Essay 2 The purpose of this project is to see if you are a.docx

Essay 2
The purpose of this project is to see if you are able to apply the
theories we have learned in this
class to gain a perspective on/explains a phenomenon in the
world. Or, to put it another way: to
see “general” processes in your “particular” case study.
For this project, the case study you will analyze will have
something to do with sports. It can be
about the career of a person, it can be about a particular sport
(or a comparison of sports), it
could be about the business of sports, it could be about a level
of sports (recreational, high
school, collegiate, professional), it could be about who gets to
participate in sports. It could be
something happening on the FIU campus or here in Miami or
anywhere. Basically anything
sports-related that you can reasonably cover in 8-10 pages. I
will take an extremely broad
definition of sports: including competitive video games,
marching band, professional wrestling,
dance, fitness, etc…
The proposal and presentation (detailed below) are steps you
take on the way to producing a
final paper. This paper will consist of three parts (plus a
bibliography), each about roughly 1/3
of the total length of your paper:
1. The presentation of the case: In this section, you will
introduce your topic. You will

include what it is about, who is/was involved, where it took
place and when. You
should also include what other people have thought/said about
it. In this section, you
must have at least 8 “data sources” – although a few more than
that is probably
preferable (but no need to go overboard). The easiest is to use
Google News or some
other news search engine (for example, the library website will
let you search old issues
of Sports Illustrated, New York Times, Miami Herald, etc.). It
would be great if you used
something like Web of Science (accessible via FIU Library
Website) to find some
sources in peer-reviewed academic journals -- but some topics
may not have anything
on them written in journals, so this is not a hard and fast
requirement. You are also
welcome to conduct interviews, observe/take field notes to get
information, particularly if
your topic is located in South Florida or impacts South Florida.
Citations must be
included and properly formatted in a style of your choosing.
The goal of this section is
to demonstrate that you have a good grasp of the nuances of the
topic, and have
examined multiple perspectives on it.
2. The summarization of two theorists from the course: In
this section, you will
introduce two theorists/writers from the course whose theory
you think will be applicable
to an analysis of the topic. They MUST be from this course,
not other courses you have
taken. Authors covered on Thursdays will be easier to work
with, because the “general”

point of their readings is clearer. You will begin by
summarizing the reading from the
first author, highlighting its particular topic (e.g. prisons,
Lesothto) and then outlining its
general point, using the author’s specific terminology (but
explained in your own words).
For example, if you cited Butler, you would explain
performativity; Foucault, panopticism
and discipline; etc…. You would then do the same for a second
author. You will then
compare and contrast the two authors – how are their ideas
similar? How are their ideas
distinct from each other? The key thing I am looking for here
is that you understand
each of the theories and are able to explain them in your own
words in a detailed
manner.
3. Your Analysis: In this last section, you will use the two
theorists you outlined to
conduct an analysis of your particular case. Take the first
author, and explain how their
theory explains multiple aspects of your case study. Then do
the same for other author.
Then contrast these understandings provided by course authors
to other
explanations/proclaimed impacts you have found about your
topic during your research.
Conclude by highlighting at least three major takeaways/main
points you want your
audience/reader to know about you case/remember about your
analysis. In this section,
be detailed in your explanations instead of brief – make the

specific connections
between your case and the theories clear. To use the Foucault
example: yes, Foucault
says we learn to discipline ourselves – but he has a lot of details
of how, where and why
that unfolds. Be sure to include those details.
4. Bibliography
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------
My question: How big data influenced sports and marketing
forever.
- Use the Thaler and Sunstein “Money ball” reading
- The Bourdieu reading, “How can one be a sports fan?”
- Can use additional sources if necessary
So basically, the first section you would introduce the topic of
big data in sports, and then its impact on
sports marketing in particular. The second section, first talk
about Thaler and Sunstein; then Bourdieu --
following the above guidelines. The third section is to use
whatever points you made about the authors to
analyze the case of big data and sports marketing, then discuss
how those analyses are similar and
different.
That is a rough, rough outline -- but hopefully enough to get
you started.

Economy Profile
Spain
SpainDoing Business 2020
Page 1
Economy Profile of Spain
Doing Business 2020 Indicators
(in order of appearance in the document)
Starting a business Procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum
capital to start a limited liability company
Dealing with construction permits Procedures, time and cost to
complete all formalities to build a warehouse and the quality
control and safety
mechanisms in the construction permitting system
Getting electricity Procedures, time and cost to get connected to
the electrical grid, and the reliability of the electricity supply
and
the transparency of tariffs
Registering property Procedures, time and cost to transfer a
property and the quality of the land administration system

Getting credit Movable collateral laws and credit information
systems
Protecting minority investors Minority shareholders’ rights in
related-party transactions and in corporate governance
Paying taxes Payments, time, total tax and contribution rate for
a firm to comply with all tax regulations as well as postfiling
processes
Trading across borders Time and cost to export the product of
comparative advantage and import auto parts
Enforcing contracts Time and cost to resolve a commercial
dispute and the quality of judicial processes
Resolving insolvency Time, cost, outcome and recovery rate for
a commercial insolvency and the strength of the legal
framework for
insolvency
Employing workers Flexibility in employment regulation and
redundancy cost
Page 2
About Doing Business
The project provides objective measures of business regulations
and their enforcement across 190 economies and selected cities
at the subnational and
regional level.

Doing Business
The project, launched in 2002, looks at domestic small and
medium-size companies and measures the regulations applying
to them through their life
cycle.
Doing Business
captures several important dimensions of the regulatory
environment as it applies to local firms. It provides quantitative
indicators on regulation for
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting
electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting
minority investors, paying taxes, trading across
borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. also
measures features of employing workers. Although does not
present rankings
of economies on the employing workers indicators or include
the topic in the aggregate ease of doing business score or
ranking on the ease of doing business, it does
present the data for these indicators.
Doing Business
Doing Business Doing Business
By gathering and analyzing comprehensive quantitative data to
compare business regulation environments across economies
and over time, encourages
economies to compete towards more efficient regulation; offers
measurable benchmarks for reform; and serves as a resource for
academics, journalists, private sector
researchers and others interested in the business climate of each
economy.

