MAT 308 Test 1 Chapters 6 & 7(170 Total Points)Show All Work!.docx

MAT 308
Test 1 Chapters 6 & 7(170 Total Points)
Show All Work!
Name:_______________
1. Find the value of Zsuch that 0.0500 of the area under the
curve lies to the right of the Z (5 points).
2. Find the value of Zsuch that 0.2000 of the area under the
curve lies to the left of the Z (5 points).
3. The random variable X has a normal distribution with a mean
of 100 and a standard deviation of 25(5 points each).
a. Find probability that X is between 85 & 120
b. Find probability that X is greater than 130
c. Find probability that X is less than 75
d. Find probability that X is between 95 & 105
e. Find probability that X is less than 100
4. Suppose the random variable X has a population mean of 50
and a standard deviation of 10. Calculate the mean and the
standard deviation of the sample mean for each of the following
sample sizes (5 points each).
a. n=25
b. n=40
c. n=55
d. n=65
e. What happens to the size of the standard deviation of the
sample mean as the sample size increases?
5. A national report stated that 72% of trucks sold were
extended cab. John took a random sample of 200 trucks. What is
the probability that less than 116 trucks were extended cab?(10
points)

6. Find the Z-score for (5 points each):
a. Area of .9870 to its left
b. Area of 0.035 to its right
c. Area represents the 40th percentile
d. Area between –Z and Z is 0.90
e. Area to left of –Z and the right of Z totals 0.20
7. Calculate the standard score (Z-Score)(5 points each).
a. μ = 95 and σ = 15; x = 110
b. μ = 110 and σ = 12.5; x = 70
c. μ = 100 and σ = 22; x = 115
8. With a standard normal distribution find (5 points each):
a. area between -1.00 and 1.00
b. area less than 2.45
c. area more than -2.05
d. area less than -.55 and more than .85
9. Body temperatures of adults are normally distributed with a
mean of 98.6˚ and a standard deviation of 0.45˚.What is the
probability that a healthy adult will have a temperature that
differs from the mean by more than 2.00˚?(10 points)
10. The heights of women are normally distributed with a mean
of 63.6 inches and a standard deviation 2.8 inches. With a
sample size of 35 women find (5 points each):
a. Probability that an individual woman is more than 71.5
inches tall

b. Probability that the sample of women are less than 65.5
inches tall
c. Probability that the sample of women are between 56.5
and 71.5 inches tall
d. Probability that the sample of women are less than 64 inches
or greater than 72 inches tall
11. In one region, the September energy consumption levels for
single-family homes are found to be normally distributed with a
mean of 1150 kw and a standard deviation of 228kw. If 50
different homes are randomly selected, find the probability that
their mean energy consumption level for September is greater
than 1175kw (10 points).
COLLEGE LITERATURE: A JOURNAL OF CRITICAL
LITERARY STUDIES 44.4 Fall 2017
Print ISSN 0093-3139 E-ISSN 1542-4286
© Johns Hopkins University Press and West Chester University
2017
TRANSNATIONALISM AND ANTI-GLOBALISM
JOHANNES VOELZ
The recent resurgence of nationalism in the United States finds
expression in a whole vocabulary, made up of slogans, rallying
cries, and buzzwords. Most prominent among them may be

“Make
America Great Again” and “America First,” but there is another
buzzword—anti-globalism—which is particularly suggestive of
the
conundrum transnationalism faces in the Age of Trump. The
term
anti-globalism results from an act of rhetorical appropriation
and
resignification, and as I want to suggest, the idea of
transnationalism
plays an important role in this repackaging effort.
Anti-globalism recalls the anti-globalization movement of the
1990s and early 2000s, but this resonance brings out the
differences
rather than similarities between the two: where anti-
globalization
was concerned with a critique of the economic system, anti-
global-
ism attacks what is perceived as a larger ideology of globalism
that
allegedly promotes free trade as well as cultural and racial
mixing.
From the view of the leftist anti-globalization movement,
globaliza-
tion was driven by the institutions that backed the Washington
Con-
sensus (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank,
and the US Treasury), global corporations that exploited the
waning
sovereignty of nation-states, and national governments that
colluded
with the forces of global capital, for instance by entering into
inter-
national free trade agreements, such as the North American Free

522 COLLEGE LITERATURE | 44.4 Fall 2017
Trade Agreement. The targets of that earlier movement were
there-
fore the profiteers and structures of economic globalization.
This economic understanding of globalization opened up a space
for alternative conceptions of globalization that could compete
with
the economic version. It is no coincidence, therefore, that it was
also
in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the academic field of
Amer-
ican Studies turned to the transnational as an emerging
paradigm.
American Studies entered its transnational phase by engaging in
profound soul-searching about the possibilities of altering the
object
of study seemingly prescribed by the field’s name (see, for
instance,
Janice Radway’s 1998 Presidential Address at the American
Studies
Association, titled “What’s in a Name?”). Although rather
diverse
manifestos appeared in quick succession, there emerged a
consensus
that sticking to the nation form was a sign of ideological
backward-
ness, whereas transcending the nation held out the potential for
pro-
gressive change. From the get-go, transnational American
Studies

aimed to transcend the nation on two different conceptual
planes:
first, on the level of methodology, where transnationalism in
essence
meant adopting a particular perspective; second, on the level of
the
object of study, where transnationalism referred to phenomena
that
went beyond the limits of the nation. This blending of method
and
object of study meant in effect that the transnational wasn’t
some-
thing one could neutrally observe, describe, and chart. Rather,
studying the transnational meant affirming the transnational.
This
is because the approval for the new method jumped over, as it
were,
to an approval of the phenomena studied. If, in other words, the
transnational perspective of scholars was greeted as the
successful
overcoming of critical parochialism, then phenomena
embodying
the transnational were themselves to be commended. This valua-
tion guided the choice of what was to be studied: Preferred
objects
included oppositional social movements that traversed national
boundaries, aesthetic forms that traveled beyond the confines of
the
nation, and ideas that circulated in similarly unbounded ways
(clearly,
this list is not meant to be comprehensive). In short,
transnational
American Studies provided the opportunity to salvage a
“globaliza-
tion from below” (to use a phrase popular with the anti-
globalization

