The 1991 Water Accord allocated existing and future water shares among Pakistani provinces to facilitate dam construction. However, ambiguities around what constitutes "initial conditions" and how shortages are shared have caused inter-provincial mistrust. Specifically, interpreting initial conditions as either historical usage from 1977-1982 or the Accord allocation of 114 MAF has led to disputes. Additionally, exempting some provinces from sharing shortages in the 2003 "three-tier scenario" exacerbated tensions. Unless these ambiguities are resolved and proper implementation mechanisms established, the growing water stresses may overwhelm the Accord's functioning.

1. John Briscoe, Erum Sattar, Anjali Lohani, Hassaan
Youssuf and Laila Kasuri
Harvard University
Lahore, July 22, 2011

2. Caveats:
• These are very sensitive political issues
• These are my own opinions and absolutely not “now
revealed” views of the World Bank
• What I say about the position of the World Bank is
based on public information not on “insider
information”

3. Story line
1. Some basic facts that will drive cooperation
(or conflict) over water in South Asia
2. Sharing waters – good and bad experiences
3. Sharing benefits – good and bad experiences

4. Nothing new in conflict over water…
• Origin of the
word “rival”:
1570–80; < L
rīvālis orig., one
who uses a
stream in
common with
another, equiv. to
rīv(us) stream + -
ālis -al1

5. Water security cannot be
understood in isolation…
Income security
Energy Food
Security Security
Water
security

6. The international transboundary
waters come on top of major internal
challenges

7. Several major international river basins
Territorial disputes in important parts
of the catchments…

9. All international rivers in South Asia
rise at great height in the Himalayas

10. There is massive unexploited hydroelectric potential…
% hydropower potential developed
100%
90%
Japan
80% Europe
70% North
America
60%
50%
40%
India South
30% America
China
20%
10% Pakistan
Nepal Africa
0%
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Thousand GWH/year economically viable potential

11. And then there is climate change…

12. With the prospect of more frequent flooding…
Sukkur,
August
2009
Sukkur,
August
2010

13. And huge questions about what
happens in the Himalayas

16. Context: South Asia is the least
integrated region in the world

17. …. intra-regional trade is the lowest in
the world

19. Lack of mutual
ties-that-bind
aggravate
otherwise
resolvable
conflicts

20. The overlap between water scarcity
and the RNSSC members…
Standard fare:
•Terrorism
•Nuclear Proliferation
Now:
•Water

21. Story line
1. Some basic facts that will drive cooperation
(and conflict) over water
2. Sharing waters in South Asia – good and bad
experiences
3. Sharing benefits – good and bad experiences

22. Sharing waters
• A good framework well implemented (so far)
– the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960
• A good framework imperfectly implemented
(so far) – the 1991 Water Accord in Pakistan
(presented by Erum, Anajali, Laila and Hassan)
• A bad framework badly implemented – inter-
state rivers in India
• An nth best with implementation difficulties –
the Ganges Treaty of 1996

23. Ch
us
en
I nd
l um ab
Jh e
Bea
s
vi
Ra
Pakistan Sut
lej
India
1947 – Partition

24. The challenges and legacies of partition in
1947
• the headwaters were in India
• And the major irrigated areas (about 85% of
total irrigated area) in Pakistan

25. (Conflicting) principles for sharing
water
• Equitable use (EU)
• No appreciable harm (NAH)

26. President Ayub Khan
• “We have been able to get the
best that was possible…”
• “Very often the best is the
enemy of the good, and in this
case we have accepted the
good after careful and realistic
appreciation of our entire
overall situation”
• “The basis of this agreement is
realism and pragmatism…”

28. A brutal solution
• The Eastern Rivers – the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej -- all
water to India
• The Western Rivers – Chenab, Jhelum and Indus --
all water for Pakistan
– But what about the non-consumptive development
opportunities in India?
• Energy could be used (in Indian-held Kashmir) without affecting
quantity or timing of flows to Pakistan
– Very detailed site-by-site specification of what India could
do respecting two principles:
• No material changes in hydrographs
• Limiting the amount of “live storage” in specific Indian HEPs

29. Live
storage
Dead
storage

30. The Indus - The Treaty (1960)
P a k i s ta n
In d ia

31. Financing of “the replacement works”
in Pakistan…
• $ 900 million to finance the construction of
Mangla, Tarbela and major link canals.
• Donors -- $300 million provided by Australia,
Canada, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom
and United States.
• Pakistan provided about $350 million from own
budget
• $80 million loan from World Bank
• $174 million dollars paid by India for construction
of dams and canals in Pakistan

32. The IWT widely regarded as a great
success…
“the one area where India and Pakistan have
worked constructively together, even when
they were at war…”
But….