Doing Business
In addition, offers detailed , which exhaustively cover business
regulation and reform in different cities and regions within a
nation.
These studies provide data on the ease of doing business, rank
each location, and recommend reforms to improve performance
in each of the indicator areas. Selected
cities can compare their business regulations with other cities in
the economy or region and with the 190 economies that has
ranked.
Doing Business subnational studies
Doing Business
The first study, published in 2003, covered 5 indicator sets and
133 economies. This year’s study covers 11 indicator sets and
190 economies. Most
indicator sets refer to a case scenario in the largest business city
of each economy, except for 11 economies that have a
population of more than 100 million as of 2013
(Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the United States)
where also collected data
for the second largest business city. The data for these 11
economies are a population-weighted average for the 2 largest
business cities. The project has benefited from
feedback from governments, academics, practitioners and
reviewers. The initial goal remains: to provide an objective
basis for understanding and improving the
regulatory environment for business around the world.
Doing Business

Doing Business
To learn more about please visitDoing Business
doingbusiness.org
Page 3
http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/reports/subnational-reports
http://doingbusiness.org/
Ease of Doing Business in
Spain
Region OECD high income
Income Category High income
Population 46,723,749
City Covered Madrid
30
DB RANK DB SCORE
77.9
Rankings on Doing Business topics - Spain
97
79

55 59
80
28
35
1
26
18
Starting
a
Business
Dealing
with
Construction
Permits
Getting
Electricity
Registering
Property
Getting
Credit
Protecting
Minority
Investors

Paying
Taxes
Trading
across
Borders
Enforcing
Contracts
Resolving
Insolvency
Topic Scores
86.9 70.8 83.0 71.7 60.0 72.0 84.7 100.0 70.9 79.2
(rank)Starting a Business 97
Score of starting a business (0-100) 86.9
Procedures (number) 7
Time (days) 12.5
Cost (number) 3.9
Paid-in min. capital (% of income per capita) 11.6
(rank)Dealing with Construction Permits 79
Score of dealing with construction permits (0-100) 70.8
Time (days) 147
Cost (% of warehouse value) 4.7
Building quality control index (0-15) 11.0
(rank)Getting Electricity 55
Score of getting electricity (0-100) 83.0
Time (days) 95
Cost (% of income per capita) 93.1

Reliability of supply and transparency of tariff index (0-8) 8
(rank)Registering Property 59
Score of registering property (0-100) 71.7
Time (days) 13
Cost (% of property value) 6.1
Quality of the land administration index (0-30) 22.5
(rank)Getting Credit 80
Score of getting credit (0-100) 60.0
Strength of legal rights index (0-12) 5
Depth of credit information index (0-8) 7
Credit registry coverage (% of adults) 68.6
Credit bureau coverage (% of adults) 7.5
(rank)Protecting Minority Investors 28
Score of protecting minority investors (0-100) 72.0
Extent of disclosure index (0-10) 7.0
Extent of director liability index (0-10) 6.0
Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10) 6.0
Extent of shareholder rights index (0-6) 6.0
Extent of ownership and control index (0-7) 5.0
Extent of corporate transparency index (0-7) 6.0
(rank)Paying Taxes 35
Score of paying taxes (0-100) 84.7
Payments (number per year) 9
Time (hours per year) 143
Total tax and contribution rate (% of profit) 47.0
Postfiling index (0-100) 93.6
(rank)Trading across Borders 1
Score of trading across borders (0-100) 100
Time to export

Documentary compliance (hours) 1
Border compliance (hours) 0
Cost to export
Documentary compliance (USD) 0
Border compliance (USD) 0
Time to export
Documentary compliance (hours) 1
Border compliance (hours) 0
Cost to export
Documentary compliance (USD) 0
Border compliance (USD) 0
(rank)Enforcing Contracts 26
Score of enforcing contracts (0-100) 70.9
Time (days) 510
Cost (% of claim value) 17.2
Quality of judicial processes index (0-18) 11.5
(rank)Resolving Insolvency 18
Score of resolving insolvency (0-100) 79.2
Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 77.5
Time (years) 1.5
Cost (% of estate) 11.0
Outcome (0 as piecemeal sale and 1 as going
concern)
1
Strength of insolvency framework index (0-16) 12.0
Page 4

Starting a Business
This topic measures the number of procedures, time, cost and
paid-in minimum capital requirement for a small- to medium-
sized limited liability company to start up and
formally operate in each economy’s largest business city.
To make the data comparable across 190 economies, uses a
standardized business that is 100% domestically owned, has
start-up capital equivalent to
10 times the income per capita, engages in general industrial or
commercial activities and employs between 10 and 50 people
one month after the commencement of
operations, all of whom are domestic nationals. Starting a
Business considers two types of local limited liability
companies that are identical in all aspects, except that one
company is owned by 5 married women and the other by 5
married men. The ranking of economies on the ease of starting a
business is determined by sorting their
scores for starting a business. These scores are the simple
average of the scores for each of the component indicators.
Doing Business
The most recent round of data collection for the project was
completed in May 2019. .See the methodology for more
information
What the indicators measure
Procedures to legally start and formally operate a company
(number)

Preregistration (for example, name verification or reservation,
notarization)
•
Registration in the economy’s largest business city•
Postregistration (for example, social security registration,
company seal)
•
Obtaining approval from spouse to start a business or to leave
the home to register the company
•
Obtaining any gender specific document for company
registration and operation or national identification card
•
Time required to complete each procedure (calendar days)
Does not include time spent gathering information•
Each procedure starts on a separate day (2 procedures cannot
start on the same day)
•
Procedures fully completed online are recorded as ½ day•
Procedure is considered completed once final document is
received
•
No prior contact with officials•

