SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 61
Download to read offline
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Emulating an Adversary
with Imperfect Intelligence
Adam Pennington
@_whatshisface
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
2
System Owner/User Discovery (T1033)
adamp$ whoami
§ Lead of MITRE ATT&CK
§ 12 years with MITRE
§ Focused on threat intel and deception
§ Past defender and CTI analyst
§ Part of ATT&CK since it was a spreadsheet with no &
§ 11 years at Carnegie Mellon as student and researcher
§ SCUBA diver certified for decompression and rebreather diving
§ Former live sound engineer
§ DEF CON attendee since DEF CON 13
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
3
Outline
§Setting the stage on adversary emulation
§Gathering and extracting intelligence
§Recognizing imperfections
§Filling in the gaps
§Organizing our intel into a plan
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY.
Adversary Emulation
A type of red team engagement that
mimics a known threat to an
organization by leveraging threat
intelligence to influence what actions
and behaviors the red team uses.
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
5
What’s Different About Adversary Emulation?
Driven by threat intelligence
Scoped to activity like known threat
Likely follows a constructed scenario
Gives idea of how defenses might fare against adversary
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
6
New Challenges Introduced by Emulation
Need for intel
Lack of intel in a form we can use
Lack of intel on chosen adversary
Need to turn intel into a workable scenario
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Our Adversary Emulation Process
| 7 |
Gather
threat intel
Extract
techniques
Analyze &
organize
Develop
tools
Emulate
the
adversary
Today’s Focus
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
| 8 |
Choose an Adversary and Gather Threat Intelligence
• Identify the adversary you want to emulate
• Consider who is targeting you and gaps you’re trying to assess
• Gather data about that adversary
• Look for post-exploit information
• Consider their tools, associated groups, and campaigns
• Think about the time frame
Gather
threat
intel
Extract
techniques
Analyze &
organize
Develop
tools
Emulate
the
adversary
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
9
Identify the Adversary You Want to Emulate
§ I’m going to leverage ATT&CK, but you don’t have to
§ Other options
§ Your own internal groups tracking
§ Commercial threat intel providers
§ Open source reports
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Command and Control Exfiltration Impact
Valid Accounts Scheduled Task/Job Modify Authentication Process System Service Discovery Remote Services Data from Local System Data Obfuscation Exfiltration Over Other
Network Medium
Data Destruction
Replication Through
Removable Media
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Valid Accounts Network Sniffing Software Deployment
Tools
Data from Removable
Media
Fallback Channels Data Encrypted for Impact
Hijack Execution Flow OS Credential Dumping Application Window
Discovery
Application Layer Protocol Scheduled Transfer Service Stop
Trusted Relationship Software Deployment
Tools
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Direct Volume Access Input Capture Replication Through
Removable Media
Input Capture Proxy Data Transfer Size Limits Inhibit System Recovery
Supply Chain Compromise Create or Modify System Process Rootkit Brute Force System Network
Configuration Discovery
Data Staged Communication Through
Removable Media
Exfiltration Over
C2 Channel
Defacement
Hardware Additions Shared Modules Event Triggered Execution Obfuscated Files or
Information
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Internal Spearphishing Screen Capture Firmware Corruption
Exploit Public-Facing
Application
User Execution Boot or Logon Autostart Execution System Owner/User
Discovery
Use Alternate
Authentication Material
Email Collection Web Service Exfiltration Over
Physical Medium
Resource Hijacking
Exploitation for Client
Execution
Account Manipulation Process Injection Exploitation for Credential
Access
Clipboard Data Multi-Stage Channels Network Denial of Service
Phishing External Remote Services Access Token Manipulation System Network
Connections Discovery
Lateral Tool Transfer Automated Collection Ingress Tool Transfer Exfiltration Over
Web Service
Endpoint Denial of Service
External Remote Services System Services Office Application Startup Group Policy Modification Steal Web Session Cookie Taint Shared Content Audio Capture Data Encoding System Shutdown/Reboot
Drive-by Compromise Command and Scripting
Interpreter
Create Account Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Unsecured Credentials Permission Groups
Discovery
Exploitation of Remote
Services
Video Capture Traffic Signaling Automated Exfiltration Account Access Removal
Browser Extensions Exploitation for Privilege
Escalation
Indicator Removal on Host Credentials from
Password Stores
Man in the Browser Remote Access Software Exfiltration Over
Alternative Protocol
Disk Wipe
Native API Traffic Signaling Modify Registry File and Directory
Discovery
Remote Service Session
Hijacking
Data from
Information Repositories
Dynamic Resolution Data Manipulation
Inter-Process
Communication
BITS Jobs Trusted Developer Utilities
Proxy Execution
Steal or Forge Kerberos
Tickets
Non-Standard Port Transfer Data to
Cloud AccountServer Software
Component
Peripheral Device
Discovery
Man-in-the-Middle Protocol Tunneling
Traffic Signaling Forced Authentication Archive Collected Data Encrypted Channel
Pre-OS Boot Signed Script Proxy
Execution
Steal Application Access
Token
Network Share Discovery Data from
Network Shared Drive
Non-Application
Layer ProtocolCompromise Client
Software Binary
Password Policy Discovery
Rogue Domain Controller Man-in-the-Middle Browser Bookmark
Discovery
Data from
Cloud Storage ObjectImplant Container Image Indirect Command
Execution Virtualization/Sandbox
EvasionBITS Jobs
XSL Script Processing Cloud Service Dashboard
Template Injection Software Discovery
File and Directory
Permissions Modification
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox
Evasion
Network Service Scanning
Process Discovery
Unused/Unsupported
Cloud Regions
System Information
Discovery
Use Alternate
Authentication Material
Account Discovery
System Time Discovery
Impair Defenses Domain Trust Discovery
Hide Artifacts Cloud Service Discovery
Masquerading
Deobfuscate/Decode Files
or Information
Signed Binary Proxy
Execution
Exploitation for
Defense Evasion
Execution Guardrails
Modify Cloud Compute
Infrastructure
Pre-OS Boot
Subvert Trust Controls
ATT&CK Knowledge Base Basics
Tactics: the adversary’s technical goals
Techniques:howthegoalsare
achieved
Sub-techniques:
More specific techniques
Procedures: Adversary technique and
sub-technique implementations
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Group: APT29
| 11 |
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Group: APT29
| 12 |
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Group: APT29
| 13 |
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
ATT&CK Use Cases
| 14 |
Threat Intelligence
processes = search Process:Create
reg = filter processes where (exe == "reg.exe" and parent_exe
== "cmd.exe")
cmd = filter processes where (exe == "cmd.exe" and
parent_exe != "explorer.exe"")
reg_and_cmd = join (reg, cmd) where (reg.ppid == cmd.pid and
reg.hostname == cmd.hostname)
output reg_and_cmd
Detection
Adversary Emulation
Assessment and Engineering
Use ATT&CK for Adversary Emulation and Red Teaming
The best defense is a well-tested defense. ATT&CK provides a common adversary
behavior framework based on threat intelligence that red teams can use to emulate
specific threats. This helps cyber defenders find gaps in visibility, defensive tools, and
processes—and then fix them.
Legend
Low Priority
High Priority
Finding Gaps in Defense
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Mshta
PowerShell
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rundll32
Scheduled Task
Scripting
Service Execution
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Source
Space after Filename
Third-party Software
Trap
Trusted Developer Utilities
User Execution
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Windows Remote Management
XSL Script Processing
Application Shimming
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default File Association
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Create Account
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
External Remote Services
File System Permissions Weakness
Hidden Files and Directories
Hooking
Hypervisor
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Kernel Modules and Extensions
Launch Agent
Launch Daemon
Launchctl
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Local Job Scheduling
Login Item
Logon Scripts
LSASS Driver
Modify Existing Service
Netsh Helper DLL
New Service
Office Application Startup
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Port Monitors
Rc.common
Re-opened Applications
Redundant Access
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Scheduled Task
Screensaver
Security Support Provider
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
Shortcut Modification
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Startup Items
System Firmware
Systemd Service
Time Providers
Trap
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Windows Management
Instrumentation Event Subscription
Winlogon Helper DLL
Bypass User Account Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Extra Window Memory Injection
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Monitors
Process Injection
Scheduled Task
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
SID-History Injection
Startup Items
Sudo
Sudo Caching
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compile After Delivery
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Search Order Hijacking
DLL Side-Loading
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for Defense Evasion
Extra Window Memory Injection
File Deletion
File Permissions Modification
File System Logical Offsets
Gatekeeper Bypass
Group Policy Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
Hidden Users
Hidden Window
HISTCONTROL
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Indicator Blocking
Indicator Removal from Tools
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Install Root Certificate
InstallUtil
Launchctl
LC_MAIN Hijacking
Masquerading
Modify Registry
Mshta
Network Share Connection
Removal
NTFS File Attributes
Obfuscated Files or Information
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Process Doppelgänging
Process Hollowing
Process Injection
Redundant Access
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rootkit
Rundll32
Scripting
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Software Packing
Space after Filename
Template Injection
Timestomp
Trusted Developer Utilities
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Web Service
XSL Script Processing
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
Relay
Network Sniffing
Password Filter DLL
Private Keys
Securityd Memory
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
System Network Configuration
Discovery
System Network Connections
Discovery
System Owner/User Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through Removable
Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote Management
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multi-hop Proxy
Multi-Stage Channels
Multiband Communication
Multilayer Encryption
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer Protocol
