40 / Rotman Magazine Spring 2007
The vast majority of today’s business decisions
are made with incomplete information and in the face of an uncer-
tain future. Indeed, with the exception of a reasonable expectation
that the sun will come up tomorrow, few things in human affairs can
be predicted with certainty. The term ‘risk management’ has come
to serve as a set phrase in the financial services industry, referring
to a formal process for evaluating and controlling a company’s total
exposure to loss together with estimates of the probability of loss.
However, this term deserves to be reclaimed to a broader usage, as
all companies have to deal with risk.
While risk can never be completely avoided, well-trained man-
agers have many ways to take uncertainty into account in their
strategy planning. Successful long-term planning includes a combi-
nation of the following six techniques.
1. Risk Identification
In most business situations it is remarkably easy to identify the
risks that a firm is facing by simply asking, “What could go wrong?”
For example, if a product depends on components, the inability of
a supplier to ship parts when needed is a risk that can be readily
anticipated. Where a firm is attempting to develop a new technol-
ogy, its research and development efforts will be successful in
achieving desired performance – or not.
This is not to say that all risks can be foreseen. Former U.S.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously observed that
there are both ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns.’ In a
military situation, he meant that an army might know that its
adversary had troops over the horizon, but not exactly how many (a
‘known unknown’); and there might be some uncertainty as to
whether the enemy had certain types of weapons (again, a known
unknown). However, his dictum was meant to alert planners that,
for all the variables that they could list and worry about, there
would always be some others that could not have been anticipated
(the ‘unknown unknowns’).
It is hard to describe an ‘unknown unknown’ in business, simply
because it is just that – unknown. However, an example would be
A Primer on the
Management of
Risk and Uncertainty
By David Robinson
Effective risk management depends on a clear understanding of
what a firm can control and what factors are beyond its control.
Using a combination of the techniques described here can go a long
way to effective strategic planning in the face of risk.
Strategy
Near Misses
Plan
ROT045
This document is authorized for use only by Familia Herring in Strategy at Strayer University, 2018.
Rotman Magazine Spring 2007 / 41
something like the emergence of a completely new technology, such
as the advent of transistors in electronics. The efficiency and minia-
turization offered by these solid-state devices could not have been
predicted from the existing development work on thermionic valves.
How can business leaders plan for the unknown unknown? At
the extreme, t ...
40 Rotman Magazine Spring 2007The vast majority of today.docx
1. 40 / Rotman Magazine Spring 2007
The vast majority of today’s business decisions
are made with incomplete information and in the face of an
uncer-
tain future. Indeed, with the exception of a reasonable
expectation
that the sun will come up tomorrow, few things in human affairs
can
be predicted with certainty. The term ‘risk management’ has
come
to serve as a set phrase in the financial services industry,
referring
to a formal process for evaluating and controlling a company’s
total
exposure to loss together with estimates of the probability of
loss.
However, this term deserves to be reclaimed to a broader usage,
as
all companies have to deal with risk.
While risk can never be completely avoided, well-trained man-
agers have many ways to take uncertainty into account in their
strategy planning. Successful long-term planning includes a
combi-
nation of the following six techniques.
1. Risk Identification
In most business situations it is remarkably easy to identify the
risks that a firm is facing by simply asking, “What could go
wrong?”
2. For example, if a product depends on components, the inability
of
a supplier to ship parts when needed is a risk that can be readily
anticipated. Where a firm is attempting to develop a new
technol-
ogy, its research and development efforts will be successful in
achieving desired performance – or not.
This is not to say that all risks can be foreseen. Former U.S.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously observed that
there are both ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns.’ In
a
military situation, he meant that an army might know that its
adversary had troops over the horizon, but not exactly how
many (a
‘known unknown’); and there might be some uncertainty as to
whether the enemy had certain types of weapons (again, a
known
unknown). However, his dictum was meant to alert planners
that,
for all the variables that they could list and worry about, there
would always be some others that could not have been
anticipated
(the ‘unknown unknowns’).
It is hard to describe an ‘unknown unknown’ in business, simply
because it is just that – unknown. However, an example would
be
A Primer on the
Management of
Risk and Uncertainty
By David Robinson
3. Effective risk management depends on a clear understanding of
what a firm can control and what factors are beyond its control.