movement), and to favorably contrast it to both nationalism and
eco-
nomic globalization (or “globalization from above”).
One of the problems faced—but rarely addressed—by propo-
nents of transnationalism emerged from this differentiation of
eco-
nomic and cultural globalization. Did the idea that these two
forms
of globalization are principally different really hold up? Didn’t
both
Johannes Voelz | CRITICAL FORUM 523
visions of globalization rely on some of the very same images:
flows
(of goods, people, ideas) as something natural, borders and
bound-
aries as artificial? Wasn’t there, in fact, a deep affinity between
the
longing for cultural transnationalism and the ideology of
economic
globalization, despite the political differences that seemed to
keep
them both neatly separated? I have argued elsewhere that
conceptu-
ally (though not politically) transnational American Studies is
indeed
indebted to economic globalization, and that it is nonetheless
advis-
able to pursue the project of transnationalism, albeit in a self-
re-
flexive manner (Voelz 2011). But rather than revisiting this
debate

at this point, suffice it to say that the question of
transnationalism’s
oppositional purity emerged from the somewhat tenuous
conceptual
framework shared by the anti-globalization movement and
transna-
tional Americanists: globalization, according to this framework,
had
an economic and a cultural aspect, which were to be seen as
opposed
to one another.
Quite some time has passed since the early 2000s. By now, aca-
demic transnationalism in American literary and cultural stud-
ies has been solidly institutionalized. Think only of the Journal
of
Transnational American Studies, the recent Cambridge
Companion to
Transnational American Literature, edited by Yogita Goyal
(2017), or
the founding of the “Obama Institute for Transnational
American
Studies” at the University of Mainz, Germany. Meanwhile, pre-
dictably, the hype that initially attended the “transnational turn”
has faded rather quickly. The anti-globalization movement, on
the
other hand, has largely run out steam, mostly because center-
left
parties across North America and Europe failed to support it;
they
embraced neoliberal reforms instead, a decision which has cost
many
of them a good share of their votes. (One could add that the
move-
ment only petered out after the demise of Occupy, or that, in
fact,

it has survived in places like Spain, where Podemos has
managed
to transform the protest against neoliberal globalization into
party
politics—but these are nuances that don’t change the big
picture.)
Along with the overall decline of anti-globalization came the
rise of
anti-globalism (itself a movement of transnational scope), and
thus
the seemingly miraculous transformation of a left-wing into a
right-
wing movement.
How in the world could that happen? In moving the critique
of globalization across the political spectrum, anti-globalists
have
rejected the foundational premise of anti-globalization and
academic
transnationalism: they refuse to differentiate between two
differ-
ent kinds of globalization, be they “from below and from
above,”
“cultural and economic,” or simply “good and bad.” As London-
based
blogger Jacob Stringer has aptly summarized it on
opendemocracy.
net: “[Anti-]Globalisation refers to certain processes in the
interests
of corporate trade. [Anti-]Globalism refers to a global outlook,
bor-

ders too open, a feared mingling of cultures, implied dangerous
liai-
sons with aliens” (March 26, 2017). Anti-globalists, in other
words,
have tied the critique of economic globalization to xenophobia,
rac-
ism, and a disdain for global elites, and have thus
conceptualized
economic and cultural globalization as hanging together.
Anti-globalists’ longing for cultural isolationism, it must be
admitted, has rendered the economic dimension of anti-
globalism
strikingly toothless. It is as if they offered cultural anti-
globalism as
a solution to the problems caused by global capitalism: their
implied
economic platform seems to be limited to the call for
protectionism
(the economic dimension of “America First!”) and the hope for
more
high-paying manufacturing jobs. In Strangers in Their Own
Land,
sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild (2016) has recently shown
just
how deeply the Tea Party members and Trump supporters she
inter-
viewed in Louisiana are invested in the free market, and how
much
they detest the welfare state. Their critique of economic
globaliza-
tion spares multinational corporations (even if these
corporations,
like the petrochemical companies in Louisiana, ruin the
environ-
ment and cause a virtual cancer epidemic) because they are seen

as
the older siblings of small businesses run by local
entrepreneurs.
Though the anti-globalists’ mix of economic and cultural anti-
glo-
balism may be rife with logical faults and moral deficiencies,
their
triumph should not be simply dismissed as racist and
xenophobic
(though it is that, too). Instead, their rise should prompt
scholars
of transnationalism to reflect on the involvement of the idea of
the
transnational in the political struggle that divides the United
States
and, increasingly, other countries in which right-wing populism
has taken hold. In this context, it becomes newly significant
that
transnational Americanists have tended to politically identify
with
the transnational formations they study and that they have thus,
as
described earlier, conflated method and object of study. As a
result
of this conflation, academic transnationalism has come to
embody
the idea of globalism targeted by the anti-globalist agenda.
Econom-
ically, transnationalism encapsulates the privileged status of a
global
elite (here, transnationalism refers to the scholars) and
culturally, it
raises fears of migration, hybridity, and the demise of white
hege-
mony (here, transnationalism refers to the phenomena studied).

