.59 He demanded
that the Department of State needed to resume its unpublicized approach exhibiting humanitarian
impulse. 60Dulles replied to Conant’s concern of blatant propaganda and expressed his and the
administration’s view on how they wanted to portray American publicity. Dulles agreed that the

14
US should remain in the background, but also understood that America should have the ability to
make it well known that the food arrived through United States contributions.61 Dulles and
Conant worked diligently to organize a program that served the best interests for the German
population and the American citizens as well. High Commissioner Conant displayed his opinion
that the steps to leave the food relief programs in the hands of the Germans served as the correct
decision.62 He acknowledged that the progress of the project provided an impressive political
propaganda victory over the communists. He related the positive advancement to the fact that US
involvement remained limited and in the background.63
High Ambassador Conant continued to emphasize the psychological impact the operation
made on those East German citizens who witnessed the United States and the western coalition
at their best. Their exposure to western generosity traveled by word of mouth into the deepest
parts of the Soviet Union.64 Conant credited the unpublicized form of propaganda for igniting a
spark, within the east zone population, that supplied optimism and hope for an eventual
reunification with West Germany.65 The traveling residents from the East grew increasingly
willing to trust the situation. The western influence temporarily refreshed the attitudes of those
receiving the goods. For the most part, the food programs generated an enjoyable experience in
their lives.66 With their travels to the West, they witnessed a civilization that enjoyed prosperity
and autonomy; free from a political establishment that controlled every facet of daily life. Their
exposure to a flourishing society led to the East’s anxiousness for immediate and radical change.
Many of the East Germans called for a sensationalized propaganda war, which gave the
communists ammunition for assault against the West.67 Nearly 1,200,000 communist civilians
took part in the programs first month of functional operation.68 Surprised at the large amount of
turnout, Soviet officials took an active role in stopping the relief efforts progress. A series of

15
counter attacks came into effect with the travel bans that halted transportation by way of
highways or railroads. The “Peoples Police” even fired on those citizens boarding the trains
headed for West Germany. The citizens, however, swiftly rose up against the forces and started
to riot once more. They took to the streets and set fire to government buildings and stores,
forcing the communists’ troops to move out of the cities and let the people through.69
With James Conant’s beliefs for immediate infiltration of food into eastern sectors from
West Germany, it ultimately portrayed American involvement in a better light.70 Through the
slightly muted publicity efforts, perception of the United States evolved across the world. Conant
praised the success of the food programs and the response it garnered in Berlin and the Soviet
zones.71 He knew that the American and Allied decisions to act would come under intense
political scrutiny, but understood their determination benefited social justice. With James Bryant
Conant’s never ending push to demonstrate American interests in Germany as purely
humanitarian, he effectively achieved the underlining political objectives for the Western
coalition countries. His relentlessness in structuring the programs in the correct manner gave the
citizens from both spheres of influence a reason to trust and believe in the United States. Conant
hoped and dreamed for an eventual reunification of Germany, and although these programs did
not bring about immediate fusion of the two, they did open the eyes of the world to the
questionable tactics the Soviet Union would take to attain political triumph, even if that came at
the expense of its own populations well-being.

16
1 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Germany and Austria
Diplomatic Papers, 1952-1954 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 1591.
“Hogs and Cherries,” Time, 27 July 1953, 15.

17
16 “More Schemes to Relieve East Germans Hunger,” The Times (London), 22 July 1953, 7.
17 “Food Through the Curtain,” The Times (London), 25 July 1953, 7.
19 “More Schemes to Relieve East Germans Hunger,” The Times (London), 22 July 1953,
7.
21 “Germans Get Deal For Russian Food,” The New York Times, 21 July 1953, 6.
22 “Germans Get Deal For Russian Food,” The New York Times, 21 July 1953, 6.

18
31“More Schemes to Relieve East Germans Hunger,” The Times (London), 22 July 1953, 7.
35 “Rush for Free Berlin Food Mounts; Aid to Million by Week-End Seen,” The New York Times,
30 July 1953, 1.
36 “Rush for Free Berlin Food Mounts: Aid to Million by Week-End Seen,” The New York Times,
30 July 1953, 1.
38 “Soviet Offers German Reds $57 Million Credit for Food,” The New York Times, 22 July
1953, 1.
40 “Food for A Million East Germans,” The Times (London), 25 July 1953, 7.

19
45 Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 1953, 7, pt. 6-8: A4851.
46 Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 1953, 7, pt. 6-8: A4851-52.
52 “New Red Ruse Used On Food In Berlin,” The New York Times, 7 August 1953, 6.
Diplomatic Papers, 1952-1954 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986),
1631.
1630.

20
1630.
1629.
1639.
1639.
66 Norman Cousins, “Berlin, 1953,” Saturday Review (October 1953): 21-25.
68 “American Swine,” New Republic, 10 August 1953, 4.
69 “American Swine,” New Republic, 10 August 1953, 4.
1629.

21
Bibliography
(* indicates reference sources consulted but not cited)
Government Documents:
US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States Volume VII: Germany
and Austria Diplomatic Papers, 1952-54. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1986.
US Congress. Congressional Record. 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953. Vol. 99, pt. 6-8.
Newspapers:
The Times (1953).
The New York Times (1953).
Milwaukee Journal (1953).*
Magazines:
America, “Food Giveaway in Berlin.” August 15, 1953.*
Life, “Food As Propaganda.” July 27, 1953.*
Life, “Scramble For Western Food.” August 10, 1953.*
New Republic, “America Swine.” August 10, 1953.
Newsweek, “Berlin Food, Offer of Talks Point Up East Germans Unrest.” August 10, 1953.*
Newsweek, “New Focus for the Cold War: West’s Eyes on East Germany.” August 10, 1953.
Time, “Hogs and Cherries.” July 27, 1953.
Time, “Eisenhower Parcels.” August 10, 1953.*
U.S. News and World Report, “Ike’s Plan.” July 10, 1953.*
Journals:
Cousins, Norman. “Berlin, 1953,” Saturday Review (October 1953): 21-25

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