Napoleon Part 2, session vi Voelkerschlacht

Napoleon
Part 2
session vi
Völkerschlacht

Napoleon La Resistance
Part 2 de
1814

session vi
Völkerschlacht

My star was fading. I felt the reins
slipping out of my grasp, and could
do nothing to stop it.

--Napoleon

major topics for this session

I. Rise of German Nationalism

II.Leipzig, The Battle of the Nations (Volkerschlacht)

III. Invasion of France

IV. Abdication

1813 Campaign
Leipzig
16-19 October

1814 Campaign

The 19th century statue of Arminius,
the Hermannsdenkmal

Rise of German
Nationalism

‘In the beginning was Napoleon' -- with these words the late and much-lamented Thomas
Nipperday began his masterly account of the history of Germany in the nineteenth century
(recently translated as From Napoleon to Bismarck). Like most lapidary phrases, it begs as many
questions as it answers. Many of the forces which turned Germany into the greatest power on
the European continent went back far into the eighteenth century and beyond. But, as we
shall see, there is certainly a great deal to be said for taking Napoleon as the starting point.

Tim Blanning,”Napoleon and German Identity: How Napoleon Laid Up Trouble for Future Generations of Frenchmen by
Kick-Starting Prussian and German Domination of Eastern Europe” History Today, vol. 48, April 1998

What are the Germans? enquired Friedrich von Moser in 1766 replying to his question as
follows: ‘What we are, then, we have been for centuries; that is, a puzzle of a political
constitution, a prey of our neighbors, an object of their scorn, … disunited among ourselves,
weak from our divisions, strong enough to harm ourselves, powerless to save ourselves,
insensitive to the honour of our name, … a great but also a despised people….”

Hagen Schulze, The Course of German Nationalism from Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763-1867, p.43

The End of the Ancien Régime in Central Europe

✦ 1801-the Treaty of Luneville, which ended Austria’s part in the war of the
Second Coalition, gave the German states of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE)
located on the west bank of the Rhine to France

The Thus began the
Lower break-up of this
Rhine medieval
institution

These German
Rhinelanders
were the ﬁrst to
taste the reforms
of the French
Revolution

The End of the Ancien Régime in Central Europe
✦ 1801-the Treaty of Luneville, which ended Austria’s part in the war of the
Second Coalition, gave the German states of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE)
located on the west bank of the Rhine to France

✦ there was a great political division among the German political classes
between the admirers and the opponents of the French Revolution

✦ a famous example was Beethoven who originally dedicated his Third
Symphony to Napoleon only to change it in ...

✦ 1805-after the defeat of Austria for the third time, the Treaty of Pressburg
continued the demise of the HRE

✦ July 1806- the Rheinbundachte created a 16 state confederation of German
states under Bonaparte’s protection. Austria dissolved the HRE that August

✦ over the next seven years, 23 more German states, composed from the remains
of the former HRE, would ally with Napoleon

The Rise of German Nationalism
or The German Princes vs das deutsche Völk oder die deutsche Nation

✦ as many Prussian patriots were girding to ﬁght the French and redeem the
military humiliations of Jena-Auerstedt in1806, most of the princes hesitated

✦ many princes had personally beneﬁtted from Napoleon’s destruction of the 306
feudal states of the Holy Roman Empire

✦ they had gained the lands and taxes of the former church properties, “free cities”
and “free knights of the empire”

✦ most princes in the central, southern and, especially western and Catholic,
Germanies, preferred to sit on the sidelines and wait to see who won the struggle

✦ this infuriated the emerging group of pan-German nationalists. They came to
believe that all the princely divisions needed to be swept away as Medieval relics
and be replaced by a German Nation under either Habsburg (Groß) or
Hohenzollern (Klein) (Greater or Smaller German) leadership

✦ this German Question would be answered in 1866-1871

Prussia; A Special Case
✦ 1806-the Prussian civilian population had stood aside politely while the French emperor
struck a mortal blow at their own king’s army. Even if the Prussians did not openly
approve of the coming of the French, they certainly regarded them with open interest

✦ It took them no more than a couple of years to realize that their country had become
just another cow to be milked by Napoleon. Their king, Frederick William III, had
been no Frederick the Great. If they had felt themselves bound to the idea of Prussia, it
had been to the state and its institutions, not to the king

✦ 1812-the Prussian nation had done an about-face. The king had become a partner in his
people’s suffering. While Napoleon had not incurred the enmity of the Prussian nation
by waging war against its king, it had become hostile when he became its master by
remote control….

✦ 1813-the rising of the Prussian nation was something Frederick William could have
never accomplished by decree. Only Napoleon could take credit for that

Richard Riehn, Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, pp. 68-69

Prussia’s Special Spur to Military Reform
✦ 1807-the Treaty of Tilsit deeply humiliated Prussia, reducing her territory and imposing
economic terms which threatened her with ruin

✦ ministers Stein and Hardenberg were able to pressure King Frederick William III to adopt a
famous series of reforms:

✦ 1807-Edict of Emancipation-ended serfdom and class distinctions based on occupation. It also ended
separate conditions of land tenure under the law, e.g., nobles’ estates, peasants lands

✦ next the cabinet system was strengthened on British lines, as against monarchial absolutism

✦ 1808-municipal reform-local self-government for towns and villages greater than 800 inhabitants

✦ they also promoted the military reforms of Chief of the Prussian General Staff, General
Gerhard von Scharnhorst:

✦ 1813-compulsory universal service was the crowning reform

✦ promotion by merit, creation of the Landwehr (reserve system) was begun

✦ military administration was simpliﬁed and rationalized

The aristocracy and middle-classes were in the grip of a surge of patriotic
feeling, and many banded themselves together into volunteer Jäeger
formations. In a similar fashion, Freicorps came into existence---mainly
consisting of foreigners [i.e., non-Prussian Germans]. By April 1813 there
were over 80,000 men under arms, and the net result of all these measures
was the creation, by the end of the June-August armistice, of an army of
228,000 infantry, 31,100 cavalry and 13,000 gunners and sappers, with 376
cannon at their disposal.

Chandler, p.873

Lützow’sches Freikorps
! Feb 1813-founded as the Royal Prussian Free Corps von
Lützow, after its founder

! alleged to have consisted mostly of students and academics
from all over Germany; actually, these amounted to no
more than 12%, most were laborers

! average corps size, 1,200 infantry, 600 cavalry and 120
artillery. Operating ﬁrst in the rear of the French forces,
then with regular Allied units

! Despite its small size the corps became famous after the
war, as it was the only unit in the army consisting of people
from all over Germany. Also, it contained academics,
writers and other well known people such as Karl Körner
and Friedrich Jahn. The educator Friedrich Fröbel who
later developed the concept of the kindergarten also
belonged to the corps.

! In addition, two women, Eleonore Prochaska and Anna
Lühring, had managed to join in disguise. their black-red-gold uniform color scheme became
associated with republican ideals

“Potsdam’s Joan of Arc”
n Eleonore's father was an ofﬁcer in the Prussian guards, on a
low income. She grew up poor and was sent by her father to
the military orphanage in Potsdam when her mother died

n she disguised herself as a man and registered for 1
Jägerbataillon of the Lützow Free Corps under the name
August Renz, serving ﬁrst as a drummer, then later as an
infantryman

Eleonore Prochaska
1785 - 5 October 1813

“Potsdam’s Joan of Arc”
n Eleonore's father was an officer in the Prussian guards, on a
low income. She grew up poor and was sent by her father to
the military orphanage in Potsdam when her mother died

n she disguised herself as a man and registered for 1
Jägerbataillon of the Lützow Free Corps under the name
August Renz, serving first as a drummer, then later as an
infantryman

n She was severely wounded and field-surgeons, rushing to
treat her wounds, discovered she was a woman and took her
to Dannenberg, where she succumbed to her wounds three
weeks later

n In retrospect, she was strongly idealized as a chaste heroine
and honored as "die Potsdamer Jeanne d'Arc". Various
plays and poems were written on her life , whilst Ludwig
van Beethoven began a "Bühnenmusik" (WoO 96) on her,
with a libretto entitled "Eleonore Prochaska" written by the Eleonore Prochaska
Prussian royal private-secretary Friedrich Duncker
1785 - 5 October 1813

Karl Theodor Körner (1791 – 26 August 1813) was a German poet
and soldier. After some time in Vienna, where he wrote some light
comedies and other works, he became a soldier [at age 21] and joined
the German uprising against Napoleon. During these times, he
displayed personal courage in many fights, and encouraged his
comrades by fiery patriotic lyrics he composed, one of these being
“Schwertlied" (Sword Song), composed during a lull in fighting only a
few hours before his death and set to music by Franz Schubert.

Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778 – 1852) He studied theology and philology from
1796 to 1802 at Halle, Göttingen and the University of Greifswald. After the Battle
of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806 he joined the Prussian army. In 1809 he went to Berlin,
where he became a teacher at the Gymnasium. Brooding upon what he saw as the
humiliation of his native land by Napoleon, Jahn conceived the idea of restoring
the spirits of his countrymen by the development of their physical and moral
powers through the practice of gymnastics. The first Turnplatz, or open-air
gymnasium, was opened by Jahn in Berlin in 1811, and the Turnverein (gymnastics
association) movement spread rapidly. Young gymnasts were taught to regard
themselves as members of a kind of guild for the emancipation of their fatherland.
This nationalistic spirit was nourished in no small degree by the writings of Jahn.
Early in 1813 [at age 35] Jahn took an active part in the formation of the famous
Lützow Free Corps, a volunteer force in the Prussian army fighting Napoleon. He
commanded a battalion of the corps, though he was often employed in the secret
service during the same period.

During the short one-and-a-half years of the War of Liberation, the
volunteer bands felt themselves to be ‘the nation in arms’. The political
aims of the youths and burghers who gathered together in the Freikorps
appear obvious, when one looks at the prevalent programatic
lyrics…‘What is the German’s Fatherland?’ asked Ernst Moritz Arndt in
1813:
Is it Prussia? Is it Swabia?
Is it along the Rhine where the vine resides?
Is it along the Belt where the seagull glides?
Oh no! No! No!
His Fatherland must be greater still!

It must be--Germany is presented as will and idea, in a purely optative
form. Arndt’s Song of the Fatherland employs felicitous couplets to run
through provinces and countries...and then concludes:
As far as the German tongue rings
And to God in Heaven Lieder sings
That’s where it should be!
That, bold German, pertains to thee!

Schulze, p. 54

II. Leipzig, The Battle of the
Nations(Völkerschlacht)

It was high time for Napoleon to reconsider his strategy….He might mass
the bulk of his forces for a drive against Prague, hoping to complete the
defeat of [Schwarzenberg]; if this was successful this might drive Austria
out of the war. Or, alternatively, he might renew the advance against Berlin.
Once again, the old lure of his April “master plan” won the day. It offered
palpable advantages. To the northward the countryside was still relatively
unravaged and could be therefore be expected to yield considerable
supplies. The French would also be able to assume a more central position
in the face of the three Allied armies. And even if Schwarzenberg did
decide to double back...and head for Dresden once more, ...a new offensive
over the Bohemian mountains would take a considerable period, by which
time the French could be in Berlin and on their way to the relief of Stettin.
Such a threat must surely draw the Prussians and Russians north, leaving
Austria precariously isolated. A sudden move south would then place
Napoleon in a commanding position, with power to end the war in a blaze
of glory.

Chandler, pp. 912-913

BERLIN

PRAGUE

Situation Evening of 30 April 1813 After
Vandamme’s defeat at Kulm

BERLIN

Macdonald, “already a beaten man” (Chandler) was pleading for help. Napoleon
marched east on 2 September with the Guard, Latour-Maubourg and Marmont,
gendarmes were sent ahead to deal with Macdonald’s stragglers and deserters.
He also ordered Poniatowski to be ready to fall on Blücher’s left ﬂank.
Macdonald was told to get his army concentrated so that the Emperor could
inspect it in a half hour.

MACDONALD

PRAGUE


BERLIN

MACDONALD

Undoubtedly, Napoleon hoped to deal with Blücher as he had with
Schwarzenberg, but the sight of Macdonald’s demoralized command drove him
into an unusual ﬁt of public fury. Riding on to Hochkirch, he saw Blücher’s
advance guard approaching, and ordered the nearest French units against it.
Revitalized by his presence, these whipped men turned on the Prussians with
PRAGUE
such enthusiasm that Blücher rapidly guessed its cause and at once retreated [in
accordance with the Trachtenberg Plan]. Esposito & Elting, MAP 138

a

c

Recognizing that Blücher had no intention of ﬁghting d
(Map a, above), on 5 September, Napoleon ordered
Macdonald to drive Blücher east of the Queiss River.
His plans to advance on Berlin were interrupted by
the report that Schwarzenberg had recrossed the
Elbe with 60,000 Austrians. Barclay, with the rest of
the Army of Bohemia was threatening Dresden.
That same day he learned that Ney had
aggressively blundered into a trap that Bernadotte
had set for him. The French were almost saved by
Renier’s skill and the fury with which the French
came on. But Ney managed to lose the battle and
retreated to Torgau in great disorder, having lost
some 10,000 men to the Allies’ 7,000. Situation 19 September Situation 9 October

Returning to Dresden, Napoleon advanced on a 8
September (map b) through Fürstenwalde aiming at
Teplitz. Barclay fell back through Peterswalde;
Schwarzenberg hastily recrossed the Elbe. On 10
September Napoleon came over the mountains just
west of Kulm. In 1796 Napoleon would have
attacked. Now, his artillery was unable to get into
action over the ruined roads, and he would not risk
his conscripts without it.
Increasingly bad weather made further movements
almost impossible. His problems were further
complicated by Macdonald’s tendency to withdraw
every time Blücher stirred.
c

d

Situation 19 September Situation 9 October

a

c

After considering a variety of plans, Napoleon abruptly decided to retire west of the Elbe (map c)
d
retaining strong bridgeheads at Königstein, Pillnitz, Dresden, Meissen, Torgau, Wittenberg and
Magdeburg. This done, he would clear up his rear area [of Cossacks and Freikorps], reorganize his
communications and wait for the Allies to come and be killed. This withdrawal began on the 24th.
The Allies developed a new plan: once Bennigsen arrived, Blücher would march north to join
Bernadotte; Schwarzenberg would advance on Leipzig via Chemnitz. (There is no trace of any plan to
coordinate their operations.) Blücher marched on the 25th….
Napoleon had already decided that Dresden was too close to the Bohemian mountains (behind which
the beaten enemy could always take refuge) to be a satisfactory central position. Leipzig appeared to be a
better one. Blücher’s maneuvers left him suspicious but uncertain until 4 October, when Marmont warned
him that Blücher had forced the Elbe at Wartenburg the day before, driving Bertrand off after a hard
ﬁght (map d).


Bernadotte now began breaking out of Rosslaua and Barby. Napoleon now rearranged his troops
according to a plan to cross the Elbe at either Torgau or Wittenberg, cutting communications between
Bernadotte and Blücher. Murat would delay Schwarzenberg, keeping between him and Leipzig.
Learning on 8 October that Bernadotte and Blücher had come close together west of the Elbe,
Napoleon changed his orders. Ney was to join him and move north to attack the Allies. Weakened by
short rations and bad weather, the French marched more slowly than usual. Blücher and Bernadotte,
having lost contact with Ney, were angrily disputing the wisdom of moving further. Suddenly confronted
by Napoleon’s converging columns, they chose (apparently on Blücher’s initiative) to retire westward
across the Salle, rather than recross the Elbe. A frantic scramble got Blücher clear, though Sebastiani cut
up his rearguard and captured his supply trains.
Esposito & Elting, MAP 139

c

d


Although healthy reinforcements were steadily reaching the enemy, the French were not so fortunate.
Napoleon’s only immediate assets were Augereau’s corps coming from Würzburg and the Bavarian
army, vapid at best, loitering on the Bavarian frontiers but at least holding one Austrian army in check.
Eugene’s army in northern Italy was facing another Austrian army and would go nowhere. Davout’s
divisions were stumbling around the countryside south of Hamburg and would soon retire inside its
walls….Garrisons in Danzig, Stettin and Küstrin fortresses might as well have been on the moon. The
combat troops were generally exhausted, hungry, their uniforms in tatters, many lacking shoes.