Seen in this light, the idea of globalism embodied by
transnational
Johannes Voelz | CRITICAL FORUM 525
American Studies becomes a tailor-made point of attack for
what
John Judis, in The Populist Explosion (2016), has described as
the tri-
angular scapegoating of right-wing populism. Right-wing
populism
is triangular in that it claims to defend “the people” against two
per-
ceived enemies: the elites (situated above) and undeserving
“others”
(situated below).
The challenge of anti-globalism, then, is not only that it rejects
transnationalism’s starting premise of the two kinds of
globaliza-
tion, but, more crucially, that it brings to light the degree to
which
transnationalism is itself involved in the divisive struggle
currently
rocking the United States. This challenge, I think, can be seen
as
a welcome opportunity to generate a new kind of knowledge
from
within transnational American Studies. It calls for an approach
that
is more self-reflexive than the identificatory stance taken by
many
scholars of transnationalism so far. Rather than starting from
the

presumption that studying transnational formations means
helping
to fight the good fight, transnational American Studies could
begin to
chart how the transnational itself has become a currency, or
capital,
in the struggle for symbolic advantages in a starkly divided
society.
This isn’t to devalue the study of transnational formations, but
rather to come to realize that embracing and valuing the
transna-
tional is a maneuver that helps secure symbolically
advantageous
positions. This is the case both in the academic field of
American
Studies, which has long been organized around a moral
economy of
political engagement, and in the larger public sphere of the
United
States. The idea (taken from Bourdieu) is not that we
consciously
try to amass as much symbolic capital as possible—as if we
were
rational-choice actors in the field of symbolic capital—but
instead
that trying to carve out for ourselves a recognized position in
the
field of transnational American Studies is what it means to
“have
an investment in the game” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 98).
The same goes for the other side of the divide: the embrace of
anti-globalism speaks to the specific value of the ideas and
princi-
ples captured by the term transnationalism in the broader
political

discourse of the United States. Here, too, the currency of the
idea
of transnationalism has a particular valuation. The fact that we
may
think of this value as “negative” when used by anti-globalists
begins
to suggest that taking stock of transnationalism as a currency
helps
us capture its political existence. I am suggesting, in other
words,
to incorporate a self-reflexive and relational sociology of the
trans-
national into the program of transnational American literary and
cultural studies.
One of the welcome ramifications of such an extension of
Amer-
icanist transnationalism, it seems to me, would be to overcome
the
harmful dualism of nation and trans-nation. Ultimately, this
dualism
suggests that by turning to the transnational, we will have to
learn
to stop worrying about the nation-state. But Trump’s rise to
power
should make it apparent that American Studies needs to be able
to provide explanations of what goes on inside the United
States.
The truly surprising suggestion to be taken away from the rise
of
anti-globalism is this: a self-reflexively and relationally
revamped

transnational American Studies may provide a necessary tool for
coming to terms with the nationalist resurgence.
WORKS CITED
Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc Wacquant. 1992. An Invitation to
Reflexive Sociol-
ogy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Goyal, Yogita, ed. 2017. The Cambridge Companion to
Transnational American
Literature. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2016. Strangers in their Own Land:
Anger and
Mourning on the American Right. New York: The New Press.
Judis, John. 2016. The Populist Explosion: How the Great
Recession Transformed
American and European Politics. New York: Columbia Global
Reports.
Ebook.
Radway, Janice. 1999. “What’s in a Name? Presidential Address
to the
American Studies Association, 20 November, 1998.” American
Quarterly
51.1: 1–32.
Stringer, Jacob. “Why did anti-globalisation fail and anti-
globalism suc-
ceed?” Open Democracy. March 26, 2017. Opendemocracy.net.
Last vis-
ited: May 28, 2017.
Voelz, Johannes. 2011. “Utopias of Transnationalism and the

Neoliberal
State.” In Re-Framing the Transnational Turn in American
Studies, edited
by Winfried Fluck, Donald E. Pease, and John Carlos Rowe.
Hanover,
NH: University Press of New England.
JOHANNES VOELZ is Heisenberg-Professor of American
Studies,
Democracy, and Aesthetics at Goethe-University Frankfurt,
Ger-
many. He is the author of Transcendental Resistance: The New
Amer-
icanists and Emerson’s Challenge (UP New England, 2010) and
The
Poetics of Insecurity: American Fiction and the Uses of Threat
(Cambridge
UP, forthcoming 2017).
Reproduced with permission of copyright owner.
Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Listen
Plum Print
The assumption of this article is that the "second great
transformation" proposed by global actors parallels the one
advanced
by those who resisted laissezțfaire capitalism in the 19th
century. Both

dispute the unilateral imposition of a new planetary order and
endeavor to modify the rhythm and direction of economic
processes
presented as either fact or fate. In doing so, they effectively
place the
question of the political institution of this order on the agenda. I
look
briefly at the familiar underside of globalism and then move on
to
develop a tentative typology of initiatives that set the tone for a
politics
of globalization. These include radical and viral direct action,
the
improvement of the terms of exchange between industrialized
and
developing countries, the expansion of the public sphere outside
national borders through global networks, the accountability of
multilateral organizations, and the advancement of democracy at
a
supranational level. Participants in these initiatives take politics
beyond
the liberalțdemocratic format of elections and partisan
competition
within the nationțstate. They exercise an informal supranational
citizenship that reclaims—and at the same time reformulates—
the
banners of social justice, solidarity, and internationalism as part
of the
public agenda.
Ever since the market ceased to be a taboo and globalization
became
a dominant cognitive framework, the Left seems to have
confined itself
to a principled commitment toward the dispossessed and a
continual

