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Web Application Social Engineering
Vulnerabilities

Matt Cooley
Lead Security Advisory Analyst
Symantec Security Strategy & Advisory Services
Agenda

           1        Overview


           2        Homograph Attacks


           3        Web Application Vulnerabilities


           4        Demonstration




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities    2
Presentation Overview
• This presentation will demonstrate some attacks that can be
  used to target users and administrators of web applications.


• You will learn techniques attackers use to steal money and
  sensitive data while going undetected.




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities               3
Domain Spoofing
    Homograph Attacks


Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   4
Domain Name Spoofing
• Wait, that’s not a web application vulnerability
• No, but it’s a tool in our toolbox which we will use to make our
  attacks more convincing




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                   5
Internationalized Domain Names (IDN)
http
http://例子.测试
http://παράδειγμα.δοκιμή
http://пример.испытание
http




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   6
The problem is, this is also an Internationalized Domain Name:


                                          miсrоsоft.com

                                                     This is not:


                                          microsoft.com



Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                  7
When Homographs Attack




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   8
Homograph Attacks – A Brief History
 2002 – Paper by Gabrilovich and Gontmakher
 • Revealed that it was possible to register a domain containing
   non-Latin characters which would appear indistinguishable from
   a legitimate domain name.


 microsoft.com (authentic)


 miсrоsоft.com (Russian letters ‘c’ and ‘o’)
 • с = Unicode Character 'CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ES' (U+0441)
 • о = Unicode Character 'CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER O' (U+043E)

http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~gabr/papers/homograph.html

 Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities             9
Web Browsers Were Fixed.. Kinda
 2005 – Shmoo Group revisits homograph attacks
 • Found that homograph attack prevention in browsers was
   applied inconsistently and spoofing issues could be exploited in
   Firefox, Safari, and Opera


 www.paypal.com (the real site)
 • a = Unicode Character 'LATIN SMALL LETTER A' (U+0061)


 www.pаypal.com (Shmoo’s site)
 • а = Unicode Character 'CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A' (U+0430)

http://www.shmoo.com/idn/homograph.txt

 Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                   10
Still not fixed
 2009 – Chris Weber discloses IDN spoofing issue with Safari




https://www.owasp.org/images/5/5a/Unicode_Transformations_Finding_Elusive_Vulnerabilities-Chris_Weber.pdf
http://support.apple.com/kb/ht3733

 Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                                                         11
Today
 • All popular browsers implement their own policies for how
   IDN’s should be displayed in the address bar
 • If a Unicode IDN doesn’t pass the browser’s policy for display, it
   will be displayed in Punycode – should raise suspicion
 • Safari and mobile Safari have more permissive rules than
   Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer




http://www.idnnews.com/?p=8760

 Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                     12
These are all the same domain
                                                     Chrome 14.0 Windows

                                                     Firefox 7.0 Windows

                                                     Internet Explorer 9.0 Windows

                                                     Android 2.2

                                                     Safari 5.1 Windows

                                                     Safari 5.0.2 iPhone

                                                     Opera Mini 6.0 iPhone

Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                                   13
Safari’s IDN Handling Policy
 • There is a white list file containing permitted IDN character sets.
   It is up to the user to maintain the list
 • /System/Library/Frameworks/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/R
   esources/IDNScriptWhiteList.txt
 • C:Program FilesSafariSafari.resourcesIDNScriptWhiteList.txt




http://support.apple.com/kb/TA22996

 Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                      14
Safari’s White List
# Default Web Kit International Domain Name Script White List.

Common
Inherited

Arabic
Armenian
Bopomofo
Canadian_Aboriginal
Devanagari
Deseret
Gujarati
Gurmukhi
Hangul
Han
Hebrew
Hiragana
Katakana_Or_Hiragana
Katakana
Latin
Tamil
Thai
Yi



Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities               15
Safari has the Weakest IDN Spoofing Protection Policy
• So let’s attack Safari




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities      16
My first attempt

 • sỵmantec.com
 • xn--smantec-h64c.com (Punycode)
 • ỵ = Unicode 0x1ef5 “LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DOT
   BELOW”




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities     17
Somewhat Convincing Spoof in both Punycode and
Native Character Formats