Cost required to complete each procedure (% of income per
capita)
Official costs only, no bribes•
No professional fees unless services required by law or
commonly used in practice
•
Paid-in minimum capital (% of income per capita)
• Funds deposited in a bank or with third party before
registration
or up to 3 months after incorporation
Case study assumptions
To make the data comparable across economies, several
assumptions about the business and the
procedures are used. It is assumed that any required information
is readily available and that the
entrepreneur will pay no bribes.
The business:
-Is a limited liability company (or its legal equivalent). If there
is more than one type of limited
liability company in the economy, the limited liability form
most common among domestic firms is
chosen. Information on the most common form is obtained from
incorporation lawyers or the
statistical office.
-Operates in the economy’s largest business city. For 11
economies the data are also collected for
the second largest business city.
-Performs general industrial or commercial activities such as

the production or sale to the public of
goods or services. The business does not perform foreign trade
activities and does not handle
products subject to a special tax regime, for example, liquor or
tobacco. It is not using heavily
polluting production processes.
-Does not qualify for investment incentives or any special
benefits.
-Is 100% domestically owned.
-Has five business owners, none of whom is a legal entity. One
business owner holds 30% of the
company shares, two owners have 20% of shares each, and two
owners have 15% of shares
each.
-Is managed by one local director.
-Has between 10 and 50 employees one month after the
commencement of operations, all of them
domestic nationals.
-Has start-up capital of 10 times income per capita.
-Has an estimated turnover of at least 100 times income per
capita.
-Leases the commercial plant or offices and is not a proprietor
of real estate.
-Has an annual lease for the office space equivalent to one
income per capita.
-Is in an office space of approximately 929 square meters
(10,000 square feet).
-Has a company deed that is 10 pages long.
The owners:
-Have reached the legal age of majority and are capable of
making decisions as an adult. If there
is no legal age of majority, they are assumed to be 30 years old.
-Are in good health and have no criminal record.
-Are married, the marriage is monogamous and registered with

the authorities.
-Where the answer differs according to the legal system
applicable to the woman or man in
question (as may be the case in economies where there is legal
plurality), the answer used will be
the one that applies to the majority of the population.
Page 5
http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/methodology/starting-a-
business
Starting a Business - Spain
Figure – Starting a Business in Spain – Score
Procedures
64.7
Time
87.9
Cost
98.1
Paid-in min. capital
97.1
Figure – Starting a Business in Spain and comparator economies

– Ranking and Score
DB 2020 Starting a Business Score
0 100
91.3: Regional Average (OECD high income)
90.9: Portugal (Rank: 63)
88.4: Switzerland (Rank: 81)
86.9: Spain (Rank: 97)
86.8: Italy (Rank: 98)
83.7: Germany (Rank: 125)
Note: The ranking of economies on the ease of starting a
business is determined by sorting their scores for starting a
business. These scores are the simple average of
the scores for each of the component indicators.
Standardized Company
Legal form Sociedad de responsabilidad limitada (SRL) -
Limited Liability Company
Paid-in minimum capital requirement EUR 3,000
City Covered Madrid
Indicator Spain OECD high income Best Regulatory
Performance
Procedure – Men (number) 7 4.9 1 (2 Economies)

Time – Men (days) 12.5 9.2 0.5 (New Zealand)
Cost – Men (% of income per capita) 3.9 3.0 0.0 (2 Economies)
Procedure – Women (number) 7 4.9 1 (2 Economies)
Time – Women (days) 12.5 9.2 0.5 (New Zealand)
Cost – Women (% of income per capita) 3.9 3.0 0.0 (2
Economies)
Paid-in min. capital (% of income per capita) 11.6 7.6 0.0 (120
Economies)
Page 6
Figure – Starting a Business in Spain – Procedure, Time and
Cost
This symbol is shown beside procedure numbers that take place
simultaneously with the previous procedure.*
Note: Online procedures account for 0.5 days in the total time
calculation. For economies that have a different procedure list
for men and women, the graph shows the
time for women. For more information on methodology, see the
website ( ). For details on the procedures
reflected here, see the summary below.
Doing Business http://doingbusiness.org/en/methodology

Procedures (number)
1 2 3 4 5 6 * 7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Ti
m
e
(d
ay
s)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2

2.5
C
os
t
(%
o
f i
nc
om
e
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
)
Time (days) Cost (% of income per capita)
Page 7
https://doingbusiness.org/en/methodology
Details – Starting a Business in Spain – Procedure, Time and
Cost

No. Procedures Time to Complete Associated Costs
1 Obtain a certificate of availability for the proposed company
name (certificación negativa
de la denominación social)
: Mercantile RegistryAgency
To register a company, entrepreneurs can choose between
obtaining a certificate of availability of
the company name or selecting a name from a list of approved
names (Bolsa de
denominaciones). Most companies are registered with a
previous certificate.
The certificate of availability of the company name is typically
requested through the website of
the Central Commercial Registry:
https://www.rmc.es/privado/CertificacionesDenominaciones.asp
x. The company can choose
between obtain the certificate in person at the Registry, receive
it by email or received it
electronically (with the electronic signature of the register). The
Registry will issue and deliver the
certificate within the next 48 hours.
This procedure can also be requested through the Help Desk for
Entrepreneurs (Puntos de
Atención al Emprendedor, PAE) or through the notary online
system SIGNO.
Once the Registry issues the certificate, the requested corporate
name will be reserved for a
maximum of 6 months from the certificate's date of issuance.
Each certificate is valid for 3 months
from its date of issuance. Furthermore, once the certificate's

validity has expired (3 months), the
certificate can only be renewed once, after which a new
certificate must be requested.
2 days EUR 13.52 (excluding
VAT)
2 Open a company bank account and deposit capital
: BankAgency
In most cases, the entrepreneur deposits the amount of the
contributions directly in the bank. The
contributions can also be directly given to the public notary at
the time of granting the deed of
incorporation. In this scenario, the notary can deposit them in
the company's bank account.
The law No. 14/2013 of Entrepreneurship support established
that is not necessary to justify the
deposit of the share capital if the shareholders express in the
public deed that they will respond
jointly and severally in front of the company and its creditors.
1 day no charge
3 File the Single Electronic Document (Documento Único
Electrónico - DUE) and make an
appointment with a notary
: Help Desk for Entrepreneurs (PAE)Agency
Prior incorporation, the entrepreneur completes a single
registration form (DUE) through the
online system CIRCE that is then sent to the notary's office, the
commercial registry, the tax
agency and the social security agency to obtain the company
contribution number (Codigo de