33. After 40 years,
for the first time,
India and
Pakistan were
unable to
bilaterally resolve
an issue through
the IWT
Commission –
the design of
Baglihar Dam on
the Chenab

34. • India’s design of Baglihar:
– Concern about siltation (Salal Dam silted up very fast)
– Chinese principle “store clear water, discharge muddy
water”
– Good practice is to install low gates to flush silt
• Pakistan’s fear:
– With low gates, India could manipulate flows coming
into Pakistan..
• In 2004 Pakistan petitioned the World Bank to
appoint a “neutral expert”
• As stipulated in the IWT the World Bank did this

36. Outcome of the Baglihar case…
• Apparently
– Solomonic:
• 3 findings for Pakistan
• 3 for India
– a successful “win-win”…
• But re-interpreted the IWT:
– Legitimately:
• took into account new knowledge (especially on
sedimentation management)

37. Rivers full of silt…

38. The Baglihar re-interpretation on permissible
“manipulable storage” …
Old manipulable
storage
New manipulable
storage

39. Indian Hydro, especially in the Chenab
Basin will put great stress on the IWT
Kishenganga 330 mw
Sawal Kot 1200 mw
Baglihar 450 (+ 450) mw
Salal 700 mw
Bursar 1000 mw
Pakuldul 1000 mw
Dul Haste 390 (+ 390) mw
P a k i s ta n
In d i a
Complete
Under construction
In planning

40. The result of the Baglihar NE
decision?
– Baglihar NE focussed only on the “make
use of the resources” principle in the
IWT and ignored the “without giving a
capacity to manipulate flows” principle
– Back-of-envelope calculations suggest
that after it has built all currently-
planned hydros, India will be able to
store about 40 days of low-flow in the
Chenab
– Pakistan left largely without protection
if India decided to temporarily withhold
water from Pakistan

42. The current conflict (Kishenganga)…
Neelum River
Neelum Jhelum
1000 mw
Jhelum River

43. The current conflict…
Kishangana
330 mw
Neelum River
Neelum Jhelum
1000 mw
Jhelum River

44. What does the Indus Waters Treaty say?
• Annexure D, para 15
– where a Plant is located on a tributary of The
Jhelum on which Pakistan has any agricultural
use or hydro-electric use, the water released
below the plant may be delivered, if necessary,
into another tributary but only to the extent that
the then existing agricultural use or hydro-
electric use by Pakistan on the former tributary
would not be adversely affected .
Case before an international tribunal – let’s see how it rules….

45. The choice?
• For Pakistan (and India):
– With massive increase in plans on the Jhelum and
(especially) Chenab in Indian-held Kashmir..
– The stresses on the IWT mechanism will become
overwhelming
– Continue as is – heading for a trainwreck?
• For Pakistan major concerns:
– The “physical protection” of limiting live storage has been greatly
reduced by the Baglihar finding….
• For India:
– major uncertainties for investors
– And fuel to the jehadi fire…

47. What might be done to save the IWT?
• The division of property rights is sound and
should be maintained
• The dispute resolution mechanism could be
modernized:
– Away from engineers scoring points against other
engineers
– Engagement of neutral dispute resolution
expertise
– Invest in win-win projects

48. • For example, why not do jointly-planned,
jointly-financed and jointly-operated hydel?
Itaipu Binacional (Brazil-Paraguay)

49. The example of the bi-national (Paraguay and
Brazil) Itaipu project
2500
GDP (billion US$ ppp)
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Brazil Paraguay Bolivia

50. • Brazil’s president agreed to triple Paraguay’s income
from Itaipú
• The agreement is a huge deal for Paraguay…
• For Brazil, the approximately $240 million a year it
agreed to give up is a small price to pay for Mr. da
Silva’s broader goals of calming tensions with its
neighbors, asserting Brazil’s leadership in the region
and promoting regional integration

51. Is such big-heartedness likely on
the Indus?
– In the past the general sentiment in India
would have been “we would never use water
as a weapon…”
– And now the prevailing sentiment is “this
would be legitimate payback for Mumbai”….
– And India has simultaneously:
• advised Pakistan to build storage on the Indus
and
• Pressured the World Bank (which has
apparently caved in to such pressure) to not
invest in Daimler Basha Dam on the Indus in
Pakistan…

52. Sharing waters
• A good framework well implemented (so far) –
the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960
• A good framework imperfectly implemented
(so far) – the 1991 Water Accord in Pakistan
(presented by Erum, Anajali, Laila and Hassan)
• A bad framework badly implemented – inter-
state rivers in India
• An nth best with implementation difficulties –
the Ganges Treaty of 1996