 • xn--microsoft-msft.com (Punycode)
 • micro̦so̤ft.com
 • Instead of gibberish in the Punycode format, the text “msft” is used
   (stock symbol for Microsoft)
 • If the victim opens the URL in a browser that shows Punycode, they
   will see this:




  • Otherwise, they will see this:




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                        18
Hmm.. This is interesting

 • sy̲mantec.com
 • xn--symantec-rcf.com (Punycode)
 • Unicode 0x0332 “COMBINING LOW LINE”
 • Safari in Windows 7 - Underline doesn’t display:




     Achievement unlocked!



Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities    19
A fix?
Removing “Latin” from the Safari IDN white list causes this:




To become this:




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities             20
IDN Spoofing on iOS Devices
The following Unicode characters are not displayable on iOS
devices, but can be registered within an IDN:

                                                     夆   U+5906
                                                     悞   U+609E
                                                     暵   U+66B5
                                                     煒   U+7152
                                                     譿   U+8B7F
                                                     驊   U+9A4A

       Bonus: They are allowed by Safari’s default white list (Han)

Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                    21
iOS IDN Spoofing Proof of Concept
• www.apple夆.com
• www.xn--apple-c94i.com (Punycode)


Mobile Safari:




Opera Mini:




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   22
Another Neat Trick.. Dot.. Dot.. Dot..
• So I was at a restaurant and scanned the QR code on a bottle of
  ketchup with an iPhone.




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                  23
We can register one domain and spoof everything!
• 夆. 夆. 夆. 夆.夆夆.com
• xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrsa.com
• www.microsoft.co.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--
  rrs.xn--rrsa.com




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                24
iOS Fix?
• Apple provides a mechanism for preventing native IDN display
  with undesirable character sets
• So let’s just remove “Han” from the white list file… oh wait




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities               25
QR Codes
    Let me show you my QR codes


Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   26
Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   27
Combining Homograph Attack with QR Codes
• Replace legit QR code with malicious QR code
• Victim scans malicious QR code and browser is redirected to
  attacker’s URL
• Attacker’s server examines user agent header
• If it is not a vulnerable device, forward them to a legitimate site
• Otherwise, spoof the domain and capture info (PROFIT!!!)




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                      28
american.xn--redcross-vr0o.com
american.redcross夆.com




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   29
Web Application Vulnerabilities
    Arbitrary URL Redirection


Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   30
Arbitrary URL Redirection
 • A common web application vulnerability which can be used to
   coerce victims into clicking a malicious link
 • http://<target site>/redirect?url=http://<attacker’s site>
 • Because the host name in the URI is legitimate, it should pass
   the trust test
 • OWASP refers to this vulnerability as “Open redirect”
 • The difficulty in using this as an exploit is in hiding the true
   nature of the URL: that it’s directing you to somewhere bad




https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Open_redirect

 Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                   31
URL Redirection with Percent Encoding Obfuscation
Before:
• http://ourcompany.com/wordpress/wp-
  login.php?redirect_to=http://evilhost.com
After:
• http://ourcompany.com/wordpress/wp-
  login.php?%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%74%6F=%68%
  74%74%70%3A%2F%2F%65%76%69%6C%68%6F%73%74%2E%
  63%6F%6D#501_Table_Integrity_Error_in_SQL_Notify_Adminis
  trator




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities       32
URL Redirection with IDN Spoofing
• http://ourcompany.com/wordpress/wp-
  login.php?redirect_to=http://ourcompanỵ.com/wordpress/mai
  n
Or if targeting iPhone readers:
• http://ourcompany.com/wordpress/wp-
  login.php?redirect_to=http://ourcompany.com.xn--
  ourcompany-wr7r.com/wordpress/main
(xn--ourcompany-wr7r.com = ourcompany夆.com)




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities            33
URL Redirection Triple Threat
• http://ourcompany.com/wordpress/wp-
  login.php?redirect_to=http://ourcompany.com〳error-
  %61%2E%78%6E%2D%2D%6F%75%72%63%6F%6D%70%61%6
  E%79%2D%77%72%37%72%2E%63%6F%6D#501_SQL_Encodin
  g_Error
• This is the redirection target:
• http://ourcompany.xn--comerror-a-3w3i.xn--ourcompany-
  wr7r.com/
• Use TinyURL to wrap it all up into a nice gift




