LESSON NOTES WEEK 3: Chemical Agents This week we are looking closer at chemical agents. Let’s start with some significant historical events… On March 16, 1988, a five hour attack occurred following a series of undiscriminating conventional attacks, when Iraqi aircraft began dropping chemical bombs on Halabja's residential  area.   According to regional Kurdish rebel commanders, “Iraqi aircraft conducted up to 14 bombings in sorties of seven to eight planes each; helicopters coordinating the operation were also seen. Eyewitnesses told of clouds of smoke billowing upward white, black and then yellow, rising as a column about 150 feet (46 m) in the air” (kurdishgenocide.com 2012). “Survivors said the gas at first smelled of weet apples” (kurdishgenocide.com 2012). Those that survived said “people died in a number of ways, suggesting a combination of toxic chemicals. Some ‘some of the victims just dropped dead while others died of laughing;’ while still others took a few minutes to die, first ‘burning and blistering’ or coughing up green vomit” (HRW 1991). It is believed that Iraqi forces used multiple chemical agents during the attack, including mustard gas and the nerve agents Sarin, Tabun and VX; (Death Clouds) some sources have also pointed to the blood agent hydrogen cyanide (most of the wounded taken to hospitals in the Iranian capital Tehran were suffering from mustard gas exposure) (BBC 2008). Sarin is a human-made chemical warfare agent classified as a nerve agent. Nerve agents are the most toxic  and  rapidly  acting  of  the  known  chemical warfare agents. “They are similar to certain kinds of pesticides (insect killers) called organophosphates in terms of how they work and what kind of harmful effects they cause. However, nerve agents are much more potent than organophosphate pesticides” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] 2006). Once a person is exposed to Sarin gas (GB) it can cause great harm or even death to that person. Sarin gas is binary weapon used by several countries. “GB is a first generation nerve agent that was identified in 1938 as a potential chemical agent by German researchers examining toxic organophosphates result in discovery a nerve agent Tabun (GA), simultaneously they discovered Sarin (GB) and it was identified as code number T-144. The Sarin came from its researchers involved in the project” (cbwinfo.com 2005 ). Some of the symptoms are as follows: Runny nose, Watery eyes, Small, pinpoint pupils, Eye pain, Blurred vision, Drooling and excessive sweating, Cough, Chest tightness, Rapid breathing, Diarrhea, Increased urination, Confusion, Drowsiness, Weakness, Headache, Nausea, vomiting, and/or abdominal pain, Slow or fast heart rate, Low or high blood pressure. Even a small drop of Sarin on the skin can cause sweating and muscle twitching where Sarin touched the skin. Exposure to large doses of Sarin by any route may result in the following harmful health effects: Loss of consciousness ...

1. LESSON NOTES WEEK 3: Chemical Agents
This week we are looking closer at chemical agents. Let’s start
with some significant historical events…
On March 16, 1988, a five hour attack occurred following a
series of undiscriminating conventional attacks, when Iraqi
aircraft began dropping chemical bombs on Halabja's residential
area.
According to regional Kurdish rebel commanders, “Iraqi aircraft
conducted up to 14 bombings in sorties of seven to eight planes
each; helicopters coordinating the operation were also seen.
Eyewitnesses told of clouds of smoke billowing upward white,
black and then yellow, rising as a column about 150 feet (46 m)
in the air” (kurdishgenocide.com 2012).
“Survivors said the gas at first smelled of weet apples”
(kurdishgenocide.com 2012). Those that survived said “people
died in a number of ways, suggesting a combination of toxic
chemicals. Some ‘some of the victims just dropped dead while
others died of laughing;’ while still others took a few minutes
to die, first ‘burning and blistering’ or coughing up green
vomit” (HRW 1991). It is believed that Iraqi forces used
multiple chemical agents during the attack, including mustard
gas and the nerve agents Sarin, Tabun and VX; (Death Clouds)
some sources have also pointed to the blood agent hydrogen
cyanide (most of the wounded taken to hospitals in the Iranian
capital Tehran were suffering from mustard gas exposure) (BBC
2008).

