cia in south vietnam paper

Alexander Fischer
History 600-CIA
The CIA in South Vietnam: “A great place to have a war”
Thesis:
Considered the best candidate able to fulfil the power void created by the United State’s
defeat of the corrupt French client State in Vietnam, President Diem was thought to be the answer
to the US’s attempts to battle communism in Vietnam; however, he lost favor during his persecution
of Vietnam’s Buddhist population, which impaired the war against the communists and worsened
relations with the nation which had brought him to power; as a result, the US neither warned, nor
stopped the ARVN general’s coup against Diem, which forced it to work with unstable and
unreliable subsequent military regimes which threw Vietnam into years of political and socio-
economic instability, further frustrating the war effort.
Introduction:
The First Indochina War, which lasted from 1946-1954, further exasperated underlying
problems within France’s subordinate, corrupt, and problematic client state in South Vietnam;
witnessing the increasingly corrupt and weak nature of the French client state, the United States’
goal was to supplant the pro-French regime, led by Bao Dai, with someone whom they believed was
a pro-American reformer, namely in Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem, in the beginning, would prove himself
to be a rather competent reformer considering the situation he was given; however, as he began to
attempt to increase his power and force his religious views onto others, he fell out of favor with the
US and the people of Vietnam, resulting in a coup against him that would destabilize Vietnam for
years to come.
Contextualizing the beginning of Diem’s Rule:
Vietnam as a subjugated, corrupt French client state (1950-1954):

To understand the context which allowed Diem to be installed in power, it is necessary to
understand how the corrupt French client state associated with, and was propped up by, crooked and
ethically questionable organizations. France had many economic interests in Southeast Asia and had
operated in Vietnam since the 19th
century, apart from the interruption of French governance during
WWII. This interruption, in part, forced France to institute and rely on a French client state which
helped France maintain its rule over Vietnam. As communism rose in popularity and threatened
French interests, one such organization that was essential to France’s fight against the Viet Minh
was the Binh Xuyen.
A few years removed from being a divided and ragtag criminal gang, under their new leader
Bay Vien, the Binh Xuyen were able to turn their knowledge of urban counterintelligence and
security forces into a benefit for the French.1
Soon after, and in return, the French ceded policing
parts of Saigon-Cholon to the Binh Xuyen. To further the war effort and completely remove the
Viet Minh from Saigon, the French needed to increasingly cede control to the Binh Xuyen. For the
French, this alliance was especially troublesome as the Binh Xuyen had worked and were allies
with the Viet Minh only months earlier. Bao Dai, former emperor and then-current head of state,
complicated the matter further by authorizing the Binh Xuyen and other non-communist forces to
be incorporated into the struggling and thinly-spread French Army and Vietnamese National Army.
The Vietnamese National Army (VNA) was also known as and later called the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Similarly, Vietnamese religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao
were also incorporated into the VNA. The Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen comprised part of
the French United Front, and in the summer of 1954, the three organizations controlled
approximately one-third of the territory and population in South Vietnam.2
1
Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, 2nd
rev ed.,
(Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), pp.152-153.
2
Jessica Chapman, Cauldron of resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s southern
Vietnam, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 74.
2

The Bien Xuyen as a former crime organization was now legally legitimized, and the French
client state increasingly relied on organizations like the Bien Xuyen to further their political and
economic interests. In order to bring in more revenue to fund their multifaceted operations, in the
1950s the Binh Xuyen bribed and commandeered their way into being awarded “one of the most
profitable casinos in Asia and perhaps in the world.3
”
The Binh Xuyen’s economic exploits were another example of the corrupt and problematic
client state the French ran. Included in the Binh Xuyen’s seedy economic exploits were prostitution
and the Saigon opium trade, the latter of which was originally controlled and operated by the French
government itself. World War II interrupted and ended official French government involvement in
the opium trade. In its place, the French covert intelligence organizations, the French elite in
Vietnam, and the Corsican Mafia took over where the French government left off and helped further
all of these economic interests. The opium trade helped to fund the French war effort and
clandestine operations against the pro-communist Viet Minh from North Vietnam. Some portion of
these economic exploits went to members of the French alliance including the Corsican Mafia, Bao
Dai, prominent cabinet members, and the French 2eme
Bureau. The Binh Xuyen held up their end by
assisting the French and 2eme
Bureau in “countering the growing power of the nationalist parties,
keeping the Viet Minh terrorists off the streets, and battling the American CIA for control of South
Vietnam.4
”
After Mao Zedong’s communist takeover in China over US-supported Chiang Kai-shek,
China began sending aid to help their fellow communists in North Vietnam. As the US witnessed
France’s increasingly desperate situation, America saw fit to increase their own aid to France and
South Vietnam. However, in 1954 the French troops were defeated by Ho Chi Minh and his
Vietnamese army at the battle of Dien Bien Phu, which unofficially ended the war. With the French
3
McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, pp.154.
4
Ibid., pp. 152.
3