Cuenta de Cotizacion, CCC) and to register the employees.
The single registration form can be filed at any Help Desk for
Entrepreneurs (Puntos de Atención
al Emprendedor - PAE) or online by the entrepreneur, in which
case a digital signature is required.
Once the DUE is sent, an appointment request is generated with
the notary chosen for the
preparation of the public deed of incorporation.
1 day no charge
Page 8
Takes place simultaneously with previous procedure.
4 Obtain through a notary the registered public deed of
incorporation and the fiscal
identification number (Código de identificación fiscal - CIF)
: Public Notary and Mercantile RegistryAgency
The notary provides the public deed (escritura de constitucion)
once it is obtained the company
name certificate and the rest of the documents. The Notary will
send to the Registry the accredited
copy of the deed through the online platform SIGNO. The
Registry will incorporate the company
and the confirmation of the incorporation will be notified
electronically to the Notary.
The Notary will apply for a provisional fiscal identification
number (NIF) at the tax authority

(Agencia Estatal de Administracion Tributaria) through the
online notary platform SIGNO. Once
the tax authority confirmed the permanent NIF, it will be
electronically notified to the Notary and
Registry.
At the moment of incorporation, the entrepreneurs must provide
to the Notary the information on
the company's beneficial owners that will be included in the
company deed by a 'responsible
declaration". The Notary will verify the provided information at
the Beneficial Ownership Database.
The registration and the fiscal identification number can also be
obtained through CIRCE, the
electronic platform of the Ministry of Economy, Commerce and
Tourism. Although, the SIGNO
platform is more used among notaries to incorporate a company.
For a company with a share capital higher than EUR 30,000, the
notary fees are as follows (per
Number 2, Royal Decree 1426/1989, last modified per Official
Gazette 285 of Nov. 17, 2011):
1. Notary fee for public deed of incorporation (a 5% discount
applies):
- until EUR 6,010.12: fixed sum of EUR 90.15
- for the amount from EUR 6,010.12 until 30,050.61: 4.5 per
thousand of capital
- from EUR 30,050.61 until 60,101.21: 1.5 per thousand
2. Additional notary charges (per Number 1-h, Royal Decree
1426/1989, last modified per Official
- designation of positions (cargos): EUR 30.05
- paper cost (papel matriz): EUR 1.50

- authorized mandatory copy (copia autorizada): EUR 30.05
- paper cost for the copy: EUR 1.50
- safety seal (sello de seguridad): EUR 0.15
Registration fees as follows (per Number 2, Royal Decree
1427/1989 last modified per Official
- until EUR 6,010.12: fixed sum of EUR 24.04
- for the amount from EUR 6,010.12 until 30,050.61: 1.75 per
thousand of capital
- fee for record entry: EUR 6.01
7 days See comments
5 Payment of the municipal tax for urban services (tasa por
prestación de servicios
urbanísticos)
: CIRCE portalAgency
Payment of the municipal tax ("tasa por prestación de servicios
urbanísticos") is required before
submitting the notification of start of operations ("declaración
responsable"). It can be made online
(through the CIRCE system) or at the authorized banks.
Less than one day
(online procedure)
EUR 414
6 Submit a notification of start of operations (declaración
responsable) to the Town Council
: Town CouncilAgency

The responsible declaration procedure is to be prepared in
accordance with an official model,
which will include the following circumstances: (i)
identification of the owner of the activity; (ii)
identification of the office's surface; (iii) identification of the
activity declared; (iv) a representation
granting that the activity is not undertaken in a building
protected due to its cultural interest; and
(v) that the activity does not imply the private use or occupation
of public domain spaces and
goods.
This declaration will entitle the applicant to undertake the
activity declared, subject to further
control by physical inspection of the office by the local
authorities or by the technical services of
the private agencies authorized by the municipality, depending
on to which of those entities the
declaration has been filed with. This declaration can be filed
with the Municipality in person, by
mail or online through the CIRCE platform.
Less than one day
(online procedure)
included in Procedure 5
7 Notify the Ministry of Labor and Industry of the start of
operations
: Ministry of Labor, Migrations and Social Security (Dirección
General de Trabajo)Agency
The corresponding autonomous community must be notified
within the first 30 days of the start of
activities and the opening of the workplace. Every autonomous

community has its own form.
Some require that work injury and safety documentation
(corresponding to the specific business or
workplace in question) be filed along with the forms. Other
forms and documents might be needed
depending on the workplace activities.
Business founders can notify the Ministry of Labor and Industry
online through the CIRCE
platform.
Less than one day
(online procedure,
simultaneous with
previous procedure)
no charge
Page 9
Dealing with Construction Permits
This topic tracks the procedures, time and cost to build a
warehouse—including obtaining necessary the licenses and
permits, submitting all required notifications,
requesting and receiving all necessary inspections and obtaining
utility connections. In addition, the Dealing with Construction
Permits indicator measures the building
quality control index, evaluating the quality of building
regulations, the strength of quality control and safety
mechanisms, liability and insurance regimes, and professional
certification requirements. The most recent round of data

collection was completed in May 2019. See the methodology for
more information
What the indicators measure
Procedures to legally build a warehouse (number)
Submitting all relevant documents and obtaining all necessary
clearances, licenses, permits and certificates
•
Submitting all required notifications and receiving all necessary
inspections
•
Obtaining utility connections for water and sewerage•
Registering and selling the warehouse after its completion•
Time required to complete each procedure (calendar days)
Does not include time spent gathering information•
Each procedure starts on a separate day—though procedures
that can be fully completed online are an exception to this rule
•
Procedure is considered completed once final document is
received
•
No prior contact with officials•
Cost required to complete each procedure (% of income per
capita)

Official costs only, no bribes•
Building quality control index (0-15)
Quality of building regulations (0-2)•
Quality control before construction (0-1)•
Quality control during construction (0-3)•
Quality control after construction (0-3)•
Liability and insurance regimes (0-2)•
Professional certifications (0-4)•
Case study assumptions
To make the data comparable across economies, several
assumptions about the construction
company, the warehouse project and the utility connections are
used.
The construction company (BuildCo):
- Is a limited liability company (or its legal equivalent) and
operates in the economy’s largest
business city. For 11 economies the data are also collected for
the second largest business city.
- Is 100% domestically and privately owned; has five owners,
none of whom is a legal entity. Has a
licensed architect and a licensed engineer, both registered with
the local association of architects
or engineers. BuildCo is not assumed to have any other
employees who are technical or licensed
experts, such as geological or topographical experts.
- Owns the land on which the warehouse will be built and will
sell the warehouse upon its
completion.
The warehouse:

