عرض تقديمي1.pptx

HELWAN UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION
AUTOMOTIVE AND TRACTORS TECHNOLOGY
DEPRATMENT
‫ل‬‫الكهربية‬‫الوقاية‬‫نظم‬‫بمقرر‬‫اسية‬‫ر‬‫د‬‫وحدة‬‫تطوير‬‫في‬‫النتائج‬‫واستخدام‬ ‫النطاق‬‫واسعة‬‫وقاية‬ ‫اتيجية‬‫ر‬‫الست‬‫معملي‬ ‫نموذج‬‫واختبار‬ ‫بناء‬
‫ك‬‫طالب‬
‫التعليم‬‫لية‬
‫الصناعي‬
Building and Testing of a Laboratory Model for a wide area protection strategy and Using the
Results in Developing a Study unit of power system protection course for the students at the
faculty of industrial Education
Prepared by
Ahmed abdel wahab Youssif Abd ElAziz
Supervisors:
Assistant Professor and Head of the Department of
Electrical Power and machine engineering Faculty of
Industrial Education - Helwan University
Assoc .Prof. Dina Mourad Hafez
Lecturer of Electrical Power and Machines Engineering
Faculty of Engineering, Helwan University
Dr. Abd ellatif sayed Ahmed
Professor of Curriculum and Instruction Faculty of
Education Helwan University
Prof. Adel Mostafa Mahran
Ph.D. in Technical Education Curricula - Lecturer, College
of Technology, Journalism, Ministry of Higher Education
Dr. Tamer abdelmotelb

operation closer to the
system's and its
component's limits.
The electrical market
and grid operators are
under economic pressure
to maximise the use of
high-voltage equipment,
which frequently entails
There is a broad tendency
for power system
automation to incorporate
both concerns with regular
operation and handling of
disturbances (PSA).
Additionally, there is a
desire to "push" the
boundaries for the same
purpose.
The vendor offers in wide-
area protection and control
have been driven by a few
fundamental facts and
technology advancements.
For the society as a
whole, reliable energy
supply is continuously
growing more and more
important, and
blackouts are always
becoming more and
more expensive.
The operating conditions
change rather quickly as
a result of the
deregulated power
market. For the system
operator, uncharted load
flow patterns appear
more frequently.

THE NEEDS FOR UTILITIES AND THE MARKET
or
a combination of
the two.
boost its
dependability;
boost its ability to
transmit energy;
As a result, the grid operator can operate the system closer to its
physical limitations without having to make any expenditures in high-voltage
machinery.
The phrase "the power system should resist the most severe credible
contingency" has been changed to "the power system should endure the most
severe credible contingency, followed by protective measures from the wide-
area protection system."

Hence the need to introduce intelligent schemes with a
broad perspective based on the latest communications and
computer infrastructures that have been developed recently.
Therefore, an extensive back-up protection system was reported
in this presentation using modules.
How to Address Current and Future Needs

When no specific
equipment is
malfunctioning or being
used improperly, system
protection or wide-area
protection is utilised to
prevent a partial or
complete blackout or
brownout. This
circumstance may arise
following the removal of
a very serious disruption
in a scenario of strained
operation or following
an extraordinary load
increase.
The purpose of
protection equipment
is to prevent harm and
damage from electrical
failures to people,
animals, and property.
When a protection
device trips, the
situation is so dire that
if the equipment is not
tripped, it will suffer
catastrophic damage or
the area will be in
grave danger.
Protection is closely
related to circuit-
breaker trip signals,
which are used to
disconnect
malfunctioning or
overloaded equipment
from the network, save
the component, and
restore the healthy
part of the power
system to its normal
operation, thereby
maintaining the ability
to supply electricity to
the customers.
ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS IN CONTROLAND
PROTECTION

PHENOMENA IN THE
POWER SYSTEM TO
INTERACT
Utility requirements and
issues are sometimes
described in extremely
general terms, such as
"counteract cascaded
line tripping,"
"protection system
against large
disruptions," and
"intelligent load
shedding." These
requirements must be
reduced to physical
occurrences, such as
defence against:
Angle
instability
that is
momentary
Instability
at Small
Signal
Angles
Instability
in
frequency
Instability
of the
Short-Term
Voltage
Prolonged
Voltage
Instability
Cascading
Outages

Since each utility company may have different needs for a wide-
area protection system, the architecture for such a system must be
created in accordance with the technologies that utility has available at
the time. Additionally, the design must be chosen to match the utility in
question's technology migration path in order to prevent becoming
outdated. The following discussion covers three key design philosophies.
POSITIVE DESIGN STRUCTURES

System Protection Terminals and "Flat Architecture“
Equipment protection typically involves the use of terminals or protection
devices (lines, transformers, etc.). Modern security tools are equipped with
enough computing and communication power to go above and beyond their
conventional duties. These devices can process intelligent algorithms (or
"agents") based on information gathered locally or exchanged with other
devices when connected via communications links.