call for measures to ameliorate inequality. Outside the
mainstream,
globaliphobic groups—an expression I use as shorthand to
designate
the naysayer as well as Beck's "black," "green," and "red"
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 1 of 36
protectionists[ 1]—offer more militant, yet scarcely innovative
responses. They conceive globalization as a purely negative
phenomenon, little more than old capitalism dressed in new
clothes.
For them, especially the red and black globaliphobes, the
assault on
sovereignty spearheaded by governments and multilateral
agencies in
the name of international trade strengthens the hand of the
business
and financial community, compromises the autonomy of
domestic
political decisions, and reinforces the submissive status of less
developed countries to the dictates of the major industrial
nations.
Globaliphobes are quite right about this, but they also think
about the
phenomenon from a reductionist perspective that confuses
globalization with what Beck calls "globalism," that is, "the
ideology of
rule by the world market, the ideology of neoliberalism."[ 3] In
doing
so, they neglect the range of contending forces set into motion
by the
process of globalization itself. The paradoxical effect of this

confusion
is that their diagnostic converges with that of the neoliberal
right: both
conceive globalization as a victory of liberalism, except that
each
assigns opposite values to it.
Yet the hegemony of the market and free trade is not quite the
same
as the victory of liberalism tout court. When one looks at the
efforts to
recast the rules and the institutional design of the international
order
that has been emerging from the ruins of the Berlin wall, the
thesis of a
liberal end of history proves to be somewhat premature.
Globalism
undermines Westphalian sovereignty and deepens inequality,
but also
has at least a potential for political innovation as the resistance
to
globalism opens the doors for an expansion of collective action
beyond its conventional enclosure within national borders.
Notwithstanding the unipolarity of the international order, the
wide
array of new global warriors that rally around the banner of the
World
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 2 of 36
Social Forum—"another world is possible"—are assembling a
politics
that seeks to move the current setting beyond mere globalism.

This
intervention examines some of the symptoms of this move.
Every age of great changes brings along an underside.
Nineteenthț
century industrialization unleashed a productive power on a
scale
unknown before while it simultaneously destroyed traditional
communities, virtually wiped out the cottage industry of artisan
production, and created a new urban underclass. Industrial
society
also saw the emergence of efforts to resist and modify the
capitalist
reorganization of the world. Globalization, with its remarkable
time–
space compression and its impact on our perception of
distance,[ 4]
presents us with an underside too. It has three salient aspects:
the
deepening gap between rich and poor countries, the creation of
a
mobile elite and an increasingly confined mass, and the
resurrection of
more rigid and less liberal models of identity as a defensive
reaction to
the dislocations brought upon by globalization under the guise
of
globalism.
The first point has been discussed profusely.[ 5] For the purpose
of
our argument, it suffices to point out that one does not need to
be an
orthodox communist or a Rousseauțstyle egalitarian to
understand
that a minimum threshold of equality is required to shore up

governance and level the field for participants in the public
sphere.
The second aspect addresses a sociological issue. While moral
indignation in the face of human suffering is not enough to
reorient the
global patterns of development towards greater social justice
and
solidarity, the persistence of exclusion confirms the coexistence
of two
worlds or lifețexperiences concerning globalization. These
typically
show themselves, and converge, in one place, border crossings,
and
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 3 of 36
around one issue, mobility. Advocates of globalism extol the
virtues of
the free transit of capitals, goods, services, and people. Without
it,
globalization faces a real and perhaps unsurpassable limit. That
is why
the World Trade Organization (WTO) insists on this free
passage.
However, migratory controls to stop the entry of those fleeing
from
poverty or persecution multiply. The freedom of the market, say
Zincone and Agnew, entails a schizophrenic logic—positive for
capital
and negative for labor.[ 6] The UN reports something similar:
"The
collapse of space, time and borders may be creating a global
village,

but not everyone can be a citizen. The global professional elite
now
face low borders, but billions of others find borders as high as
ever."[
7] Bauman builds on this to identify a novel socioțpolitical
division
developing in the global order. If distance has ceased to be an
obstacle only for the rich—since for the poor it never was more
than a
shackle—this creates a new type of division between the haves
and
the haves not. The former are tourists who travel because they
can
and want to do so, while the latter are vagabonds, people who
move
because the world around them is unbearable, more of a prison
than a
home.[ 8] While the vagabond is the nightmare of the tourist, he
says,
they share something in that they are both "radicalized"
consumers—
they are embarked in a continual pursuit of satisfaction fueled
by
desire rather than by the object of desire—only that the former
is a
"defective" one. Thus, they are not mutually exclusive
categories, both
because tourists might become vagabonds and because one
might
occupy the position of the tourist in some domains and of the
vagabond in others.
The third salient aspect of globalization arises from the
exponential
increase in the pace of political, technological, economic, or
cultural

change. Its impact is undecidable. It can be lived as an opening
up of
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 4 of 36
possibilities for emancipatory projects or as a threat to identity
and to
the certainties of a more familiar world. When the latter gains
the
upper hand, people might turn to aggressive forms of
nationalism,
religious orthodoxy, tribalism, or messianic leaders—none of
which are
likely to enhance toleration—with the expectation of restoring
certainty. This is not entirely new. The industrial revolution
also
undermined the referents of everyday life without offering
cultural
responses, at least not at the beginning. Marx and Engels
describe the
distinctive traits of the dislocations brought upon by capitalism
in a
wellțknown passage of the Manifesto. They say:
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted
disturbance of
all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation
distinguish
the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fastțfrozen
relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices
and
opinions, are swept away, all newțformed ones become
antiquated

before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is
holy is
profaned.
Nationalism helped to counteract this "uninterrupted
disturbance" that
undermined identities and governmentality. Kahler argues that
in the
19th century, especially after the expansion of the franchise, the
emergence of mass nationalism had a political function, for it
enabled
states to forge strong links with the citizenry and to ensure their
loyalty
in an age of democracy. Later, anticommunism and the promise
of
economic prosperity replaced nationalism as a political
programmed.[
9] Globalism has nothing comparable to offer, or rather, as
Debray
remarks, it seems to offer no other mystique than the prospect
of
economic growth.[10] The latter is certainly desirable, at least
if one
expects some form of income distribution as its side effect, but
it is
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 5 of 36
probably not enough to sway those whose livelihood and
identity are
threatened by the rapid reorganization of labor markets and
trade
patterns. As suggested, the danger here is the possible appeal of