Using a combination of the techniques described here can go a
long
way to effective strategic planning in the face of risk.
Strategy
Near Misses
Plan
ROT045
This document is authorized for use only by Familia Herring in
Strategy at Strayer University, 2018.
Rotman Magazine Spring 2007 / 41
something like the emergence of a completely new technology,
such
as the advent of transistors in electronics. The efficiency and
minia-
turization offered by these solid-state devices could not have
been
predicted from the existing development work on thermionic
valves.
How can business leaders plan for the unknown unknown? At
the extreme, they could calculate the cost of project
abandonment
due to unforeseen circumstances. It is usually possible to
imagine
the effects of an unknown unknown, even when a specific cause
4. cannot be anticipated. For example, prior to 2001, the managers
of
the New York Stock Exchange would have had little reason to
include terrorist attacks in their strategic planning. However,
they
could reasonably plan for ‘something’ (an unknown unknown)
that
would make it impossible for them to use their own trading
floor:
burst water-pipes, bomb threats and catastrophic fires in
neighbor-
ing buildings were reasonably foreseeable as rare-but-possible
events that could interrupt access to their building.
One useful source of ideas for things that can go wrong is ‘near
misses.’ For example, in the loss of the Columbia space shuttle
in
2003, the vehicle broke apart upon re-entry, a problem that had
never been seen before. However, the cause of this disaster was
damage to a heat-shielding tile that in turn was the result of a
strike
by fuel tank insulation that had broken away during the launch.
The
Control
loss of insulation had been observed before, and was a matter of
ongoing concern for NASA engineers.
In the business realm, the hint of a near miss comes when a suc-
cessful tactical maneuver is accompanied by exclamations of,
“phew
– we were lucky!” For example, suppose a firm runs an overly-
gener-
ous mail-in coupon rebate program, but is saved from crippling
expense by the lucky coincidence of a major storm that kept
5. most
shoppers out of the malls during the time of the promotion. This
is
a clue that in future, the firm could face a predictable loss if
rebate
programs are not more carefully planned and controlled.
2. Risk Assessment
There are several ways to take risks into account and develop
ways
to manage them. The first step is to consider when trend shifts
and
adverse events might occur, and then to make an assessment of
the
severity of the impact of these future states. Once risks have
been
identified, the impact of each can be assessed and assigned to
one
of three categories: noticeable, moderate and severe.
‘Noticeable’ events are things such as the market entry of a
small competitor with an offering that appeals to a market
niche;
the competitor’s eventual entry has been predicted, and as long
as
the competitor stays in its narrow market, there is a measurable-
but-small loss in sales that requires no particular response.
Events
that have moderate impact might include the failure of a
supplier in
a market with many generic alternatives, or the entry of a
competi-
tor with equivalent technology. A catastrophic impact would be
something that makes the current strategy infeasible, such as the
Unknown Unknowns
6. This document is authorized for use only by Familia Herring in
Strategy at Strayer University, 2018.
42 / Rotman Magazine Spring 2007
overturning of a patent or the emergence of a severe side effect
to
a drug – as happened to Merck with the Vioxx painkiller.
When these dimensions have been added to the list of risks,
they can be organized into a matrix that gives general guidance
for
how to manage them, as shown in Figure 1. Consider first the
col-
umn of ‘immediate-impact events.’ Few firms have to face a
catastrophic event with little warning. Terrorist attacks and the
outbreak of civil war certainly count in this category – but
thank-
fully, these are rare.
Where there is a change in the environment that has an imme-
diate impact that is moderate, the prudent managerial course of
action is to quickly shift additional resources to the current
strate-
gy. For example, when a major competitor enters a firm’s
principal
market, a substantial investment in promotional spending (and a
new advertising approach emphasizing either a defensible core
position or direct comparison) is likely warranted.
In the case of an immediate event that is assessed to have a
merely ‘noticeable’ impact, firms should continue with the
strategy
7. already in place and make only moderate adjustments. For
example,
suppose a niche-player enters a firm’s established market. The
firm
would continue the same level of promotional spending, but
might
retrain salespeople with new talking points to specifically
address
the competition. The key to success here is in correctly
assessing an
impact as ‘noticeable,’ but not over-reacting. Temporary promo-
tional pricing by close competitors is an example of such a
situation
that should not require a complete rethinking of strategy.