Structure with Multiple Layers
While the aforementioned two designs aim to broaden the "reach" of
already-existing control domains (EMS being the other domain and protection
terminal being the first), there is no assurance that the final product will be all-
inclusive. Integration of the two control domains, EMS and protection devices,
constitutes a full solution.
This architecture has up to three layers. PMUs, or PMUs with added
protection functions, make up the bottom layer. A number of local protection
centres (LPCs), each of which directly interfaces with a number of PMUs, make
up the layer above. The system protection centre (SPC), which is the top layer,
serves as the LPCs' coordinator.
The three-layered architecture can be designed in a number of steps.
The initial goal should be to develop monitoring capabilities, such as aWAMS.
The most popular PMU-based application is WAMS. Although they are most
common in North America, these systems are becoming more widespread
worldwide.
The major goals are to enhance operator information, postfault
analysis, and state estimate. Several PMUs are connected to a data concentrator,
which is essentially a mass storage and is accessible from the control centre, in
WAMS applications.

A data concentrator can become a hub-based local protection centre
(LPC) by integrating control and security features into the data concentrator,
starting from a WAMS design.
The integration of a number of these local protection centres into a
bigger, system-wide solution with an SPC at the top is then possible; see Figure
2. This approach creates a system protection scheme (SPS) for the local
protection centre and a defensive strategy for the connected coordinated system.

Wide-area protection, emergency control, and power system
optimization have different meanings depending on who you ask, what you need,
and where you are in the globe, but the fundamental problems they aim to solve
remain the same. So it's crucial to use standardised, agreed terms.
For various applications and utility settings, the response to a given physical
phenomena may vary greatly. Some utilities may want to start with tiny
installations of new technology running alongside existing systems, while others
may want to deploy a full system to handle numerous applications. While some
utilities prefer to purchase fully assembled turnkey systems, others prefer to
carry out the majority of the studies, designs, and engineering themselves. Any
vendor in this space needs to offer solutions that work with various utility
organisations and traditions.
DISCUSSION

The voltage signal (v1s) and the current signal (i1s) of phase "s" are calculated
between two subsequent windows (each window having m samples). According
to equation (1-1).
)
1
4
(
)
))
(
(
1
))
(
(
(
)
))
(
(
1
))
(
(
(
1
)
(
)
(
)
(
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 



















m
k
s
m
k
s
m
k
s
m
k
s
m
k
s
m
k
s
m
k
s
s
s
i
k
v
m
k
v
k
i
m
k
i
v
i
m
k
v
k
i
k
Cr
In the same manner as (Cri1s), the second VI correlation factor (Cri2s) is
calculated between voltage signal (v2s) and current signal (i2s) of the same
phase (s). According to equation (1-1).
)
2
4
(
)
))
(
(
1
))
(
(
(
)
))
(
(
1
))
(
(
(
1
)
(
)
(
)
(
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
2 



















m
k
s
m
k
s
m
k
s
m
k
s
m
k
s
m
k
s
m
k
s
s
s
i
k
v
m
k
v
k
i
m
k
i
v
i
m
k
v
k
i
k
Cr
proposed technical

The VI correlation factor for a specific sample k, at the sending and
receiving ends of each transmission line, respectively, is represented by Cri1s
and Cri1s.
It is not possible to determine whether a fault is internal to a transmission line or
external from the values of the two VI correlation factors calculated at the two
terminals of each transmission line. Therefore, the multiplication factor must be
calculated for each line as shown below to identify the line that is at fault.
3-Calculating the Multiplication Factor (MFs )
According to equation, the Multiplication Factor (MFs) is determined for each
(4-3).
)
3
4
)(
(
)
(
1
)
( 2
1
1


 

k
Cr
k
r
C
m
k
MF s
i
s
i
m
k
s
The next section explains how the case of operation affects the sign of
the multiplication factor for each transmission line.
The following processes are followed when using this approach as a broad area
protection:

The phase voltage and line current signals from each transmission line's two sides
are received by the SPTs. The SPTs can connect directly with other SPTs,
substation equipment, and the system protection centre (SPC) as indicated in
figure. They can also execute all or portions of distributed control algorithms (4-
2).
System Protection Terminals (SPT)
Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC)
The PDC is viewed as a database on
computers that houses information
from nine system protection
terminals (SPTs). Each SPT
transmits its measured status to the
PDC using a quick communication
system, and the PDC correlates the
data using a time tag to produce a
system-wide measurement.