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
Situation the Evening of 13 October
and Concentrations Prior to the
Battle of Leipzig

Napoleon must have been on the verge of
exhaustion. For weeks he had been almost
constantly on the move, ﬁghting a dozen
battles often in miserable weather, all in
futile pursuit of that “decisive battle.”
Why then did he persist in his discredited
strategy? The short answer is that he did
not believe that it was discredited. We are
dealing here with disparate and complex
factors working on a strange amalgam of
past and present caught in the fearful coils
of the arrogance of ignorance, trapped in
his belief of enemy impotence and
cowardice, failing to recognize that his
once omnipotent and beautiful army had
weakened and withered into halting old
age….

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
Battle of Leipzig

Professionally, he was failing to respect the interplay of quantitative and qualitative factors that govern
the battleﬁeld, the basis of the formula which when applied to his immense strategic and tactical skills
explained his former military mastery. That was the real key to his disjointed actions and spurious
decisions and it is at once terribly sad, yet in another sense strangely noble--a defeated man refusing to
accept defeat.
Asprey, pp. 326-327

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
Battle of Leipzig

er
e Riv
Parth
Elste
r Riv
er

Lupp
e Riv
er

Leipzig offered several advantages for
a resourceful commander. The ﬁve
rivers that converged there split the
surrounding terrain into as many
separate sectors. Holding Leipzig and
its bridges, Napoleon could shift
troops from one sector to another far
more rapidly than could the Allies.
(And to compound their troubles, he
had destroyed most of the nearby
bridges over the Elster and Pleisse Pleisse River
rivers,)

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
BATTLE OF LEIPZIG Elster River

Situation Early 16 October 1813

1 0 1 2

SCALE OF MILES

er
e Riv
Parth
Elste
r Riv
er

Lupp
e Riv
er

Two sectors--that between the Luppe and
the Elster, and the one between the Elster
and the Pleisse--were so cut up by
marshes, ditches and gardens that they
were impassable for formed bodies of
troops. Between the Pleisse and the
Parthe, the countryside was marked by a
series of low concentric ridges, dotted with
solidly built villages, but open enough for Pleisse River
massed cavalry. The dominating features
were the Galgenberg and the nearby
Kolm Berg. Napoleon and several of his
subordinates had thoroughly reconnoitered
LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
thisBATTLE OF LEIPZIG
entire area. Elster River


1 0 1 2

SCALE OF MILES

er
Leipzigarthe Riv
P
proper had a decayed city
Elste
r Riv
er
wall, but its gates were still in fair
repair. The outer edges of its suburbs
(as at Dresden) had been organized
for defense, and there was a small
Lupp
e Riv
er
fortiﬁed bridgehead at
Lindenau.Between Leipzig and
Lindenau, the road was a potential
bottleneck--a built up causeway, a mile
and a half long, cut by several bridges.
Southwestward, this road continued
R OA
D
on to Lützen, Erfurt, and to France.
T
RF
UR Since Napoleon at this time considered
E
himself based on the Torgau-Wittenberg-
Magdeburg fortress complex, he regarded
this Erfurt road only as an alternate line
of communication. Consequently, he did
Pleisse River
not order extra bridges constructed
between Leipzig and Lindenau.
(Because of the swampy terrain, this
would have been a major engineering
LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN project, for which he had neither the
time nor material.)

1 0 1 2

SCALE OF MILES

er
e Riv
Parth
Elste
r Riv
er
The night of the 14th-15th, Napoleon, as usual, studied the enemy’s campfires for indications of
their dispositions. This time they roundly deceived him. Noting a large cluster near Markrandstädt
he concluded that Bernadotte and Blücher had moved south from Halle to cut his communication
withupErfurt and link up with Schwarzenberg’s left flank. Actually, Bernadotte was still north of
L p
e Riv
er
Halle; Blücher, marching on Schkeuditz. The campfires were Gyulai’s….
Though outnumbered, Napoleon planned to take the offensive between the Pleisse and the Parthe
Rivers….

Pleisse River

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN


1 0 1 2

SCALE OF MILES

er
e Riv
Parth
Elste
r Riv
er

Lupp
e Riv
er

Schwarzenberg’s original plan called
for a secondary attack on Lindenau by
Blücher and Gyulai, and a main attack
astride the Pleisse River….This plan had Pleisse River

the unusual virtue of being so bad that
e v e r y o n e p r o t e s t e d . A l e x a n d e r,
“surprised beyond measure at this
LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
u n a n i m iOF LEIPZIG o n g h i s g e nElstera l s , ”
BATTLE t y a m e r River
intervened, October 1813 Schwarzenberg to
forcing
Situation Early 16
develop a new plan that was largely
designed to 1let everyone do as they
1 0 2

pleased. OF MILES
SCALE

er
e Riv
Parth
Elste
r Riv
er
To sum up, Napoleon massed approximately
121,700 out of 177,500 available men in the
decisive sector; the Allies managed 77,500 (plus
24,000 in reserve) out of more than 200,000….
Lupp
e Riv
er
On the Allied side, Barclay entrusted the
organization of the main attack to Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein thoroughly scrambled the available
units, then spred them out on a six-mile front,
too far apart to maintain visual contact across
that rolling terrain. The morning was rainy and
fog-bound, delaying the Allied attack to 0800, but
also slowing Macdonald’s approach march.

Pleisse River

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN


1 0 1 2

SCALE OF MILES

er
e Riv
Parth
Elste
r Riv
er

Lupp
e Riv
er

Pleisse River

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN


1 0 1 2

SCALE OF MILES

Situation 1100, 16 Oct, Just Prior
to Napoleon’s Counterattack

Richard Woodville Caton, Poniatowski’s Last Charge, 1912

...it appeared that Napoleon was on the point of bringing off a model
combined evacuation and river crossing in the face of the enemy ﬁt to rival
the celebrated passage of the Berezina in 1812.
Unfortunately, however, Napoleon delegated responsibility [authority,
a commander can delegate authority, but never responsibility, jbp] for
preparing the causeway for demolition to an unreliable general ofﬁcer of
the Guard named Dulaloy. He in turn passed on the task to a Colonel
Montfort, who soon decided that the whistle of musketballs was coming
uncomfortably close and quitted the scene, leaving one miserable corporal
in charge of the demolition. This unfortunate individual panicked at one
o’clock and without the least need blew the bridge in spite of the fact that
it was crowded with French troops. This criminal mistake turned a
successful withdrawal operation into a disaster, for the rear guard was
trapped in Leipzig with no means of making good their escape. Oudinot
managed to swim his way over the Elster, but Poniatowski, handicapped
by his wounds was drowned attempting the same feat--a mere twelve
hours after being appointed a marshal.


January Suchodolski, Death of Poniatowski, before 1830

Over the four-day period the Allies probably lost 54,00 killed and
wounded…. As for the French, their battle casualties were probably in
excess of 38,000, but a further 30,000 fell into Allied hands on the 19th.
Additionally, 5,000 German troops defected to the enemy during the
battle. The French losses included six general ofﬁcers killed, a further
twelve wounded, and no less than thirty-six fell into Allied hands as
prisoners of war, a fate also shared by the King of Saxony. In terms of
materiel, Napoleon abandoned at least 325 cannon, most of his trains and
transport stores and large quantities of military stores.
The long battle was the severest of the Napoleonic Wars save only for
Borodino; over 200,000 rounds of artillery ammunition were discharged,
and by the 19th the French stocks were down to a mere 20,000. The
ultimate result was to destroy what was left of the French empire east of
the Rhine…. Militarily, Leipzig dealt a heavy blow to Napoleon’s martial
reputation, and eventually destroyed over two thirds of France’s hard-
found forces outside Spain. Politically, it marked the emergence of Prussia
as a leading power in Germany once more, and prepared the way for the
birth of modern Europe.