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Standard Non-Application Layer
Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Other Network
Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data Manipulation
AppleScript
Application Deployment
Software
Distributed Component
Object Model
Exploitation of
Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through
Removable Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote
Management
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and
Control Protocol
Custom Cryptographic
Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation
Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multiband Communication
Multi-hop Proxy
Multilayer Encryption
Multi-Stage Channels
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer
Protocol
Standard Cryptographic
Protocol
Standard Non-Application
Layer Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Other
Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Command
and Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Alternative
Protocol
Exfiltration Over
Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data
Manipulation
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information
Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network
Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing
Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through
Removable Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
AppleScript
CMSTP
Command-Line Interface
Compiled HTML File
Control Panel Items
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through
Module Load
Exploitation for
Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Mshta
PowerShell
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rundll32
Scripting
Service Execution
Signed Binary
Proxy Execution
Signed Script
Proxy Execution
Source
Space after Filename
Third-party Software
Trusted Developer Utilities
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Image File Execution Options Injection
Plist Modification
Valid Accounts
Accessibility Features
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Dylib Hijacking
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Port Monitors
Service Registry Permissions Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
Startup Items
Web Shell
.bash_profile and .bashrc
Account Manipulation
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default
File Association
Component Firmware
BITS Jobs
Clear Command History
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model
Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files
or Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Side-Loading
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for
Defense Evasion
File Deletion
File Permissions
Modification
File System Logical Offsets
Gatekeeper Bypass
Group Policy Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
Hidden Users
Exploitation for
Privilege Escalation
SID-History Injection
Sudo
Sudo Caching
Scheduled Task Binary Padding Network Sniffing
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Trap
Access Token Manipulation
Bypass User Account Control
Extra Window Memory Injection
Process Injection
Account Manipulation
Bash History
Brute Force
Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for
Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
and Relay
Password Filter DLL
Private Keys
Securityd Memory
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Account Discovery
Application Window
Discovery
Browser Bookmark
Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Discovery
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information
Discovery
System Network
Configuration Discovery
System Network
Connections Discovery
System Owner/User
Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox
Evasion
Use ATT&CK for Cyber Threat Intelligence
Cyber threat intelligence comes from many sources, including knowledge of past incidents,
commercial threat feeds, information-sharing groups, government threat-sharing programs,
and more. ATT&CK gives analysts a common language to communicate across reports and
organizations, providing a way to structure, compare, and analyze threat intelligence.
Use ATT&CK to Build Your Defensive Platform
ATT&CK includes resources designed to help cyber defenders develop analytics that
detect the techniques used by an adversary. Based on threat intelligence included in
ATT&CK or provided by analysts, cyber defenders can create a comprehensive set of
analytics to detect threats.
Get Started with ATT&CK
Legend
APT28
APT29
Both
Comparing APT28 to APT29
we've chosen 12 of those data sources to show the techniques each of them might be able to detect with the right colle
analytics. Check out our website at attack.mitre.org for more information on how each technique can be detected, and
adversary examples you can use to start detecting adversary behavior with ATT&CK.
You can visualize how your own data sources map to adversary behavior with ATT&CK. Read our blog post at bit.ly/ATT
learn how we generated this diagram, check out the code, and begin building your own diagrams from ATT&CK conten
Initial Access
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through Removable
Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
Execution
AppleScript
CMSTP
Command-Line Interface
Compiled HTML File
Control Panel Items
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Mshta
PowerShell
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rundll32
Scheduled Task
Scripting
Service Execution
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Source
Space after Filename
Third-party Software
Trap
Trusted Developer Utilities
User Execution
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Windows Remote Management
XSL Script Processing
Persistence
.bash_profile and .bashrc
Accessibility Features
Account Manipulation
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default File Association
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Create Account
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
External Remote Services
File System Permissions Weakness
Hidden Files and Directories
Hooking
Hypervisor
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Kernel Modules and Extensions
Launch Agent
Launch Daemon
Launchctl
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Local Job Scheduling
Login Item
Logon Scripts
LSASS Driver
Modify Existing Service
Netsh Helper DLL
New Service
Office Application Startup
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Port Monitors
Rc.common
Re-opened Applications
Redundant Access
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Scheduled Task
Screensaver
Security Support Provider
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
Shortcut Modification
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Startup Items
System Firmware
Systemd Service
Time Providers
Trap
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Windows Management
Instrumentation Event Subscription
Winlogon Helper DLL
Privilege Escalation
Access Token Manipulation
Accessibility Features
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Bypass User Account Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Extra Window Memory Injection
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Monitors
Process Injection
Scheduled Task
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
SID-History Injection
Startup Items
Sudo
Sudo Caching
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Defense Evasion
Access Token Manipulation
Binary Padding
BITS Jobs
Bypass User Account Control
Clear Command History
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compile After Delivery
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Search Order Hijacking
DLL Side-Loading
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for Defense Evasion
Extra Window Memory Injection
File Deletion
File Permissions Modification
File System Logical Offsets
Gatekeeper Bypass
Group Policy Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
Hidden Users
Hidden Window
HISTCONTROL
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Indicator Blocking
Indicator Removal from Tools
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Install Root Certificate
InstallUtil
Launchctl
LC_MAIN Hijacking
Masquerading
Modify Registry
Mshta
Network Share Connection
Removal
NTFS File Attributes
Obfuscated Files or Information
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Process Doppelgänging
Process Hollowing
Process Injection
Redundant Access
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rootkit
Rundll32
Scripting
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Software Packing
Space after Filename
Template Injection
Timestomp
Trusted Developer Utilities
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Web Service
XSL Script Processing
Credential Access
Account Manipulation
Bash History
Brute Force
Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
Relay
Network Sniffing
Password Filter DLL
Private Keys
Securityd Memory
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Discovery
Account Discovery
Application Window Discovery
Browser Bookmark Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
System Network Configuration
Discovery
System Network Connections
Discovery
System Owner/User Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
AppleScript
Application Deployment Software
Distributed Component Object
Model
Exploitation of Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through Removable
Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote Management
Collection
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Command And Control
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and Control
Protocol
Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multi-hop Proxy
Multi-Stage Channels
Multiband Communication
Multilayer Encryption
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer Protocol
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Standard Non-Application Layer
Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Command and
Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Other Network
Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Impact
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data Manipulation
Initial Access
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through Removable
Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
Execution
AppleScript
CMSTP
Command-Line Interface
Compiled HTML File
Control Panel Items
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Mshta
PowerShell
Persistence
.bash_profile and .bashrc
Accessibility Features
Account Manipulation
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default File Association
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Create Account
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Privilege Escalation
Access Token Manipulation
Accessibility Features
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Bypass User Account Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Extra Window Memory Injection
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Defense Evasion
Access Token Manipulation
Binary Padding
BITS Jobs
Bypass User Account Control
Clear Command History
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compile After Delivery
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Credential Access
Account Manipulation
Bash History
Brute Force
Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
Relay
Network Sniffing
Password Filter DLL
Discovery
Account Discovery
Application Window Discovery
Browser Bookmark Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
Lateral Movement
AppleScript
Application Deployment Software
Distributed Component Object
