This document discusses strategies for countering improvised explosive device (IED) networks. It outlines the typical structure of a terrorist network, including leadership that provides direction, operators who plan and execute operations, and active supporters who assist without direct involvement in violence. Approaches to defeating the network at the strategic level include targeting training camps, disrupting procurement chains, and using social network analysis. The challenges of maintaining momentum during assaults, global rather than regional analysis, and preparing for future threats like CBRN weapons are also addressed.

1. Secure Cities II InitiativeCountering Improvised Explosive Device Networks Chris Hunter QGM FIExpE GCGI MCMI KratosEnterprises Ltd Counter-IED Consultants

2. Counter-Terrorist Bomb Disposal

3. Assault IEDD Assault IEDD is the process in which an operator uses speedy render-safe techniques to maintain the momentum of an assaulting force in a potentially hostile environment.

4. Nov 26th Mumbai Attacks

5. C-IED Operations Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan and Colombia

6. Scope The Structure of a Terrorist Network Methods of attacking the network Challenges Final Considerations

7. Leadership Provides direction and policy Approves Goals and Objectives Overarching guidance for Operations Generally rise from within ranks or establish their own splinter groups

8. Operators Plan and execute operations Manage and acquire intelligence, finance, logistics and comms Includes bomb making and surveillance expertise Bomb emplacers generally not bomb makers

9. Operators: Cellular Foundation Tactical level 3 – 4 people Security Difficult to infiltrate Unaware of other cells and their membership Provide emotional and social support Leader is often only contact with outside world

10. Active Supporters Active in: Political/Ideological Indoctrination Fund Raising Information gathering Provision of safe houses, transportation and medical assistance Do not normally commit violent acts

11. Defeating the Terror Network at the Strategic and Operational Level

12. Profiling those at high risk of becoming radicalised

13. Targeting the Training Camps Assassination Arson Bombing Hijacking Hostage Taking Kidnapping Maiming Raids Seizure Sabotage Hoaxes Use of CBRN weapons

14. Global not Regional Trend Analysis

15. RamziYousef

16. Project Bojinka - 1995

17. Airline Bomb Plot

18. Money Laundering

19. Global Logistics and Procurement Chains (Land, Sea and Air)

20. Covert Operations – Letting an operation run

21. Disruption of Component Chain

22. Technical & Forensic Exploitation

23. Social Network Analysis

24. Correctly Trained Debriefing Personnel

25. Other Considerations

26. Analysis and Testing of Likely Targets

27. Intelligence must be multi-source:

28. Booby-trapped Safe-houses

29. Prepare for the Future: CBRN

30. Prepare for Future Threats: London & Glasgow Bombings 2007

31. Investing in protection: The Cost of Terror vs Defence Spending Sept 11Twin towers New York: Cost to terrorist $500,000; Cost to America $600bn Madrid Bombings: Cost to terrorist 10,000 euros; Cost to Spain 212 million euros 2002: Yemen French oil tanker Limburg: Cost to terrorist <$50,000. Cost to Yemen $3.8m per month

32. The war on terror has only two outcomes: Win, or lose…and we can only win, if we stay alert…and look for absence of the normal, and presence of the abnormal

33. Questions? Chris Hunter QGM FIExpE GCGI MCMI Director Kratos Enterprises Ltd Counter-IED Consultants www.kratosenterprises.com