In the intermediate time horizon, where the risk to the firm is
not imminent, the key success factor is to anticipate the risks to
cur-
rent strategy and then identify and monitor the relevant metrics.
For example, it is often anticipated that a firm’s customers will
migrate from one technology to another at some unknown point
in
the future. Prudent managers will handle this by surveying
customer
interest and monitoring the pricing of competing technology.
For
example, for many years manufacturers of cathode ray tube
comput-
er monitors were well aware that flat panel displays would
eventual-
ly take over their business. However, early flat panels were very
expensive. There was no way to predict whether the change-
over
would be sudden (as happened with adoption of home use of the
Internet) or would occur only as consumers replaced their
8. comput-
ers (about once every four years). As long as careful
observation is in
place and managers are not complacent, a firm can take some
time
to develop alternate strategies.
Where the intermediate future includes some possibly-cata-
strophic events, managers should test strategies against the cost
of
project abandonment. For example, in the tourism and
hospitality
industry, avian influenza or other contagious diseases might
close
down all intercontinental travel for a period of time. The
prudent
course in the face of such a risk is to avoid over-investment that
would ‘bet the company’ on one project.
When threats are far distant, the best approach is to have a
comprehensive view of strategy planning and to fully explore
all the
options available. This is especially true in the middle case,
where
perceived adverse events are likely to have a moderate impact
on
the company’s operations. Where the impact will be
catastrophic,
the firm should have an exit strategy in mind. Often this will
simply
be the abandonment of a specific market, with investment-to-
date
treated as a sunk cost. For far-distant threats that are likely to
have
only a minimal impact on the firm, identification of the relevant
metrics – such as market share or consumer sentiment – and
9. regu-
lar monitoring are all that is required.
3. Risk Tolerance and Diversification
All firms and their management teams have a certain tolerance
for
risk, usually tied to the company’s age, with young companies
often willing to bet their entire net worth on a single strategy,
while
more mature firms may become positively risk averse. Between
these two extremes, many firms actively manage their exposure
to
risk through a ‘portfolio approach.’
Investors are familiar with the portfolio approach to investing,
whereby they tolerate owning risky instruments by only putting
a
portion of their net worth into each one. A well-balanced
portfolio is
one with investments in many different industries, so that an
adverse
event that affects one investment will not impact the others.
Firms
use the same portfolio approach for projects, especially those
associ-
ated with new product development. A simple product
modification
to adapt a product to an existing market is low risk, whereas
entering
a new industry with no developed market is very high risk.
Under a portfolio approach, a firm would not completely avoid
high-risk projects, but would limit the number of such projects
that
it undertakes simultaneously, balancing them with low-
risk/moder-
10. ate-reward projects. For example, a firm with too many high-
risk
projects might license out some patents to other firms to avoid
the
expenses and risks of new product introduction for some lines
of
business, while concentrating on the in-house launch of other
ideas.
4. Risk Transfer
When risk can be clearly identified, one way to eliminate it is to
transfer it to another entity. For example, almost all
homeowners
transfer the risk of loss of their house by fire to an insurance
com-
CATASTROPHIC Abandon Manage with Plan an
current strategy this in mind – exit strategy
and develop a don’t
new one over-invest
MODERATE Shift Pre-plan an Research
significant appropriate strategy
resources to reaction options
counter
NOTICEABLE Modest change Plan a Develop
in resource possible metrics
allocation resource shift and monitor
NOW SOON FAR DISTANT
Approaches to risk management
based on immediacy and impact
Strategy
11. Effect
Figure 1
This document is authorized for use only by Familia Herring in
Strategy at Strayer University, 2018.
Rotman Magazine Spring 2007 / 43
pany. Similarly, commodity producers can transfer the risk of
price declines by trading in the futures markets to lock in a
price
and commodity users can avoid price shocks by purchasing
future
contracts. Southwest Airlines used this technique to avoid a rise
in jet fuel prices in 2005. Firms whose strategies are impacted
by
foreign currency exchange variations can reduce their risk by
hedging transactions.