Chandler, p. 936

Napoleon, indeed, was guilty of several severe political and military
miscalculations which between them underlay his failure. He tended to
despise his opponents…. He never expected that his father-in-law, the
Emperor of Austria, would turn fully against him, he never appreciated
how sick were the German states of the French yoke…. He left thousands
of invaluable ﬁghting men and several of his best generals south of the
Pyrenees. But worst of all, he never realized that there was a new spirit
abroad in Europe; he still believed that he was dealing with the old feudal
monarchies which in fact his earlier victories had largely swept away.
France was no longer the only country to be imbued with a genuine
national inspiration or equipped with a truly national army. France’s foes
had at last learned valuable lessons from their earlier defeats, both political
and military, and were now learning to employ their new-found strength
against a rapidly tiring opponent. In the words of General Fuller, for
Napoleon the battle of Leipzig was “a second Trafalgar, this time on land;
his initiative was gone.”


Against greatly superior forces it is possible to win a battle, but
hardly a war--NAPOLEON

III.Invasion of
France

A people who have been brought up
on victories often do not know how to
accept defeat.

--Napoleon

A people who have been brought up
on victories often do not know how to
accept defeat. La Résistance de 1814

--Napoleon

Would the war continue or would there be peace? The negotiating
waters rising from a slimy bottom composed of ambition, greed, fear,
arrogance and deceit, remained deep and dark….
In mid November, Napoleon ordered Marshal Marmont to discuss
terms of capitulation of the beseiged fortresses, including Dresden…
and to request the traditional “honorable surrender” which would
allow the troops to march home with arms and equipment. Prior to
this...Metternich had summoned the French...to peace talks at
Frankfurt…. Such was the Allied altruism that France would only
have to return to its “natural” frontiers--the Rhine, the Alps and the
Pyrenees….
...Metternich wrote General Caulaincourt: “...France will never sign
a more fortunate peace than that which the Powers will make today.”
Asprey, pp. 337-338

Baron de Marbot writes, "No previous general had ever shown
such talent, or achieved so much with such feeble resources.
With a few thousand men, most of whom were inexperienced
conscripts, one saw him face the armies of Europe, turning up
everywhere with these troops, which he led from one point to
another with marvellous rapidity. ... he hurried from the
Austrians to the Russians, and from the Russians to the
Prussians, ... sometimes beaten by them, but much more often
the victor. He hoped, for a time, that he might drive the
foreigners, disheartened by frequent defeats, from French soil
and back across the Rhine. All that was required was a new
effort by the nation; but there was general war-weariness..."
http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/La_Rothiere_battle.htm

! mid-December 1813-he expected that the main a

Allied offensive would strike directly across the
lower Rhine (map a)

! if ﬁnally forced back by superior numbers, the
marshals must cover Paris

! Augereau would form a new army at Lyons for an
advance to the northeast across Schwarzenberg’s
line of communications

! (map b) eastern France was quickly overrun, the
open cities surrendering to handfuls of cavalry b

! the demoralizing behavior of several marshals
contributed to the civilians’ servile behavior Châlons-sur-Marne

! only Mortier did his duty, ﬁghting an aggressive,
18 day delaying action from Langres back to Bar-
sur-Aube MORTIER

! 26 Jan-Napoleon takes command--E&E, MAP 145
Situation Early 26 January

The drafts from
Italy fail to
materialize
Joachim Murat, King of
Naples

The chief reason for this was the defection of
Murat, Napoleon’s brother-in-law, on January
11th. “The conduct of the King of Naples is
infamous,” stormed the Emperor to Fouché on
February 13th, “and that of the Queen quite
unspeakable. I hope to live long enough to avenge
for myself and for France such an outrage and such Caroline Murat and daughter in 1807. The
painting is by Élisabeth Vigée-Lebrun
horrible ingratitude.” This desertion ultimately
strengthened the Allies in North Italy by a further Maria Annunziata Carolina Murat (née
Bonaparte) (1782 – 1839), better known as
30,000 Neapolitan troops; this inevitably rendered Caroline Bonaparte, was the seventh surviving
Eugène’s position more difﬁcult. Then on 14 child and third surviving daughter of Carlo

January, the King of Denmark also signed an Buonaparte and Letizia Ramolino

agreement with the Allies….
Chandler, p. 950

Against Overwhelming Odds, Still Not Admitting Defeat
✦ Nov-Jan 1814-a ﬂurry of diplomatic exchanges
produce no acceptable peace

✦ 26 January-traveling from Paris, Napoleon
reaches Imperial headquarters at Châlons-sur-
Marne to take command

✦ although his own strength was not slight, it was
dangerously dispersed

✦ many of his best veterans were besieged to the
north and east

✦ Soult and Suchet had to protect the south

✦ Eugene had to face the Austrians in Italy, soon to
be joined by the turncoat Murat’s Neapolitans

✦ Napoleon’s troops lacked food, clothing and shoes

✦ volunteers were many, but he had few and often
no arms for them--Asprey, pp. 344-345

A bleak picture, yes, but not without some merits. The allies had not marched
all this way without some losses of their own. They had suffered heavily in
Saxony, they were forced to leave substantial garrisons and siege forces in
Germany, Holland, Belgium and northern France, their ponderous supply
lines were uncomfortably stretched and they were not agreed as to a strategic
objective. Czar Alexander, strongly influenced by his militant advisors who
were Napoleon’s old nemeses, the Prussian Stein and the Corsican Pozzo di
Borgo, and King Frederick William, influenced by Alexander and by his own
General Gneisenau, wanted to march straight on Paris. Prince Schwarzenberg
commanding the large Austrian force was reluctant to do so. Although
Napoleon dangerously minimized allied strengths he was correct in writing
to one of his marshals that the enemy “are scattered in all directions.”
Napoleon also held the decided advantage of fighting on interior lines.
Asprey, p. 345

So skilled a soldier as the Emperor knew how much advantage could be
obtained from this river- and road-dominated terrain in mounting a
defensive campaign...employing the smaller petites places as food and
ammunition depots, Napoleon considered that he could dispense with long,
slow-moving convoys and thus be able to prosecute operations of lightning
speed against heavily encumbered opponents. Every effort must be made to
keep the foe from fully uniting his forces, but a full-scale battle must be
avoided….A war of subtlety and fast maneuver, of engagements with
isolated enemy detachments on adventageous French terms, of slim forces
manning the river lines to hold off the hostile masses….”It is necessary to fall
well concentrated on some corps of the enemy and destroy it,” wrote
Napoleon to some officer on his staff (january 23). The rapier of 1796 was to
replace the bludgeon of 1812.
After a slow start and despite the disastrous outcome, this was to be one of
Napoleon’s finest campaigns. His powers of generalship took on a new lease
of life and inspiration; unfortunately few of the generals and none of the
politicians rose to the occasion--although the “Marie-Louise” conscripts were
to perform wonders under Napoleon’s leadership.
Chandler, p. 955

ST DIZIER

BAR-SUR-AUBE

At Châlons, Napoleon learned that Blücher was approaching St. Dizier;
Schwarzenberg, Bar-sur-Aube. Both armies were considerably weakened by
detachments left to blockade various fortified towns., but they were very
close to establishing contact. If Napoleon was to catch either one separately,
he must strike promptly. Blücher, advancing with the apparent intention of
reaching Paris ahead of Schwarzenberg, was the nearer and weaker target.
Esposito & Elting, Commentary on MAP 145

NAPOLEON (40,000) ! (large map a) 26 Jan-Blücher takes St. Dizier &
BLUCHER (53,000) pushes on to Brienne, Napoleon cuts his LOC