defeat came a slow understanding by the French government and French elite that their economic
interests in Southeast Asia would also need to come to an end. By increasingly relying on American
aid, and by authorizing criminal gangs and religious groups free reign politically, economically, and
militarily/policing, the French showed how fragmented and weak their control over Vietnam really
was. This allowed, or forced, the US to seize control of political power in Saigon, as the US
attempted to find a candidate to support who would further US interests and not allow communism
to spread.
From one problem to the next: American involvement in Vietnam and Diem’s ascent to power
(1954-55):
In the months following the end of the war, the Geneva Conference of 1954 was signed,
ending official military conflict between France and North Vietnam. These proceedings formally
divided Vietnam between the communist North and anti-communist South temporarily, contingent
on the outcome of the 1956 elections. However, the United States only observed the proceedings,
and thus, did not sign the subsequent treaty or participate in negotiations. Oddly enough, the United
States’ involvement in the region would not decrease as a result of their abstention at Geneva;
rather, its involvement would slowly increase after the conference. Refusing to sign the treaty was
likely a strategic move by the US, as they would not be bound by any of the rules or promises
agreed to by the countries at the conference. Nonetheless, US involvement began by assisting the
French in switching their focus to the anti-communist South and by helping resettle many Catholic
and anti-communist refugees coming from the North.5
Although the two countries seemed peaceful
on the surface, as the French slowly decreased their involvement in Vietnam and the Americans
began to increase their involvement, a quiet battle was fought for influence over the newly
independent state.
5
Special to The New York Times, "Text of Eisenhower-Diem Statement," New York Times (1923-
Current File), May 12, 1957.
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/113929595?accountid=465.
4

The problems between the French and the Americans began as the French wanted to adhere
to the conditions set at Geneva, but the Americans believed that doing so would allow the
communists in North Vietnam to seize control without a fight.6
The French had propped up their
client state, as previously mentioned, through its United Front. To secure their interests, the US
utilized the CIA, including agents like Colonel Edward Lansdale, in order to defeat this United
Front. Lansdale seized power from the French by offering large amounts of funding to the ARVN
which secured their loyalty and support during the incredibly violent proxy war against the United
Front in Saigon. After the proxy war in Saigon, the French United Front (consisting of the Binh
Xuyen in addition to the Hoa Hao and Cai Dao religious sects) was largely defeated. Afterwards,
Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem had a much clearer path to power, and did so through his regime’s
electoral fraud. During this election, the only political party allowed to actively campaign was
Diem’s own Can Lao party. Diem’s regime essentially criminalized dissent as well as alternative
options of other candidates like Bao Dai.
In October of 1955, Diem assumed the role of head of state and named himself President of
South Vietnam. The high hopes the US originally had were relatively short lived as Diem was not
as amenable to US interests and influence as originally thought. From the outset, Diem attempted to
make his nation self-sufficient and less reliant on foreign influence and aid. Diem attempted socio-
economic, educational, political, and land reform. However, at the same time, Diem attempted to
increase his own power, and was strongly biased towards his own Catholic and Confucian roots.
Diem’s biases were evident by an exceedingly disproportionate number of Catholic villages
receiving domestic and foreign aid, compared to Buddhist villages.7
However, the election fraud
and religious persecution did not immediately stop US support nor aid in the short-term. Although
6
"Focus on Diem," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 15, 1955.
7
Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam,
1950–1963, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp.91.
5

Diem caused headaches for the CIA and the White House; it was once progress in the war effort
slowed and as Diem seemed to be increasingly more concerned with antagonizing the non-Catholic
populace of South Vietnam, than fighting the war against the communists, that a coup of their once
ideal candidate seemed increasingly realistic.
In sum, both France and the United States contributed to the situation in Vietnam which led
to the creation of a problematic, morally and ethically questionable, and authoritarian governmental
regime.
Context:
Diem’s early rule and US & CIA aid (1955-1960):
Over a year after the Conference at Geneva, Col. Lansdale’s work in supplanting French
political power allowed Diem to be installed as the President of South Vietnam in October of 1955.
From 1955 to 1963 the US increased its presence and involvement more and more as the Diem
regime made slow progress towards the war effort and fight against communism. The United States
was optimistic and confident that the installation of Diem would begin to turn the tide against
communism in Vietnam.8
However, this mistaken hope was only amplified as the US funneled
military and civilian aid, personnel and advisors, and carried out covert and clandestine operations
organized by the CIA, all in an effort to improve the war against the communists.
In hopes of furthering the war effort and assisting Diem strengthen the ARVN, by 1956,
President Eisenhower provided Diem with over 900 US advisors. In 1957, “for the current fiscal
year fiscal aid from the United States to South Vietnam, exclusive of military assistance, is[was]
about $250,000,000” (equivalent to $2,142,436,594 in today’s USD).9
Similarly, the CIA provided
8
Special to The New York Times, "U.S. DISAVOWS AIM OF SAVING BAO DAI; AGAIN
BACKS DIEM," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 07, 1955.
9
Russel Baker Special to The New York Times, "Eisenhower Greets Vietnam President, Extols
Patriotism," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 09, 1957.
6

financial, political, paramilitary, and police support and training; such as, millions of dollars in
financial aid, creating South Vietnam’s political parties and secret police, and producing popular
movies, and literature (including an astrological magazine which predicted that the stars were in
Diem’s favor).10
The CIA quite literally built, trained, and supported a new infrastructure for South
Vietnam and its government. Some of this was paid for through their collaboration with local
warlords; picking up where the French left off, by selling opium to fund their clandestine
operations. However, to the US, it seemed that the amount of aid had little effect on the conduct of
the Diem regime. Although Diem did usher in some reform under his rapidly increasing autocratic
rule, and while some failed, much of his reformist policies that were enacted were done so in self-
interest. Towards the end of Diem’s rule, his regime was plagued by continued domestic crises.
These crises were perpetuated by Diem and his brother, Vice President and Chief of the Secret
Police Ngo Dinh Nhu, seemingly out of the blue and without cause. Nevertheless, the brothers were
both quite culpable in antagonizing the non-Catholic populace. For example, in 1963 the New York
Times wrote, “visions of ultimate victory are obscured by the image of a secretive, suspicious,
dictatorial regime. American officers are frustrated and irritated by the constant whimsical meddling
of the President and his brother…11
” Substantiating this further, the Times mentions that the
“President lacks peasant backing…President Ngo Dinh Diem is well aware of the importance of
securing the countryside…the Vietnamese President seems incapable of winning the loyalty of his
people.12
” Nonetheless, as time went on, it became apparent that he would refuse outside assistance
as he believed he would win them over in his own way.
Crises under Diem (1960-1963):
10
Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, 1st
ed., (New York, NY: Anchor Books,
2007), pp. 243.
11
Homer Bigart, "Vietnam Victory Remote Despite U.S. Aid to Diem," New York Times (1923-
Current File), Jul 25, 1962.
12
Ibid., Bigart, "Vietnam Victory Remote Despite U.S. Aid to Diem."
7