The relationship between the observed voltage and current signals at the
transmission line terminals determines the sign of the VI correlation factor.
Voltage and current signals at two ends of Line 1 in case of normal
operation.
Results
Normal Operation

Voltage and current signals at two ends of Line 2 in case of normal operation.

operation.

operation.
operation.

Line 1's normal operating values for (Cri1s, Cri2s, and MF).
Line 2's normal operating values for (Cri1s, Cri2s, and MF)

The previous figures show that, in case of normal operation, the signs of Cri1s
(k) and Cri2s (k) are in opposite (for all phases), so the sign of MFs (k) is
negative (for all phases), then this case is normal operation condition.
Corrlation1 Correlation 2 Multiplication Factor Line Statues
Phase
A
Phase
B
Phase
C
Phase
A
Phase
B
Phase
C
Phase
A
Phase
B
Phase
C
Phase
A
Phase
B
Phase
C
LINE 1 0.96 0.97 0.97 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 -0.93 -0.93 -0.93 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 2 0.91 0.91 0.91 -0.88 -0.88 -0.88 -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 3 0.98 0.98 0.98 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98 -0.97 -0.97 -0.97 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 4 -0.93 -0.93 -0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 -0.87 -0.87 -0.88 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 5 -0.97 -0.97 -0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 6 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 7 0.95 0.95 0.95 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 8 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 9 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 -0.86 -0.86 -0.86 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L

As can be seen in the following instance of normal operation for the examined
network, it is evident from the previous explanation that in a situation of
normal operation, the sign of MFs is negative for all transmission lines (for all
phases).
The Previous Figures depict the VI correlation factors at each transmission
line's side as well as the multiplicand for each line during typical network
operation.

depicts the instantaneous value of the voltage and current signals at
two ends of a transmission line in the event of a single line to ground fault
(AG) as an external fault. In the event of a fault condition, this fault is
internal for one line and external for other lines of the network.
the current and voltage signals at the two transmission line ends at
any given moment in the event of an internal fault AG
Fault Conditions

that in the event of a single line to ground internal fault at phase (A),
the direction of phase A at the sending end changed, but the direction of this
current in the receiving end didn't change. This is because one of the two
currents (sending or receiving) in a transmission line changes direction when
there is an internal fault, changing the sign of (Cri1s) or (Cri2s) of the faulted
phase(s).
Fig. 8-1-23: the (Cri1s, Cri2s, and MFis) values of line 1 in the event of an AG fault at line 6.

The signs of Cri1s (k) and Cri2s (k) are in opposition (for all
phases) for all lines except the sign of (Cri1a and Cri2a) of line 6 in the case
of a single line to ground fault at line 6. As a result, the sign of MFs is
negative (for all phases) for all lines except the sign of (MFa) of line 6, and
this case is a single line to ground fault at line 6 at phase A.
The Next Table also shows the values of MFs for all lines and shows the
signs of them still being negative for all lines except phase A of line 6,
which is a faulted phase. Figures (4-8a:d) show the values of the VI
correlation factors at each side of each transmission line and multiplication
factor of each line.

Corrlation1 Correlation 2 Multiplication Factor Line Statues
Phase
A
Phase
B
Phase
C
Phase
A
Phase
B
Phase
C
Phase
A
Phase
B
Phase
C
Phase
A
Phase
B
Phase
C
LINE 1 0.87 0.69 0.86 -0.98 -0.88 -0.99 -0.87 -0.64 -0.86 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 2 0.87 0.3 1.00 -0.89 -0.3 -0.98 -0.78 -0.09 -0.98 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 3 -0.86 0.98 0.62 0.86 -0.98 -0.60 -0.74 -0.96 -0.40 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 4 0.86 -0.93 -0.88 -0.86 0.94 0.88 -0.73 -0.88 -0.80 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 5 -0.96 -0.45 -1.00 0.91 0.44 1.00 -0.87 -.20 -1.00 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 6 0.94 -1.00 -0.95 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.92 -1.00 -0.93 Fault
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 7 -0.98 -0.74 -0.98 0.96 0.73 0.99 -0.94 -0.54 -0.97 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 8 0.86 0.34 1.00 -0.97 -0.34 -0.99 -0.83 -0.11 -0.99 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
LINE 9 0.87 0.58 0.99 -0.89 -0.56 -0.99 -0.77 -0.32 -0.98 NORMA
L
NORMA
L
NORMA
L
the Cr1s, Cr2s, and MF values for all lines in the event of an AG failure on line
6.

