Paradoxes of community forestry formal devolution covering informal expansion of state control: Cases from Nepal and Indonesia

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Rosan R. Devkota, Ahmad Maryudi and Max Krott
Community Forestry Working Group
Institute for Forest and Nature Conservation Policy
Georg August University Goettingen, Germany

rdevkot@gwdg.de

Presentation for the conference on
Taking stock of smallholders and community forestry
Montpellier France
March 24-26, 2010

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  • First ,lets look the role of state forest administration in devolution processes. In practice, at the initial stages of forest user group formation the state has lots of promises and also assist to the user group to formulate management plans. But the real bargaining starts after the formal contract with the group and onwards during implementation and normal operation time. The facilitation slowly goes down and imposed sanctions on the FUG activities such as limiting harvesting and marketing of the forest products. Ultimately, forest user groups can not enjoy their ‘autonomy’. Finally, contribution of CF outcomes to the local forest users are always questionable! Looking to the reality, we can say that state holds the key in devolution processes.
  • We offer the following three power factors: liberal trust, coercive trust and incentives that are the keys to explain how the actors drive the activities of community forestry and its outcomes. Liberal trust means that the actor ‘B’ freely beliefs the information by the actor ‘A’, where as in coercive trust actor ‘B’ is forced to accept the information/ decisions by actor ‘A’ and it does not necessarily B believes it. Incentives in community forestry processes motivate actions of the actors. In order to convince other actors, actor ‘A’ offers financial and/ or material sources to ‘B’ in order to dominate the decision of B.
  • Paradoxes of community forestry formal devolution covering informal expansion of state control: Cases from Nepal and Indonesia