- Will be used for general storage activities, such as storage of
books or stationery.
- Will have two stories, both above ground, with a total
constructed area of approximately 1,300.6
square meters (14,000 square feet). Each floor will be 3 meters
(9 feet, 10 inches) high and will be
located on a land plot of approximately 929 square meters
(10,000 square feet) that is 100%
owned by BuildCo, and the warehouse is valued at 50 times
income per capita.
- Will have complete architectural and technical plans prepared
by a licensed architect. If
preparation of the plans requires such steps as obtaining further
documentation or getting prior
approvals from external agencies, these are counted as
procedures.
- Will take 30 weeks to construct (excluding all delays due to
administrative and regulatory
requirements).
The water and sewerage connections:
- Will be 150 meters (492 feet) from the existing water source
and sewer tap. If there is no water
delivery infrastructure in the economy, a borehole will be dug.
If there is no sewerage
infrastructure, a septic tank in the smallest size available will
be installed or built.
- Will have an average water use of 662 liters (175 gallons) a
day and an average wastewater flow
of 568 liters (150 gallons) a day. Will have a peak water use of
1,325 liters (350 gallons) a day and
a peak wastewater flow of 1,136 liters (300 gallons) a day.
- Will have a constant level of water demand and wastewater
flow throughout the year; will be 1

inch in diameter for the water connection and 4 inches in
diameter for the sewerage connection.
Page 10
http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/methodology/dealing-with-
construction-permits
Dealing with Construction Permits - Spain
Figure – Dealing with Construction Permits in Spain – Score
Procedures
68.0
Time
65.1
Cost
76.7
Building quality control index
73.3
Figure – Dealing with Construction Permits in Spain and
comparator economies – Ranking and Score
DB 2020 Dealing with Construction Permits Score

0 100
78.2: Germany (Rank: 30)
75.6: Regional Average (OECD high income)
73.2: Portugal (Rank: 60)
71.8: Switzerland (Rank: 71)
70.8: Spain (Rank: 79)
68.3: Italy (Rank: 97)
Note: The ranking of economies on the ease of dealing with
construction permits is determined by sorting their scores for
dealing with construction permits. These scores
are the simple average of the scores for each of the component
indicators.
Standardized Warehouse
Estimated value of warehouse EUR 1,292,552.80
City Covered Madrid
Indicator Spain OECD high income Best Regulatory
Performance
Procedures (number) 13 12.7 None in 2018/19
Time (days) 147 152.3 None in 2018/19
Cost (% of warehouse value) 4.7 1.5 None in 2018/19
Building quality control index (0-15) 11.0 11.6 15.0 (6

Economies)
Page 11
Figure – Dealing with Construction Permits in Spain –
Procedure, Time and Cost
This symbol is shown beside procedure numbers that take place
simultaneously with the previous procedure.*
Note: Online procedures account for 0.5 days in the total time
calculation. For economies that have a different procedure list
for men and women, the graph shows the
time for women. For more information on methodology, see the
website ( ). For details on the procedures
reflected here, see the summary below.
Doing Business http://doingbusiness.org/en/methodology
Procedures (number)
1 * 2 * 3 * 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 * 13
0
20
40
60
80

100
120
140
Ti
m
e
(d
ay
s)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
C

os
t
(%
o
f w
ar
eh
ou
se
v
al
ue
)
Time (days) Cost (% of warehouse value)
Page 12
https://doingbusiness.org/en/methodology
Figure – Dealing with Construction Permits in Spain and
comparator economies – Measure of Quality
Spain Germany Italy Portugal Switzerland OECD
high
income

Who's on First - Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein
New Republic, The - September 1, 2003
Author/Byline: Richard H. Thaler; Cass R. and Sunstein
Section: Books & The Arts
Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game
By Michael Lewis
(W. W. Norton, 288 pp., $24.95)
Michael Lewis's new book is a sensation. It treats a topic that
would seem to interest only sports fans: how Billy Beane, the
charismatic
general manager of the Oakland Athletics, turned his baseball
team around using, of all things, statistics. What next--an
inspirational tale
about superior database management? But there are some
broader lessons in Lewis's book that make it worth the attention
also of
people who do not know the difference between a slider and a
screwball. Those lessons have to do, above all, with the limits
of human
rationality and the efficiency of labor markets. If Lewis is right
about the blunders and the confusions of those who run baseball
teams,
then his tale has a lot to tell us about blunders and confusions in
many other domains.
Lewis focuses on the extraordinary success of Beane, who has
produced a terrific baseball team despite one of the lower
payrolls in

baseball. Since 1999, when Beane took over, the Athletics have
compiled an amazing record. Consider a few numbers. In 1999,
the
Athletics ranked eleventh (out of fourteen teams) in the
American League in payroll and fifth in wins. In 2000, the
Athletics ranked twelfth
in payroll and second in wins, a feat that they duplicated in
2001. In 2002, they ranked twelfth in payroll again--and first in
wins.
How did Beane pull this off? He did it largely by ignoring or
defying baseball's conventional wisdom, otherwise known in
baseball lingo as
The Book. (As in, "The Book says that you should bunt in this
situation.") It turns out that many chapters of The Book are
simply wrong.
Sacrifice bunts are rarely a good strategy, and steals are vastly
overrated. (Unless a base stealer succeeds at least three-quarters
of the
time, his running efforts reduce runs scored rather than increase
them.) The portion of The Book that was most in need of
revision, and
the most important edge that Beane was able to exploit, was in
player evaluation. Here he tried to figure out, scientifically,
how much a
player was likely to contribute to his team's chances. He relied
on objective evidence, explicitly ignoring anything that could
be dismissed
as "subjective."
Beane found that, as a statistical regularity, players drafted out
of high school are much less likely to succeed than players
drafted out of
college. And so he drafted no high school players, regardless of
how highly they were touted. He hired a young assistant named
Paul