53. Harvard Pakistan Water Project
In Collaboration with LUMS
The 1991 Water Accord
Presentation at the Harvard South Asia
Initiative Conference in Lahore, Pakistan
July 22, 2011

54. Harvard SAI Conference
Agenda
Background on the Accord
The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
Importance of Resolving Ambiguities and Implementation
Issues
Suggestions and Next Steps

55. Harvard SAI Conference
Agenda
Background on the Accord
The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
Importance of Resolving Ambiguities and
Implementation Issues
Suggestions and Next Steps

56. Background
Why we Chose to Focus on the Accord
•Trans boundary issues of growing importance; “water
wars”
•Most focus is between countries (e.g. IWT)
•But there are issues at all levels, not least among
provinces in federal countries
•Harvard Water Security Initiative and HLS will be
doing a conference this spring on “Water Management
Across State Boundaries in Federal Countries”
Pakistan’s glass on this is half full (we HAVE an Accord!) but also half empty….

57. Background
Glass Half Empty and Half Full
Ambiguities and necessity for adjustments are part of all
Half Empty water accords
Half Full The Accord has actually worked reasonably well despite a
lot of noise
But it could work a lot better, and that is what we are going to now
focus on…

58. Background
Inter-Provincial Water Issues in Pakistan
The provincial sharing of water has been a long, contested issue even
Century
before the current Accord (e.g. Sukkur Barrage)
and a half
of
disputes
Timeline
Ad hoc sharing arrangements were followed till 1990 but no storages
post Mangla and Tarbela could be agreed upon until water apportionment
was done
Finally in 1991, the Accord was signed to allocate existing and
1991 future water amongst the provinces with the aim to create
trust and facilitate construction of much needed future
storages …

59. … however, various issues around the Accord have contributed to
the mistrust amongst the provinces and hampered the
construction of these storages
Institutional and
Mistrust Amongst
Accord Ambiguities + Implementation
Issues
= Provinces

60. Harvard SAI Conference
Agenda
Background on the Accord
The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
Importance of Resolving Ambiguities and
Implementation Issues
Suggestions and Next Steps

61. Institutional and
Mistrust Amongst
Ambiguities + Implementation
Issues
= Provinces

62. The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
Ambiguities in the Accord
The key ambiguity in the 1991 Accord relates to what
constitutes “initial conditions”
Initial Conditions Debate
One Interpretation Another Interpretation
•The historical uses (77-82) of 103
maf were used as a guideline for
creating Accord allocations of 114
maf Use historical allocation of 103
•Once the Accord has been made, it maf until 114 maf comes online
has to be implemented through additional storage
•Accord envisages pro-rata sharing
of shortages and surpluses

63. The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
The Accord: 1991 to present
These two different interpretations of the Accord have added to inter-provincial
mistrust especially in times of shortages
Accord is 1994 Ministerial 3-tier scenario
decision based on introduced; KPK and
Approved Balochistan exempted
Ad hoc historical use
Allocations
Implementated from sharing shortages
Timeline 1991 1994 1999 2001-2002 2003-present
Ministerial Meeting
decides sharing should Law Division opinion: 1994
be based on historical Ministerial decision based on
use historical use is a violation of the
Accord
150
Water
Availability
(maf)
90
‘99 – ‘00 ’03 – ‘04

64. The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
The Accord: Three-tier Scenario
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
Water
Availability 103 maf 114 maf
Shared as per Actual
Shared as per Accord
Average Historical Use
allocations
(77-82)
Shared as per Accord Balance supplies shared as
allocations per para 4 percentages
(37-37-14-12)
There are gainers and losers under this method

65. The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
The Accord: Current Mistrust
The three-tier scenario appeared to be the best compromise at that time
The three-tier method seems to be a functioning yet uneasy modus
operandi
There is constant contesting especially around the issue of exempting KPK
and Balochistan from sharing shortages
This has exacerbated rather than reduced mistrust

66. The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
The Accord: Implementation Issues
But the provinces have not yet appealed to the CCI on this issue
It seems that no single province can afford to unravel the system –
YET !
However, there will be new pressures on the system in the future (e.g. Gilgit-
Baltistan)
The implementing body of the Accord, Indus River System Authority (IRSA),
must be strengthened to deal with these existing pressures and future
challenges

67. In addition to these ambiguities, there seem to be a number of
institutional and implementation issues around the Accord
Institutional and
Mistrust Amongst
Ambiguities + Implementation
Issues
= Provinces