    1. 1. “ Paradoxes of Community Forestry: Formal Devolution Covering Informal Expansion of State Control – Cases from Nepal and Indonesia ” Rosan R. Devkota, Ahmad Maryudi and Max Krott Community Forestry Working Group Institute for Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Georg August University Goettingen, Germany [email_address] “ Taking stock of smallholder and community forestry: Where do we go from here?” 24 - 26 March 2010, Montpellier, France
    2. 2. Talk outline <ul><li>Community forestry in devolution paradoxes </li></ul><ul><li>Study methods: elements of power and quantitative network </li></ul><ul><li>Explaining community forestry devolution in specific power networks </li></ul><ul><li>Conclusion </li></ul>25.03.2010
    3. 3. Devolution model of community forestry „ returning the (state) forest to the local people ” Rural development (e.g. road, school, drinking water, health post, rural electrification, community building), livelihhod support, forest management.............. 25.03.2010
    4. 4. “ The real challenge of devolution is whether local forest users get control over the community forest and can fetch benefits derived from the forests. 25.03.2010
    5. 5. <ul><li>“ In real devolution, those to whom responsibilities are devolved should be allowed to make a real input in the setting of objectives, rather than being expected to meet objectives set by others ”. </li></ul><ul><li>( Fischer, 1999 ) </li></ul>25.03.2010
    6. 6. Practice of devolution process in community forestry 25.03.2010 “ state holds the key in devolution processes” Implementation + Normal operation Stage I Initial stage Stage II Formal handover Stage III Stage IV Trigger Administrative bargening Autonomy - Forest management Outcomes ? Sanctions + Getting started Facilitation -
    7. 7. “ Devolution processes in community forestry depend mostly on interests of the most powerful external actors” 25.03.2010 Power drives devolution processes in community forestry Internal organization of community forestry are probably not the key factors Inside CF Users User Group Outer sphere Industry NGOs Local government Media Users network Ministry donor Political parties Research institutions
    8. 8. Elements of power analysis The power (P) = f { Trust ( coercive and liberal ) , Incentives } Incentives Coercive trust Power Liberal trust B A Definition of power: “ Power is a social relationship where an actor ‘A’ exercises influence on another actor B, independent from the will of actor ‘B’” 25.03.2010 “ A is powerful than B ”
    9. 9. Quantitative network analysis <ul><li>Complete network survey was used to identify the partners of the network in each community forests ( snowball effect ). </li></ul><ul><li>Each actor was asked for his/her estimation of the power of all other actors who are the part of specific community forests. </li></ul><ul><li>The sum of estimations of each power factor is a robust indicator of the most powerful actor. </li></ul><ul><li>The quantitative data were checked by qualitative analysis. </li></ul>25.03.2010
    10. 10. Cases: 25.03.2010 1. Pashupati community forest, Makawanpur, Nepal Forest Area: 168 ha. Handed over- 2005 Total households in the FUG:211 Economic status: poor-135 hhs, medium-65, rich-11 2. Sedyo Rukun community forest ,Gunungkidul, Indonesia Forest Area: 17 ha. Formal agrement: 2007 Total households in the FUG:50
    11. 11. <ul><li>1. Power network of Pashupati community forest, Makawanpur, Nepal (Sept. 2009) </li></ul>Coercive trust Liberal trust Incentives 25.03.2010 2. Power network of Sedyo Rukun CF ,Gunungkidul, Indonesia (Sept. 2009) Coercive trust Liberal trust Incentives
    12. 12. Calculation of power percentage <ul><li>The power of one actor is measured by estimation of all other actors in the network of specific community forestry case. </li></ul><ul><li>Power factor measuring scale: </li></ul><ul><li>The sum of the specific power factor are set 100%. </li></ul><ul><li>The share of each actor is shown in each factor in %. </li></ul>Coercive Trust : 0 = No 1 = Yes Liberal Trust: Incentives : 0 = No 1 = Yes 25.03.2010 Complete trust Not at all 1 3 2
    13. 13. <ul><li>1. Power network of Pashupati community forest, Makawanpur, Nepal (Sept. 2009) </li></ul>Coercive trust Liberal trust Incentives 25.03.2010 2. Power network of Sedyo Rukun CF ,Gunungkidul, Indonesia (Sept. 2009) Coercive trust Liberal trust Incentives
    14. 14. Power features <ul><li>State- coercive trust </li></ul><ul><li>Setting of conditionalities through legally binding and non-legally binding rules </li></ul><ul><li>Ecological agenda </li></ul><ul><li>Technical rationale </li></ul><ul><li>Forest user group/committee- coercive and liberal trust </li></ul><ul><li>Failure of state centric management </li></ul><ul><li>Sovereignty over the people </li></ul><ul><li>Trade-offs and easy access </li></ul><ul><li>Donor/University/NGO- liberal trust, incentives </li></ul><ul><li>Create financial dependency syndrome </li></ul><ul><li>Technical expertise for forest management </li></ul><ul><li>Coalition building with state and non-state actors </li></ul>25.03.2010
    15. 15. Power distribution is uneven and very often with 2-3 dominant actors. Uneven distribution of power due to powerful external actors does not give the freedom of ‘autonomy’ to the local forest user groups. 25.03.2010 State Forest user group/committee Donors/research institutions
    16. 16. Conclusion: Paradoxes of devolution <ul><li>Formal devolution delegates „autonomy“ to local forest user groups. However, the reality rarely reflects this rhetoric . </li></ul><ul><li>In pratice, the state forest administration become powerful actor in community forestry informally. </li></ul><ul><li>Therefore, formal devolution covers informal espansion of state control in community forestry. </li></ul>25.03.2010
    17. 17. “ Community Forestry Working Group ” on ‘‘Stakeholders, Interests and Power as Drivers of Community Forestry” (2007-2011) <ul><li>Group members </li></ul>Supervision and coordination : Prof. Dr. Max Krott ( Chair of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy ) Theory and comparative project Team Web: http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/67088.html Goettingen Graduate School of Social Science Nepal Indonesia Namibia Thailand Germany Albania Cameroon Peru Rosan Raj Devkota Ahmad Maryudi Carsten Schusser Ratchannath Rotchana- Phattharawit 1 . Helene Aurenhammer 2. N.N. Manjola salla Yufanyi Mbolo Mariana Vidal

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