projects that offer certainty at the expense of toleration. The
strong
and often violent revival of nationalism and the aggressive
affirmation
of ethnic identities illustrate an uncanny hardening of territorial
and
cultural frontiers in a global setting where the role of borders is
supposed to have waned. This is complicated further by the rise
of
religious radicalism and by the religious coding of the global
terrorism
that became notorious after the events of 9/11. Since then, those
hitherto known as freedom fighters became the security
nightmare of
the West. Much to the chagrin of those advocating the end of
history
in the aftermath of the Cold War, the enduring presence of such
radicalism shows that the liberal worldțview is not without
rivals.
Interestingly, Debray describes religious radicalism—but not
religious
terrorism—as a defensive response to the loss of a sense of
belonging, or better still, to the dislocation of cultural referents
in the
wake of globalism. He argues that when people feel lost the list
of
"believers" usually grows. That is why he says that sometimes
religion
(but we could also say "nationalism" or "ethnic intolerance,"
which are
similar in this respect) turns out to be not the opium of the
people but
the vitamin of the weak.[11]
Globalism therefore revolutionizes the certainties of the past
and

inserts entire populations into a more open, changing and
diverse
world, often enhancing the array of options of how and where to
live
their lives. Bauman's tourists embody this freedom of choice
and
movement, so dear to liberal thought. Yet it also reminds us of a
possible trade off between these new possibilities and the
relative
security that accompanied identities in a more parochial world.
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 6 of 36
Bauman captures this disorientation when he speaks of
globalization
as the perception of "things getting out of hand."[12] The
question
here is not simply the fear of turning into vagabonds or
remaining
trapped forever in that position; it refers instead to the demand
for
certainty, a desire for more rigid codes that function as
navigational
maps for living in a world in constant flux. This is what Debray
had in
mind when he described religion as a vitamin of the weak. This
vitamin, however, is not sought by the casualties of globalism
alone,
but also by the champions of globalism who must now face the
flip
side of cheap airfares, cheap weapons, and cheap digital
communications being available to its opponents too. In an
international scene dominated by a neoțHobbesian concern for

security—terrorism, AIDS, drugs or immigration—the trade off
between a rapidly changing world and the demand for
certainty—both
in the center and in the periphery of global capitalism—
reinforces our
suspicion about a facile endorsement of a liberal telos of
history. It
does so if only because it reveals that not everyone sees
capitalism—
which Milton Friedman famously characterized as a general
freedom
to choose—and political liberalism as universally valid goods,
and
because sometimes the very advocates of those values easily
override
them by imposing illegal tariffs on imports or by engaging in
wars of
aggression in the name of prosperity and security.
Yet to accept this underside as a necessary consequence of
globalization is to submit to the naturalist fallacy of globalism,
which
presents the unilateral imposition of a world order modeled
around the
Washington Consensus as our destiny instead of as an act of
political
institution. Arguably, one could say that the war on terrorism
unleashed after 9/11 reactivates its political origin. It is the true
index
of globalization, or if one prefers, an implicit acknowledgement
that
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 7 of 36

globalism seeks to hegemonize globalization but can neither
control
nor exhaust it. However, it is the disagreement with and
resistance to
the current state of things that reactivates it explicitly.
What type of resistance? Another parallel with the 19th century
can
help to clarify this. Simplifying things a bit, the range of
responses of
those excluded from the benefits of the industrial revolution
oscillated
between two perspectives. One was the destruction of machines
advocated by the Luddites in the revolts of the 1810s and 1820s
in the
North of England—mainly the Midlands, Yorkshire, and
Lancashire.
Theirs was a mode of direct action motivated by near starvation
and
the desperation stemming from it, but also by a desire to restore
the
working conditions of earlier times, which presupposed that a
return to
the prețindustrial economy of smallțscale producers and artisans
was
a viable alternative. Marx and the International Working Men's
Association or First International exemplified the other
position. For
them there was little or no room for nostalgia since capitalism
was
here to stay, so the political task of the day was not to destroy
machines but to organize the resistance of the dispossessed
through
trade unions and other movements. Their aim was to transform
capitalism from within in order to build a more just and

fraternal
society. In the celebrated opening lines of the Manifesto, their
socialist
and internationalist project was the specter haunting Europe—or
rather, the European ruling classes. Polanyi sees the alternative
in
similar, yet less revolutionary terms, as he claims that by the
1830s "
[E]ither machines had to be demolished, as the Luddites had
tried to
do, or a regular labor market had to be created. Thus was
mankind
forced into the paths of a utopian experiment."[13]
Today we face a similar challenge and a new specter, one
haunting the
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 8 of 36
neoliberal efforts to reduce globalization to globalism. While
globaliphobes—in many ways the latterțday Luddites—see
globalization as the ruse of capitalism and call for a return to
the stateț
centered and protectionist policies of the past, others have
chosen to
become global warriors to transform the current state of affairs.
Like
their socialist predecessors in the industrial age, the more lucid
critics
of the global condition are not against globalization or trade per
se.
Just like those who opposed Gulf War II were not always
pacifists, in

the sense that many did not pose a moral injunction to war as
such but
only to a war that lacked the moral and political legitimacy of a
UN
resolution, these critics are not necessarily opposed to
globalization
but rather to globalism.[14] They do not stand in awe for the
momentum it has gathered nor delude themselves about the
eventual
disappearance of its negative effects either. They partake in the
global
fray to modify the course of globalization from within. Global
warriors
aim to bring about what Zincone and Agnew, in a felicitous play
of
words with the title of Polanyi's celebrated study of
industrialization,
call the political phase of the "second great transformation."[15]
We can read the latter as a move from globalism to
globalization,
which amounts to an effort to politicize economic processes
currently
mystified as either fact or fate. I propose a tentative typology of
the
initiatives undertaken by globalțminded actors. It functions as a
provisional guideline to differentiate forms of collective action
that
seek to modify the course of globalization. Their common trait
is the
resistance to the Washington Consensus of the 1990s—captured
in
ATTAC's slogan "The World is not for Sale"—in order to
transform
globalism from within and below. Their actions extend the
political field