Model
Exploitation of Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through Removable
Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Collection
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Command And Control
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and Control
Protocol
Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multi-hop Proxy
Multi-Stage Channels
Multiband Communication
Multilayer Encryption
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Command and
Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Other Network
Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Impact
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data Manipulation
ob
stan
Use ATT&CK to Build Your Defensive Platform
ATT&CK includes resources designed to help cyber defenders develop analytics that
detect the techniques used by an adversary. Based on threat intelligence included in
ATT&CK or provided by analysts, cyber defenders can create a comprehensive set of
analytics to detect threats.
Legend
APT28
APT29
Both
Legend
Low Priority
High Priority
Comparing APT28 to APT29
Finding Gaps in Defense
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through Removable
Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
AppleScript
CMSTP
Command-Line Interface
Compiled HTML File
Control Panel Items
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Mshta
PowerShell
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rundll32
Scheduled Task
Scripting
Service Execution
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Source
Space after Filename
Third-party Software
Trap
Trusted Developer Utilities
User Execution
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Windows Remote Management
XSL Script Processing
.bash_profile and .bashrc
Accessibility Features
Account Manipulation
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default File Association
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Create Account
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
External Remote Services
File System Permissions Weakness
Hidden Files and Directories
Hooking
Hypervisor
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Kernel Modules and Extensions
Launch Agent
Launch Daemon
Launchctl
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Local Job Scheduling
Login Item
Logon Scripts
LSASS Driver
Modify Existing Service
Netsh Helper DLL
New Service
Office Application Startup
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Port Monitors
Rc.common
Re-opened Applications
Redundant Access
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Scheduled Task
Screensaver
Security Support Provider
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
Shortcut Modification
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Startup Items
System Firmware
Systemd Service
Time Providers
Trap
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Windows Management
Instrumentation Event Subscription
Winlogon Helper DLL
Access Token Manipulation
Accessibility Features
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Bypass User Account Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Extra Window Memory Injection
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Monitors
Process Injection
Scheduled Task
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
SID-History Injection
Startup Items
Sudo
Sudo Caching
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Access Token Manipulation
Binary Padding
BITS Jobs
Bypass User Account Control
Clear Command History
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compile After Delivery
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Search Order Hijacking
DLL Side-Loading
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for Defense Evasion
Extra Window Memory Injection
File Deletion
File Permissions Modification
File System Logical Offsets
Gatekeeper Bypass
Group Policy Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
Hidden Users
Hidden Window
HISTCONTROL
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Indicator Blocking
Indicator Removal from Tools
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Install Root Certificate
InstallUtil
Launchctl
LC_MAIN Hijacking
Masquerading
Modify Registry
Mshta
Network Share Connection
Removal
NTFS File Attributes
Obfuscated Files or Information
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Process Doppelgänging
Process Hollowing
Process Injection
Redundant Access
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rootkit
Rundll32
Scripting
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Software Packing
Space after Filename
Template Injection
Timestomp
Trusted Developer Utilities
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Web Service
XSL Script Processing
Account Manipulation
Bash History
Brute Force
Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
Relay
Network Sniffing
Password Filter DLL
Private Keys
Securityd Memory
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Account Discovery
Application Window Discovery
Browser Bookmark Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
System Network Configuration
Discovery
System Network Connections
Discovery
System Owner/User Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
AppleScript
Application Deployment Software
Distributed Component Object
Model
Exploitation of Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through Removable
Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote Management
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and Control
Protocol
Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multi-hop Proxy
Multi-Stage Channels
Multiband Communication
Multilayer Encryption
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer Protocol
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Standard Non-Application Layer
Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Command and
Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Other Network
Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data Manipulation
Initial Access
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through Removable
Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
Execution
AppleScript
CMSTP
Command-Line Interface
Compiled HTML File
Control Panel Items
Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
InstallUtil
Launchctl
Local Job Scheduling
LSASS Driver
Mshta
PowerShell
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
Rundll32
Scheduled Task
Scripting
Service Execution
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Source
Space after Filename
Third-party Software
Trap
Trusted Developer Utilities
User Execution
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Windows Remote Management
XSL Script Processing
Persistence
.bash_profile and .bashrc
Accessibility Features
Account Manipulation
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Authentication Package
BITS Jobs
Bootkit
Browser Extensions
Change Default File Association
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Create Account
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
External Remote Services
File System Permissions Weakness
Hidden Files and Directories
Hooking
Hypervisor
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Kernel Modules and Extensions
Launch Agent
Launch Daemon
Launchctl
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Local Job Scheduling
Login Item
Logon Scripts
LSASS Driver
Modify Existing Service
Netsh Helper DLL
New Service
Office Application Startup
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Port Monitors
Rc.common
Re-opened Applications
Redundant Access
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Scheduled Task
Screensaver
Security Support Provider
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
Privilege Escalation
Access Token Manipulation
Accessibility Features
AppCert DLLs
AppInit DLLs
Application Shimming
Bypass User Account Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Dylib Hijacking
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Extra Window Memory Injection
File System Permissions Weakness
Hooking
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Launch Daemon
New Service
Path Interception
Plist Modification
Port Monitors
Process Injection
Scheduled Task
Service Registry Permissions
Weakness
Setuid and Setgid
SID-History Injection
Startup Items
Sudo
Sudo Caching
Valid Accounts
Web Shell
Defense Evasion
Access Token Manipulation
Binary Padding
BITS Jobs
Bypass User Account Control
Clear Command History
CMSTP
Code Signing
Compile After Delivery
Compiled HTML File
Component Firmware
Component Object Model Hijacking
Control Panel Items
DCShadow
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information
Disabling Security Tools
DLL Search Order Hijacking
DLL Side-Loading
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for Defense Evasion
Extra Window Memory Injection
File Deletion
File Permissions Modification
File System Logical Offsets
Gatekeeper Bypass
Group Policy Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
Hidden Users
Hidden Window
HISTCONTROL
Image File Execution Options
Injection
Indicator Blocking
Indicator Removal from Tools
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Install Root Certificate
InstallUtil
Launchctl
LC_MAIN Hijacking
Masquerading
Modify Registry
Mshta
Network Share Connection
Removal
NTFS File Attributes
Obfuscated Files or Information
Plist Modification
Port Knocking
Process Doppelgänging
Process Hollowing
Credential Access
Account Manipulation
Bash History
Brute Force
Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry
Exploitation for Credential Access
Forced Authentication
Hooking
Input Capture
Input Prompt
Kerberoasting
Keychain
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
Relay
Network Sniffing
Password Filter DLL
Private Keys
Securityd Memory
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
Discovery
Account Discovery
Application Window Discovery
Browser Bookmark Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Network Share Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
System Network Configuration
Discovery
System Network Connections
Discovery
System Owner/User Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
AppleScript
Application Deployment Software
Distributed Component Object
Model
Exploitation of Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through Removable
Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote Management
Collection
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Command And Control
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and Control
Protocol
Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multi-hop Proxy
Multi-Stage Channels
Multiband Communication
Multilayer Encryption
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer Protocol
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Standard Non-Application Layer
Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Command and
Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Other Network
Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Impact
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data Manipulation
malwarerever
net
work device logs
network intrusion detection system
ssl/tls inspection
system
calls
windowseventlogs
ocol
compromise
point denial of service
network denial of service
obfuscated files or information
remote access tools
spearphishing attachment
standard non-application layer protocoltemplate injection
domain fronting
drive-by compromise
endpoint denial of service
install root certificate
obfuscated files or information
spearphishing link
spearphishing via service
standard cryptographic protocol
web service
applescript
