This presentation was given by CIFOR scientist by Anne Larson and Ashwin Ravikumar at a COP20 side-event titled "Benefit and Burden Sharing in Forest Policies and REDD+" in Lima, Peru.
The event addressed the benefits and costs associated with forest conservation initiatives across multiple countries, and their equity implications. It builds on results gathered from an ongoing multi-year European Commission-funded project aimed to provide policy options and guidance to improve the design, development, and implementation of REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms.
5. Site selection criteria
Decreasing emissions sites
COUNTRY
REGION
SITE 4
SITE 5
SITE 1: NO
REDD+
SITE 3:
REDD+
SITE 2:
REDD+
Increasing emissions sites
REGION
1
REGION
2
REGION
3
* Based on key informants interviews
6. Theoretical and methodological framework
Policies, institutions &
incentives
Land use
decisions
Benefit-sharing
mechanisms
Trends in
livelihoods
(Equity)
Emissions
trends
(Effectiveness)
SECONDARY DATA
• Legal/policy studies (multilevel
and multisector)
PRIMARY DATA (FIELD WORK)
• >200 Key informant
Interviews
7. IV. MLG and Benefit
Sharing Results:
Peru and Indonesia
8. Results overview
Variation at the national level and sub-national levels
Ad-hoc strategies on the ground with multiple benefits
Non-monetary benefits are key so far
Legitimacy depends on multiple factors; not just the type of
initiative
9. Benefit sharing policies & processes
National
policy
Sub-national
policy
Initiative
/Project
INDONESIA PERU
• FREDDI
• MOF reg. 39
• Inti-plasma
???????
Provincial strategies
(poorly defined)
???????
Ad-hoc strategies and
processes
• National Forest Conservation
Program
• PES laws
???????
Multistakeholder spaces and
discussions; draft roadmaps
(no explicit benefit sharing guidance)
???????
Ad-hoc strategies and processes
11. Benefit sharing on the ground:
Multiple burdens?
Reduced access and tenure security:
6 cases in Peru (2 REDD+ projects)
4 in Indonesia (1 REDD+ project)
WHY DO WE SEE BURDENS INSTEAD OF BENEFITS?
12. What makes arrangements
legitimate?
Not entirely dependent on initiative type (cross-cutting)
Broad consultation, NOT just representative-based
(cross-cutting)
Community control access is key (Indonesia)
Information flows: what should REDD+ communities be
told? (Peru)
17. Example 4:
Fair and equitable oil palm?
• Consultation
• Conservation
• High inti-plasma payment
• Community buy-in
18. REDD+ in Peru: Creating Dialogue Spaces?
National Ministry of
Environment
Regional
Environmental
Authority
Environmental NGOs
and Project
Proponents
Producer
groups
Indigenous
Communities
Local
governments
Private Extractive
Firms
National
Ministry of
Agriculture
Regional
Directorate of
Agriculture
Smallholder
communities
19. Takeaways and Conclusions
Slow policies mean ad hoc arrangements
Ad hoc arrangements deliver multiple benefits, but they’re
not always legitimate
More legitimate arrangements can be achieved through
better participation and tapping customary/existing
institutions
Integration across scales will be a challenge. Dialogue
spaces are opportunities, but they’re imperfect and
imperfectly understood
20. Acknowledgements: Research
Peru researchers: Laura Kowler, Jazmín Gonzales Tovar, Dawn
Rodriguez Ward, Carol Burga, Harold Gordillo, Anne Larson,
Support from: Medardo Miranda, Anggela Michi
Indonesia researchers: Rodd Myers, Anna Sanders, support from
Rut Din
Tanzania researchers: Martin Kijazi & Joshua Ivan
22. Further reading
The legitimacy of multilevel governance structures for
benefit sharing: REDD+ and other low emissions options in
Peru
http://www.cifor.org/library/5201/the-legitimacy-of-multilevel-
governance-structures-for-benefit-sharing-redd-and-
other-low-emissions-options-in-peru/
Benefit sharing in context: A comparative analysis of 10
sub-national initiatives in Indonesia (forthcoming)
Editor's Notes
Layout: Title Slide
Variation: none
Financing REDD+ Instruments in Indonesia FREDDI is based on Presidential Regulation No. 80 of 2011
government, developers and communities, depending on the type of management regime in place. But it’s not clear what happens in the case of competeing land claims, nor are specific mechanisms forthcoming – further problematic because of tensions w/ the ministry of finance, who has rejected and delayed implementation of this regulation
Direct monetary
Capacity building
Technical assistance
Jobs
Infrastructure