—and by implication, the scope of citizenship—beyond the
enclosure
of the nationțstate. As in any classification, the boundaries
between
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 9 of 36
the various groupings are somewhat porous, as initiatives tend
to
overlap and to appear conjointly. I will distinguish six types,
the first
two being common to political activism more generally.
The lingering perception of the antițglobalization (i.e. antiț
globalism)
movement consists of a string of cities—Seattle, Prague,
Gothenburg,
Genoa—accompanied by images of sitțins, smashed windows,
street
violence, police barricades, and people being arrested. It also
includes
iconic referents like the destruction of a McDonald's restaurant
in
France led by José Bové and the Confédération Paysanne to
protest
against the use of genetically modified foods. This imagery is
prevalent partly because streetțbased politics tends to be more
salient
and thus the media picks on it as newsworthy. They are also the
ones
that instill most fear in the hearts of governments, business
leaders,
and multilateral agencies more accustomed to the logic of

expert
committees than to mass mobilizations, although at times they
embarrass and even undermine the strategic planning of other
global
protesters too. That is why some might argue that many activist
groups lack a strategic political compass. This is correct, but it
is not
the full story, as they range from strict globaliphobes to those
with a
clearer agenda for transforming globalism. Examples of those
who do
have such an agenda are those who participate in the World
Social
Forum of Porto Alegre, in the more recent European Social
Forum,
which gathered nearly 60,000 people when launched in Florence
in
November 2002, as well in other initiatives I will mention
shortly.[16]
Leading organizations associated with direct action include the
Ruckus Society, Global Exchange, and an array of anarchist
groups like
the Black Bloc.[17] One could also mention the "glocal"
dimension of
resistance, like the international support for local struggles
against
privatized utility companies in Third World countries. Here one
can
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 10 of 36
think of solidarity campaigns for the Bolivian Water Wars of
2000

against a subsidiary of Bechtel Corporation in Cochabamba, or
for the
Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee set up to resist rate
increases of
privatized state utilities in South Africa.[18]
Advocates of direct action—who can be violent or nonțviolent
in their
expression of discontent with the order of things—are the
generic
equivalent of the "dangerous classes" of 19thțcentury
conservative
discourse. Yet most movements and protests have a radical wing
or
radical strands among their ranks. Luddites shunned negotiation
or
accommodation within the system, and promoted the destruction
of
machines instead of proposing an alternative to the brutal
exploitation
of early capitalism. They ultimately failed, but theirs proved to
be a
productive failure, for cotton merchants and politicians got the
message about the perils of excessive greed. New social
movements
have been perhaps less destructive of private property, although
the
cathartic dimension of destruction should not be overlooked in
mass
protests. Yet they also appealed to radical direct action to
advance
their cause—the antinuclear protests in Germany during the
1970s and
the guerrilla tactics of Greenpeace are typical examples. One
can
agree or not with these "hot" actions, which are often

accompanied by
more protests and slogans than by strategic proposals, but they
play
an important role. They provide an initial momentum for
resistances to
globalism and for the globalization of resistances, and therefore
contribute to give visibility to the political phase of the "second
great
transformation." As Wallach says, sometimes direct action helps
to cut
through the arrogance of the international bureaucracy.[19]
Experts of
multilateral agencies often refuse to give any serious thought to
proposals of advocacy groups or stall them in the paper chase of
countless committees. As theorists of realpolitik have shown, a
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 11 of 36
capacity for disruption—which is a de facto veto power—serves
as a
bargaining tool, in this case helping global warriors to get their
case
heard.
The analogical model of these initiatives is the propagation of
digital
viruses over the Web: once they start to circulate, whoever
created
them loses track of how they propagate and cannot control who
will
get infected or when they will be contained. Chain letters are a
less
damaging example of such dissemination. Terrorist cells are a

more
threatening illustration. Viral action coincides with what
Deleuze and
Guattari designate as a "rhizome," a mode of organization that
lacks an
"arborescent" or treețlike central structure connecting and
directing
its parts.[20] A rhizome links people and individuals, and
facilitates
further links—independent initiatives generated by other groups
and
individuals—without the usual hierarchies or infrastructure of
more
conventional social and political organizations. The range of
viral
actions is quite broad. While it is not confined to the "cool"
medium of
cyberspace, the latter provides interesting examples. Some
consist of
gathering funds for relief operations or clicking on websites
like The
Hunger Site (www.thehungersite.org) to donate a cup of food, a
percentage of a mammogram, or to save a square foot of
rainforest—
all of this free of cost for those who do so. Others include
organizing
independent boycotts of firms employing child labor or sharing
information and other resources for sponsoring initiatives or
organizing
protests. Among the latter, one could mention the efforts of
MoveOn
(www.moveon.org, which has an ețmail list with 1.8 million
members)
to organize an internet protest against the war on Iraq, or to
disseminate information linking the war with the "Project for a
New