Changes in ownership structure can also reduce risk. For exam-
ple, a company that sells its headquarters building to a real-
estate
investor and then leases back the building transfers the risk of
future value of the building to the investor. Taking on a joint
ven-
ture partner can reduce a firm’s capital exposure to a risky new
market. For example LG.Philips LCD is a a joint venture
between
South Korea’s LG Electronics Inc. and Royal Philips
Electronics
NV of the Netherlands. It spreads the risk of loss from the
massive
12. investment needed to set up a flat-panel TV manufacturing
facility,
when consumer adoption of the new technology was unknown.
So why don’t firms simply transfer away all their risk? First,
there is no insurance or hedging that will protect against what is
called ‘ordinary business risk,’ such as the risk that consumers
won’t
like a new product. Second, all insurance comes at a price.
When
Southwest hedged its fuel costs, JetBlue, an airline with a
similar
business model, guessed that fuel prices would decline and
decided
not to purchase future contracts. The firm that engages in sale-
and-
lease back gives up the possibility of a capital return on the
asset,
and a firm that engages in a joint venture gives up part of future
profits. In sum, risk transfer is never without cost.
5. Scenario Analysis
In his seminal text Competitive Strategy, Michael Porter wrote:
“The device of scenarios is a particularly useful tool in
emerging
industries. Scenarios are discrete, internally-consistent views of
how the world will look in the future.”
Scenario planning can be contrasted with forecasting, where
careful analysis of historic data is used to offer a precise
estimate of
a parameter in the future, such as the specific level of demand
for a
firm’s product. Unfortunately, precise numeric estimates often
give
a false sense of certainty of what the future will be like. For
13. exam-
ple, the worldwide demand for domestic-use DVD recorders in
2005 was estimated at 47 million units, but in fact only about
three
million were sold.
The difficulty of extending trends into the future can also be
illustrated with the example of the market opportunity that has
opened up due to the increasing number of Americans who are
obese. Furniture manufacturers and hospital equipment
suppliers
have adapted designs that accommodate people of high body
weight. But will the trend continue? From 1980 to 2006, the
num-
ber of obese Americans rose from 23 to 60 million people: but
does
that mean that we can expect an additional 37 million obese
cus-
tomers in the next 26 years, or will the trend reverse itself due
to
cultural shifts and new treatments for obesity?
The process of constructing scenarios is fairly simple. First,
identify the relevant variables, then identify whether they are
dis-
crete or continuous. Next, gather the variables together to make
specific ‘scenarios.’ Remember that Porter said that scenarios
must
be discrete and internally-consistent. That means that one
scenario
cannot overlap another, and ideally all possible futures can be
described within the list of scenarios. The requirement for
internal
consistency may eliminate some scenarios entirely. For
example, if
14. the economy is in deep recession, it’s unlikely that consumer
spending will be high.
Coming up with a manageable, discreet set of scenarios is not
as difficult as it sounds, because of likely links between
variables.
Consider the situation faced by film maker Kodak in the early
1990s. Effective digital camera technology had just been
announced, and the uncertain future contained these
possibilities:
(a) Digital cameras remain expensive and are only adopted in
professional markets;
(b) over a long period of time, digital cameras are adopted by
professionals and a small number of ‘serious amateurs,’ and the
price of components remains high;
(c) digital cameras move to the mainstream over several decades
(similar to the adoption of automatic transmission in U.S. cars
from 1940 to 1960) and prices of components gradually fall;
(d) ‘Grandma goes digital’: fast and broad adoption of the digi-
tal format accompanied by a sharp decrease in use of film
cameras and a lowering in component costs for digital cameras.
Note that while the cost of components for cameras was uncer-
tain 15 years ago, it was reasonably predictable that with
mass-market adoption would come manufacturing inefficiencies
resulting in lower prices. As a result the possibility: “Everyone
wants
one and the prices go sky high,” is not in the set of likely
scenarios.
Once the scenarios have been identified and labeled, it is pru-
dent to make an estimate of the likelihood of each one. For
discrete
variables, when there is no credible external information, each
out-
15. come is equally likely. For example, the chance that a
competitor
will or will not decide to offer a product in a particular category
should be estimated at 50 per cent. However, if the competitor
has
signaled intentions (“We find Asian markets particularly
attractive
for future growth”), then the probability of market entry could
be
estimated higher, say 80 per cent. For continuous variables,
such as
growth of the economy, planners can use intuition or the
average
1. List the critical variables
2. Constrain continuous variables into low, medium and high
values
3. Combine variables and eliminate implausible groupings
4. Give easy-to-remember names to each scenario
5. Estimate the likelihood of each scenario
6. Develop a concise but exhaustive list of possible strategies
7. Assess the likely payoff for each strategy against each
scenario
8. Develop an algorithm to choose such as minimum acceptable
pay-
off, maximum tolerable loss
9. Select a strategy and re-test it using regret analysis
Steps in scenario planning Figure 2
This document is authorized for use only by Familia Herring in
Strategy at Strayer University, 2018.