DePodesta, a Harvard economics graduate, who relied on his
computer to project players' performances, without so much as
ever seeing
a player swing a bat. Much of the tension, and the comedy, of
Lewis's book comes from the conflict between Beane's and
DePodesta's
statistical methods of evaluation and the well established
strategies of experts who have scouted, played, and breathed
baseball for
decades. The verdict? Statistical methods outperform experts.
It's not even close.
As Lewis tells the tale, Beane's particular approach has
intensely personal foundations. Beane himself was a top high
school prospect,
one of the most sought-after in the nation. He was fast, he was
tall, he was strong, he could hit the ball a mile. The baseball
scouts loved
him. As one of them admitted, "I never looked at a single
statistic of Billy's. It couldn't have crossed my mind.... He had
it all." According to
another, "The boy had a body you could dream on. Ramrod-
straight and lean but not so lean you couldn't imagine him
filling out. And that
face!" Beane was selected in the first round of the draft, with
the highest of expectations. He was destined to be a star.
There was just one problem: Beane did not play baseball very
well. He thought too much. He was too emotional. His failures
notwithstanding, baseball people saw his body, and his face,
and his raw talent, and concluded that he was bound to succeed.
"Teammates would look at Billy and see the future of the New
York Mets. Scouts would look at him and see what they had
always seen....
The body. The Good Face." He certainly had talent, and once in
a while he would do something truly sensational. But after

several years
in major league baseball, his performance was woefully bad.
With only 301 at-bats, he hit .219; more embarrassingly, he had
80
strikeouts and only 11 walks. Abruptly, he quit the game. While
playing for Oakland, he told the team's general manager that he
no longer
wanted to be a player, and would prefer the job of advance
scout, an employee who travels ahead of the team to analyze
future
opponents. The team's general manager was stunned: "Nobody
does that. Nobody says, I quit as a player. I want to be an
advance
scout."
Beane was a much better baseball analyst than baseball player,
and he quickly moved up the Oakland club's hierarchy. He
became
interested in a simple question: what is the most efficient way
to spend money on baseball players? The origins of Beane's
iconoclastic
answers can be found in the writings of Bill James, a once
obscure but now legendary baseball writer-statistician. While
working as a
night watchman for a pork-and-beans factory, James decided
that he wanted to write about baseball in a way that would
illuminate what
really happened and why. In his view, conventional statistics
were insufficiently helpful and sometimes downright
misleading. Consider the
area of defensive play. When a player mishandles a ball or
makes a bad throw, he can be assigned an "error." A player who
accumulates
a lot of errors seems like a bad fielder, whereas one with few
errors seems really good. The problem is that a player may
accumulate

errors in part because he is unusually good at getting to the ball.
If you do not get to the ball, you do not get an error (according
to the
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/
chapter on scoring in The Book). So errors are a crude measure
of fielding ability.
Or consider walks. Since the late nineteenth century, walks have
been treated, in official statistics, as neutral--neither good nor
bad.
According to a nineteenth century expert whose advice is
followed to the present day, "There is but one true criterion of
skill at the bat,
and that is the number of times bases are made on clean hits."
Of course, many people realized that a walk is a positive event
for the
hitting team and a negative event for the team in the field, but
this commonsense notion was not incorporated into baseball's
most
common measure of batting skill, the batting average, which
leaves walks out. James found this preposterous, and he pushed
for the use
of the "on-base percentage" as an improvement. James also
criticized a standard measure of a hitter's value, the notion of
"runs batted
in." James pointed out that some players are in a position to bat
in a lot of runs, because they are lucky or because they play on
good
teams. Other players bat in fewer runs, but only because they do
not have the opportunities of their apparent superiors: "There is
a huge
element of luck in even having the opportunity, and what wasn't
luck was, partly, the achievement of others."

Eventually James punctured countless myths about what was
important to winning in baseball. And he had a positive agenda,
too. He
devised a formula to measure "runs created"--a formula that
predicted, from just a few aspects of a player's performance,
how many runs
he would produce for an average team. James's formula had
explosive implications. It suggested that professional baseball
experts,
those who ran the teams, were placing far too much emphasis on
batting averages and stolen bases, and far too little on walks
and extra
base hits. After a slow start, James was widely read; his books
became best-sellers, and he became a kind of cult figure among
certain
baseball fans. But baseball's experts and executives treated
James's work as irrelevant. He had no effect on what they did.
And with a
few exceptions, the tried-but-not-so-true baseball statistics such
as batting average and RBIs remain the only ones reported.
So Billy Beane, the "can't miss" prospect who missed, became
an avid Bill James reader. As Lewis writes, "James had
something to say
specifically to Billy: you were on the receiving end of a false
idea of what makes a successful baseball player. James also had
something
general to say to Billy, or any other general manager of a
baseball team who had the guts, or the need, to listen: if you
challenge the
conventional wisdom, you will find ways to do things much
better than they are currently done." Wanting to ensure that
statistical analyses
were done, and done right, Beane hired DePodesta to study
player performances with the aid of a computer. Some of

Lewis's most
hilarious passages illustrate the debate between old baseball
wisdom and statistical knowledge:
"The guy's an athlete, Billy," the old
scout says. "There's a lot of upside
there."
"He can't hit," says Billy.
"He's not that bad a hitter," says the old scout.
"Yeah, what happens when he
doesn't know a fastball is coming?"
says Billy.
"He's a tools guy," says the old
scout....
"But can he hit?" asks Billy.
"He can hit," says the old scout, unconvincingly.
Paul reads the player's college batting statistics. They contain a
conspicuous lack of extra base hits and walks.
"My only question is," says Billy, "if he's that good a hitter why
doesn't he hit better?" . . .
Over and over the old scouts will say, "The guy has a great
body," or, "This guy may be the best body in the draft." And