American Century" and its goal of positioning the US as the
unconditioned pole of the new world order.[21]
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 12 of 36
The strategic matrix for this mode of action in cyberspace is
electronic
civil disobedience (ECD). It was posed in the midț1990s by the
Critical
Art Ensemble as a way to match the dețcentralized and deț
territorialized nature of contemporary capitalism, particularly
financial
capital. Like all forms of radical direct action, it eschews
electoral
and/or party politics. If the streets were the privileged sites of
traditional civil disobedience, the nonțphysical cyberspace is
the
milieu where ECD takes place. The rhizomatic structure of viral
direct
action is clearly at work here, for instead of aiming for a mass
movement of public objectors, it favors a dețcentralized flow of
particularized microțorganizations. "Hacktivism," the
recombinant
encounter of technologyțsavvy hackers and traditional political
activists, is one of its modalities. In December 1997, the
Anonymous
Digital Coalition called people to block access to websites of
Mexican
financial institutions by repeatedly reloading them to protest the
massacre of indigenous people in Acteal, Chiapas, by
proțgovernment
paramilitary groups. The Electronic Disturbance Theatre, a proț
Zapatista group, developed the FloodNet software to engage in

acts of
ECD: in 1998, they flooded the then President Ernesto Zedillo's
webpage with the list of people killed in Acteal. In December
2000, the
Electrohippies group organized a virtual "sitțin" of some
450,000
people to overload the WTO servers, and more recently, Our
World
Our Say staged a 30,000 person virtual march on the US
Embassy in
London to protest George W. Bush's visit to the United
Kingdom in
November 2003.[22]
In addition to the obvious difficulty to measure their degree of
success, whether in the "cool" medium of cyberspace or as "hot"
spaces of street actions, a possible disadvantage of this type of
initiatives is their inbuilt difficulty to generate consensus or to
develop
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 13 of 36
and pursue what Gramsci would call a "counterțhegemonic
project."
However, this might not be such a bad thing. Viral direct action
can
function both as an obstacle for largețscale institutional
transformations and as an alternative to resourcețheavy projects.
Instead of aiming to articulate a wide array of forces to
reinstitute the
political order or communal space as a whole, the rhizome setup
of
viral action connects a myriad of local and global initiatives—in

cyber
or physical space—without a master plan or a central command
structure. Groups and individuals can participate and share
resources
on their own terms quickly, visibly, and costțeffectively by
setting up
transient virtual communities of action that provide adțhoc
modes of
participation for people who are neither militants nor committed
activists. It is a postțhegemony mode of political action, or at
least a
mode of intervention that does not fit strictly within the logic of
hegemony.
This is precisely what makes viral initiatives so useful. Despite
appearances to the contrary, those who stay away from politics
are not
necessarily apolitical. Many still want to change the world, but
not all
the time, for they do not conform to Rousseau's idealized image
of
virtuous citizens who rush to assemblies when called. They
might be
unhappy with the available political options yet lack the time,
the
resources, or the inclination to build institutional alternatives.
This is
not so much a proof of depoliticization as it is an indication that
dispersed people or loosely organized groups rarely count as
political
stakeholders. In a way, they live citizenship as functional
denizens. The
rhizomețstructure of viral direct action can contribute to
counteract
this experience of disenfranchisement. Signing a petition over
the

web, refusing to buy tuna cans that lack the dolphințfriendly
label,
participating in boycotts of products imported from countries
with
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 14 of 36
repressive regimes, joining a virtual sitțin, or taking to the
streets to
join forces with those who oppose wars of aggression, enables
people
to support a cause and intervene in the public sphere without the
usual risks and the costs—not to mention the complex
logistics—
associated with collective action. Here "the public sphere"
might be a
misnomer, for viral action is often a crossover between the
public and
the private. It engenders fleeting, adțhoc publics that appear
whenever and wherever private individuals decide to act, even
if they
only connect with others in the virtual communities resulting
from the
circulation of a pamphlet or forwarded ețmails for a particular
action.
More institutionalțoriented interventions include the campaigns
to
condone the debt of poor countries or to allocate 0.7% of the
GDP of
developed countries to international aid. One of the more
ambitious
initiative to foster equality is the Tobin Tax Initiative

(www.tobintax.org)
supported by a wide array of networks and organizations such as
ATTAC, Global Exchange, the AFLțCIO, or DebtChannel.org.
The Tobin
tax, named after the Nobel laureate economist who first
suggested it,
aims to discourage the ubiquitous crossțborder financial flows
carried
out by currency speculators—estimated at 1.8 trillion US dollars
daily
—by imposing a sales tax of 0.1 to 0.3% on each trade. Such a
tax
would generate estimated revenues ranging from $100 to $300
billion
yearly. As the main financial markets are located in
industrialized
countries, this would amount to a net transfer of resources to
the
developing world. These funds could be earmarked for poverty
eradication, disease prevention, and environmental programs.
This is …
Authors:
Source:
Document Type:
Subject Terms:
Author-Supplied
Keywords:
NAICS/Industry

Codes:
Abstract:
Globalisation, Globalism and
Cosmopolitanism as an Educational Ideal.
Papastephanou, Marianna
Educational Philosophy & Theory. Aug2005, Vol. 37 Issue 4,
p533-551. 19p.
Article
*EDUCATION & globalization
*GLOBAL method of teaching
*TEACHING
*COSMOPOLITANISM
*EDUCATIONAL ideologies
*PHILOSOPHY of education
*EDUCATION
antagonism
Bauman
Dewey
Giddens
globalisation
hybridity
identity
Kristeva
nation-state
923110 Administration of Education Programs
611699 All Other Miscellaneous Schools and Instruction
611710 Educational Support Services