16. 44 / Rotman Magazine Spring 2007
value of published experts’ opinions (individual expert’s
opinions
are often wrong, and ‘consensus’ of experts who listen to each
other’s forecasts are not particularly reliable.)
Fortunately, if scenario planning is done correctly, estimating
which scenario is most likely is the least important part of the
process. Rather, managers must try to choose a strategy that
will be
beneficial no matter which scenario plays out.
6. Regret Analysis
This essentially entails a ‘re-check’ of the attractiveness of the
cho-
sen strategy. When a viable strategy has emerged, it should be
con-
sidered a ‘candidate’ for the firm’s planning, and managers
should
conduct one last survey of all the options that have been
eliminat-
ed and reassess them to evaluate ‘regret.’ Regret analysis is a
form
of protection against biases that tend to creep in when planners
begin to believe with certainty the likelihood of one scenario.
As an example, imagine a company that is considering selling
software in the China. A major unknown about the future is
whether
the Chinese government will strictly enforce intellectual-
property
protection. A reasonable extrapolation from historic experience
is
that despite top government commitment to enforcement, there
is
17. still rampant piracy of computer software (more than 96 per
cent of
programs in use have been pirated). A thorough scenario
analysis
suggests that no strategy for market entry (high price, high
price and
economy versions, economy version only) can lead to any
reasonable
payoff for the foreseeable future.
However, what does regret analysis tell us? One scenario,
though extremely unlikely, is that the future includes a fail-safe
method to prevent the copying of software. Competitors who
entered early have achieved brand recognition and our firm’s
belat-
ed entry would be shut out of an emerging profitable market.
The
level of regret would be high. After the regret analysis, the firm
takes another look at the market entry strategies, and chooses
the
one with the best chance of establishing a recognized brand,
albeit
at little immediate incremental profit.
In Closing
Effective decision making depends on managers clearly under-
standing what their firm can control and what factors are
beyond
its control. The systematic identification and assessment of risk,
a
frank discussion of risk tolerance, and the use of a variety of
the
techniques described here can go a long way to achieving
effective
strategic planning in the face of risk.
18. David Robinson teaches Marketing at the Haas School of
Business, University of California, Berkeley, and has also
taught
at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. He writes a
weekly business column for The San Francisco Chronicle.
A longer version of this article is available on his Web site at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/robinson
R E U N I O N 2 O O 7
This document is authorized for use only by Familia Herring in
Strategy at Strayer University, 2018.
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37. security. Interesting is that this book is backed up by various
sources including a[n academic]
journal [article] by Kellner & Pipitone (2010), book by Kan
(2012), and an article by Turbiville
(2010). These mostly serve to reinforce the idea of the author
on the anecdotes throughout his
book. In addition, I loved his book and gained many new
insights that enable me to comprehend
the information about the background of the conflict and the
likely effects. In general, the
[Payan?] book covers the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship,
the deployment of technology, the
bureaucratic interests that control the border landscape, the
democratic deficit, and a detrimental
lack of policy coordination.
One of the many valuable insights I gained from this book is
about the historical
perspective that is necessary to understand today's border
conflicts. It is with the provision of a
detailed, history-based examination of the evolution of current
conditions on the border, that
these revelations aremade. These include: the reason [the
preceding sentences are “throat
38. clearing” — better to get to the point, eg., “Payan provides
insights into…] why corruption at the
U. S-Mexican border has increased, the reason why Mexico is
now suffering due to the cartels
that have been established at the border. Payan (2016) argues
that they exist due to a steady
growth in the security concerns of the U.S. over almost two
centuries. He also carefully
considers how much September 11th strongly affected U. S-
Mexican as many of the towns and
Comment [1]:
avoid praise that doesn’t convey anything of
substance
Comment [2]:
Make this your lede and then say that Payan (& identify
who he is) devoted his 2016 book to these issues.