application shimming
browser extensions
bypass user account control
exploitation for client execution
hypervisor
kernel modules and extensions
keychain
rootkit
account manipulation
bits jobs
cm
stp
em
s
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
15
Choosing an Adversary Based on Gaps
APT28 techniques
from ATT&CK
(based only on open
source reporting)
Diagram using ATT&CK Navigator: https://bit.ly/attacknav
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
16
Choosing an Adversary Based on Gaps
Notional gaps
in defenses
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
17
Choosing an Adversary Based on Gaps
Green = APT28
techniques that can
test our gaps
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
18
Choosing an Adversary Based on Who is Targeting You
• Work with your threat intel team – many ways to prioritize
• Adversary who targets you regularly
• Adversary who has targeted others like you
• Adversary who rarely targets but has a high skill level
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
19
Turla / Snake / Venomous Bear
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
20
Gather Data About Your Chosen Adversary
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
| 21 |
Extract Techniques from Reports
• Look for behaviors
• Identify the adversary tactic
• Move from tactic to technique/sub-technique
• Work as a team
• Free training on how to do this at: https://attack.mitre.org/training/cti
Gather
threat
intel
Extract
techniques
Analyze &
organize
Develop
tools
Emulate the
adversary
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques
| 22 |
https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-
and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/
Windows Command Shell (T1059.003)
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1574.001)
Windows Command Shell (T1059.003)
Process Discovery (T1057)
Remote System Discovery (T1018)
System Network Connections Discovery (T1049)
System Information Discovery (T1082)
System Network Configuration Discovery (T1016)
OS Credential Dumping (T1003)
Pass the Ticket (T1550.003)
Keylogging (T1056.001)
Email Collection (T1114)
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
23
Structure Your Collected Intel
Turla techniques
from ATT&CK
(based only on open
source reporting)
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
| 24 |
Analyze and Organize Techniques and Intel
• Establish the adversary’s goal
• Examine gaps between access and goal
• Fill in the gaps you have
• Organize intel into technique flow
• Organize technique flow into phases
Gather
threat intel
Extract
techniques
Analyze
&
organize
Develop
tools
Emulate
the
adversary
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
25
Establish an Adversary’s Goal(s)
https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
26
Examine Gaps Between Access and Goal
Why are there gaps?
• Open source intel likely doesn’t paint a complete adversary picture
• Biases and lack of visibility of adversary activity
• Group intel in ATT&CK subject to these biases and we add our own
• Biases from what we map and how we map it
• Understanding these is important for knowing where gaps likely are
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Open Source Biases: Visibility Bias
Visible
Disk
Forensics
Network
Flows
Process
Execution
Powershell
Registry
Monitoring
Decoded
C2
Not Seen
27
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Open Source Biases: Novelty Bias
Another APT1337
Report
APT1338
Report!!!
28
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Open Source Biases: Availability Bias
All Possible
Behaviors
Familiar
Behaviors
29
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Open Source Biases: Victim Bias
Victim 4
Victim 5Victim 3
Victim 2
Victim 1
30
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Open Source Biases: Production Bias
Operation Snakepit
APT1337 Report
Operation Brown Fox
APT1338 Report
Ducks in the Wild
FUZZYDUCK Report
Source 1 Source 2
31
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Security
Vendors
92%
Press
Reports
5%
Publicly-
available
Government
Reports
3%
ATT&CK Biases: Sources We Select
From reports used
for technique examples
in ATT&CK Groups
32
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
ATT&CK Biases: Availability Bias
All Possible
Techniques
Techniques
We
Remember
33
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
ATT&CK Biases: Novelty Bias
Yet another
FUZZYDUCK
using Powershell
report
APT1337
Using
Transmitted
Data
Manipulation
34
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
35
Other ATT&CK Group Caveats
§Reports from different time periods combined
§ Reporting frequently doesn’t say when activity happened
§ Single reports often only show a small range of activity
§Groups only include behaviors directly tied to actor activity
§ Doesn’t include the behaviors of software adversaries use
§Reporting doesn’t always agree on attribution
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
How Can We Deal With These Limitations?
| 24|
• Know that they exist
• Once you know them, you can better
determine where your gaps likely are
• Account for the gaps they create as
you build your adversary plan
Tenor.com
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
37
Identifying Possible Gaps for a Specific Adversary
Turla techniques
from ATT&CK
(based only on open
source reporting)
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
38
Missing Dependencies
Turla techniques
from ATT&CK
(based only on open
source reporting)
Finding related techniques: https://medium.com/mitre-attack/finding-related-att-ck-techniques-f1a4e8dfe2b6
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
39
Missing Dependencies
Turla techniques
from ATT&CK
(based only on open
source reporting)
Finding related techniques: https://medium.com/mitre-attack/finding-related-att-ck-techniques-f1a4e8dfe2b6
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
40
Unusually Sparse Tactics
Turla techniques
from ATT&CK
(based only on open
source reporting)
Note: Turla is older than cloud storage
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
| 41 |
Analyze and Organize Techniques and Intel
• Establish the adversary’s goal
• Examine gaps between access and goal
• Fill in the gaps you have
• Organize intel into technique flow
• Organize technique flow into phases
Gather
threat intel
Extract
techniques
Analyze
&
organize
Develop
tools
Emulate
the
adversary
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
42
Techniques for Filling in Gaps
Add techniques from software
Fill in missing dependencies
Examine peer adversaries
Look at common techniques
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Adding Techniques from Software – Turla Software
43
Arp
Carbon
certutil
ComRAT
Empire
Epic
Gazer
Kazuar
LightNeuron
Mimikatz
Mosquito
nbtstat
Net
netstat
PowerStallion
PsExec
Reg
Systeminfo
Tasklist
Uroburos
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Turla Software – Utilities
44
Arp
Carbon
certutil
ComRAT
Empire
Epic
Gazer
Kazuar
LightNeuron
Mimikatz
Mosquito
nbtstat
Net
netstat
PowerStallion
PsExec
Reg
Systeminfo
Tasklist
Uroburos
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Turla Software – Public Tools
45
Arp
Carbon
certutil
ComRAT
Empire
Epic
Gazer
Kazuar
LightNeuron
Mimikatz
Mosquito
nbtstat
Net
netstat
PowerStallion
PsExec
Reg
Systeminfo
Tasklist
Uroburos
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Turla Software – Possibly Unique to Turla
46
Arp
Carbon
certutil
ComRAT
Empire
Epic
Gazer
Kazuar
LightNeuron
Mimikatz
Mosquito
nbtstat
Net
netstat
PowerStallion
PsExec
Reg
Systeminfo
Tasklist
Uroburos
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Turla Software – Possibly Unique to Turla
47
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Turla Techniques Plus Turla Software
48
Blue = Turla
Red = Turla SW
Green = Both
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Fill in Missing Dependencies
49
Blue = Turla
Red = Turla SW
Green = Both
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Fill in Missing Dependencies
50
Blue = Turla
Red = Turla SW
Green = Both
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Fill in Missing Dependencies
51
Turla + Software + Dependencies
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
52
Examine Peer Adversaries – APT28 + APT29
Other Russia attributed groups
focused on data theft
Green = Techniques used by both
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Look at Common Techniques
53
1. Process Injection
2. Scheduled Task
3. Windows Admin Shares
4. PowerShell
5. Remote File Copy
6. Masquerading
7. Scripting
8. DLL Search Order Hijacking
9. Domain Trust Discovery
10.Disabling Security Tools
1. Security Software Discovery
2. Obfuscated Files or Info
3. Process Injection
4. System Info Discovery
5. Process Discovery
6. Software Packing
7. DLL Side-Loading
8. Data Encrypted
9. Execution through API
10.Standard Crypto Protocol
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
| 54 |
Analyze and Organize Techniques and Intel
• Establish the adversary’s goal
• Examine gaps between access and goal
• Fill in the gaps you have
• Organize intel into technique flow
• Organize technique flow into phases
Gather
threat intel
Extract
techniques
Analyze
&
organize
Develop
tools
Emulate
the
adversary
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Turla Compiled Technique Profile
55
Turla + Software + Dependencies
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
56
Organize Intel into Technique Flow
Initial Access
• Spearphishing Attachment
• Spearphishing Link
• Drive-by Compromise
Execution
• PowerShell
• Malicious File
• Malicious Link
Defense Evasion
• Deobfuscate Files or Info
• Hidden File System
• Code Signing
Discovery
• File and Dir Discovery
• Peripheral Dev Discovery
• System Info Discovery
Credential Access
• OS Credential Dumping
• Creds from PW Stores
Persistence
• Shortcut Modification
• Winlogon Helper DLL
• Screensaver
• PowerShell Profile
Lateral Movement
• Lateral Tool Transfer
• SMB/Win Admin SharesPrivilege Escalation
• Create Process w/ Token
• COM Hijacking
• DLL Injection
Collection
• Data from Remov. Media
• Remote Email Collection
• Data from Info Repos
Exfiltration
• Exfil to Cloud Storage
• Exfil over C2 Channel
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
57
Organize Technique Flow into Plan Phases
Initial
Access
Execution
Defense
Evasion
Discovery
Credential
Access
Persistence
Lateral
Movement
Privilege
Escalation
Collection
Exfiltration
Reconnaissance
Resource
Development
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
Tool up and Emulate
| 58 |
Develop Tools
• Will COTS/FOSS work?
• Need custom dev?
• Payloads inspired by APT
Emulate
• Setup infra and test
• Emulate the adversary!
• Follow the adversary MO
• Think about your goal
• Think about pacing
Gather
threat
intel
Extract
techniques
Analyze &
organize
Develop
tools
Emulate
the
adversary
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
59
In Closing
Pick your adversary to emulate wisely
The intel on your adversary isn’t perfect
You can still emulate an adversary with imperfect intel
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
60
ATT&CK Adversary Emulation Resources
§ ATT&CK Navigator
§ Live Version: http://bit.ly/attacknav
§ Source: https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-navigator
§ ATT&CK: https://attack.mitre.org/
§ APT3 Emulation plan: https://attack.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-plans/
§ APT29 Emulation plan: https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal
§ CALDERA: https://github.com/mitre/caldera
© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.
https://attack.mitre.org
attack@mitre.org
@mitreattack
Adam Pennington
@_whatshisface