! 29 Jan-Blücher intercepts a copy of Napoleon’s
orders and is able to escape the trap (losses: Fr=3,000
Prussian=4,000)

! 30 Jan-Napoleon forces Blücher out of La Rothiere

! the Allies concentrated haphazardly as Blücher’s men
mixed with Schwarzenberg’s advance

! (map a-insert)1 Feb-Blücher overpowers Napoleon
at La Rothiere with superior numbers (both lose
6,000, Fr also abandon 50 guns)

! Inﬂated with overconﬁdence at having defeated
Napoleon on French soil, and certain he was no
longer dangerous, the Allies decided to march
immediately on Paris (map b)

! 3 Feb-Napoleon reaches Troyes, reorganizes his
army weakened by 4,000 desertions

Esposito & Elting, MAP 146

! Napoleon sent Mortier southeast on a major
reconnaissance in force, which thoroughly mauled
Schwarzenberg’s outposts, who strengthened his left

! Blücher’s only reaction to this was “the joyful idea
that Napoleon would be too hard-pressed to oppose
his Army of Silesia”

! 6 Feb- Blücher’s army was in four separate groups--
all out of mutually supporting distance--plunging
headlong across Napoleon’s front in an attempt to
destroy Macdonald

! Napoleon had considered attacking Schwarzenberg.
Blücher, however, was beginning to threaten Paris
and was the easier and nearer target

Esposito & Elting, MAP 146 b ! 5-7 Feb- Napoleon concentrated at Nogent-sur-
Seine

! the newly created VII Corps (largely veterans from
Spain), which was forming at Nogent, was
mistakenly entrusted to Oudinot

7 February-to Marie Louise,
“Your letter grieves me deeply; it tells me you are discouraged. Those who
are with you have lost their heads. I am quite well and hope my affairs will
take a turn for the better, but I do beg you to cheer up and take care of
yourself… You know how much I love you.” Joseph was to ensure that the
empress, her son, and the royal family would be evacuated from Paris, but
only as an emergency measure: “We must not shut our eyes to the fact that
the consternation and despair of the populace might have disastrous and
tragic results.”
Asprey, pp. 347-348

20 0 20

SCALE IN MILES

At Nogent, Napoleon was caught in a blizzard of ill tidings.
Northward Bülow had entered Brussels; Antwerp was cut off. Paris
was clutched by a mounting panic, with Joseph one of the worst
affected. Murat had joined the Allies…. Napoleon kept his head and
nerve.

20 0 20

SCALE IN MILES

Schwarzenberg had occupied Troyes, where he
halted to ponder his next move. Finally, concluding
that Napoleon meant to offer a decisive battle at
Nogent, he asked Blücher for Kleist’s corps.
Blücher was at Champaubert when he received (9
Feb) Schwarzenberg’s request. He at once issued
orders for Kleist, Kapzevitsch and Olssuﬁev to
march on Sezanne the next morning.

TROYES

20 0 20

SCALE IN MILES

That night (9-10 Feb), Blücher somehow learned that Napoleon was in Sezanne. Knowing little of the strength and disposition of the
French forces, he was unable to make any estimate of Napoleon’s possible courses of action. However, since La Rothiere, he
considered Napoleon little better than a fugitive from justice. Consequently, though he did take the precaution of personally going
back to join Kleist and Kapzevitsch, he left Olssuﬁev very much alone at Champaubert, and authorized Sacken to continue the
pursuit of Macdonald.

TROYES

20 0 20

SCALE IN MILES

Pushing northward along roads “six feet deep in mud,” Napoleon got considerable
help from the local inhabitants, who, having enjoyed a brief acquaintanceship with
Allied “liberation,” turned out to help drag his guns along. Early on the 10th,
French cavalry developed the isolated position of Olssufiev’s weak corps (inset
map). Olssufiev had been threatened with court-martial for poor performance at
TROYES
Brienne and La Rothiere; thoroughly sore-headed, he tried to fight and was
squashed. Meanwhile, Blücher marched Kleist and Kapzevitsch toward Sezanne,
placidly ignoring the sound of battle to the west. About dusk...he finally learned of
Olssufiev’s disaster, and countermarched...sending off an urgent order recalling
Sacken to Montmirail.

20 0 20

SCALE IN MILES

TROYES

MONTMIRAIL

20 0 20

SCALE IN MILES

Olssufiev having been disposed of, Napoleon swung westward to deal with Sacken
and Yorck…. {He ordered his other commanders that] if Napoleon fought his
expected battle near Montmirail, they were to march to the sound of the guns….
Encountering Napoleon west of Montmirail the next morning, Sacken attempted
to bull his way through, but was outmaneuvered and outfought by Napoleon’s
slightly smaller force. Yorck reached the field at about 1530, with part of his corps,
to find Sacken on the point of collapse…. His arrival saved Sacken from
TROYES
destruction, but he was himself promptly driven back …. During the night,
Sacken’s shattered corps groped along woods to join Yorck

MONTMIRAIL

20 0 20

SCALE IN MILES

On 12 Feb, Napoleon renewed his attack,
Ney leading. Yorck and Sacken barely
escaped across the Marne, with over-all
losses of 7,000 men, more than 20 guns, and
most of their trains. French losses, 2,500

20 0 20
SCALE OF MILES

Learning of Schwarzenberg’s offensive during
the 13 th , Napoleon began planning a
concentration around Montereau. However,
that night, Marmont reported Blücher again
moving west. Blücher had concluded that
Napoleon would be countermarching to meet
Schwarzenberg and planned to attasck the
Emperor’s rear. Too weak to oppose this force,
Marmont was skillfully ﬁghting a delaying
action back from Etoges.

20 0 20
SCALE OF MILES

Resolved to teach Blücher a lesson, Napoleon
ordered Marmont to draw the Prussian on to
Montmirail, where he concentrated his
available forces. During the early morning of
the 14th, Marmont retired from Fromentiers
(inset map)to a strong position west of
Vauchamps. Advancing carelessly, Blücher’s
advance guard attacked him there, but was
trapped and largely destroyed as Grouchy
burst in on his right ﬂank… Blücher quickly
ordered a retreat...Had Grouchy’s horse
artillery been able to keep up with him through
the deep clay mud, Blücher’s destruction
would have been certain.

20 0 20
SCALE OF MILES

During 12 February, Schwarzenberg had got across the Seine River…. An
unidentified [French] officer hastily ordered the army’s trains toward Paris,
fanning the panic in that unstable city. A long ripple of Allied cavalry and
Cossacks now fanned out across the countryside...their outriders even
penetrating to Fontainebleau.
A new factor now permeated the campaign. Allied claims of “coming as
friends and liberators” and of maintaining strict discipline had been
deliberate falsehoods from the start. Advancing out of the devastated
Rhineland, with long miles of ruined roads between them and their bases,
the Allies could not feed their troops from their own countries. (The
Russians had never had a supply system worth mentioning; in Germany,
they had foraged on ally, neutral, and enemy with equal informality.) From
the first, the Allies had lived off the country--Schwarzenberg generally by
requisition, Blücher by cruder methods. All were as demanding and hard-
handed as the French had been in Germany and Austria, but the Prussians
and Cossacks were outstanding for misbehavior and brutality--the latter by
habit, the former in the name of “vengeance.” Looting and burning as they
advanced, the Allied forces became increasingly savage after their first
defeats.
E & E, commentary on the preceding map, MAP 148

Exasperated civilians began to waylay stragglers and small detachments.
The Vosges Mountain passes became especially dangerous; heavy escorts
soon were necessary for couriers and convoys. This irregular warfare was
just beginning to make itself felt by the end of the campaign. “Had the
Emperor been as well served in Paris as he was in [eastern France],” 1814
might have seen his greatest victories.
E & E, commentary on the preceding map, MAP 148

News that Blücher had been thoroughly defeated, losing a
third of his army, dazed the Allied high command. Its ﬁrst
reaction (based on the supposition that Napoleon was
pursuing Blücher toward Chalons) was to send
Wittgenstein and Wrede north through Sezanne to
attack him from the rear. Then came word that Napoleon
had broken contact with the Army of Silesia (Blücher).
Apprehensive but uncertain, the Army of Bohemia
(Schwarzenberg) ended by milling in place “to await
developments” during most of 15-16 February. On the
17th, Wittgenstein and Wrede were ordered to fall back
gradually through Bray. Barclay would mass the Russian-
Prussian guards and reserves at Nogent.