Monitoring the sign of the MFs for all of the network's
transmission lines is done as indicated below in order to confirm the relay
decision:
a- A typical operating condition is present when the signs of Cri1s and Cri2s
are in opposition (for all phases), the sign of MFs is negative (for all phases),
and so on.
b- It is an internal fault situation for this transmission line if any of Cri1s or
Cri2s changes its sign (for any phase), in which case the sign of MFs will be
positive (for the faulted phase(s)).
Tripping Behavior

To show how the off-line simulation can be realised in real time,
hardware implementation is necessary. Since no noise or distortion is produced,
the non-real time digital simulation offers the technique's best performance.
The whole experimental setup is depicted in Figure (6-1). The transmission line
(300 km, 380 KV), the load (3 phase load 90 watt), the real current and voltage
transformers (4 VT, 4 CT), associated with the PC through the interfacing card,
as well as the fault circuit are all depicted in this image. Through three voltage
transformers and four current transformers, the interface card receives signals
for both voltage and current. The data acquisition card connected to the laptop's
Core i5, 2.4 GHz processor receives the voltage and current signals.
The following section explains the main components of the experimental setup.
2 Generator
Tested transmission line model
Load circuit
Voltage and current transformers
The fault circuit
Hardware Implementation

Data Acquisition Card and Lap-View Environment

Figure illustrates the software architecture utilising a block diagram
for signal processing and fault detection (10-43). The Lab-View software
package has two primary parts for data processing and analysis, as indicated
in the picture. To accomplish the data processing and analysis, the two
components are described in a package utilising two blocks. The structure
instruction known as Section1 is responsible for producing the four voltage
signals and four current signals in real time. The protection method is
applied via Section 2.

The fault detection for the system depicted in The Previous figure
is carried out online using VI correlation factors calculated at the two ends
of each transmission line. In this part, the fault detection procedure is
examined. Numerous examples are provided to demonstrate the
dependability and stability of the technique's real-time performance.
The problems on transmission line 1 are represented by F1, while the faults
on transmission line 2 are represented by F2. The results of the experiment
for various occurrences are explained in this section.
The front panel of the Lab-View, which displays the signals for two
different loading circumstances, is shown in Figures (10-1-43). In the image,
experimental values for the two multiplication factors (MF1 and MF2) are
shown. The figures demonstrate that in two loading scenarios, the signs of
(MF1 and MF2) are negative. This suggests that the system is in good shape
The performance of the technique during normal operation

(A)
(B)
The technique's reaction under regular operating conditions.
A) MF1, B) MF 2.

The Previous Figures (a-b)) depict the Lab-front View's panel, which
displays signals for fault conditions on TL1 when the fault switch (Sf1) is
activated (at section 2 at Rf 4 ohm). In the image, experimental values for the
two multiplication factors (MF1 and MF2) are shown. According to the data,
MF1's sign changed to positive while MF2's sign remained negative. This
suggests that the TL1 fault indeed happened.
The ability to distinguish between the unhealthy and incorrect lines is
demonstrated by these results, which are identical to the technique response.
The method's performance during the TL 1 fault

This thesis introduces a digital approach for wide-area protection.
The suggested method makes use of real-time measurements of line current
and phase voltage signals at both ends of each transmission line in the network
under study.
At system protection terminals (SPTs), these signals are processed to
determine the VI correlation factors over an appropriate window. These values
of the VI correlation factor are then combined in the phasor data concentrator
(PDC) and sent to the system protection centre (SPC), where the values of the
multiplication factor (MFs) are determined for each transmission line. The sign
of the MF of each transmission line is used to distinguish between faulty and
healthy lines; a positive value of the MF denotes a faulty line. A negative MF
value indicates a good transmission line. The method also categorises the
problematic phase (s).
Without sending data across buses, the suggested technique can only
communicate the status of the VI correlation factor at either end of each
transmission line in order to identify the damaged line.
CONCLUSION

This method is used on a section of the Egyptian 220 kV network that is
connected to the Zaafarana wind farm, and the simulating is carried out using the
MATLAB/ SIMIULINK programme.
The simulation results for various fault scenarios demonstrated that the
proposed VI correlation technique is stable for the network transient state and
that it can identify the defective line and also categorise the defective phase.
To address the aforementioned constraints and some of the unresolved issues, the
author suggests ongoing research in the field.
The faulted line and phase have been successfully located by the
protective system. The suggested method makes use of the voltage and current
signals at the two ends of each transmission line's correlation factor.
The approach relies on independent judgement at the two transmission
line terminals, communication between the system protection centre (SPC), and
all SPTs to transfer status rather than data. Results show that the proposed
technique is stable and reliable for differentiating between different fault types
and different fault locations.

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