More Related Content

What's hot

State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power Hour
State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power HourState of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power Hour
State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power HourAdam Pennington
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - November
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - NovemberMITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - November
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - NovemberMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
BSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status Quo
BSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status QuoBSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status Quo
BSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status QuoKatie Nickels
 
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation Plans
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation PlansEvolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation Plans
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation PlansChristopher Korban
 
Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018
Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018
Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018Christopher Korban
 
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CK
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CKThreat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CK
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CKKatie Nickels
 
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and Research
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and ResearchUsing MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and Research
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and ResearchMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Firewall buyers-guide
Firewall buyers-guideFirewall buyers-guide
Firewall buyers-guideAndy Kwong
 
Putting MITRE ATT&CK into Action with What You Have, Where You Are
Putting MITRE ATT&CK into Action with What You Have, Where You ArePutting MITRE ATT&CK into Action with What You Have, Where You Are
Putting MITRE ATT&CK into Action with What You Have, Where You AreKatie Nickels
 
FIRST CTI Symposium: Turning intelligence into action with MITRE ATT&CK™
FIRST CTI Symposium: Turning intelligence into action with MITRE ATT&CK™FIRST CTI Symposium: Turning intelligence into action with MITRE ATT&CK™
FIRST CTI Symposium: Turning intelligence into action with MITRE ATT&CK™Katie Nickels
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Ready to ATT&CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Ready to ATT&CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Ready to ATT&CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Ready to ATT&CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate...MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...JamieWilliams130
 
What Happens Before the Kill Chain
What Happens Before the Kill Chain What Happens Before the Kill Chain
What Happens Before the Kill Chain OpenDNS
 
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...Adam Pennington
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITREMITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITREMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for Mobile
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for MobileMapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for Mobile
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for MobileMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Security For The People: End-User Authentication Security on the Internet by ...
Security For The People: End-User Authentication Security on the Internet by ...Security For The People: End-User Authentication Security on the Internet by ...
Security For The People: End-User Authentication Security on the Internet by ...Duo Security
 
The Internal Signs of Compromise
The Internal Signs of CompromiseThe Internal Signs of Compromise
The Internal Signs of CompromiseFireEye, Inc.
 
ATT&CKing with Threat Intelligence
ATT&CKing with Threat IntelligenceATT&CKing with Threat Intelligence
ATT&CKing with Threat IntelligenceChristopher Korban
 

What's hot (20)

State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power Hour
State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power HourState of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power Hour
State of the ATT&CK - ATT&CKcon Power Hour
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - November
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - NovemberMITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - November
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - November
 
BSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status Quo
BSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status QuoBSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status Quo
BSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status Quo
 
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation Plans
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation PlansEvolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation Plans
Evolution of Offensive Testing - ATT&CK-based Adversary Emulation Plans
 
Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018
Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018
Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018
 
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CK
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CKThreat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CK
Threat-Based Adversary Emulation with MITRE ATT&CK
 
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and Research
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and ResearchUsing MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and Research
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and Research
 
Firewall buyers-guide
Firewall buyers-guideFirewall buyers-guide
Firewall buyers-guide
 
Putting MITRE ATT&CK into Action with What You Have, Where You Are
Putting MITRE ATT&CK into Action with What You Have, Where You ArePutting MITRE ATT&CK into Action with What You Have, Where You Are
Putting MITRE ATT&CK into Action with What You Have, Where You Are
 
FIRST CTI Symposium: Turning intelligence into action with MITRE ATT&CK™
FIRST CTI Symposium: Turning intelligence into action with MITRE ATT&CK™FIRST CTI Symposium: Turning intelligence into action with MITRE ATT&CK™
FIRST CTI Symposium: Turning intelligence into action with MITRE ATT&CK™
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Ready to ATT&CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Ready to ATT&CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Ready to ATT&CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Ready to ATT&CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate...
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
 
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...
 
What Happens Before the Kill Chain
What Happens Before the Kill Chain What Happens Before the Kill Chain
What Happens Before the Kill Chain
 
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...
RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITREMITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
 
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for Mobile
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for MobileMapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for Mobile
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for Mobile
 
Security For The People: End-User Authentication Security on the Internet by ...
Security For The People: End-User Authentication Security on the Internet by ...Security For The People: End-User Authentication Security on the Internet by ...
Security For The People: End-User Authentication Security on the Internet by ...
 
The Internal Signs of Compromise
The Internal Signs of CompromiseThe Internal Signs of Compromise
The Internal Signs of Compromise
 
ATT&CKing with Threat Intelligence
ATT&CKing with Threat IntelligenceATT&CKing with Threat Intelligence
ATT&CKing with Threat Intelligence
 

Similar to Emulating an Adversary with Imperfect Intelligence

MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdfMITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdfReZa AdineH
 
MITRE ATT&CK Updates: State of the ATT&CK (ATT&CKcon 4.0 Edition)
MITRE ATT&CK Updates: State of the ATT&CK (ATT&CKcon 4.0 Edition)MITRE ATT&CK Updates: State of the ATT&CK (ATT&CKcon 4.0 Edition)
MITRE ATT&CK Updates: State of the ATT&CK (ATT&CKcon 4.0 Edition)MITRE ATT&CK
 
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKSymantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKSymantec
 
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE Activities
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE ActivitiesMapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE Activities
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE ActivitiesMITRE ATT&CK
 
Exploring the Defender's Advantage
Exploring the Defender's AdvantageExploring the Defender's Advantage
Exploring the Defender's AdvantageRaffael Marty
 
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?) Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?) MITRE ATT&CK
 
State of the ATT&CK
State of the ATT&CKState of the ATT&CK
State of the ATT&CKMITRE ATT&CK
 
Digitalstakeout Scout Overview
Digitalstakeout Scout OverviewDigitalstakeout Scout Overview
Digitalstakeout Scout OverviewDigitalStakeout
 
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the IndicatorCrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the IndicatorCrowdStrike
 
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdfMITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdfReZa AdineH
 
How Zero Trust Makes the Mission Simple & Secure
How Zero Trust Makes the Mission Simple & SecureHow Zero Trust Makes the Mission Simple & Secure
How Zero Trust Makes the Mission Simple & Securescoopnewsgroup
 
Cyber 101: An introduction to privileged access management
Cyber 101: An introduction to privileged access managementCyber 101: An introduction to privileged access management
Cyber 101: An introduction to privileged access managementseadeloitte
 
Crack the Code
Crack the CodeCrack the Code
Crack the CodeInnoTech
 
Cyber security fundamentals (Cantonese)
Cyber security fundamentals (Cantonese)Cyber security fundamentals (Cantonese)
Cyber security fundamentals (Cantonese)Cloudflare
 
State of the ATT&CK May 2023
State of the ATT&CK May 2023State of the ATT&CK May 2023
State of the ATT&CK May 2023Adam Pennington
 

Similar to Emulating an Adversary with Imperfect Intelligence (20)

MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdfMITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 1 Slides.pdf
 
Putting the PRE into ATTACK
Putting the PRE into ATTACKPutting the PRE into ATTACK
Putting the PRE into ATTACK
 
CyberSecurity Update Slides
CyberSecurity Update SlidesCyberSecurity Update Slides
CyberSecurity Update Slides
 
State of the ATTACK
State of the ATTACKState of the ATTACK
State of the ATTACK
 
MITRE ATT&CK Updates: State of the ATT&CK (ATT&CKcon 4.0 Edition)
MITRE ATT&CK Updates: State of the ATT&CK (ATT&CKcon 4.0 Edition)MITRE ATT&CK Updates: State of the ATT&CK (ATT&CKcon 4.0 Edition)
MITRE ATT&CK Updates: State of the ATT&CK (ATT&CKcon 4.0 Edition)
 
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKSymantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
 
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE Activities
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE ActivitiesMapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE Activities
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE Activities
 
Exploring the Defender's Advantage
Exploring the Defender's AdvantageExploring the Defender's Advantage
Exploring the Defender's Advantage
 
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?) Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
Automation: The Wonderful Wizard of CTI (or is it?)
 