68. The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
Key Technical Issues (1/2)
•Correlation with prior irrigation season used for
predictions; increased variability with climate change
Predicted •Provinces bring different numbers to the table which
Flows serve their interests
•Possibility of forecast manipulation which could
undermine trust in IRSA
•Inadequate monitoring of data
Technical
Monitoring •In 2002-03, telemetric system was installed but has
Issues not been successful
•Significant losses witnessed between barrages; losses
doubled over last decade
Losses •Rapidly growing unauthorized abstractions
•Greater reliance on groundwater
All these technical limitations increase provincial mistrust

69. The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
Key Technical Issues (2/2)

70. The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
Key Institutional Issues
Enforcement •Lacks authority to double check provincial data
•Underfunding hinders implementation capacity
Funding •Important steps made to secure financial basis
for IRSA
Institutional
Issues
Lack of •Provincial dependence for allowances
Autonomy •Corporatization envisaged in 1991
Regulatory Absence of an inter-ministerial, inter-provincial body
Framework to oversee water sector planning and development

71. Harvard SAI Conference
Agenda
Background on the Accord
The Accord, Ambiguities and Implementation
Importance of Resolving Ambiguities and
Implementation Issues
Suggestions and Next Steps

72. Importance of Resolving Ambiguities
Vicious Circle of Water Insecurity
Mistrust is one factor
Lack of reservoirs
that blocks consensus
exacerbates shortages
on building reservoirs
Water
Insecurity
Lack of transparency in Shortages increase
dealing with competition which
ambiguities increases cause ambiguities to
mistrust surface

73. Importance of Resolving Ambiguities
Provincial Stalemate on Key Storages
“Sindh wants implementation of 1991 Water Accord”
Dawn, June 06, 2009
“Punjab farmers reject 1991 Water Accord without Kalabagh Dam”
Dawn, April 3, 2010
“Sindh rejects construction of Kalabagh Dam”
Dawn, June 17, 2010

74. SAI Conference
Agenda
Background on the Accord
Implementation Issues
Importance of Resolving Ambiguities
Suggestions and Next Steps

75. Suggestions and Next Steps
Some Next Steps for IRSA
•Put key data online; look to Punjab as a model.
Data Availability • IRSA’s recent step to put up daily data is commendable but needs to be
more comprehensive.
•Ensure installation of telemetry stations and training of staff for continuous
data collection and monitoring to perform flow measurements
Monitoring •Start with barrage to barrage and canal headworks monitoring
•In the long run, need more comprehensive monitoring
•Urgent need for an independent, technical assessment of “conveyance
“Conveyance losses”
Losses” •Bring illegal abstractions into the allocation and management system
through improved monitoring
Increased transparency will reduce mistrust

76. Suggestions and Next Steps
Next Steps for Us
We are preparing a paper (or papers) inter alia for the Harvard conference on
“Inter-state management of water in Federal Countries”
From that there will be “lessons of better and worse practice” around the
world
We see this as an input for the Pakistani leaders who will be invited to the
conference
Will be a great opportunity for Pakistan to consider the way in which it
can do better on this vital issue

77. Back to Professor Briscoe !

79. Sharing waters
• A good framework well implemented (so far) –
the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960
• A good framework badly implemented (so far)
– the Indus in Pakistan
• A bad framework badly implemented – inter-
state rivers in India
• An nth best with implementation difficulties –
the Ganges Treaty of 1996

80. Union Government very passive:
“Water is a state issue”, when in fact it
is on concurrent list
• Interstate issues left to Tribunals
• Which have no standard operating procedure
• Which take decades to come to unpredictable
decisions
• Which stimulate destructive gaming on behalf
of the States

81. Minister of Finance, India:
 India facing a growing series of “small civil wars”
over water rights…
Minister of Water Resources:
 “I am not the Minister of Water Resources but the
Minister of Water Conflicts”

83. Sharing waters
• A good framework well implemented (so far) –
the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960
• A good framework imperfectly implemented
(so far) – the 1991 Water Accord in Pakistan
• A bad framework badly implemented – inter-
state rivers in India
• An nth best with implementation difficulties –
the Ganges Treaty of 1996

85. The issue
• Diversions of Ganga water at Farakka has had
a negative impact on Bangladesh
• (Coupled with the “natural” easterly drift of
the main channels of the delta)