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities        34
Web Application Vulnerabilities
    Cross-Site Scripting


Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   35
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   36
Cross-Site Scripting Attack Vectors
Old School:
• Capture session identifiers to hijack session
Middle School:
• Capture keystrokes to steal valid credentials and sensitive
  information
Cool School:
• Compromise a fully patched and secured host




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities              37
BeEF Demonstration
• Leverage cross-site scripting to log keystrokes on an iPhone




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities               38
BeEF Details
• Included in BackTrack
• Works best when used with a persistent cross-site scripting
  vulnerability
• BeEF is a good resource to demonstrate bad things you can do
  with JavaScript
• Useful as a proof of concept tool




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities               39
Social Engineering Toolkit



Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   40
Social Engineering Toolkit (SET)
• One of the best ways to remotely compromise a fully patched,
  fully protected host
• The Java Applet web attack vector will get through just about
  anything
• Setup a SET listener on external host
• Send victim a URL redirect / put link on twitter or Facebook
• Use with XSS




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                41
Mega Demo
• Leveraging everything we’ve learned
• Persistent XSS redirects user to Wordpress login – steals
  credentials with keystroke logger
• Wordpress site then redirects to SET Java applet page
• SET host has an IDN hostname
• Windows 7 host is compromised




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities            42
Tools Used




Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities   43
Thank you!
    matt_cooley@symantec.com

    http://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/the-security-advisor


    Copyright © 2011 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec and the Symantec Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in
    the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.

    This document is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as advertising. All warranties relating to the information in this document, either express or implied,
    are disclaimed to the maximum extent allowed by law. The information in this document is subject to change without notice.


Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities                                                                                                                                          44

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Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities

  • 1. Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities Matt Cooley Lead Security Advisory Analyst Symantec Security Strategy & Advisory Services
  • 2. Agenda 1 Overview 2 Homograph Attacks 3 Web Application Vulnerabilities 4 Demonstration Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 2
  • 3. Presentation Overview • This presentation will demonstrate some attacks that can be used to target users and administrators of web applications. • You will learn techniques attackers use to steal money and sensitive data while going undetected. Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 3
  • 4. Domain Spoofing Homograph Attacks Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 4
  • 5. Domain Name Spoofing • Wait, that’s not a web application vulnerability • No, but it’s a tool in our toolbox which we will use to make our attacks more convincing Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 5
  • 6. Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) http http://例子.测试 http://παράδειγμα.δοκιμή http://пример.испытание http Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 6
  • 7. The problem is, this is also an Internationalized Domain Name: miсrоsоft.com This is not: microsoft.com Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 7
  • 8. When Homographs Attack Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 8
  • 9. Homograph Attacks – A Brief History 2002 – Paper by Gabrilovich and Gontmakher • Revealed that it was possible to register a domain containing non-Latin characters which would appear indistinguishable from a legitimate domain name. microsoft.com (authentic) miсrоsоft.com (Russian letters ‘c’ and ‘o’) • с = Unicode Character 'CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ES' (U+0441) • о = Unicode Character 'CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER O' (U+043E) http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~gabr/papers/homograph.html Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 9
  • 10. Web Browsers Were Fixed.. Kinda 2005 – Shmoo Group revisits homograph attacks • Found that homograph attack prevention in browsers was applied inconsistently and spoofing issues could be exploited in Firefox, Safari, and Opera www.paypal.com (the real site) • a = Unicode Character 'LATIN SMALL LETTER A' (U+0061) www.pаypal.com (Shmoo’s site) • а = Unicode Character 'CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A' (U+0430) http://www.shmoo.com/idn/homograph.txt Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 10
  • 11. Still not fixed 2009 – Chris Weber discloses IDN spoofing issue with Safari https://www.owasp.org/images/5/5a/Unicode_Transformations_Finding_Elusive_Vulnerabilities-Chris_Weber.pdf http://support.apple.com/kb/ht3733 Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 11
  • 12. Today • All popular browsers implement their own policies for how IDN’s should be displayed in the address bar • If a Unicode IDN doesn’t pass the browser’s policy for display, it will be displayed in Punycode – should raise suspicion • Safari and mobile Safari have more permissive rules than Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer http://www.idnnews.com/?p=8760 Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 12
  • 13. These are all the same domain Chrome 14.0 Windows Firefox 7.0 Windows Internet Explorer 9.0 Windows Android 2.2 Safari 5.1 Windows Safari 5.0.2 iPhone Opera Mini 6.0 iPhone Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 13
  • 14. Safari’s IDN Handling Policy • There is a white list file containing permitted IDN character sets. It is up to the user to maintain the list • /System/Library/Frameworks/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/R esources/IDNScriptWhiteList.txt • C:Program FilesSafariSafari.resourcesIDNScriptWhiteList.txt http://support.apple.com/kb/TA22996 Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 14
  • 15. Safari’s White List # Default Web Kit International Domain Name Script White List. Common Inherited Arabic Armenian Bopomofo Canadian_Aboriginal Devanagari Deseret Gujarati Gurmukhi Hangul Han Hebrew Hiragana Katakana_Or_Hiragana Katakana Latin Tamil Thai Yi Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 15
  • 16. Safari has the Weakest IDN Spoofing Protection Policy • So let’s attack Safari Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 16
  • 17. My first attempt • sỵmantec.com • xn--smantec-h64c.com (Punycode) • ỵ = Unicode 0x1ef5 “LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DOT BELOW” Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 17
  • 18. Somewhat Convincing Spoof in both Punycode and Native Character Formats • xn--microsoft-msft.com (Punycode) • micro̦so̤ft.com • Instead of gibberish in the Punycode format, the text “msft” is used (stock symbol for Microsoft) • If the victim opens the URL in a browser that shows Punycode, they will see this: • Otherwise, they will see this: Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 18
  • 19. Hmm.. This is interesting • sy̲mantec.com • xn--symantec-rcf.com (Punycode) • Unicode 0x0332 “COMBINING LOW LINE” • Safari in Windows 7 - Underline doesn’t display: Achievement unlocked! Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 19
  • 20. A fix? Removing “Latin” from the Safari IDN white list causes this: To become this: Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 20
  • 21. IDN Spoofing on iOS Devices The following Unicode characters are not displayable on iOS devices, but can be registered within an IDN: 夆 U+5906 悞 U+609E 暵 U+66B5 煒 U+7152 譿 U+8B7F 驊 U+9A4A Bonus: They are allowed by Safari’s default white list (Han) Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 21
  • 22. iOS IDN Spoofing Proof of Concept • www.apple夆.com • www.xn--apple-c94i.com (Punycode) Mobile Safari: Opera Mini: Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 22
  • 23. Another Neat Trick.. Dot.. Dot.. Dot.. • So I was at a restaurant and scanned the QR code on a bottle of ketchup with an iPhone. Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 23
  • 24. We can register one domain and spoof everything! • 夆. 夆. 夆. 夆.夆夆.com • xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrsa.com • www.microsoft.co.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn--rrs.xn-- rrs.xn--rrsa.com Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 24