Comment [3]:
this doesn’t tell the reader anything of value
Comment [4]:
which conflict?
Comment [5]:
very vague, best not mentioned until you can explain,
or at least refer to this as “what Payan calls a
‘democratic deficit’ between _[year]_ & __[year]___ “
Comment [6]:
better to refer to the specific author
39. 2
cities across the Southwestern side of the U.S. experienced the
consequences of the new security
in the U.S. that is oriented towards the practices and ethos first
hand.
He also indicates that the first priority was to make the border
areas safe through the
prevention of illegal entry which was enhanced by the strict
scrutiny of those getting in
especially through the U.S. - Mexican border. These are among
the aspects that are embodied
within the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Mainly, it is brought
about by the need for its
implementation along the 2100 miles that are found along the
border between U.S. and Mexico.
In the past, there was the optimistic talk that was related to
investment, trade, and the economic
integration in the 1990s in the North America. It is through his
book that I was exposed to the
idea of the "balloon effect". This has been very helpful to me in
understanding both drug
40. trafficking and undocumented crossing. He has convincingly
shown the need for security and
especially, the need to secure all the points of entry as well as
exit points in the U.S. It is this
strategy that he did convincingly illustrate the comprehensive
security that permeates the three
major wars at the border. These are mainly the war on drugs,
the need for the enforcement of the
immigration laws and the war on terror (Turbiville, 2010).
He also indicates that there have been major effects associated
with the three wars that
take place on the border land. It is in this case that I think they
are very significant as they
include the loss of the local autonomy. He has also highlights
the various conflicts between the
priorities that exist in Washington and those among the local
population. He suggests that this is
powerful information on development of a rigid international
line, which represents some of the
barriers to social, cultural and economic integration among the
communities through the high
Comment [7]:
vague
41. Comment [8]:
Should not start a paragraph with a pronoun — make
clear who you are referring to
Comment [9]:
eliminate all personal references
Comment [10]:
Comment [11]:
avoid such opinion-sounding descriptions — even if
“unconvincing” can be acceptable when properly
supported
Comment [12]:
Comment [13]:
does he refer to three “wars” — & specifically to
immigration enforcement as “war?
Comment [14]:
Comment [15]:
Comment [16]:
I know of this firsthand but you need to explain
3
level of corruption and cartels among the law enforcement
officers has also become a major
problem.
42. Moreover, through his penetrating analysis, I am able to
understand why these wars have
become a great source of fear and have also caused suspicion
between the two neighbors. I think
this is what has driven the author to trace the history for the
policies that are enacted at the
border that help in the discernment and the understanding of the
evolutionary patterns that are
common and help in joining the three policies that exist today
together as shown by Kellner &
Pipitone (2010). His argument has been on the gradual
tightening and the increase of militarized
activities at the border throughout its history. It is this powerful
statement that makes it easier to
understand the existence of the restrictive laws that are present
at the border today. The author
makes it clear that the changes that have taken place in relation
to the law enforcement officers
are drastic and have the potential of causing problems not only
to the Mexicans but to the U.S. as
well. This is a worry, and he says relevant and fast measures
need to be taken as soon as possible
to curb the issue and to place the border activities to their
initial state where the Mexicans will no
43. longer live in fear of the presented effects.
Surprisingly, he creates a picture of the border as a place of
hope in need of better
management rather than reinforcement of the security regime in
the last decade. Therefore, the
book makes an attempt to show me the different ways that the
residents at the border are
suffering and trying to cope with the strict security that is
maintained at the border and the
environment that is filed with the newly formed cartels. His
book also provides the effort to
navigate through their daily lives with the massive increase in
the number of federal bureaucrats
and the many programs that have been designed to close the
border. Specifically, it offers an
Comment [17]: Payan’s (?) analysis allows us to
understand…
Comment [18]:
Comment [19]:
Comment [20]:
whose, now?
Comment [21]:
ok if you say why this is surprising, eg, “After having
explained ______________, Payan (?) surprisingly…
44. Comment [22]:
4
examination of the evaluation efforts done towards the
understanding of the significant conflict
that exists between the efforts of the government to close the
borders and those of the
communities that live at the border to open it.