Many US officials considered Diem, from the beginning of his rule, the best candidate to
lead South Vietnam over a coterie of corrupt or pro-French candidates. In fact, Diem must be
credited to some extent for his aptitude in solving the many difficulties facing South Vietnam when
his regime was brought to power. Diem was able to resolve the refugee crisis from the North,
establish and consolidate his regime’s control, pacify the problems with sects like the Binh Xuyen,
and remove the Viet Cong from major cities like Saigon. Diem must also be credited for bringing
security to South Vietnam to allow for economic stability and advances in education. Diem was
well aware of the importance of being less dependent on US aid. Less successful reforms included
his land reform, resettlement, and obviously, his religious policies. Over time, his regime was
responsible for the many crises which frustrated the US and forced US officials to look elsewhere
for candidates to lead Vietnam. Many of Diem’s reforms were based largely on winning over the
peasantry and those who lived in the countryside, even though those were the same people he
simultaneously antagonized during the crises.
Diem and his brother well understood the need to win over the peasantry in order to win the
war. At the same time, Diem considered himself Catholic along with the rest of the members of his
family, and as a result, there would always remain some sort of a disconnect between his regime
and the largely Buddhist populace of Vietnam. This disconnect was due to Vietnam having a
Buddhist majority estimated to be about “70 to 80 percent Buddhist.13
” Therefore, it is difficult to
comprehend the reasoning for the atrocities committed against the Buddhists by Diem’s regime.
The crises began small enough. Diem’s regime occasionally exposed their Catholic biases; for
example, Diem had the distribution of weapons provided to village self-defense militias (intended to
repel communist forces) only given to village Catholics, and, similarly, other villages attempted to
13
"The Situation In South Vietnam – SNIE 53-2-63," The Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed. (Boston,
MA: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 729–733.
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc125.htm
8

convert en masse in order to receive aid or avoid being apart of Diem’s resettlement programs.14
Nothing was perfect during Diem’s regime. In 1960 there was an attempted coup on Diem,
and the New York Times reported in December of 1961 that the US was considering recalling its
ambassador in addition to withdrawing US aid.15
However, the major crises carried out under Diem
all occurred in 1963, as tensions with Buddhists reached their peak, so did tensions with the US. In
May 1963, the ARVN shot at and launched grenades into a crowd of protesting Buddhists in Hue.
They had been protesting against a rarely-enforced ban on flying the Buddhist flag, and wished to
fly their flag on Phat Dan day (the celebration of the birth of Gautama Buddha).16
Diem refused to
accept his government’s role in the incident, instead blaming the Viet Cong, even as the US and the
world refuted Diem’s refusal.
The protests against Diem would not end there. Later that month, over 500 monks protested
against such treatment at the National Assembly in Saigon. On June 3, Vietnamese police and
ARVN troops poured chemicals on the heads of praying Buddhist protestors in Hue; 67 people were
hospitalized. American officials did not believe a coup was necessary just yet. Still, the crisis
seemed like it could not get worse when, on June 11, the now-infamous event of the Buddhist monk
sitting down and immolating himself in the middle of Saigon occurred; an act of protest that drew
attention to the situation in Vietnam from around the world. In July 1963, the New York Times
wrote, that the protests “…have had a catalytic effect on the nation,” and that “since the Hue
incident a Buddhist priest and an eminent writer have committed suicide to protest Government
repression. Two weeks ago, Government police attacked American newsmen. This last week the
Saigon police clubbed and jailed hundreds of demonstrators.” America’s main worries were what
14
Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 993.
15
Nathaniel Peffer, "To Save South Vietnam," New York Times (1923-Current File), Dec 06, 1961.
16
Hedrick Smith Special to The New York Times, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S.," New York
Times (1923-Current File), Jul 21, 1963.
9

effect the protests might have on the war effort against the communists and the popularity of the
government in Saigon. As the article went onto state, “For 10 weeks, American diplomats have
urged President Diem to offer the Buddhist leaders a quick and generous peace. Instead he has
drawn ‘into the bosom of his family,’ as one official put it…Washington’s principal worry is that
the Buddhist crisis may upset the vital war against the Communists in which the United States has
invested 12,000 soldiers and roughly $500,000 a year…Washington is empathic in declaring that it
will not become involved in any string-pulling to change Governments in Saigon.17
”
Finally, on August 18, the protests reached an arguable climax as the Buddhists held a mass
protest of about 15,000 people at Xa Loi Pagoda, Saigon’s largest Pagoda. Three days later, in
response to these protests Diem’s brother, Nhu, ordered ARVN Special Forces troops to execute a
series of synchronized attack on a number of Buddhist pagodas in South Vietnam. Over 1,400
Buddhists were arrested, and even more were killed or disappeared. Troops also confiscated the
charred heart of Thich Quang, the Buddhist monk who had immolated himself in Saigon. Diem and
his regime again denied responsibility but the US had grown tired of Diem’s constant headaches.
The US government believed “that the South Vietnamese Government had violated pledges
on the Buddhist crisis and that the Vietnamese military chiefs were innocent of responsibility for
assault on pagodas…the Buddhist protest movement is understood to affect deeply the Kennedy
Administration’s evolving policy of encouraging Vietnamese military chiefs to reach for power…
peace (is) out of the question as long as Ngo Dinh Nhu, chief of secret police..retains his vast
power.18
” State (Cable) 243 from the Kennedy administration to the US Ambassador to South
Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr, furthered this sentenment: Nhu must be removed from power and
to look for alternatives to Diem’s rule if he did not initiate reforms.19
The Kennedy administration
17
Ibid., Smith, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S."
18
Tad Szulc Special to The New York Times, "U.S. SPURNS DENIAL BY DIEM ON CRISIS,"
New York Times (1923-Current File), Aug 29, 1963.
19
“The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May–November, 1963,” The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed.),
10