Elsewhere, Seslawin’s Cossacks were wandering
towards Orleans; more important, Bülow was
moving south out of Belgium, having been
relieved there by the newly organized corps of the
Duke of Weimar.

Napoleon’s original plans were to follow up and ﬁnish off Blücher, then to move south through Vitry
into Schwarzenberg’s rear.This probably would have been decisive. Blücher and his subordinates
were the toughest, if not the brightest, of the Allied commanders. With them gone, the Allied
sovereigns would not have lingered to risk their own necks. But Schwarzenberg’s fumbling advance
on Paris tripped Napoleon up in full career: Paris was still unfortiﬁed, Joseph was butter-hearted;
Victor, Oudinot and Macdonald plainly were not equal to gaining their Emperor the three or four
days he would need. Hastily regrouping, Napoleon came southwestward by forced marches, reaching
Guignes on the 16th.

Mortier and Marmont were left to maintain
pressure on Blücher and Winzingerode….
On the 17th and 18th Napoleon inﬂicted
heavy losses on Schwarzenberg’s forces,
clearing the north bank of the Seine.

On the 17th February, Schwarzenberg had
already sent Berthier a sniveling and lying
message stating that--since the
preliminaries of a peace treaty on
Napoleon’s terms had been signed at
Chatillon (in fact, the Allies had broken off
negotiations on the 10th)--he had halted
“offensive movement against the French
armies,” and must request that Napoleon
return the courtesy. He then ordered a
headlong retreat to Troyes to Be covered
by Wrede. Seslawin was recalled, and
Blücher instructed to join Wittgenstein at
Mery-sur-Seine by the 21st.

The Allies were not going to leave France, there would be no armistice.
Napoleon was not going to have peace with honor. Despite the dramatic
series of French victories, despite continuing quarrels between the Russian
and Austrian emperors and their marshals and generals, the allies with the
possible exception of Austria seemed no more inclined to peace than ever.
Soon after negotiations reopened at Châtillon, Lord Castlereagh knocked
petulant heads together to bring about a declaration of renewed solidarity
among the four allies, and it soon became clear that they and not Napoleon
were negotiating from strength.
Allied generals had good reason for their belief. Ever since the invasion
Napoleon had been reacting rather than acting. If he knocked out one corps
here another popped up there--a repeat of allied strategy and tactics in
Saxony: muscle over mind, quantity over quality. Napoleon had dealt no
knockout blow.
Asprey, p. 350

He had hurt Blücher and Schwarzenberg but each had been reinforced and
soon returned to the offensive. He had also hurt himself because
replacements were not easy to come by and good commanders were
becoming increasingly rare. He was also paying a price--ill on occasion,
sometimes exhausted:

19 February-to Marie Louise,
“I was so tired last night,”...one of the rare times when he did not claim the
best of health, “that I slept eight hours on end.”
Asprey, p. 350

Lacking a bridge train [on the 21st], Napoleon had to funnel his advance through
Montereau until Macdonald restored the bridge at Bray. This delay, plus the haste in which
Schwarzenberg retreated, resulted in the French largely losing contact with the Allies for
two days.

Schwarzenberg needed the respite. In addition to the excited
yammerings of his three sovereign commanders and their polyglot
personal staffs, he was afflicted by highly exaggerated reports of
Augereau’s activities--which, so far, actually had amounted to nothing
more than continuous complaints and excuses. The Troyes area,
relatively unproductive in normal times, already had been eaten up by
both armies. Disease, hunger, bad weather, and recent defeats had left
the Army of Bohemia shaky. Soldiers and commanders alike had little
appetite for a stand-up fight against Napoleon; especially since recent
intelligence reports had grossly overestimated the strength of his army.
Schwarzenberg knew he could lose the war in a few hours; defeat would
mean a retreat through a vindictively hostile countryside, with Augereau
advancing into his rear. Also, he personally commanded the last army
that Austria would be able to put into the field, and had no intention of
sacrificing it for the sake of temporary allies, whose known postwar aims
were inimical to Austrian expansion...by the evening of 21 February he
had made up his mind to continue his retreat.
E & E, commentary to MAP 150

To screen his retreat--from Napoleon, Alexander and the King of Prussia alike--
Schwarzenberg ordered a heavy reconnaissance in force all across his front.
Moving forward at about noon on the 22nd, this reconnaissance promptly collided with
Napoleon’s cavalry screen, and was everywhere beaten and driven in.

Following up, Oudinot’s advance guard rushed the Allies out of the Mery suburb on the
west bank of the Seine. It then forced its way across the ruined bridge and stormed into
Mery itself, but had to withdraw when the Allies fired the town. (Blücher, still clamoring for
an advance on Paris, had joined Wittgenstein here on the 21st.) Reaching the front,
Napoleon quickly assessed the situation: Blücher and Wittgenstein were on the east bank of
the flooded Seine; Schwarzenberg was west of that river, in front of Troyes; it was too late to
attack that evening, especially since his own army had not closed up. He would leave a part
of Oudinot’s veterans to watch Blücher and Wittgenstein...With the rest of his army, he
would attack Schwarzenberg the next morning. The odds would be heavy--some 70,000
French, mostly green conscripts and national guardsmen, against more than 100,000 veteran
Allies--but he was confident, and his troops wild with enthusiasm.

Schwarzenberg likewise saw the situation clearly. In quiet deﬁance of the Czar and the
King of Prussia, he continued his withdrawal, sending the Prince of Lichtenstein to beg
Napoleon for an armistice. Though inglorious, these measures probably saved his army.

Napoleon entered Troyes about 0600 on the 24th, and this time he received a roaring
welcome, one of the most heartfelt in his career.
Schwarzenberg th, Gerard, Oudinot, and Macdonald, supported by Ney, Czar and the
During the 24 likewise saw the situation clearly. In quiet defiance of the energetically
King of Prussia, he continued his withdrawal, sending the Prince of Lichtenstein to beg
followed up the Army of Bohemia’s disorderly withdrawal. To climax Schwarzenberg’s
Napoleon for an armistice. Though reluctantly)thesebestirred himself. saved his army.
perplexities, Augereau finally (and inglorious, had measures probably
Responding to Schwarzenberg’s plea for an armistice, Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp to
negotiate on the basis of the Allies’ first proposals--the natural borders of France. Hostilities
would continue until the armistice was signed.

25 Feb-Alexander, Francis, Frederick Wm and
Castlereagh held a council at Bar-sur-Aube.
Agreeing that Augereau menaced their rear, they
dispatched Hesse-Homburg with two Austrian
corps to deal with him. After much brawling, they
agreed to retreat to Langres, there to ﬁght a
defensive battle if Napoleon pursued them, or to
resume their offensive if he turned on Blücher.
Authorizing Blücher to operate as he saw ﬁt, they
transferred Bülow’s and Winzingerode’s corps to
his command.
Blücher once more marched on Paris with his
augmented command. Hoping to stimulate
Schwarzenberg, he sent the latter a purposely false
report (25 Feb) that Napoleon was already
pursuing the Army of Silesia (Blücher).

Napoleon was slow to believe that Blücher was
again deliberately asking to be knocked on the
head. 27 Feb-ﬁnally certain that Blücher was
marching on Paris, he sent Ney (with Victor) in
pursuit, and marched from Troyes with the
remainder of his Guard. Augereau was to
concentrate his troops and join the main army via
Dijon.