  • 25. iOS Fix? • Apple provides a mechanism for preventing native IDN display with undesirable character sets • So let’s just remove “Han” from the white list file… oh wait Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 25
  • 26. QR Codes Let me show you my QR codes Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 26
  • 27. Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 27
  • 28. Combining Homograph Attack with QR Codes • Replace legit QR code with malicious QR code • Victim scans malicious QR code and browser is redirected to attacker’s URL • Attacker’s server examines user agent header • If it is not a vulnerable device, forward them to a legitimate site • Otherwise, spoof the domain and capture info (PROFIT!!!) Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 28
  • 30. Web Application Vulnerabilities Arbitrary URL Redirection Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 30
  • 31. Arbitrary URL Redirection • A common web application vulnerability which can be used to coerce victims into clicking a malicious link • http://<target site>/redirect?url=http://<attacker’s site> • Because the host name in the URI is legitimate, it should pass the trust test • OWASP refers to this vulnerability as “Open redirect” • The difficulty in using this as an exploit is in hiding the true nature of the URL: that it’s directing you to somewhere bad https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Open_redirect Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 31
  • 32. URL Redirection with Percent Encoding Obfuscation Before: • http://ourcompany.com/wordpress/wp- login.php?redirect_to=http://evilhost.com After: • http://ourcompany.com/wordpress/wp- login.php?%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%74%6F=%68% 74%74%70%3A%2F%2F%65%76%69%6C%68%6F%73%74%2E% 63%6F%6D#501_Table_Integrity_Error_in_SQL_Notify_Adminis trator Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 32
  • 33. URL Redirection with IDN Spoofing • http://ourcompany.com/wordpress/wp- login.php?redirect_to=http://ourcompanỵ.com/wordpress/mai n Or if targeting iPhone readers: • http://ourcompany.com/wordpress/wp- login.php?redirect_to=http://ourcompany.com.xn-- ourcompany-wr7r.com/wordpress/main (xn--ourcompany-wr7r.com = ourcompany夆.com) Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 33
  • 34. URL Redirection Triple Threat • http://ourcompany.com/wordpress/wp- login.php?redirect_to=http://ourcompany.com〳error- %61%2E%78%6E%2D%2D%6F%75%72%63%6F%6D%70%61%6 E%79%2D%77%72%37%72%2E%63%6F%6D#501_SQL_Encodin g_Error • This is the redirection target: • http://ourcompany.xn--comerror-a-3w3i.xn--ourcompany- wr7r.com/ • Use TinyURL to wrap it all up into a nice gift Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 34
  • 35. Web Application Vulnerabilities Cross-Site Scripting Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 35
  • 36. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 36
  • 37. Cross-Site Scripting Attack Vectors Old School: • Capture session identifiers to hijack session Middle School: • Capture keystrokes to steal valid credentials and sensitive information Cool School: • Compromise a fully patched and secured host Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 37
  • 38. BeEF Demonstration • Leverage cross-site scripting to log keystrokes on an iPhone Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 38
  • 39. BeEF Details • Included in BackTrack • Works best when used with a persistent cross-site scripting vulnerability • BeEF is a good resource to demonstrate bad things you can do with JavaScript • Useful as a proof of concept tool Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 39
  • 40. Social Engineering Toolkit Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 40
  • 41. Social Engineering Toolkit (SET) • One of the best ways to remotely compromise a fully patched, fully protected host • The Java Applet web attack vector will get through just about anything • Setup a SET listener on external host • Send victim a URL redirect / put link on twitter or Facebook • Use with XSS Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 41
  • 42. Mega Demo • Leveraging everything we’ve learned • Persistent XSS redirects user to Wordpress login – steals credentials with keystroke logger • Wordpress site then redirects to SET Java applet page • SET host has an IDN hostname • Windows 7 host is compromised Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 42
  • 43. Tools Used Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 43
  • 44. Thank you! matt_cooley@symantec.com http://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/the-security-advisor Copyright © 2011 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec and the Symantec Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners. This document is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as advertising. All warranties relating to the information in this document, either express or implied, are disclaimed to the maximum extent allowed by law. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Web Application Social Engineering Vulnerabilities 44

Editor's Notes

  1. This is a sample Agenda/Preview slide. This slide is ideal for setting the scene at the beginning of your presentation by providing a big picture overview of what you plan to cover. To Change Titles in Shapes (i.e.: “Text here”):Select text. (Optional: Press Delete.) Begin typing desired text.To Change Font Color/Size: Select text, right-click and adjust the font setting on the Mini toolbar. Select desired attributes to change: font, size, boldness, color, etc. Note: many of the same commands can also be accessed from the Font group of the Home tab.To Change a Shape’s Fill Color:Select the desired object by clicking once on its edge. On the Home tab, click the Shape Fill button within the Drawing group to select a theme color from the Symantec color palette. To Delete a Shape:Select the desired object by clicking once on its edge. Press the Delete key on your keyboard.To Copy a Text Box or Shape:Select the text box or shape. Note: Make sure to select the entire object, not just the text, by clicking the edge of the text box or shape.Type Ctrl C (copy), click outside object, then type Ctrl V (paste) to place the object. Click and drag the pasted object to desired location.