every time they
do, Billy will say, "We're not selling jeans here," and deposit
yet another highly touted player, beloved by the scouts, onto his
shit list.
Beane ends up seeking, and getting, young players that other
teams simply do not want. These were people largely ignored by
the
professional scouts, typically because they had something
wrong with them--they did not match up with the scouts' mental
prototype of a
successful ballplayer. While scouts on other teams were still
searching for young players who looked like Beane did in high
school,
DePodesta was busy surfing the Internet. "The evaluation of
young baseball players," Lewis writes, "had been taken out of
the hands of
old baseball men and placed in the hands of people who had
what Billy valued most (and what Billy didn't have), a degree in
something
other than baseball."
The statistical method was the only way for Beane to solve a
serious problem: obtaining first-rate talent without a lot of
money. After all,
the New York Yankees had three times the budget of the
Oakland Athletics. And if Beane did find good players, and they
performed well,
they would be bid away by richer teams. Owing to his low
payroll, he would be forced to replace his own greatest
successes. In 2001,
Oakland won 102 games in the regular season, the second-
highest total in baseball. They lost three players widely
regarded as their best,

and they were expected by many to have a catastrophic fall.
Instead they used statistical methods to try to replace the lost
players with
new ones who would provide statistical equivalents--and they
ended up winning 103 games, the most in baseball. Their
payroll for that
year was $34 million, less than half that of their division rivals
the Seattle Mariners. In Lewis's account, Beane was able to
succeed
because "the market for baseball players was so inefficient, and
the general grasp of sound baseball strategy so weak, that
superior
management could still run circles around taller piles of cash."
Lewis has a wonderful story to tell, and he tells it wonderfully.
His account of Beane's success is punctuated by descriptions of
numerous
colorful characters, among them a promising fat catcher
dumbfounded by Beane's interest in him, an excellent pitcher
whose fastball is
extremely slow, and of course Beane himself. Lewis also raises
some serious puzzles that he does not resolve, and his account
has
some large and perhaps profound implications that he does not
much explore.
Why do professional baseball executives, many of whom have
spent their lives in the game, make so many colossal mistakes?
They are
paid well, and they are specialists. They have every incentive to
evaluate talent correctly. So why do they blunder? In an
intriguing
passage, Lewis offers three clues. First, those who played the
game seem to overgeneralize from personal experience: "People
always
thought their own experience was typical when it wasn't."

Second, the professionals were unduly affected by how a player
had performed
most recently, even though recent performance is not always a
good guide. Third, people were biased by what they saw, or
thought they
saw, with their own eyes. This is a real problem, because the
human mind plays tricks, and because there is "a lot you
couldn't see when
you watched a baseball game."
Lewis is actually speaking here of a central finding in cognitive
psychology. In making judgments, people tend to use the
"availability
heuristic." As Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have shown,
people often assess the probability of an event by asking
whether
relevant examples are cognitively "available." Thus, people are
likely to think that more words, on a random page, end with the
letters
"ing" than have "n" as their next to last letter--even though a
moment's reflection will show that this could not possibly be
the case. Now, it
is not exactly dumb to use the availability heuristic. Sometimes
it is the best guide that we possess. Yet reliable statistical
evidence will
outperform the availability heuristic every time. In using data
rather than professional intuitions, Beane confirmed this point.
There is an even larger puzzle. Why didn't someone like Beane
come along sooner? Why didn't baseball executives start using
statistics
a decade, or two decades, or three decades, earlier? Why have
falsehoods and mistakes persisted? The economic stakes are
extremely
high, after all, and if Lewis is correct, the management of most
baseball teams could have saved many millions of dollars

simply by
making more rational personnel decisions. Nor was the
important information hard to find. James's arguments have
been around for
nearly two decades. In a market as competitive as major league
baseball, surely the information should have been used, and
fast. What
went wrong?
The problem is not that baseball professionals are stupid; it is
that they are human. Like most people, including experts, they
tend to rely
on simple rules of thumb, on traditions, on habits, on what other
experts seem to believe. Even when the stakes are high, rational
behavior does not always emerge. It takes time and effort to
switch from simple intuitions to careful assessments of
evidence. This point
helps to explain why baseball owners have been slow to copy
Beane's approach. But at least they are starting. The Toronto
Blue Jays
and the Boston Red Sox have recently hired general managers
who follow Beane. And, in one of the longest-overdue moves in
baseball,
the new general manager of the Red Sox, just twenty-eight years
old, has hired James as a consultant.
There are many lessons from this book that apply in domains far
from baseball. One involves the harmful repercussions of using
bad
statistics. Consider the case of the "save" statistic. A save is
awarded to a relief pitcher who comes in near the end of a close
game with
his team ahead and "saves" the win for his team. Most
thoughtful observers realized long ago that this is a really dumb
statistic. Why
should pitching the last inning of a game have any special

significance? A pitcher who comes in for the sixth inning of a
tied game and
pitches three scoreless innings has done something much more
important than one who just pitches the ninth inning, protecting
a three-
run lead. Now, a dumb statistic could be harmless, but in this
case, as is often true, the very fact that the number is collected
and
tabulated ends up influencing behavior. The existence of the
save statistic (and the muddled thinking that goes along with it,
namely the
idea that runs scored at the end of the game count more) seems
to have altered the way teams use their relief pitchers. Statistics
can do
a lot better than intuitions; and relevant statistics can do a lot
better than irrelevant ones, which tend to take on lives of their
own.
In the past twenty years, most teams have settled on using their
best relief pitcher in a specific role that has acquired a name:
the closer.
The closer comes in just to pitch the ninth inning in close games
with his team ahead. Though this strategy is nearly universally
used, it is
clearly stupid. A team that is ahead by three runs going into the
ninth inning has a 97 percent chance of winning the game (a
percentage
that has not changed since the advent of the closer). As James
has argued for years, it makes more sense to use your best relief
pitcher
in more crucial situations, such as a tied game. Saving a three-
run lead is much easier than protecting a tie, since you can give
up two
runs and still win the game.
What should a team do if it figures this out? One strategy would

be to take your best reliever and use him more strategically,
sometimes in
the seventh inning of a close game with the best players of the
other team due to bat, other times with a one-run lead in the
ninth. This
strategy would win more games, but it would not create many
"saves" for the ace. Beane did this, but he also did something
deviously
clever: he created closers in order to sell them. As Lewis puts
it: "Established closers were systematically overpriced, in large
part
because of the statistic by which closers were judged in the
marketplace: `saves.' The very word made the guy who achieved
them seem
vitally important.... You could take a slightly above average
pitcher and drop him into the closer's role, let him accumulate
some gaudy
number of saves, and then sell him off. You could, in essence,
buy a stock, pump it up with false publicity, and sell it off for
much more
than you paid for it."
Beane's use of relief pitchers, and his performance in general,
bears on a more general problem. To what extent are the top
managers in
an organization--here the owners and the general managers--
able to push a rational but radical change down through an
organization?
Beane has an owner who is sympathetic to his philosophy, but if
he wants to try something new, such as using the relief ace
flexibly, he
has to convince the field manager to implement his strategy. He
also has to avoid a rebellion by the players. To get his manager