had already begun to attempt to rid themselves of their Diem troubles; meanwhile, the CIA was
trying to ensure that the Diem regime would not see 1964.
Conduct:
The coup d’état against President Diem (October & November 1963):
The Kennedy administration was preparing and seriously discussing plans to remove Diem
as early as June 1963, while the Diem administration was beginning to carry out their religious
persecution against the Buddhists. On July 4, the ARVN generals notified Ambassador Lodge’s
trusted liaison officer and CIA operative, Lucien Conein, that they were beginning preparations for
their plot against Diem. Conein had infiltrated and worked with the South Vietnamese government,
and as such, he was trusted by the ARVN generals not to expose their plans. Moreover, Conein
provided (at least) $42,000 in cash to the ARVN generals plotting against Diem.20
In response to the repression of the Buddhists and attacks on the pagodas, the US imposed
sanctions and froze US aid to Diem’s regime in August. It was during this time, that the United
States was “almost…advocating a military coup d’état in Saigon.21
” In fact, on August 23, President
Kennedy gave the initial go-ahead for the coup against Diem. Six days later, the ARVN generals
were signifying their readiness to move forward; Kennedy again approved and encouraged the plan.
However, Kennedy ordered was emphatic that US support was contingent on ensuring that the US’s
role would be concealed. Similarly, Kennedy believed US support could be concealed during the
Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba. Previously on vacation during the crises and approval of coup, CIA
director John McCone strongly advised Kennedy against supporting a coup. It was at this time the
White House and Kennedy administration began to reconsider its actions. Moreover, this change of
opinion was also due to the fact that the New York Times and other media outlets were beginning to
pp. 201–276. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm.
20
Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 243.
21
Szulc, "U.S. SPURNS DENIAL BY DIEM ON CRISIS."
11

report on intimate details about the planning of the coup.22
The White House cabled Conein to learn
details about the generals’ plan, but not to encourage the plot further. Instead, the White House
ordered Conein to keep a low profile, which was almost impossible for Conein as he was well
known, even famous, in Vietnam by this time.23
The coup against Diem had finally reached the point of no-return, apart from the US to
inform Diem and lose deniability; the ARVN generals had their plan and were ready to strike. To
inform Diem now would mean to lose support of the military. On October 24, Conein met again
with the ARVN generals who informed him that the coup was no more than 10 days away. Conein
informed the generals that the US opposed assassination, but did not discourage the plot for fear of
being cut out of South Vietnam’s emerging power circle. In the last days of Diem’s regime, the
Kennedy administration, with little reform being seen in Vietnam, cut all remaining aid to Diem.
The stage for the coup was set.
A few days later, on November 1, 1963, the coup d’état against Diem’s regime began. The
ARVN generals behind the coup ordered that Saigon be completely shutdown: they halted flights
from the airport, cut telephone lines, stormed police headquarters and the government radio station,
and attacked the centers of political power in Saigon. Conein watched the progress anxiously with
the rest of the generals.24
The generals attempted to give Diem a way out by offering an ultimatum:
if he were to resign immediately they would guarantee his safety and safe departure of his family,
Diem refused. The next day, on November 2, rebel troops made their way into the presidential
palace only to find Diem and his family were no longer in the building but rather in a safe house
elsewhere. Finally, around 6am on November 2, Diem telephoned General Duong Van “Big” Minh,
and informed him of his regime’s readiness to resign. General Minh guaranteed Diem and Nhu’s
safety and sent a convoy, which included Minh’s own personal body guard, to arrest the brothers.
22
Smith, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S."
23
24
12

After they were arrested, the general signaled the convoy to kill Diem and Nhu. It was believed that
President Diem and his brother were executed in the back of an armored personnel vehicle by
ARVN officers on the way back to military headquarters at Tan Son Nhut Air base.
Through all of this, the White House was largely in the dark during the coup against Diem,
and Conein was once again ordered by the Kennedy administration to figure out what was
happening in Saigon. To better understand the situation, Conein went to meet with General Minh,
only to be told that the brothers committed suicide in a Catholic church--an obvious fabrication as
suicide for anyone professing themselves to be Roman Catholic is well aware that committing
suicide is a mortal sin, with the result being eternal damnation of the soul. Conein provided the
requested report to the White House that Diem had likely been killed, but did not provide the full
truth. “General Taylor recounted that the president leaped to his feet and ‘rushed from the room
with a look of shock and dismay on his face which I had never seen before.25
’” Although their tacit-
support of the coup was in hoping a better regime would take Diem’s place, the White House
certainly did not want Diem killed. Later that day, the generals arrived at the American Embassy in
Saigon, with Conein in the back seat traveling along with them. “They walk[ed] up to the embassy,
as if to say, ‘Hey, boss, we did a good job, didn’t we?26
’”
In the wake of the coup and as news spread that Diem and Nhu had been killed the
immediate question was who would assume responsibility for the coup, and who would assume
power in their place. The ARVN generals immediately attempted to diffuse responsibility for the
coup and there was no immediate apparent successor to rule. Conein asserted that “I have it on very
good authority of very many people, that Big Minh gave the order.27
” William Colby, the director of
the CIA’s Far Eastern division reiterated this view.28
Regardless, it was clear that no direct order to
25
26
27
Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the
Vietnam War, (New York City, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.435.
28
Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam
13

