Pathogen Spillover and Interfaces in the Anthropocene
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Christian Walzer POLICY SEMINAR Virtual Event - COVID-19: The role of the agriculture-ecosystem health interface AUG 18, 2020 - 09:30 AM TO 11:00 AM EDT
![What do we know?
Zoonoses are diseases the
move between animals and
humans
Emerging Infectious Diseases
[EID] are dominated by
zoonoses
72% of all zoonotic EIDs
originate in wildlife
EID frequency is increasing
HIV, Ebola, H1N1, SARS, Nipah,
Hendra, H7N9]()
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Pathogen Spillover and Interfaces in the Anthropocene
- 1. Pathogen Spillover and Interfaces in the Anthropocene Chris Walzer Wildlife Conservation Society University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna
- 2. What do we know? Zoonoses are diseases the move between animals and humans Emerging Infectious Diseases [EID] are dominated by zoonoses 72% of all zoonotic EIDs originate in wildlife EID frequency is increasing HIV, Ebola, H1N1, SARS, Nipah, Hendra, H7N9
- 3. 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 Nbdeaths(logarithmicscale) Years Spanish flu 1918 H1N1 influenza 50 millions deaths 50 0000 0000 Asian flu 1957 H2N2 influenza 100,000 deaths Hong Kong flu 1968 H3N2 influenza 700,000 deaths Ebola virus 1976 1,550 deaths AIDS 1981 HIV 30 millions deaths Hendra virus 1994 4 deaths H9N2, H7N7 influenza 1999 1 death SARS-CoV 2002 770 deaths H5N1 influenza 1997 371 deaths Nipah virus 1999 250 deaths Covid-19 2019 SARS-Cov-2 > 250,000 deaths Ebola virus 2014 11,000 deaths H7N9 influenza 2013 44 deaths MERS coronavirus 2012, 54 deaths Zika virus 2016 West Nile virus USA 1999, 2,000 deaths A flu 2009 H1N1 influenza 15,000 deaths From Lowenthal et al 2015. Emerging viral diseases
- 4. SARS-CoV-2 Spillover: What is known? Zoonotic pandemic – broad consensus Ancestral host is a horseshoe bat species The time, place, mechanism of the spillover event is unclear Positive environmental samples from market [31/33+ Western part| only 4 could be sequenced identical to HU-1] Information lacking ? ?? ?
- 5. It is not about bat-soup, civets or pangolins
- 6. Barriers to spillover. This figure was adapted from Plowright et al. 2017 Link s betw een ecological integrity, emerging infectious diseases originating from w ildlife, and other aspects of human health - an overview of the literature Tom Evans, Sarah Olson, JamesWatson, Kim Gruetzmacher, Mathieu Pruvot, Stacy Jupiter, StephanieWang, Tom Clementsand KatieJung April 2020
- 7. What do we know? Across 25 high-risk viral families, there are estimated to be 1.7M unknown viruses About 700k of which likely have the potential to infect humans For example, for every known coronavirus, there are thousands of unknown coronaviruses circulating in wildlife Carroll et al. (2018) Science
- 9. Wildlife surveys in markets Distribution chain Consumer/vendor demography and behaviour Consumer/vendor demography and behaviour Sampling/testing bushmeat Direct behavioral observations Sero-conversion study in vendors Coordinated One Health Approach Pruvot et al. 2019 Sci. Tot. Env
- 10. What do we know? Huong et al. (2020) https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.06.05.0985 90 (PLoS One in press)
- 11. Conservation, Health and Society • COVID-19 is a symptom of ailing planetary health • Starkly reminded us of the basic fact: Human, animal, plant, and environmental health and well-being are all intrinsically connected • Potential to value and catalyze modes of stewardship for “intact” healthy and resilient nature
- 12. What do we need to do now? Permanently ban the commercial trade in wildlife for consumption Strengthen efforts to combat trafficking of wild animals within countries and across borders Work to change dangerous wildlife consumption behaviors, especially in cities
- 13. Thank you for your attention VISIT: wcs.org/coronavirus oneworldonehealth.wcs.org cwalzer@wcs.org
Editor's Notes
- Good morning from the Bronx, hope you are all well, staying healthy, safe and sane! Thanks very much for the invitation Before I start I really want to thank the entire AAZV organisation team who have put in countless hours to pull this together. The recording will be available after 24 hours for 1 month Similarly the resources linked the talks will be available on the webpage 7th Edition of the EAZVW COVID factsheet will be available next week There will be a few polls during the talks and it would be great if you provide feedback - Thanks And with that let us start....
- Globally, more than 335 Emerging Infectious Disease (EID) outbreaks, involving 183 distinct pathogens, were reported between 1940-2004. That’s more than 50 outbreaks per decade, and the rate is increasing. More than half (52%) of all EID events in recent years originated in wildlife (2). Among emerging zoonoses specifically, 72% of outbreaks have originated in wildlife with the rest emerging from domestic animals In his sweeping thesis Against the Grain, James A. Scott demonstrates that population growth nearly froze in the 5,000 years following the widespread adoption of the agricultural lifestyle, with a global population of four million people in 10,000 BCE rising to only five million by 5,000 BCE. That period, Scott argues, produced some of the highest mortality rates our species has ever experienced as the frequency of epidemics skyrocketed.