to use
the player Beane thinks is his most effective pitcher in tight
situations, Beane tells the manager to think of him as "the
closer before the
ninth inning." A relief ace would likely complain about being
used in the optimal manner, because he would accumulate fewer
saves and
thus would be worth less on the open market. Similarly, suppose
a player takes more pitches in an attempt to draw more walks
and as a
result increases his on-base percentage at the cost of lowering
his batting average. His team might like this trade-off, but if it
lowered his
value to other teams, then the player might suffer in the free-
agent market.
Finally, there is the impact of the media and the fans. When
James was hired by the Red Sox last winter, there was great
anticipation
about how the team would deal with relief pitchers. The rational
strategy of using pitchers to maximize the chance of winning
the game
was quickly dubbed "bullpen by committee" by Boston
sportswriters, who knew (from The Book, naturally) that this
was a terrible idea.
When Red Sox relievers lost the opening-day game to the
woeful Tampa Devil Rays and suffered through an awful
opening month,
James was viewed as the villain. Of course, James does not
advocate bad pitching, and, presumably with his help, the team
has acquired
three new relief pitchers. But, interestingly, they also seem to
have designated one as their closer, perhaps deciding to let this
particular
battle wait for another day.

The difficulty of achieving sensible change in organizations is
hardly special to baseball. If a new CEO comes in and wants to
change how
things are done, a selling job must be performed all the way
down the organizational ladder. Every institution has
organizational norms,
ways of doing things (the in-house version of The Book) that
are hard to overcome. The new guy is told, well, we don't do
things that way
here. If the CEO forces his views down the organizational
ladder and his methods are unconventional, then lower-level
workers may face
the same dilemma as the player trying to get more walks. Do
they maximize their value to the current CEO or to the outside
world?
Lewis's account bears more generally on the performance of
markets. He often refers to the inefficiency of the market for
player talent, as
the example of the closer illustrates. If it were not for this
inefficiency, Beane would not be able to procure a winning
team while spending
one-third as much as the Yankees and one-half as much as his
division rivals. How can this market be so inefficient? Simply
put, the
baseball owners seem to have evolved into a "bad equilibrium."
Teams have thought the same way for years, The Book has
never been
revised, and so there are massive inefficiencies that have been
relatively easy for Beane to exploit. You do not need a Harvard
economics graduate to realize that "a walk is as good as a hit,"
an expression that was around well before James started
writing. Beane's
key insight was exactly that this market was inefficient and
could therefore be exploited. Now that Beane has succeeded, it
is likely that

the market for baseball-player talent will get more competitive.
Still, it is embarrassing that it took so long for this to happen,
especially for
those who think that competitive markets always lead to a
rational allocation of resources.
What does this tell us about other markets? Lewis poses this
question: "If professional baseball players could be over- or
undervalued,
who couldn't? Bad as they may have been, the statistics used to
evaluate baseball players were probably more accurate than
anything
used to measure the value of people who didn't play baseball for
a living." Right! On the basis of first principles, the market for
baseball
players should be one of the most efficient labor markets on
earth. It is hard to think of any high-paid profession in which
performance is
measured so precisely--and is publicly available to every other
potential employer. Compare the market for baseball players
with the
market for corporate executives. A company looking for a new
director of human resource management would be hard-pressed
to get any
objective data on the past performance of job candidates.
Instead, such a company would be forced to make choices based
on interviews
with the candidates--a process that is even less accurate than the
one the old scouts use to size up a high school player.
Interviews are
notoriously bad predictors of future job performance. In most
contexts their predictive value is essentially zero.
The biases caused by labor markets using subjective evaluations
instead of objective measures of output are potentially huge. We
can

glimpse the scope of the problem by studying one subjective
variable that most people would say should be irrelevant to
accurate job
evaluations in most positions: physical beauty. Away from
places such as the back lots of Hollywood and the runways of
Milan, most of us
who do not look like Ben Affleck or Jennifer Lopez would like
to think that successful people get where they do because of
their
accomplishments, not their attractiveness. Alas, it ain't so. To
take one simple example, height matters. In the United States,
the taller
presidential candidate has usually won. And beauty matters in
domains where we might not expect it to matter: law and
business. In both
fields, and for both sexes, career success and earnings are
correlated with good looks.
And consider another problem. We have said that interviews are
not useful predictors of job performance--except that once you
have
conducted an interview, it is almost impossible to avoid the
conclusion that you have learned a lot. But the facts are clear:
interviews are
nearly useless at predicting anything except whether the
interviewer will subsequently like the interviewee. So a rational
Beane-like
strategy would be to interview only employees who will work
directly with you and otherwise make all decisions based on
objective criteria
and statistical models. Rather than conduct interviews, firms
should give tests and pay more attention to grades in school (a
good
predictor of both intelligence and diligence, admirable traits in
nearly any job). Procedures such as this also prevent
discrimination,

inadvertent or otherwise, based on factors such as race, gender,
or beauty. Major symphony orchestras have found that if they
conduct
auditions with the candidates hidden behind a screen, more
women are hired. And when employees are hired, firms should
seek objective
measures of performance, which distinguish luck from skill.
Some enlightened firms are already taking steps along these
lines. Many more should be doing so. We suspect that countless
areas of
enterprise, both private and governmental, would benefit from
their own Billy Beanes and Paul DePodestas, challenging
widespread
intuitions, or what "everyone knows," with statistical
information about what works and what does not, and with
performance measures
that more accurately reflect the true contribution to
organizational success. Baseball is not the only realm for which
The Book is in need of
revision.
Volume: 229
Issue: 9
Record: 0FD5CE18B919C4E6
Copyright: Copyright (c) 2003 The New Republic, Inc.

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