State of the ATT&CK
State of the ATT&CKState of the ATT&CK
State of the ATT&CK
 
Hacking3e ppt ch11
Hacking3e ppt ch11Hacking3e ppt ch11
Hacking3e ppt ch11
 
Digitalstakeout Scout Overview
Digitalstakeout Scout OverviewDigitalstakeout Scout Overview
Digitalstakeout Scout Overview
 
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the IndicatorCrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator
 
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdfMITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdf
MITRE-Module 4 Slides.pdf
 
Cybersecurity Slides
Cybersecurity  SlidesCybersecurity  Slides
Cybersecurity Slides
 
How Zero Trust Makes the Mission Simple & Secure
How Zero Trust Makes the Mission Simple & SecureHow Zero Trust Makes the Mission Simple & Secure
How Zero Trust Makes the Mission Simple & Secure
 
Cyber 101: An introduction to privileged access management
Cyber 101: An introduction to privileged access managementCyber 101: An introduction to privileged access management
Cyber 101: An introduction to privileged access management
 
Crack the Code
Crack the CodeCrack the Code
Crack the Code
 
Cyber security fundamentals (Cantonese)
Cyber security fundamentals (Cantonese)Cyber security fundamentals (Cantonese)
Cyber security fundamentals (Cantonese)
 
State of the ATT&CK May 2023
State of the ATT&CK May 2023State of the ATT&CK May 2023
State of the ATT&CK May 2023
 

Recently uploaded

Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions
 
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubUnleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubKalema Edgar
 
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 3652toLead Limited
 
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptxMaking_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptxnull - The Open Security Community
 
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...shyamraj55
 
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationConnect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationSlibray Presentation
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Snow Chain-Integrated Tire for a Safe Drive on Winter Roads
Snow Chain-Integrated Tire for a Safe Drive on Winter RoadsSnow Chain-Integrated Tire for a Safe Drive on Winter Roads
Snow Chain-Integrated Tire for a Safe Drive on Winter RoadsHyundai Motor Group
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsMark Billinghurst
 
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitecturePixlogix Infotech
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Enterprise Knowledge
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Mattias Andersson
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesSinan KOZAK
 
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksBenefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksSoftradix Technologies
 
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
 
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubUnleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
 
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
 
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptxMaking_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
 
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
 
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptxVulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
 
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
 
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationConnect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024
 
Snow Chain-Integrated Tire for a Safe Drive on Winter Roads
Snow Chain-Integrated Tire for a Safe Drive on Winter RoadsSnow Chain-Integrated Tire for a Safe Drive on Winter Roads
Snow Chain-Integrated Tire for a Safe Drive on Winter Roads
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
 
Hot Sexy call girls in Panjabi Bagh 🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort Service
Hot Sexy call girls in Panjabi Bagh 🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort ServiceHot Sexy call girls in Panjabi Bagh 🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort Service
Hot Sexy call girls in Panjabi Bagh 🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort Service
 
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC BiblioShare - Tech Forum 2024
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
 
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksBenefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
 
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special EditionDMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
 