In a detailed explanation and elaboration, the book offers an
explanation for the reason
that makes the issue about the U.S.-Mexico border a hot topic
both for the two countries as well
as in other places around the world. In particular, through the
exploration of the focus on the
policy that exists in the U.S. after the September 11 terrorist
attacks he reveals that this idea is
also a contentious one. It is in this regard that through his book,
I am updated on the happenings
that are being experienced at the U.S. – Mexico border and their
causes. According to his
argument the factors are a result of the steady growth [of what?]
that has been present due to the
45. security concerns that have been held by the U.S. for over two
centuries. In this way, it becomes
possible for him to show that the activities at the border have
gone through several historical
stages that eventually have led to the crippling of the region in
the form of the numerous cartels
in which the law enforcement officers are involved to make the
residents of the region suffer in
fear. Substantially, I feel he has backed up his idea with
relevant example.
The author manages to combine breadth and depth to cover the
economic relationship
that exists between the U.S. and Mexico through the ability to
deploy technology and to cater for
the bureaucratic interests they control the landscape at the
border, the deficit that exists in the
democratic space and the detrimental lack of coordination of the
policies. He explores a number
of the issues that affect the area such as drug trafficking and the
homeland security which is also
considered. Moreover, the book also demonstrates the
contradictory logic that is found within the
internal aspects of the American policy that is established to
cater for the border activities. In this
46. relation, he provides the argument that the current conditions
are likely to cause the return of the
Comment [23]:
Comment [24]:
Comment [25]:
address?
5
authoritarian rule in Mexico and the concurrent rise of the
sentiments against the Americans
(Kan, 2012).
Payan (2016) indicates that there were presidents in the U.S.
and Mexico who knew each
other and had formed partnerships together before the
September 11 attacks. In particular, he
mentions the time when Bush was the Governor of Texas. He
goes on to show how George W.
Bush and Vicente Fox were involved in the economic activities
and the human costs that would
be realized following the delays at the border. It is through his
couple examples that make the
47. situation is more human. Further, for this reason, an effort was
made to implement the idea of
having an open border that would be related to the aspect that
was raised by the European
community in order to enhance the integration efforts of their
economies. However, after the
attacks, there was a wayside demolition and fall of the walls.
This was because of the opinion by
the U.S. that there was need for more control regarding the
border and its activities in order to
stop any likely terrorist, the trafficking of illegal drugs as well
as immigrants. In a
methodological way, he points out sound policy separately and
highlights the related folly and
the wasted resources that are directed towards this effort.
All in all, he asserts that the policies in the U.S. are leading to
hostility towards its
neighbors and thus ending up in the detrimental economies of
both countries. This may mean
that the efforts being put up are futile since the U.S. has not
been able to stop the war on drugs
by stopping their flow. Finally, he says that the war on drugs
only acts to enhance the situation as
also expressed by Kellner & Pipitone (2010).
48. Comment [26]:
be sure to be precise — does he refer to the EC
(European Community) or EU (European Union) or
what? Different names at different times.
Comment [27]:
clarify — “fall of the wall” is taken to mean the Berlin
Wall that fell in 1989 — a dozen years before 9/11
Comment [28]:
I don’t think you’ve given supporting evidence to
justify this language
Comment [29]:
incomprehensibly vague
6
There’s lots to fix, frankly, to make it more readable and allow
a focus on substance. All the self
references, the unhelpful opinionating (mainly excessive
praise), the overuse of pronouns
instead of referring to authors by name — those are all serious
distractions that stand between
the reader and what you may substantively have to say. The
assigned report is not supposed to
be a “book report” but rather a report on the best sources you’ve
found on a particular question
or topic. Taking care of all the needed cleaning up, answering
the questions I raised in the
49. comments, and balancing the report among several sources
instead of organizing around the
Payan book is plenty to do.
References
Kan, R. P. (2012). Cartels at War: Mexico’s Drug-Fueled
Violence and the Threat to US
National Security. New York: Potomac books.
Kellner, T., & Pipitone, F. (2010). Inside México's drug war.
World Policy Journal, 27(1), 29
37.
Payan, T. (2016). The Three US-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs,
Immigration, and Homeland
Security: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security. ABC-
CLIO.
Turbiville Jr, G. H. (2010). Firefights, raids, and assassinations:
tactical forms of cartel violence
and their underpinnings. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21(1),
123-144.