kill the brothers ever came from the White House nor from Conein. The White House and the US
did not want Diem outright killed, knowing the worldwide backlash they would receive, especially
after bringing Diem to power in the first place. As a result, as their reputation was increasingly
diminished over carrying out and result of the coup, the generals argued acrimoniously amongst
themselves. And as South Vietnam delved into a period of greater instability and in-fighting, the
war effort also began to falter. The White House and the CIA would be forced to wonder what
might have been, had they only acted differently.
Consequences:
The aftermath of the Diem coup, and the deepening American involvement under President Lyndon
B. Johnson in the wake of President Kennedy’s assassination (1963 and beyond):
The impact and effect of the Diem coup was not well thought out by the US government, or
at least, the consequences of a Diem regime change were not fully appreciated by the US. President
Kennedy and his administration was largely surprised, albeit not shocked, by Diem’s assassination.
Kennedy called the assassination “particularly abhorrent,” and blamed himself for the coup and
eventual assassination against Diem.29
Nonetheless, by not stopping the coup, the Kennedy
administration failed to understand or consider the lack of reasonable alternatives. Shortly after the
coup, US officials recognized the political and military setbacks which had already occurred due to
the coup and the new government’s actions.30
The only two organizations who had the sort of cohesive power structure necessary to
assume the power vacuum created by the Diem coup were either the Viet Cong or the ARVN
generals. The Buddhists, who had created the crisis through their protests which set the stage for
Diem’s removal, lacked the means, plans, or organizational hierarchy necessary to assume power.
War, pp.435.
29
Ibid., pp.425.
30
Jacob Van Staaveren, “USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam 1961-1963,” United States Air
Force Historical Liaison Office (June, 1965), pp. 73-80.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB248/usaf_61-63.pdf
14

The labor unions were urban-based and only appealed to the small segment of the populace that
lived in the cities. The political parties had been outlawed under Diem, were largely clandestine,
and were not prepared for immediate power. Similarly, the religious sects had been largely
decimated by Diem’s ascent and were small and diverse. The Viet Cong had some support and real
influence among the peasantry in the countryside, and they continued to present themselves as the
only realistic alternative to the ARVN. However, the ARVN possessed a large disciplined
organizational structure spanning through South Vietnam, an independent communication and
transportation system, and the bureaucratic tools left behind by Diem’s regime; as such, they were
the clear and obvious choice to fill the power vacuum in the wake of the coup.31
After the coup, the populace was largely ambivalent about Diem’s fate; the coup had
happened only a few months after the Buddhist crises and many were still unhappy with Diem’s
regime’s involvement. However, any hope of the government improving the general functions,
stability, or treatment of the populace by the government quickly evaporated as the ARVN generals
who led the coup, witnessing the worldwide backlash against them, attempted to diffuse their roles
in the coup. Meanwhile, as criticism was increasing, the generals were battling each other for
positions in the new government.
As the dust of the coup settled, distrust set in among the generals. As the State Department
reported in their Pentagon Papers report, “The U.S. military had failed to appreciate the deeply
corrosive effect on internal allegiance and discipline in the Army that Diem's loyalty based
promotion and assignment policies had had. They did not foresee that in the wake of a coup senior
officers would lack the cohesiveness to hang together and that the temptations of power
would promote a divisive internal competition among ambitious men at the expense of the war
against the Viet Cong.32
” “Nor was the US able to find effective formulas to strengthen the
31
“The Political Situation in South Vietnam,” Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State
Department, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/D-I.pdf.
32
"The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963," The Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed.
15

government, or to make its own military action against the VC (Viet Cong) more effective without
diminishing South Vietnamese initiative.33
”
Four days after the coup, on November 6, 1963, General Minh took over the government of
South Vietnam under a military junta consisting of himself and twelve other generals. Within three
days the US almost immediately recognized this new government, restored aid ($500 million),
added an additional $107 million in new programs aimed at fighting the Viet Cong, and removed
other sanctions imposed on the Diem regime.34
However, even as economic assistance resumed and
began to pour into Vietnam once again, General Minh could not sustain his regime; his rule would
only last three months.
On January 30, Minh’s regime was toppled in a coup by Nguyen Khanh, shooting Minh’s
body guard and causing small-scaled protests (both for and against Minh) throughout South
Vietnam. Soon after, Khanh attempted to put Minh and many of the ARVN generals on trial.
However, Khan was unable to substantiate his claims; instead, he reprimanded the officers and
confined them to desk jobs or forced them to retire. When Khan himself was disposed in 1965,
almost all of the claims he made against the officers were show to be false. The dependence and
impact of the United States’ economic involvement was relatively large, and South Vietnam’s
economies would not recover to their pre-US involvement GDP per capita by 1969 (indexed
through Japanese yen=100; South Vietnam, 1958: 50; South Vietnam, 1969: 12).35
Largely unscathed and unpunished in the wake of Diem’s assassination, the CIA would
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 1, pp. 201-232.
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm.
33
“Time of Decision: November 1963-March 1965,” Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S.
State Department. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/A-IV.pdf
34
Special to The New York Times, "U.S. WILL RESUME KEY AID PROGRAM IN SOUTH
VIETNAM." New York Times (1923-Current File), Nov 10, 1963.
35
Bassino, Jean-Pascal, and Pierre Van Der Eng, "Economic Divergence in East Asia: New
Benchmark Estimates of Levels of Wages and GDP, 1913-1970," ResearchGate, Accessed April 03,
2016.
16