2. Sarin is a human-made chemical warfare agent classified as a
nerve agent. Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly
acting of the known chemical warfare agents. “They are
similar to certain kinds of pesticides (insect killers) called
organophosphates in terms of how they work and what kind of
harmful effects they cause. However, nerve agents are much
more potent than organophosphate pesticides” (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] 2006).
Once a person is exposed to Sarin gas (GB) it can cause great
harm or even death to that person. Sarin gas is binary weapon
used by several countries. “GB is a first generation nerve agent
that was identified in 1938 as a potential chemical agent by
German researchers examining toxic organophosphates result in
discovery a nerve agent Tabun (GA), simultaneously they
discovered Sarin (GB) and it was identified as code number T-
144. The Sarin came from its researchers involved in the
project” (cbwinfo.com 2005 ). Some of the symptoms are as
follows:
Runny nose, Watery eyes, Small, pinpoint pupils, Eye pain,
Blurred vision, Drooling and excessive sweating, Cough, Chest
tightness, Rapid breathing, Diarrhea, Increased urination,
Confusion, Drowsiness, Weakness, Headache, Nausea,
vomiting, and/or abdominal pain, Slow or fast heart rate, Low
or high blood pressure. Even a small drop of Sarin on the skin
can cause sweating and muscle twitching where Sarin touched
the skin. Exposure to large doses of Sarin by any route may
result in the following harmful health effects: Loss of
consciousness, Paralysis, Respiratory failure possibly leading to
death. Showing these signs and symptoms does not necessarily
mean that a person has been exposed to Sarin.
(cbwinfo.com 2005)

3. Recovery from Sarin exposure is possible with treatment, but
the antidotes available must be used quickly to be effective.
Therefore, the best thing to do is avoid exposure: Leave the area
where the Sarin was released and get to fresh air. Quickly
moving to an area where fresh air is available is highly effective
in reducing the possibility of death from exposure to Sarin
vapor. If people think they may have been exposed, they should
remove their clothing, rapidly wash their entire body with soap
and water, and get medical care as quickly as possible. (CDC
2006)
A few years later, in March of 1995, terrorists used the
chemical warfare agent against a civilian population in Tokyo,
Japan. “The nerve agent Sarin (GB) was released in the Tokyo
subway system causing at least 5500 people to get medical care”
(Sidell n.d.). The Aum Shinriko Cult was responsible for this
massive chemical attack in Japan. They killed at least 12
persons at the time of the attack. The Aum Cult was established
in 1987 by Shoko Asahara; its ideology and goals are to take
over Japan (Dugdal-Pointon 2004). The reason they attack the
Tokyo subway is because the organization was disbanded by
Japanese law in October 1995, stripping the cult of its legal
status and tax privileges that it use to have before 1995
(Dugdal-Pointon 2004). At the time of the attack the cult claims
to have over 9,000 members locally and 40,000 members
worldwide (Dugdal-Pointon 2004). The assets of Amu Cult were
estimated at between 300 million and one billion dollars
(Dugdal-Pointon 2004).
Almost one year before the Tokyo incident, the cult terrorist
group successfully released Sarin gas in the city of Matsumoto,
Japan killing seven people injuring about 500 (Dugdal-Pointon
2004). At this incident, there was a container of liquid Sarin
(approx. 20 kilograms) dropped onto a heated surface therefore
producing Sarin vapor and then eventually blown into the air by
a fan (Dugdal-Pointon 2004). The time of the release was about

4. 20 minutes (Dugdal-Pointon 2004).
Below is an excerpt from James Robertson (2011) that further
delves into more recent comparisons and potentials as it relates
to chemical weapons:
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)
terrorism is often portrayed as one of the greatest threats
facing the world. Since 11th September 2001, it has been widely
assumed that terrorists are intent on causing the highest
possible numbers of casualties and that CBRN weapons
present their best opportunity for achieving this, thus it is often
claimed it is vital to take measures to prevent terrorists from
gaining access to these so-called weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).
A comparison of Aum Shinrikyo – the perpetrators of the most
lethal CBRN terrorist attack to date – and al-Qaeda – the group
considered most likely to carry out an attack of this nature in
future – reveals that these unconventional weapons in fact have
a very limited appeal to terrorist groups, and that this appeal
may in fact have diminished rather than increased over the last
two decades. By exploring the circumstances which allowed
Aum Shinrikyo to pursue its CBRN programme and placing
them in contrast to the position of al-Qaeda since 2001 it can be
shown that at least the top leadership of al-Qaeda has little to
gain and much to lose by launching any form of mass casualty
attack, and that in any case the use of CBRN weapons is far
from guaranteed to produce this outcome. Chemical, biological
and radiological weapons might be used by smaller extremist
groups with links to al-Qaeda, but the operational limits on
these groups would make any mass casualty outcome unlikely,
and the potential benefit would be minimal in return for the
difficulties and dangers of using unconventional and unfamiliar
weapons.