Marmont and Mortier bloodied Blücher at the river
crossing at Meaux on the 27th and 28th.
Napoleon reached La Ferte on 1 March, but
could only snatch Blücher’s last wagons and
stragglers before the Marne bridges were cut. Once
again, Napoleon’s lack of bridge train balked him; it
took sixteen hours to repair the damaged La Ferte
bridge. Early on the 3rd, however, Napoleon’s
advance guard was north of Rocourt. Just to the
north,

Blücher was leaving Oulchy-le-Chateau, still
ignorant of Bülow’s and Winzingerode’s
whereabouts. His army had had three night
marches and three defeats in the last seventy-two
hours, and had no supplies for a week, beyond
what could be seized from the countryside. Certain
only that Bülow had been at Laon, Blücher decided
to retire in that direction. Ahead of him was the
ﬂooded Aisne River. Blücher had a good bridge
train, but would need almost a day to bridge the
Aisne and get his whole army across. He decided to
give his troops twelve hours rest; send his trains to
build a pontoon bridge three miles east of Soissons.

26 Feb-on receipt of Blücher’s deceptive report,
Alexander and Frederick Wm bullied
Schwarzenberg into counterattacking towards Bar-
sur-Aube, where Oudinot occupied an awkward
position astride the river. Refusing to heed repeated
warnings, Oudinot even ignored a premature,
unsuccessful attack by Wrede on the 26th. Attacked
by Wittgenstein the next day, he threw away the
battle. That night Oudinot retired, his disheartened
troops accusing him of treason. His withdrawal
uncovered Macdonald, but the latter’s advance
guard managed to bluff Würtemberg into halting.

BAR-SUR-AUBE

0700 3 March-Blücher received a message from
Winzingerode, reporting that he had failed to storm
Soissons and he was planning to withdraw. At 1200, a
second message ended Blücher’s profane rage.
SOISSONS
Soissons had capitulated!

1 0 1 2

20 0 20

SOISSONS

1 0 1 2

General Moreau, the commandant of Soissons, was lazy
and a braggart. Though he had repulsed Winzingerode’s
assault, had plenty of supplies, and could hear Marmont‘s
and Mortier’s cannon, he allowed the Prussian emissaries
to bully him into capitulating. To crown his incompetence,
he failed to blow up the Soissons bridge. Using it, Blücher
and Winzingerode escaped across the Aisne
20 0 20

Napoleon drove north on the 4th; that night, a
brigade of his cavalry surprised and captured
Rheims. Informed of Moreau’s capitulation, he
continued his advance, hoping that Blücher
BERRY would attempt to defend the line of the Aisne.
SOISSONS
(He knew that Winzingerode had joined
RHEIMS
Blücher, but believed that Bülow was still north
of Laon.) Blücher did try to hold the Aisne, but
mistakenly massed opposite Soissons; leaving
Berry lightly defended. Grouchy’s cavalry
discovered the weakness; Nansouty galloped
through Berry and seized the bridge intact; and
Napoleon turned northwest, attempting to cut
1 0 1 2

Blücher off from Laon.

20 0 20

CRAONNE
BERRY
SOISSONS

RHEIMS

1 0 1 2

Blücher marched to intercept Napoleon at Craonne. His plan was to station Woronzow
(Winzingerode’s second-in-command) and Sacken on the dominating Craonne plateau to ﬁx Napoleon;
Winzingerode, with 11,000 cavalry and Kleist’s corps, would then attack Napoleon’s right rear.
Napoleon came up faster than expected, Ney seizing a foothold on the plateau late on the 6th. Sacken
was correspondingly slow.
With Marmont and Mortier still well to his rear, Napoleon could not risk pushing ahead toward Laon
while a strong Allied force held the Craonne plateau. After studying the terrain, he planned a double
envelopment to trap Woronzow, but his attack on 7 March went awry when Ney advanced
prematurely. Woronzow retired in good order, covered by Sacken’s cavalry. Meanwhile, poor staff
work and stupid execution so entangled Winzingerode’s cavalry and Kleist’s corps that even Blücher’s
expert professional blasphemy only increased the confusion. (Napoleon had been prepared to trap
Winzingerode’s enveloping movement had it taken place.) French losses in the Battle of Craonne were
5,400; Allied, 5,000. Blücher now ordered a concentration at Laon (inset map).
20 0 20

CRAONNE
BERRY
SOISSONS

RHEIMS

1 0 1 2

Napoleon believed that Craonne had been a rear-guard battle,
designed to cover either a retreat into Belgium or an advance on
Paris along the west bank of the Oise River. While Blücher’s army
was now obviously too strong for him to destroy, he might be able ETOUVELLES

to trap its rear guard and force Blücher far enough away from
Paris to permit him to again turn on Schwarzenberg. At the same
time, he would pick up the garrisons of the minor fortiﬁed towns
in northeastern France. A Russian rear guard checked him late on
8 March at the Etouvelles deﬁle, but was enveloped that night by
a small detachment moving along back trails and largely destroyed.
The French pushed rapidly forward, hoping to rush Laon.

20 0 20

8 March-Tired of running, Blücher had decided to stand there--an immensely strong position along a
high, steep ridge, which concealed much of his army. Believing that Napoleon had 90,000 men, he
feared some enveloping maneuver; Marmont’s tardy appearance confirmed this worry. Finding Laon
strongly held, Napoleon made several limited attacks to develop the enemy position. Winzingerode
probed his left flank, but was easily discouraged. Darkness ended the fighting
Marmont had turned sulky, twice refusing to leave Berry on the 8th. Advancing timidly the next
morning, he finally took Athies. There he halted haphazardly, sending a detachment to seek contact
with Napoleon, and quartering himself in a chateau two miles from his troops. His weary subordinates
neglected their local security.
By dark, Blücher had a good idea of Napoleon’s relative weakness and
Marmont’s exposed position. Yorck--supported by Kleist, Sacken,
Langeron, and the Prussian cavalry--surprised Marmont’s command and
1 0 1 2
chased it toward Festieux (off inset map, three miles east of Bruyeres). Kleist
maneuvered to block the Rheims road, while cavalry galloped deeper to
seize Festieux. Fighting his way through to Festieux, Marmont found that
defile held by 125 Old Guard infantry--the escort of a supply train that had
halted there for the night! Thus saved, Marmont reorganized at Corbeny.
(off map).
Elated, Blücher ordered Yorck and Kleist to pursue Marmont to Berry;
Winzingerode and Bülow would attack Napoleon frontally; Langeron and
Sacken would advance through Bruyeres to cut the Soissons road behind
Napoleon at L’Ange-Gardien.
At 0500 10 March, two fugitives from Marmont’s column reached
Napoleon. A hasty reconnaissance having confirmed their story, Napoleon
decided to remain before Laon. If only a strong rear guard held Laon, he
still should be able to defeat it. If Blücher’s whole army faced him, an
aggressive front would take pressure off Marmont.
Yorck and Kleist were already at Festieux; Sacken and Langeron had
reached Bruyeres. But Blücher, sick and exhausted, suddenly collapsed.
20 0 20

Awed by Napoleon’s threatening maneuvers, Gneisenau (Blücher’s
chief of staff) recalled these four corps. The day passed in minor
attacks and counterattacks. (French casualties for the two days
were approximately 6,000; Allied, 4,000)

Napoleon withdrew after sundown, 10 March. There was no
pursuit until the 11th; then, Ney’s ﬁrst ambush cowed it.

E & E, COMMENTARY ON MAP 152

As the French fell back towards Soissons, however, there was no
disguising the unpalatable fact that another of the Emperor’s schemes had
ended in complete failure….proportionally, the French losses in men,
materiel and morale were far greater than those of their opponents.
Napoleon wrote to Joseph on the 11th:
I have reconnoitered the enemy’s position at Laon. It is too strong to permit an
attack without heavy loss. I have therefore given the word to fall back on
Soissons. It is probable that the enemy would have evacuated Laon for fear of
an attack but for the crass stupidity of the Duke of Ragusa [Marmont], who
behaved himself like a second lieutenant. The enemy is suffering enormous
losses; he has attacked the village of Clacy [Ney’s ambush} ﬁve times--and
been repulsed on each occasion.
Unfortunately, the Young Guard is melting like snow. The Old Guard keeps
up its strength, but the Guard cavalry is shrinking a great deal. It is vital that
General Ornano should remount all dragoons and chasseurs--and even old
soldiers--using all means in his power.