come under greater scrutiny under President Johnson’s administration; as President Kennedy
himself was assassinated on November 22 in Dallas, Texas. Johnson inherited the wealth of
problems and instability that came after the coup. Some of the problems President Johnson faced
included: concerns about being associated with the subsequent regimes (considering the world
opinion regarding the violence of the coup), recurring coups and regime changes in Saigon, a secret
insurgency killing South Vietnamese and Americans alike, and an untrustworthy intelligence
agency operating outside their charter in the CIA. The latter was especially troublesome for Johnson
as he had been concerned about Robert Kennedy and the CIA’s roles in political murder games and
their clandestine operations. In President Kennedy’s administration, his brother Robert had been
Attorney General and had worked on National Security Council problems, counterinsurgency
matters, and other general intelligence work. President Johnson would take matters into his own
hands, as he removed his non-Attorney General roles and requested Robert to resign on December
13th
; Robert Kennedy would indeed resign seven months later.
The Diem coup had clearly had an effect on the agency, at least in the short term. In late
December, CIA director John McCone and President Johnson began to discuss the possibility of a
change in the role of the agency from the covert, clandestine operations it was currently conducting,
to its original and (more importantly) legal role to organize, gather, and report intelligence to the
President. Others took a more moderate view, as one US official said, “If the agency is going to
survive, it has to be limited to clandestine operations-small, high-caliber, short-term, high-
concentration efforts with a minimum of visibility.36
” Regardless, even at the time, many agreed
that the CIA should concentrate on intelligence information gathering and analyzing functions,
“where they have their best work in Vietnam…The agency has been successful, sources say, in its
analysis of enemy strength and capability and usually more correct in its assessments than the
36
William Tuouhy, "CIA in Vietnam Shifting Toward Old Role: Spying," Los Angeles Times
(1923-Current File), Oct 13, 1968.
17

military service’s intelligence agencies. However, by moving in-to ‘open’ programs, critics say, the
agency stretched itself too thin.37
”
However, President Johnson also needed the CIA to keep conducting its cover operations to
solve the problems his administration inherited. Johnson did not want American troops to die in
Vietnam; but he also did not want America to pull out of Vietnam, admit failure, or be seen as
weak. He believed, correctly, then, that covert operations were his only real option, and the CIA
was the only organization with the capabilities of carrying covert action out.38
When McCone
himself left the agency shortly before Johnson’s election in November of 1964, he left with a
hauntingly prophetic quote, “We will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a
military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty extracting
ourselves.39
”
Surprisingly enough, the Diem coup and aftermath were nowhere near the end of US
involvement in the region. On August 4, 1964 the Gulf of Tonkin incident was alleged to occur
(discovered in 2005 to be an outright fabrication procured through “intelligence” gathered by the
NSA).40
However, this “attack” was more than enough to allow the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to be
passed through Congress six days later. The resolution marked the first time the President was
allowed to authorize the use of conventional military force without a formal declaration of war. This
act fully committed the US to the war in Vietnam. The war would last until April 1975.
Conclusion:
Through the US’s decision neither to warn, nor stop the ARVN general’s coup against
President Diem, the US was forced to work with the unstable and unreliable subsequent military
regimes which threw Vietnam and its government into years of political and socio-economic
37
Tuouhy, "CIA in Vietnam Shifting Toward Old Role: Spying."
38
Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 272-276.
39
“The Air War in North Vietnam: Rolling Thunder Begins, February-June, 1965,” The Pentagon
Papers (Gravel ed.), pp. 332-388. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent6.htm.
40
18

instability. Due to the US and the CIA’s concealment and unwillingness to share their knowledge of
an impending coup on South Vietnamese President Diem, the CIA and the US government were
equally complicit through their tacit support of the coup as they would have been by outright
encouragement. In their actions, the CIA, fully supported by the US government, immersed itself in
Vietnamese society and forced the US to assume responsibility over the fate of South Vietnam. A
path to instability began with the problems created by the French United Front and was further
exacerbated by the US’s installation of Diem. Furthermore, America’s continued direct involvement
further exacerbated problems. Increasingly, after decades of conflict and war, South Vietnam was
forced to be reliant on American support which brought further socio-economic and political
instability. As American aid tried to solve these problems, they were only amplified, driving the
US’s increased involvement in the region and charting a new era in US foreign policy particularly
within the region of Southeast Asia and the State of Vietnam.
As General Maxwell Taylor, Chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted while remembering
US involvement in Vietnam, "there was the memory of Diem to haunt those of us who were aware
of the circumstances of his downfall. By our complicity, we Americans were responsible for the
plight in which the South Vietnamese found themselves.41
"
From 1955 to1964, and even before, a clear pattern emerged when looking at Vietnam from
a lens some 60 years later: imperialist forces from outside and authoritarian forces from within
dominated and controlled a largely peasant populace doing its best to make a living. As with many
wars, political grandstanding, clandestine operations, and general government meddling, the only
people that lose in the long-term are the everyday, peaceful citizen trying to support themselves and
their families. President Diem and his brother Nhu were both killed, and as a result they felt the
effects of their rule, but for the few governmental officials that are killed or imprisoned, there are
thousands more people nowhere near complicit in their government’s actions that are economically
41
Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963, (New York City, NY: E. P.
Dutton, 1987), pp. 315.
19