5. Recent literature on CBRN terrorism has focused strongly on
the issue of acquisition, working on the assumption that if
terrorists can get hold of these weapons then they will not
hesitate to use them. Thus much of the academic debate
revolves around the ease with which terrorists could construct a
WMD or steal or buy one (Bunn & Weir 2006), and much of the
policy debate around how to prevent the requisite materials
from falling into the wrong hands. This has led to the alarming
conclusion reached by the Commission on Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Proliferation that
‘unless the world community acts decisively and with great
urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass
destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the
world by the end of 2013’ (2008, xv). It is important to examine
the logic behind such alarmist statements and question the
fundamental assumption that terrorists are not only prepared,
but determined to use CBRN weapons.
Aum Shinrikyo: a unique case?
Aum Shinrikyo’s release of sarin gas on the Tokyo subway
system in 1995 remains the most deadly CBRN attack to date,
killing twelve people. Despite fears articulated by authors such
as Jessica Stern (2000, 157) that future terrorists would learn
from Aum’s experiments, it did not mark the beginning of a new
era in terrorist methods. This can be explained through the very
particular circumstances which allowed Aum to carry out this
attack. Aum was uniquely well- resourced, with financial assets
worth hundreds of millions of dollars (Jackson et al. 2004, 11),
and facilities in several different countries including a ranch in
the Australian outback where it carried out its experiments
using sarin gas. These resources were essential to Aum’s pursuit
of CBRN weapons (Falkenrath 1998, 23).
The cult was dedicated to ‘causing great chaos and loss of life’
(Tucker 2000, 216), believing that its activities were to

6. instigate an apocalyptic war between the United States and
Japan. The psychological dimension of CBRN weapons was
clearly important in the group’s decision to pursue them. The
chemical and biological weapons used in all the group’s
attempted attacks fitted with its apocalyptic goals since ‘[t]he
idea of infection caused by invisible agents is frightening. It
touches a deep human concern about the risk of being destroyed
by a powerful, evil, imperceptible force.’ (Holloway et al. 2004,
183-184) Aum wanted to jolt the Japanese population into
awareness of the
impending apocalypse, so the shock-value of CBRN weapons
had a unique appeal for them, but also key their strategy was the
belief was that these weapons would also cause a huge number
of casualties.
Aum’s ideology not only made CBRN weapons especially
appealing, but it also freed the cult of the restraints that might
otherwise prevent their use. Aum was unconcerned about losing
the support from any external community. The group became
increasingly paranoid in the 1990s, believing the rest of society
was conspiring against it, and by the middle of the decade its
recruitment had slowed dramatically (Jackson et al. 2005, 13).
When the sarin gas attacks were carried out, a more severe
retaliation by the government was also not a concern, as Aum
already believed the police were planning an imminent raid on
its facilities regardless. The group believed it had nothing to
lose. The preconditions for Aum to break the norms against use
of CBRN weapons can be summarised as follows: a
determination to carry out a mass casualty attack and a belief
that CBRN weapons were an appropriate method to achieve this;
a lack of important external support which could be withdrawn;
and a disregard for the possibility of retaliation. (Robertson
2011)
References:

7. BBC. 2008. On this Day. | 16 | 1988: Thousands die in Halabja
gas attack Death Clouds: Saddam Hussein’s Chemical War
Against the
Kurds http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16
/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm
Bunn, Matthew, and Wier, Anthony. 2006. “Terrorist Nuclear
Weapon Construction: How Difficult?” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 607, 133-149.
CBWInfo. 2005. Factsheets on Chemical and Biological Warfare
Agents. http://www.cbwinfo.com/intro.html
Center for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC]. 2006. Facts
about Sarin. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/facts.asp
Dugdale-Pointon, T. (13 November 2004), Aum Shinrikyo
Cult/Terrorist
Organisation, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_au
m.html
Falkenrath, Richard. 1998. America’s Achilles Heel: Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack.
Holloway, H., Norwood, A., Engel, C., Fullerton, C., and
Ursano, R. 2004. “The Threat of Biological Weapons:
Prophylaxis and Mitigation of Psychological and Social
Consequences” in Schneider, Barry & Davis, Jim (eds.), The
War Next Time: Countering Rogue States and Terrorists Armed
With Chemical and Biological Weapons.
Human Rights Watch. 1991. Whatever Happened to the Iraqi
Kurds? http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/IRAQ913.htm#4
Kurdish Genocide. 2012. It is time to end the silence: Kurdish

8. genocide. www.kurdishgenocide.com
Robertson, J. 2011. How Appealing are CBRN Weapons to
Terrorist Groups? http://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/26/how-
appealing-are-cbrn-weapons-to-terrorist-
groups/?lang=en_us&output=json
Sidell, F.R. n.d. Chemical Agent
Terrorism. http://www.totse2.com/totse/en/bad_ideas/guns_and_
weapons/chemterr.html
Tucker, Jonathan. 2000. Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use
of Chemical and Biological Weapons.
Have chemical attacks conducted in the past by such groups like
the Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo or the Iraqi
government in the late 1980s had a significant effect on
counterterrorism preparedness against chemical weapons in the
United States? Why or Why not? And do you feel the more
recent chemical attack by the Syrian government against their
own people will have an impact on chemical weapon
preparedness here in the United States? Why or why not?
350 word minimum Include citations