The ﬁnal sentence of this letter is even more revealing of the gravity that
the Emperor read into the general situation: “Orders must be given for
the construction of redoubts at Montmartre.” The capital’s peril was very
real
Chandler, p.991

Despite terrible news from almost all fronts
(Wellington was driving Soult across southern
France, Bayonne was besieged, Bordeau had been
betrayed to the English on 12 March, in Italy a
SOISSONS British expedition had seized Genoa) Napoleon
RHEIMS refused to cease ﬁghting. Unaware of Blücher’s
collapse, he hesitated to leave Soissons. When he
learned that the Prussian St.-Priest had
recaptured Rheims his indecision ended.
Napoleon had the great captain’s knack of turning
calamity into opportunity. Sweeping forty miles
across Blücher’s front, he completely surprised
St.-Priest on 13 March and recovered Rheims.
(Casualties: Allies, 6,000; French, 700)
At Rheims, Napoleon directly threatened
Blücher’s left ﬂank and Schwarzenberg’s right.
French morale rallied. To the shocked Allies, it
seemed as though Napoleon was able to whistle
fresh armies out of the earth. The news halted
Schwarzenberg on 16 March. Blücher had
lurched southward on the 13th, Bülow reaching
Compiegne, which he found too strong, and
Sacken approaching Soissons, where Mortier
defeated him. Learning the next day of St.-Priest’s
fate, Blücher withdrew to Laon and went on the
defensive, considerably heckled by French
partisans

Despite terrible news from almost all fronts
(Wellington was driving Soult across southern
France, Bayonne was besieged, Bordeau had been
COMPIEGNE betrayed to the English on 12 March, in Italy a
SOISSONS British expedition had seized Genoa) Napoleon
RHEIMS refused to cease ﬁghting. Unaware of Blücher’s
collapse, he hesitated to leave Soissons. When he
learned that the Prussian St.-Priest had
recaptured Rheims his indecision ended.
Napoleon had the great captain’s knack of turning
calamity into opportunity. Sweeping forty miles
across Blücher’s front, he completely surprised
At Rheims, Napoleon revived his earlier plan to St.-Priest on 13 March and recovered Rheims.
crush Blücher, then move eastward to gather in (Casualties: Allies, 6,000; French, 700)
the garrisons of his frontier At Rheims, Napoleon directly threatened
Blücher’s left ﬂank and Schwarzenberg’s right.
French morale rallied. To the shocked Allies, it
seemed as though Napoleon was able to whistle
fresh armies out of the earth. The news halted
Schwarzenberg on 16 March. Blücher had
lurched southward on the 13th, Bülow reaching
Compiegne, which he found too strong, and
Sacken approaching Soissons, where Mortier
defeated him. Learning the next day of St.-Priest’s
fate, Blücher withdrew to Laon and went on the
defensive, considerably heckled by French
partisans

To add to his burdens he had become suspicious of a growing intimacy
between Marie Louise and [his brother] King Joseph. “Do not be too familiar
with the king,” he cautioned his wife. “Keep him at a distance, never allow
him to enter your private apartments...do not let him play the part of
adviser.” He wrote again the following day: “You trust [Joseph] too much…
Everyone has betrayed me… Mistrust the king: he has an evil reputation with
women.” Two days later: “The king is intriguing; he will be the first to suffer;
he is a pygmy, swelling with his own importance.”
Asprey, p. 353

[On 23 March] the allies had intercepted a letter from Napoleon to Marie
Louise informing her of his intended march to the Marne. At an allied council
of war on the following day Czar Alexander persuaded Schwarzenberg to
join Blücher in an attack on Napoleon’s much smaller force. But now the
allies intercepted an official dispatch from Paris to Napoleon that spoke of an
empty treasury, general discontent and the sensation caused by Wellington’s
seizure of Bordeaux. Using this incentive the czar won Prussian and Austrian
approval to march directly on Paris.
Asprey, p. 355

Advancing through Mery-sur-Seine (where he destroyed Würtemburg’s rear guard) Napoleon saw
indications of a hasty retreat everywhere, and reverted to his former plan of marching eastward to
collect his garrisons. Contemptuous of Schwarzenberg, he marched on Arcis-sur-Aube. Paris would
have to defend itself.
Napoleon was overly contemptuous of Schwarzenberg. Learning that some French troops were
south of the Aube, the Austrian advanced on Mery, bringing on a haphazard clash (20 March)
around Arcis. Here Ney and Sebastiani--led with cold savagery by Napoleon--whipped off twice
their numbers. (Casualties: Allies, 2,500; French, 1,700) Concluding that Napoleon was stronger
than reported, Schwarzenberg [once again] retired that night, concentrating 80,000 men for a
defensive-offensive battle.

Napoleon ﬁrst thought that he had encountered an unusually stubborn rear guard. Moving
cautiously southward on 21 March to develop the situation, he found Schwarzenberg too strong to
attack, and withdrew across the Aube. He then continued toward Vitry. Schwarzenberg attempted
to follow,, was repulsed, and relapsed into confusion. Napoleon mistakenly believed that
Schwarzenberg would fear having his LOC cut and have to follow him to the northeast. He also
believed that Blücher and Bülow were not able to move on Paris by themselves. But he had fought
his last battle of this campaign. Schwarzenberg was bullied by the Tsar into ignoring the threat to
his rear and joining Blücher in the drive toward Paris.

[On the 29th] the Empress Marie-Louise and the King of Rome left the
capital and headed south. They were followed toward Orléans by Joseph
and part of the government on the 30th; some high ofﬁcials, including the
treacherous Talleyrand, found excuses for remaining in the capital where
they busied themselves preparing a welcome for the Tsar. Thereafter the
fall of Paris could not be long delayed….at two o’clock on the morning of
the 31st, Marshal Marmont, the Duke of Ragusa, agreed to an armistice
with the Allies, and under its terms withdrew his men to the south of the
capital. Soon after, Allied cavalry were swarming through the barriers.
After twenty-two years of practically continual warfare, the forces of
reaction had attained their original avowed goal. Talleyrand made the most
of his opportunity; rallying a rump of the government, he declared
Napoleon to be deposed, and succeeded in dazzling the Tsar with his
charm at their very ﬁrst meeting. His genius for survival again stood him
in good stead.

Chandler, pp.1000-1001

On 11 April a forlorn and dejected Napoleon dictated and signed his
abdication. Caulaincourt and Macdonald remained with him but could not
bring him out of a deep depression. On the night of 12 April the emperor
attempted suicide by swallowing the contents of a phial that he had worn
around his neck during the retreat from Russia. A combination of opium,
belladonna and white hellebore made him very sick but did not kill him.
After a ghastly night he recovered sufficiently to prepare himself for exile.
Asprey, p. 355

IV. Abdication

Adieux de Napoléon à la Garde impériale dans la cour du Cheval-Blanc
du château de Fontainebleau.

You, my friends--continue to serve
France. Its welfare was my single
thought and will always be the object of
my wishes. Do not pity me...I want to
write about the great things that we have
done together. Farewell, my children.

--Napoleon’s farewell address to the Old Guard,
Fontainebleau, 20 April 1814

On 11 April a forlorn and dejected Napoleon dictated and signed his
abdication..
Asprey, p. 355

France was occupied by foreign troops. Louis XVIII was placed
on his throne by them. The aristocratic émigrés returned, dreaming
of overturning the Revolution. Napoleon was escorted off to his
new “empire” of Elba. Plans were made for a Congress in Vienna
where the victors would divide the spoils. But it was not to be that
easy...

Napoleon Part 2, session vi Voelkerschlacht

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