distressed or destroyed, forced to uproot their lives, tortured, killed, imprisoned, or some
combination of these and others. They are dragged into conflicts that largely do not matter to them,
but they are forced to face adversity and adapt to problems regardless.
Governments are certainly capable of improving lives of citizens, but as in Vietnam when
Diem was attempting to institute reforms, those reforms were always in the context of improving
his own political reputation or increasing his own power; they are almost always put on the
backburner when the reforms are no longer convenient. To the peasant rice farmer at the time, why
does it matter if their ruler is pro-American, pro-French, or a communist? Largely, the war forced
the average citizen to take sides unnecessarily and forced their involvement into a conflict that they
had nothing to do with. If they chose the wrong side, their whole life would be impacted, possibly
destroyed. Both the communists and non-communists alike demanded support for their side, and the
farmer, villager, or factory worker would pay the price for their lack of support depending on who
was sweeping through their area.
From the average American’s perspective, how was hundreds of millions of dollars in aid
and funding given yearly to the war effort and economy in Vietnam helpful to their everyday lives?
Could there be a better use of all that tax revenue that could be put towards helping American
citizens? The Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress reports that the total
military cost of the Vietnam War was $111 billion (roughly $491 billion today).42
This figure likely
does not include non-military costs nor the value of human life loss during the course of the war. It
is hard to say exactly what effect this money could have had on the average American’s life, but it
is not hard to say that some positive effect of $111 billion could have been had and that the money
could have been put to better use.
The CIA and the US would not be forced to consider for very long what might have been in
Vietnam. An unfortunate aspect of the US’s democracy is the revolving door of leaders and
42
Stephen Dagget, “Cost of Major U.S. Wars,” CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress,
(July, 2008), pp. 2. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/108054.pdf.
20

personnel which comprise it. They are rarely forced to learn lessons from history and see how their
government failed. This is certainly true of the Diem coup. Those who comprised the CIA or the US
government during the Diem coup was likely promoted, left, or died by the end of the war a decade
later. Kennedy himself did not learn all the lessons he should have previously from the Bay of Pigs
in Cuba. Considering the similarities: an aggressive foreign policy, getting cold feet, and then the
subsequent half-effort defeat; Kennedy should have learned previously to go all in or not at all.
Although the CIA, from time to time, considers changing its role to what its original charter
intended it to be, it never lasts. The CIA is too useful, and too stubborn to admit its failures. The US
government’s foreign policy would not appear to change as it continued to interfere in a plethora of
countries around the world (Chile, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many others), and if there were lessons
learned it was not in Vietnam as the US doubled down in their support of South Vietnam and
increased our involvement even more after the Diem coup.
As others have said, evil only triumphs when good men and women fail to act. That is
certainly true in Vietnam, and it is definitely true in the United States. A truly good United States
does not torture, wage unjust wars, and definitely does not play political murder games, all of which
it did in Vietnam. The US government did not change its long-term foreign policy after the coup
against Diem, nor did it change when the Vietnam War ended. The only way it will change is when
enough knowledgeable citizens take notice and vote accordingly. But to the millions who lost their
lives in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere the US invokes its foreign policy, it will not matter when the
US changes, as it’s already too late.
Annotated Bibliography:
1
Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, 2nd
rev ed.
(Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), pp.152-153.
Used Professor McCoy’s book for information on the background of the French client-state and the
different groups they supported/used to support their rule.
21

2
Jessica Chapman, Cauldron of resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s southern
Vietnam, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 74.
Used Mrs. Champman’s book for the statistic of how much land organizations like the Bien Xuyen
were controlling at the time.
3
McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, pp.154.
Used Professor McCoy’s book for the information on opium and the quote on casinos.
4
Ibid., pp. 152
Used Professor McCoy’s book for the quote.
5
Special to The New York Times, "Text of Eisenhower-Diem Statement." New York Times (1923-
Current File), May 12, 1957.
Used this article printed in the New York Times to support my statement about the US assisting in
moving refugees and the increased US involvement in partnership with Diem.
6
"Focus on Diem", New York Times (1923-Current File), May 15, 1955.
Used this article printed in the New York Times to support my statement about the US not wanting
the communist regime to annex South Vietnam
7
Seth Jacobs. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam,
1950–1963. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp.91.
Used Mr. Jacobs book for my statement that Buddhist villages were receiving a disproportionate
amount of aid compared to Catholic villages.
8
Special to The New York Times, "U.S. DISAVOWS AIM OF SAVING BAO DAI; AGAIN
BACKS DIEM," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 07, 1955.
Used this article printed in the New York Times to support my statement about the US believing
Diem was the key to the war effort in Vietnam.
9
Russel Baker Special to The New York Times, "Eisenhower Greets Vietnam President, Extols
Patriotism," New York Times (1923-Current File), May 09, 1957.
Used this article printed in the New York Times to support my statistics about US aid to Vietnam.
10
Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, 1st
ed. (New York, NY: Anchor Books,
2007), pp. 243.
Used Mr. Weiner’s book to support my information on how the CIA assisted Diem’s regime.
11
Homer Bigart, "Vietnam Victory Remote Despite U.S. Aid to Diem," New York Times (1923-
Current File), Jul 25, 1962.
Used this quote in an article printed in the New York Times to support my view of Diem’s inability
to further the war effort in the view of the Americans.
12
Ibid., Bigart, "Vietnam Victory Remote Despite U.S. Aid to Diem."
22