- Emerging zoonoses have significant implications for both public health and economic stability with the costs of many individual recent major outbreaks such as SARS, MERS and Ebola estimated in the tens of billions of US dollars. These costs exceed 1-2% of GDP in less wealthy countries and surpass the International Monetary Fund’s threshold (0.5% GDP loss) for major economic disasters (3). When all is tallied, it is certain that the economic devastation caused by COVID-19 will be orders of magnitude greater: in the trillions to tens of trillions of US dollars.
- THESE EDGES ARE THE FRONTLINES OF THE NEXT SPILLOVER – WCS ALREADY HAS BOOTS ON THE GROUND IN SOME 60 COUNTRIES AND WE NOW NEED TO ALSO USE THE EYES ON THE GROUND TO INTEGRATE THIS VALUABLE RESSOURCE INTO THE GLOBAL PUBLIC HEAKTH CONTEXT The spillover of a pathogen from animals requires a series of stages: reservoir host being at sufficient density to retain the pathogen the pathogen release human exposure to the pathogen and the pathogen overcoming structural barriers, innate immune responses and molecular compatibility
- Of these 700k high-risk viruses, we only understand <0.1%;
- Wildlife trading sites, as in the Wuhan market, are vast, industrialized centers, cramming thousands of live animals from hundreds of species alongside thousands of domestic animals. This contrasts starkly with small stalls where local communities exchange and sell wildlife for subsistence. Furthermore, not only do animals exchange viruses among themselves, but vendors and customers also circulate within this milieu while slaughter and purchasing practices continually generate potential spillover opportunities. The commercial live wildlife trade and wildlife markets constitute true caldrons of contagion. While robust data is lacking, the legal and illegal trade in wildlife is valued at hundreds of billions in US dollars (8). Wildlife trade is driving species extinctions and is a critical factor in global biodiversity loss (9). The illegal trade in wildlife is the fourth most profitable crime after drugs, human trafficking, and arms and generates at least USD 23 billion in illicit annual revenue (10). Data on the value of the global commercial wildlife trade for consumption is sparse, but the global total annual value of wildlife harvesting is estimated at USD 400 billion (11) These activities induce stress, injury, sickness, and compromise immune systems. The multiple stressors inhibit animal immune responses and allow for enhanced shedding of pathogens (16). Stress also leads to increased excretion of saliva and voiding of urine and feces, all of which facilitate the shedding of viruses. Genetic change in viruses is driven by several mechanisms, amongst them recombination, which occurs when two or more viral genomes co-infect the same host cell and can exchange genetic segments (17). This trade, particularly in live animals, creates super-interfaces along the food value chain co-mingling species from many different geographies and habitats (that would never have otherwise come into contact).
- Wildlife trading sites, as in the Wuhan market, are vast, industrialized centers, cramming thousands of live animals from hundreds of species alongside thousands of domestic animals. This contrasts starkly with small stalls where local communities exchange and sell wildlife for subsistence. Furthermore, not only do animals exchange viruses among themselves, but vendors and customers also circulate within this milieu while slaughter and purchasing practices continually generate potential spillover opportunities. The commercial live wildlife trade and wildlife markets constitute true caldrons of contagion. While robust data is lacking, the legal and illegal trade in wildlife is valued at hundreds of billions in US dollars (8). Wildlife trade is driving species extinctions and is a critical factor in global biodiversity loss (9). The illegal trade in wildlife is the fourth most profitable crime after drugs, human trafficking, and arms and generates at least USD 23 billion in illicit annual revenue (10). Data on the value of the global commercial wildlife trade for consumption is sparse, but the global total annual value of wildlife harvesting is estimated at USD 400 billion (11) These activities induce stress, injury, sickness, and compromise immune systems. The multiple stressors inhibit animal immune responses and allow for enhanced shedding of pathogens (16). Stress also leads to increased excretion of saliva and voiding of urine and feces, all of which facilitate the shedding of viruses. Genetic change in viruses is driven by several mechanisms, amongst them recombination, which occurs when two or more viral genomes co-infect the same host cell and can exchange genetic segments (17). This trade, particularly in live animals, creates super-interfaces along the food value chain co-mingling species from many different geographies and habitats (that would never have otherwise come into contact).
- This trade, particularly in live animals, creates super-interfaces along the food value chain co-mingling species from many different geographies and habitats (that would never have otherwise come into contact). A recent study from Vietnam demonstrated that the odds of coronavirus RNA detection among field rats (Rattus sp. and Bandicota sp.) destined for consumption increased significantly along the supply chain from traders to markets to restaurants