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
 

Emulating an Adversary with Imperfect Intelligence

  • 1. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10.© 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Emulating an Adversary with Imperfect Intelligence Adam Pennington @_whatshisface
  • 2. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 2 System Owner/User Discovery (T1033) adamp$ whoami § Lead of MITRE ATT&CK § 12 years with MITRE § Focused on threat intel and deception § Past defender and CTI analyst § Part of ATT&CK since it was a spreadsheet with no & § 11 years at Carnegie Mellon as student and researcher § SCUBA diver certified for decompression and rebreather diving § Former live sound engineer § DEF CON attendee since DEF CON 13
  • 3. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 3 Outline §Setting the stage on adversary emulation §Gathering and extracting intelligence §Recognizing imperfections §Filling in the gaps §Organizing our intel into a plan
  • 4. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY. Adversary Emulation A type of red team engagement that mimics a known threat to an organization by leveraging threat intelligence to influence what actions and behaviors the red team uses.
  • 5. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 5 What’s Different About Adversary Emulation? Driven by threat intelligence Scoped to activity like known threat Likely follows a constructed scenario Gives idea of how defenses might fare against adversary
  • 6. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 6 New Challenges Introduced by Emulation Need for intel Lack of intel in a form we can use Lack of intel on chosen adversary Need to turn intel into a workable scenario
  • 7. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Our Adversary Emulation Process | 7 | Gather threat intel Extract techniques Analyze & organize Develop tools Emulate the adversary Today’s Focus
  • 8. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. | 8 | Choose an Adversary and Gather Threat Intelligence • Identify the adversary you want to emulate • Consider who is targeting you and gaps you’re trying to assess • Gather data about that adversary • Look for post-exploit information • Consider their tools, associated groups, and campaigns • Think about the time frame Gather threat intel Extract techniques Analyze & organize Develop tools Emulate the adversary
  • 9. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 9 Identify the Adversary You Want to Emulate § I’m going to leverage ATT&CK, but you don’t have to § Other options § Your own internal groups tracking § Commercial threat intel providers § Open source reports
  • 10. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Command and Control Exfiltration Impact Valid Accounts Scheduled Task/Job Modify Authentication Process System Service Discovery Remote Services Data from Local System Data Obfuscation Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Data Destruction Replication Through Removable Media Windows Management Instrumentation Valid Accounts Network Sniffing Software Deployment Tools Data from Removable Media Fallback Channels Data Encrypted for Impact Hijack Execution Flow OS Credential Dumping Application Window Discovery Application Layer Protocol Scheduled Transfer Service Stop Trusted Relationship Software Deployment Tools Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Direct Volume Access Input Capture Replication Through Removable Media Input Capture Proxy Data Transfer Size Limits Inhibit System Recovery Supply Chain Compromise Create or Modify System Process Rootkit Brute Force System Network Configuration Discovery Data Staged Communication Through Removable Media Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Defacement Hardware Additions Shared Modules Event Triggered Execution Obfuscated Files or Information Two-Factor Authentication Interception Internal Spearphishing Screen Capture Firmware Corruption Exploit Public-Facing Application User Execution Boot or Logon Autostart Execution System Owner/User Discovery Use Alternate Authentication Material Email Collection Web Service Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Resource Hijacking Exploitation for Client Execution Account Manipulation Process Injection Exploitation for Credential Access Clipboard Data Multi-Stage Channels Network Denial of Service Phishing External Remote Services Access Token Manipulation System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Tool Transfer Automated Collection Ingress Tool Transfer Exfiltration Over Web Service Endpoint Denial of Service External Remote Services System Services Office Application Startup Group Policy Modification Steal Web Session Cookie Taint Shared Content Audio Capture Data Encoding System Shutdown/Reboot Drive-by Compromise Command and Scripting Interpreter Create Account Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Unsecured Credentials Permission Groups Discovery Exploitation of Remote Services Video Capture Traffic Signaling Automated Exfiltration Account Access Removal Browser Extensions Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Indicator Removal on Host Credentials from Password Stores Man in the Browser Remote Access Software Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Disk Wipe Native API Traffic Signaling Modify Registry File and Directory Discovery Remote Service Session Hijacking Data from Information Repositories Dynamic Resolution Data Manipulation Inter-Process Communication BITS Jobs Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Non-Standard Port Transfer Data to Cloud AccountServer Software Component Peripheral Device Discovery Man-in-the-Middle Protocol Tunneling Traffic Signaling Forced Authentication Archive Collected Data Encrypted Channel Pre-OS Boot Signed Script Proxy Execution Steal Application Access Token Network Share Discovery Data from Network Shared Drive Non-Application Layer ProtocolCompromise Client Software Binary Password Policy Discovery Rogue Domain Controller Man-in-the-Middle Browser Bookmark Discovery Data from Cloud Storage ObjectImplant Container Image Indirect Command Execution Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionBITS Jobs XSL Script Processing Cloud Service Dashboard Template Injection Software Discovery File and Directory Permissions Modification Query Registry Remote System Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Network Service Scanning Process Discovery Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions System Information Discovery Use Alternate Authentication Material Account Discovery System Time Discovery Impair Defenses Domain Trust Discovery Hide Artifacts Cloud Service Discovery Masquerading Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Signed Binary Proxy Execution Exploitation for Defense Evasion Execution Guardrails Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Pre-OS Boot Subvert Trust Controls ATT&CK Knowledge Base Basics Tactics: the adversary’s technical goals Techniques:howthegoalsare achieved Sub-techniques: More specific techniques Procedures: Adversary technique and sub-technique implementations
  • 11. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Group: APT29 | 11 |
  • 12. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Group: APT29 | 12 |
  • 13. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Group: APT29 | 13 |
  • 14. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. ATT&CK Use Cases | 14 | Threat Intelligence processes = search Process:Create reg = filter processes where (exe == "reg.exe" and parent_exe == "cmd.exe") cmd = filter processes where (exe == "cmd.exe" and parent_exe != "explorer.exe"") reg_and_cmd = join (reg, cmd) where (reg.ppid == cmd.pid and reg.hostname == cmd.hostname) output reg_and_cmd Detection Adversary Emulation Assessment and Engineering Use ATT&CK for Adversary Emulation and Red Teaming The best defense is a well-tested defense. ATT&CK provides a common adversary behavior framework based on threat intelligence that red teams can use to emulate specific threats. This helps cyber defenders find gaps in visibility, defensive tools, and processes—and then fix them. Legend Low Priority High Priority Finding Gaps in Defense Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trap Trusted Developer Utilities User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Remote Management XSL Script Processing Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking External Remote Services File System Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and Directories Hooking Hypervisor Image File Execution Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions Launch Agent Launch Daemon Launchctl LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Local Job Scheduling Login Item Logon Scripts LSASS Driver Modify Existing Service Netsh Helper DLL New Service Office Application Startup Path Interception Plist Modification Port Knocking Port Monitors Rc.common Re-opened Applications Redundant Access Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Scheduled Task Screensaver Security Support Provider Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Shortcut Modification SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Startup Items System Firmware Systemd Service Time Providers Trap Valid Accounts Web Shell Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Winlogon Helper DLL Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid SID-History Injection Startup Items Sudo Sudo Caching Valid Accounts Web Shell CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion Extra Window Memory Injection File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window HISTCONTROL Image File Execution Options Injection Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal from Tools Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Install Root Certificate InstallUtil Launchctl LC_MAIN Hijacking Masquerading Modify Registry Mshta Network Share Connection Removal NTFS File Attributes Obfuscated Files or Information Plist Modification Port Knocking Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing Process Injection Redundant Access Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rootkit Rundll32 Scripting Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Software Packing Space after Filename Template Injection Timestomp Trusted Developer Utilities Valid Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Web Service XSL Script Processing Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multiband Communication Multi-hop Proxy Multilayer Encryption Multi-Stage Channels Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trusted Developer Utilities DLL Search Order Hijacking Image File Execution Options Injection Plist Modification Valid Accounts Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Dylib Hijacking File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Port Monitors Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Startup Items Web Shell .bash_profile and .bashrc Account Manipulation Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware BITS Jobs Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Exploitation for Privilege Escalation SID-History Injection Sudo Sudo Caching Scheduled Task Binary Padding Network Sniffing Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Trap Access Token Manipulation Bypass User Account Control Extra Window Memory Injection Process Injection Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Discovery Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Use ATT&CK for Cyber Threat Intelligence Cyber threat intelligence comes from many sources, including knowledge of past incidents, commercial threat feeds, information-sharing groups, government threat-sharing programs, and more. ATT&CK gives analysts a common language to communicate across reports and organizations, providing a way to structure, compare, and analyze threat intelligence. Use ATT&CK to Build Your Defensive Platform ATT&CK includes resources designed to help cyber defenders develop analytics that detect the techniques used by an adversary. Based on threat intelligence included in ATT&CK or provided by analysts, cyber defenders can create a comprehensive set of analytics to detect threats. Get Started with ATT&CK Legend APT28 APT29 Both Comparing APT28 to APT29 we've chosen 12 of those data sources to show the techniques each of them might be able to detect with the right colle analytics. Check out our website at attack.mitre.org for more information on how each technique can be detected, and adversary examples you can use to start detecting adversary behavior with ATT&CK. You can visualize how your own data sources map to adversary behavior with ATT&CK. Read our blog post at bit.ly/ATT learn how we generated this diagram, check out the code, and begin building your own diagrams from ATT&CK conten Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Execution AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trap Trusted Developer Utilities User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Remote Management XSL Script Processing Persistence .bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features Account Manipulation AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking External Remote Services File System Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and Directories Hooking Hypervisor Image File Execution Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions Launch Agent Launch Daemon Launchctl LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Local Job Scheduling Login Item Logon Scripts LSASS Driver Modify Existing Service Netsh Helper DLL New Service Office Application Startup Path Interception Plist Modification Port Knocking Port Monitors Rc.common Re-opened Applications Redundant Access Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Scheduled Task Screensaver Security Support Provider Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Shortcut Modification SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Startup Items System Firmware Systemd Service Time Providers Trap Valid Accounts Web Shell Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Winlogon Helper DLL Privilege Escalation Access Token Manipulation Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid SID-History Injection Startup Items Sudo Sudo Caching Valid Accounts Web Shell Defense Evasion Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion Extra Window Memory Injection File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window HISTCONTROL Image File Execution Options Injection Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal from Tools Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Install Root Certificate InstallUtil Launchctl LC_MAIN Hijacking Masquerading Modify Registry Mshta Network Share Connection Removal NTFS File Attributes Obfuscated Files or Information Plist Modification Port Knocking Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing Process Injection Redundant Access Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rootkit Rundll32 Scripting Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Software Packing Space after Filename Template Injection Timestomp Trusted Developer Utilities Valid Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Web Service XSL Script Processing Credential Access Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Discovery Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Lateral Movement AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Collection Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Command And Control Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Impact Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Execution AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Persistence .bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features Account Manipulation AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Privilege Escalation Access Token Manipulation Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Defense Evasion Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking Credential Access Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Discovery Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery Lateral Movement AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Collection Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Command And Control Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Impact Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation ob stan Use ATT&CK to Build Your Defensive Platform ATT&CK includes resources designed to help cyber defenders develop analytics that detect the techniques used by an adversary. Based on threat intelligence included in ATT&CK or provided by analysts, cyber defenders can create a comprehensive set of analytics to detect threats. Legend APT28 APT29 Both Legend Low Priority High Priority Comparing APT28 to APT29 Finding Gaps in Defense Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trap Trusted Developer Utilities User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Remote Management XSL Script Processing .bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features Account Manipulation AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking External Remote Services File System Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and Directories Hooking Hypervisor Image File Execution Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions Launch Agent Launch Daemon Launchctl LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Local Job Scheduling Login Item Logon Scripts LSASS Driver Modify Existing Service Netsh Helper DLL New Service Office Application Startup Path Interception Plist Modification Port Knocking Port Monitors Rc.common Re-opened Applications Redundant Access Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Scheduled Task Screensaver Security Support Provider Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Shortcut Modification SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Startup Items System Firmware Systemd Service Time Providers Trap Valid Accounts Web Shell Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Winlogon Helper DLL Access Token Manipulation Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid SID-History Injection Startup Items Sudo Sudo Caching Valid Accounts Web Shell Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion Extra Window Memory Injection File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window HISTCONTROL Image File Execution Options Injection Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal from Tools Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Install Root Certificate InstallUtil Launchctl LC_MAIN Hijacking Masquerading Modify Registry Mshta Network Share Connection Removal NTFS File Attributes Obfuscated Files or Information Plist Modification Port Knocking Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing Process Injection Redundant Access Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rootkit Rundll32 Scripting Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Software Packing Space after Filename Template Injection Timestomp Trusted Developer Utilities Valid Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Web Service XSL Script Processing Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Execution AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trap Trusted Developer Utilities User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Remote Management XSL Script Processing Persistence .bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features Account Manipulation AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking External Remote Services File System Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and Directories Hooking Hypervisor Image File Execution Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions Launch Agent Launch Daemon Launchctl LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Local Job Scheduling Login Item Logon Scripts LSASS Driver Modify Existing Service Netsh Helper DLL New Service Office Application Startup Path Interception Plist Modification Port Knocking Port Monitors Rc.common Re-opened Applications Redundant Access Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Scheduled Task Screensaver Security Support Provider Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Privilege Escalation Access Token Manipulation Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid SID-History Injection Startup Items Sudo Sudo Caching Valid Accounts Web Shell Defense Evasion Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion Extra Window Memory Injection File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window HISTCONTROL Image File Execution Options Injection Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal from Tools Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Install Root Certificate InstallUtil Launchctl LC_MAIN Hijacking Masquerading Modify Registry Mshta Network Share Connection Removal NTFS File Attributes Obfuscated Files or Information Plist Modification Port Knocking Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing Credential Access Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Discovery Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Lateral Movement AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Collection Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Command And Control Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Impact Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation malwarerever net work device logs network intrusion detection system ssl/tls inspection system calls windowseventlogs ocol compromise point denial of service network denial of service obfuscated files or information remote access tools spearphishing attachment standard non-application layer protocoltemplate injection domain fronting drive-by compromise endpoint denial of service install root certificate obfuscated files or information spearphishing link spearphishing via service standard cryptographic protocol web service applescript application shimming browser extensions bypass user account control exploitation for client execution hypervisor kernel modules and extensions keychain rootkit account manipulation bits jobs cm stp em s
  • 15. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 15 Choosing an Adversary Based on Gaps APT28 techniques from ATT&CK (based only on open source reporting) Diagram using ATT&CK Navigator: https://bit.ly/attacknav
  • 16. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 16 Choosing an Adversary Based on Gaps Notional gaps in defenses
  • 17. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 17 Choosing an Adversary Based on Gaps Green = APT28 techniques that can test our gaps
  • 18. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 18 Choosing an Adversary Based on Who is Targeting You • Work with your threat intel team – many ways to prioritize • Adversary who targets you regularly • Adversary who has targeted others like you • Adversary who rarely targets but has a high skill level
  • 19. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 19 Turla / Snake / Venomous Bear
  • 20. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 20 Gather Data About Your Chosen Adversary
  • 21. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. | 21 | Extract Techniques from Reports • Look for behaviors • Identify the adversary tactic • Move from tactic to technique/sub-technique • Work as a team • Free training on how to do this at: https://attack.mitre.org/training/cti Gather threat intel Extract techniques Analyze & organize Develop tools Emulate the adversary
  • 22. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Mapping ATT&CK Techniques | 22 | https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2018/march/apt15-is-alive- and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1574.001) Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) Process Discovery (T1057) Remote System Discovery (T1018) System Network Connections Discovery (T1049) System Information Discovery (T1082) System Network Configuration Discovery (T1016) OS Credential Dumping (T1003) Pass the Ticket (T1550.003) Keylogging (T1056.001) Email Collection (T1114)
  • 23. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 23 Structure Your Collected Intel Turla techniques from ATT&CK (based only on open source reporting)
  • 24. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. | 24 | Analyze and Organize Techniques and Intel • Establish the adversary’s goal • Examine gaps between access and goal • Fill in the gaps you have • Organize intel into technique flow • Organize technique flow into phases Gather threat intel Extract techniques Analyze & organize Develop tools Emulate the adversary
  • 25. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 25 Establish an Adversary’s Goal(s) https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
  • 26. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 26 Examine Gaps Between Access and Goal Why are there gaps? • Open source intel likely doesn’t paint a complete adversary picture • Biases and lack of visibility of adversary activity • Group intel in ATT&CK subject to these biases and we add our own • Biases from what we map and how we map it • Understanding these is important for knowing where gaps likely are
  • 27. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Open Source Biases: Visibility Bias Visible Disk Forensics Network Flows Process Execution Powershell Registry Monitoring Decoded C2 Not Seen 27
  • 28. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Open Source Biases: Novelty Bias Another APT1337 Report APT1338 Report!!! 28
  • 29. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Open Source Biases: Availability Bias All Possible Behaviors Familiar Behaviors 29
  • 30. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Open Source Biases: Victim Bias Victim 4 Victim 5Victim 3 Victim 2 Victim 1 30
  • 31. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Open Source Biases: Production Bias Operation Snakepit APT1337 Report Operation Brown Fox APT1338 Report Ducks in the Wild FUZZYDUCK Report Source 1 Source 2 31
  • 32. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Security Vendors 92% Press Reports 5% Publicly- available Government Reports 3% ATT&CK Biases: Sources We Select From reports used for technique examples in ATT&CK Groups 32
  • 33. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. ATT&CK Biases: Availability Bias All Possible Techniques Techniques We Remember 33
  • 34. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. ATT&CK Biases: Novelty Bias Yet another FUZZYDUCK using Powershell report APT1337 Using Transmitted Data Manipulation 34
  • 35. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 35 Other ATT&CK Group Caveats §Reports from different time periods combined § Reporting frequently doesn’t say when activity happened § Single reports often only show a small range of activity §Groups only include behaviors directly tied to actor activity § Doesn’t include the behaviors of software adversaries use §Reporting doesn’t always agree on attribution
  • 36. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. How Can We Deal With These Limitations? | 24| • Know that they exist • Once you know them, you can better determine where your gaps likely are • Account for the gaps they create as you build your adversary plan Tenor.com
  • 37. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 37 Identifying Possible Gaps for a Specific Adversary Turla techniques from ATT&CK (based only on open source reporting)
  • 38. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 38 Missing Dependencies Turla techniques from ATT&CK (based only on open source reporting) Finding related techniques: https://medium.com/mitre-attack/finding-related-att-ck-techniques-f1a4e8dfe2b6
  • 39. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 39 Missing Dependencies Turla techniques from ATT&CK (based only on open source reporting) Finding related techniques: https://medium.com/mitre-attack/finding-related-att-ck-techniques-f1a4e8dfe2b6
  • 40. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 40 Unusually Sparse Tactics Turla techniques from ATT&CK (based only on open source reporting) Note: Turla is older than cloud storage
  • 41. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. | 41 | Analyze and Organize Techniques and Intel • Establish the adversary’s goal • Examine gaps between access and goal • Fill in the gaps you have • Organize intel into technique flow • Organize technique flow into phases Gather threat intel Extract techniques Analyze & organize Develop tools Emulate the adversary
  • 42. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 42 Techniques for Filling in Gaps Add techniques from software Fill in missing dependencies Examine peer adversaries Look at common techniques
  • 43. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Adding Techniques from Software – Turla Software 43 Arp Carbon certutil ComRAT Empire Epic Gazer Kazuar LightNeuron Mimikatz Mosquito nbtstat Net netstat PowerStallion PsExec Reg Systeminfo Tasklist Uroburos
  • 44. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Turla Software – Utilities 44 Arp Carbon certutil ComRAT Empire Epic Gazer Kazuar LightNeuron Mimikatz Mosquito nbtstat Net netstat PowerStallion PsExec Reg Systeminfo Tasklist Uroburos
  • 45. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Turla Software – Public Tools 45 Arp Carbon certutil ComRAT Empire Epic Gazer Kazuar LightNeuron Mimikatz Mosquito nbtstat Net netstat PowerStallion PsExec Reg Systeminfo Tasklist Uroburos
  • 46. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Turla Software – Possibly Unique to Turla 46 Arp Carbon certutil ComRAT Empire Epic Gazer Kazuar LightNeuron Mimikatz Mosquito nbtstat Net netstat PowerStallion PsExec Reg Systeminfo Tasklist Uroburos
  • 47. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Turla Software – Possibly Unique to Turla 47
  • 48. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Turla Techniques Plus Turla Software 48 Blue = Turla Red = Turla SW Green = Both
  • 49. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Fill in Missing Dependencies 49 Blue = Turla Red = Turla SW Green = Both
  • 50. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Fill in Missing Dependencies 50 Blue = Turla Red = Turla SW Green = Both
  • 51. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Fill in Missing Dependencies 51 Turla + Software + Dependencies
  • 52. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 52 Examine Peer Adversaries – APT28 + APT29 Other Russia attributed groups focused on data theft Green = Techniques used by both
  • 53. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Look at Common Techniques 53 1. Process Injection 2. Scheduled Task 3. Windows Admin Shares 4. PowerShell 5. Remote File Copy 6. Masquerading 7. Scripting 8. DLL Search Order Hijacking 9. Domain Trust Discovery 10.Disabling Security Tools 1. Security Software Discovery 2. Obfuscated Files or Info 3. Process Injection 4. System Info Discovery 5. Process Discovery 6. Software Packing 7. DLL Side-Loading 8. Data Encrypted 9. Execution through API 10.Standard Crypto Protocol
  • 54. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. | 54 | Analyze and Organize Techniques and Intel • Establish the adversary’s goal • Examine gaps between access and goal • Fill in the gaps you have • Organize intel into technique flow • Organize technique flow into phases Gather threat intel Extract techniques Analyze & organize Develop tools Emulate the adversary
  • 55. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Turla Compiled Technique Profile 55 Turla + Software + Dependencies
  • 56. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 56 Organize Intel into Technique Flow Initial Access • Spearphishing Attachment • Spearphishing Link • Drive-by Compromise Execution • PowerShell • Malicious File • Malicious Link Defense Evasion • Deobfuscate Files or Info • Hidden File System • Code Signing Discovery • File and Dir Discovery • Peripheral Dev Discovery • System Info Discovery Credential Access • OS Credential Dumping • Creds from PW Stores Persistence • Shortcut Modification • Winlogon Helper DLL • Screensaver • PowerShell Profile Lateral Movement • Lateral Tool Transfer • SMB/Win Admin SharesPrivilege Escalation • Create Process w/ Token • COM Hijacking • DLL Injection Collection • Data from Remov. Media • Remote Email Collection • Data from Info Repos Exfiltration • Exfil to Cloud Storage • Exfil over C2 Channel
  • 57. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 57 Organize Technique Flow into Plan Phases Initial Access Execution Defense Evasion Discovery Credential Access Persistence Lateral Movement Privilege Escalation Collection Exfiltration Reconnaissance Resource Development Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
  • 58. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. Tool up and Emulate | 58 | Develop Tools • Will COTS/FOSS work? • Need custom dev? • Payloads inspired by APT Emulate • Setup infra and test • Emulate the adversary! • Follow the adversary MO • Think about your goal • Think about pacing Gather threat intel Extract techniques Analyze & organize Develop tools Emulate the adversary
  • 59. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 59 In Closing Pick your adversary to emulate wisely The intel on your adversary isn’t perfect You can still emulate an adversary with imperfect intel
  • 60. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. 60 ATT&CK Adversary Emulation Resources § ATT&CK Navigator § Live Version: http://bit.ly/attacknav § Source: https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-navigator § ATT&CK: https://attack.mitre.org/ § APT3 Emulation plan: https://attack.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-plans/ § APT29 Emulation plan: https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal § CALDERA: https://github.com/mitre/caldera
  • 61. © 2020 THE MITRE CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 20-00841-10. https://attack.mitre.org attack@mitre.org @mitreattack Adam Pennington @_whatshisface