Used this quote in an article printed in the New York Times to support my view that Diem is unable
to gain support of the rural people in the countryside and the populace in general.
13
"The Situation In South Vietnam – SNIE 53-2-63," The Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed. (Boston,
MA: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 729–733.
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc125.htm
Used the Pentagon Papers to support my statistic about the number of Buddhists in Vietnam.
14
Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 993.
Used Mr. Buttinger’s book to support my information about Diem’s biases in providing
governmental aid to Catholics.
15
Nathaniel Peffer, "To Save South Vietnam," New York Times (1923-Current File), Dec 06, 1961.
Used this article printed in the New York Times to support my statement about withdrawing US aid
and the American ambassador.
16
Hedrick Smith Special to The New York Times, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S.," New York
Times (1923-Current File), Jul 21, 1963.
Used this article printed in the New York Times to better understand and discuss the protests in
Saigon.
17
Ibid., Smith, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S."
Used this article printed in the New York Times to better understand and discuss the protests in
Saigon, and to describe American feelings about Diem during the protests
18
Tad Szulc Special to The New York Times, "U.S. SPURNS DENIAL BY DIEM ON CRISIS,"
New York Times (1923-Current File), Aug 29, 1963.
Used this quote in an article printed in the New York Times to discuss the furtherance of US
frustrations with Diem and the need to remove Nhu.
19
“The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May–November, 1963,” The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed.),
pp. 201–276. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm.
Used the Pentagon Papers to better support my information about what Cable 243 consisted of.
20
Used Mr. Weiner’s book to support my information on how the CIA assisted the coup against
Diem.
21
Szulc, "U.S. SPURNS DENIAL BY DIEM ON CRISIS."
Used this quote in an article printed in the New York Times to discuss the furtherance of US
attempts to encourage regime change in Saigon.
22
Smith, "SAIGON UNREST STIRS U.S."
Used this article printed in the New York Times to help support my view that the Times and other
media outlets knew about US involvement in the coup.
23

23
Used this quote to show how impossible it was for Conein to keep a “low-profile, as Mr. Weiner
wrote about the US’s directions, “Find out the generals’ plans, don’t encourage them, keep a low
profile. Too late: the line between espionage and covert action had already been crossed. Conein
was far too famous work undercover; ‘I had a very high profile in Vietnam,’ Conein said.”
24
Used Mr. Weiner’s book to support that Conein was quite literally in the room during the coup’s
progression.
25
Used a quote in Mr. Weiner’s book to show how shocked and upset JFK was that Diem was killed.
26
Used a quote in Mr. Weiner’s book to show both how involved Conein and the CIA were in the
coup, and how complicit the US was by inviting them immediately after the coup to meet with
Amb. Lodge.
27
Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the
Vietnam War, (New York City, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.435.
Used Mr. Jones’ book to help substantiate that Minh gave the order to kill Diem.
28
Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam
War, pp.435.
Used Mr. Jones’ book to help substantiate that Minh gave the order to kill Diem.
29
Ibid., pp.425.
Used Mr. Jones’ book to discuss JFK’s feelings about the coup and his regret in being involved.
30
Jacob Van Staaveren, “USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam 1961-1963,” United States Air
Force Historical Liaison Office (June, 1965), pp. 73-80.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB248/usaf_61-63.pdf
Used the Air Force’s historical office report to discuss how the coup affected the war effort.
31
“The Political Situation in South Vietnam,” Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State
Department, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/D-I.pdf.
Used the Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s report as a general history for the paragraph to
discuss how the coup was not well thought out by the US, and how the Viet Cong and ARVN were
the two main organizations able to improve their stakes in the wake of the coup.
32
"The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963," The Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed.
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 1, pp. 201-232.
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm
Used this quote in the Pentagon Papers to discuss how the coup was not well thought out by the US,
in the opinion of the US.
33
“Time of Decision: November 1963-March 1965,” Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S.
State Department, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/A-IV.pdf
24

Used this quote in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s report to discuss how, after the coup,
the US could not improve the government or the war effort against the Viet Cong.
34
Special to The New York Times, "U.S. WILL RESUME KEY AID PROGRAM IN SOUTH
VIETNAM," New York Times (1923-Current File), Nov 10, 1963.
Used this statistic posted in an article printed in the New York Times to show the resumption of aid
to Vietnam from the US.
35
Bassino, Jean-Pascal, and Pierre Van Der Eng, "Economic Divergence in East Asia: New
Benchmark Estimates of Levels of Wages and GDP, 1913-1970," ResearchGate, Accessed April 03,
2016.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242771349_Economic_Divergence_in_East_Asia_New_
Benchmark_Estimates_of_Levels_of_Wages_and_GDP_1913-1970.
Used this research paper on the economies of Southeast Asia during the 20th
century to show the
dependence of South Vietnam on US aid.
36
William Tuouhy, "CIA in Vietnam Shifting Toward Old Role: Spying," Los Angeles Times
(1923-Current File), Oct 13, 1968.
Used this quote printed in the LA Times to show the diverse opinions regarding what the CIA
should do, at the time the US was involved in Vietnam.
37
Tuouhy, "CIA in Vietnam Shifting Toward Old Role: Spying."
Used this quote printed in the LA Times to show that many agreed the CIA should focus on
intelligence gathering, as also shown in the Mr. Weiner’s book.
38
Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, pp. 272-276.
Used Mr. Weiner’s book to show that a President has only a few options when trying to resolve
military conflict, LBJ chose the one he felt had the best chance of working with fewest casualties.
39
“The Air War in North Vietnam: Rolling Thunder Begins, February-June, 1965,” The Pentagon
Papers (Gravel ed.), pp. 332-388. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent6.htm.
Used former CIA Director McCone’s quote in the Pentagon Papers predicting the outcome of the
Vietnam War exactly.
40
Used Mr. Weiner’s book to support the statement that the Golf of Tonkin incident was fabricated, or
at least, never happened.
41
Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963, (New York City, NY: E. P.
Dutton, 1987), pp. 315.
Used this quote from Gen. Taylor to show the American understanding of how the US had messed
up Vietnam both for the people and the government of South Vietnam.
42
Stephen Dagget, “Cost of Major U.S. Wars,” CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress,
(July, 2008), pp. 2. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/108054.pdf
Used Mr. Dagget’s report to allow the reader to fully understand the cost of wars, in particular, the
Vietnam War.
25

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