In this paper, I discuss globalisation as an empirical reality that
is in a
complex relation to its corresponding discourse and in a critical
distance
from the cosmopolitan ideal. I argue that failure to grasp the
distinctions
between globalisation, globalism, and cosmopolitanism derives
from
mistaken identifications of the Is with the Ought and leads to
naïve and
ethnocentric glorifications of the potentialities of globalisation.
Conversely,
drawing the appropriate distinctions helps us articulate a more
critical
1
4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 1 of 2
Author Affiliations:
ISSN:
DOI:
Accession
Number:
Publisher Logo:
approach to contemporary cultural phenomena, and reconsider
the current

place and potential role of education within the context of
global affairs.
From this perspective, the antagonistic impulses cultivated by
globalisation
and some globalist discourse are singled out and targeted via a
radicalization of educational orientations. The final suggestion
of the article
concerns the vision of a more cosmopolitically sensitive
education.
[ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Educational Philosophy & Theory is the property
of Routledge
and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or
posted to a
listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However,
users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
This abstract
may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the
copy.
Users should refer to the original published version of the
material for the
full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
University of Cyprus
0013-1857
10.1111/j.1469-5812.2005.00139.x
17715367
1
Plum Print

4/5/20, 10:08 PM
Page 2 of 2
5
Week 1 Assignment Two
Importance of Becoming a Global Citizen
Student’s Name
GEN499 General Education Capstone
Professor’s Name
1
Date
Note: This assignment should be written in the correct format
per APA guidelines. Please click on the Writing Center tab at
the left-hand toolbar of the course. You will then click on the
“Writing a Paper” tab, which goes over the basics of writing an
essay. For information on how to write in-text citations in APA
format, click on the “Citing Within Your Paper” link under the
Writing Center & Library tab. This paper needs to consist of
750 – 1,000 words (excluding the title and reference page).
Start your paper with the title of this assignment:
Importance of Becoming a Global Citizen
The introduction paragraph of this paper should inform the

reader of the topic you are writing about while providing
background information and the purpose or importance of
addressing this topic of global citizenship. You should prepare
the reader by stating the concepts you are about to address
further in your paper. Typically a good introduction paragraph
is made up of 5 – 7 sentences.
Short Title of First Prompt (i.e. Distinction between
“Globalism” and “Globalization”)
After viewing the required video “Globalization at a
Crossroads”, you need write a paragraph of 5 – 7 sentences
addressing the distinction between “globalism” and
“globalization” It’s important to cite the video per APA
guidelines within this paragraph.
Short Title of Second Prompt
Write a paragraph (about 5 sentences) describing how being a
global citizen in the world of advanced technology can be
beneficial to your success in meeting your persona, academic,
and professional goals.
Short Title of Third Prompt
After reading the article by Reysen and Katzarska-Miller,
you need to write a paragraph of 5 – 7 sentences explaining why
there has been a disagreement between theorists about the
definition of global citizenship. Within the article, the authors
address how specific schools of thought define global
citizenship. It would be a good idea to paraphrase this
information in your own words and cite the article per APA
guidelines. Also, within this paragraph, you should provide your
own definition of global citizenship after reading what other
ideas are from the article.
Short Title of Fourth Prompt
Note: Based on the article, you need to write two paragraphs: a
paragraph on each of the two outcomes of global citizenship you
chose (intergroup empathy, valuing diversity, social justice,
environmental sustainability, intergroup helping, and the level
of responsibility to act for the betterment of this world).
Name of First Outcome Addressed (i.e. Valuing Diversity)

Within this paragraph you need to explain why this outcome is
important in becoming a global citizen. It’s a good idea to first
define the outcome in your own words and then provide a
thorough explanation on why it’s important for your own
development as a global citizen.
Name of Second Outcome Addressed (i.e. Social Justice)
Same instructions as the first paragraph above.
Short Title for Fifth Prompt
First Personal Example on (Name First Outcome)
You need to write a short paragraph describing a personal
experience that has corresponds to the first outcome you
addressed in the third prompt and has assisted or resulted in
your development as a global citizen.
Second Personal Example on (Name of Second Outcome)
You need to write a short paragraph describing a personal
experience that has corresponds to the second outcome you
addressed in the third prompt and has assisted or resulted in
your development as a global citizen.
Short Title of Sixth Prompt
You need to write a 5 – 7 sentence paragraph that identifies two
specific education courses and explains how each of those
courses assisted or influenced your development in becoming a
global citizen.
Conclusion
In this paragraph, you need to summarize the main points of this
assignment and include a description of why this topic is
important to address when it comes to the development of
global citizenship. Typically a good conclusion paragraph
consists of 5 – 7 sentences. Keep in mind that you should not
share new information in the conclusion paragraph. This means
that there should not be any in-text citations. You are basically
summarizing what you have written.

References
Note: References are written below in the correct format per
APA guidelines. In addition to these two required resources,
you must locate another scholarly source from the Ashford
University Library that applies to this topic and can be used to
support your perspective.
Reysen, S., & Katzarska-Miller, I. (2013). A model of global
citizenship: Antecedents and outcomes. International Journal of
Psychology, 48(5), 858-870.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00207594.2012.701749
Stucke, K. (Writer). (2009). Globalization at a crossroads
[Series episode]. In M. Stucke & Claudin, C. (Executive
Producers), Global issues.
https://fod.infobase.com/OnDemandEmbed.aspx?token=39350&
wID=100753&plt=FOD&loid=0&w=640&h=480&fWidth=660&
fHeight=530

MAT 308 Test 1 Chapters 6 & 7(170 Total Points)Show All Work!.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to MAT 308 Test 1 Chapters 6 & 7(170 Total Points)Show All Work!.docx

Similar to MAT 308 Test 1 Chapters 6 & 7(170 Total Points)Show All Work!.docx (20)

More from tienboileau

More from tienboileau (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

MAT 308 Test 1 Chapters 6 & 7(170 Total Points)Show All Work!.docx