86. Ganges at
Hardinge bridge
Effect of abnormal
reduction of
Ganges flows in
Bangladesh

87. Dry season 5 ppt
r
e
isohaline now
v
i
R
a
n
u
m
a
Gn J
ag
es
Ri e
vr
G r
e
oa v
i
R
r
iR
ive C
Dry season 5 ppt h
a
n
r h eg
a
nd
isohaline in 60s r M
Kmu a n
a e
p
rRiv R P
a p
U
er i
v dm
Nb
Closing of
a ag er aR
ag
na iv
R er
Gorai has
major
environ-
mental
impact in
Sundarbans
Salinity Intrusion

88. The 1996 Ganges Treaty signed by
India and Bangladesh
Water for India
Water for Bangladesh
Low flow Medium flow High flow
Water Availability at Farakka

89. (A posture which would help in the case of the IWT….)
Tariq Karim is now the Bangladesh High Commissioner in
Delhi…. And have just concluded another major treaty
on sharing waters of the Teesta River

90. Story line
1. Some basic facts that will drive cooperation
(and conflict) over water
2. Sharing waters – good and bad experiences:
3. Sharing benefits in South Asia – good and
bad experiences

91. Sharing benefits…
• An international success – Bhutan and India
• An international failure – Nepal and India
• An international possibility – China and India
on the Brahmaputra

92. Bhutan’s main resource is water and gravity……

93. Gross national happiness is very high…

94. • “Bhutan’s ability to harness the hydropower resources has been made
possible because of the close and friendly ties with its neighbour India.
India has been the lead donor in providing both technical and financial
assistance to develop the numerous hydro power projects in Bhutan. The
relationship developed in the hydro power sector has been a win- win
situation for both the countries. India has a huge power shortage while
Bhutan a large hydro power potential.”
• GoI has funded the construction of the major hydropower facilities. The
scheme used to finance these facilities was 40% grant and 60% loan (20
years maturity and 9 percent interest rate in rupees).
• Direct sale of electricity (with installed capacity of about 300mw)
contributed as high as about 45% of the gross national revenue during the
8th Plan (1997-2002), mainly from its export to India. The 1020 mw Tala
project came on line in 2007 (and led to 23% growth in GDP!)

95. Sharing benefits…
• An international success – Bhutan and India
• An international failure – Nepal and India
• An international possibility – China and India
on the Brahmaputra

96. The (shameful) case of Arun III
• A medium-size project (400 mw)
• Nepal relied on “international
donors” so that it would not be in
India’s hands.
• The World Bank abandoned Nepal
on the altar of political
expediency….
• The fig-leaf was “the project is too
big for Nepal” (although Bhutan’s
Tala, 2.5 times as large as Arun, proved
not to be “too big” for the economy of
Bhutan, which is 1/8th that of Nepal…”)

97. Although, of
course, the
World Bank’s
withdrawal
really had
more to do
with this….
As told here….

98. Happily it looks as though Nepal is
finally learning from Bhutan….

99. Sharing benefits…
• An international success – Bhutan and India
• An international failure – Nepal and India
• An international possibility – China and India
on the Brahmaputra

100. TRANSFER TO
YANGTZE?:
Would have to
pump over 8000
Yangtze river feet!
ENERGY:
IMPACT ON INDIA/BD?: 40,000 mw at Big
(a)70% of flow comes below the border Bend:
(b) Some augmentation of low flows Sell to India?

101. Overall Conclusions
• Tensions over transboundary waters are growing
between countries and within countries

102. • These tensions raise the specter of water wars…
• The internal challenges are often as serious as the
international ones (except that provinces do not –
usually -- have armies)

103. • To move from conflict to cooperation:
– In some cases sharing water can be the solution, in
others sharing benefits
– Solutions almost always involve both soft (treaties,
institutions) and hard (infrastructure) components
– External “full-service” partners (such as the World Bank)
have played and could play facilitating roles
• Cooperation:
– Is dependent on the broader set of relationships
between countries and
– Can contribute to improving such relationships
“beyond the river”
– Politicians are going to have the maturity to lower
the temperature…

104. President Ayub Khan
• “We have been able to get the
best that was possible…”
• “Very often the best is the
enemy of the good, and in this
case we have accepted the
good after careful and realistic
appreciation of our entire
overall situation”
• “The basis of this agreement is
realism and pragmatism…”

105. • Politicians (and people and the media) are going to
have to learn to let bygones be bygones…
• Santayana:
– “those who do not learn their history will be condemned
to repeat it…”

106. • I am a South African of Irish descent:
• Conor Cruise O’Brien:
– In Ireland we have learned our history so well that
we are condemned to repeat it, endlessly
• Nelson Mandela:
– Acknowledge the past but do not become a
prisoner to it…
– Move on and focus on creating a better
future for all…
– If this example is followed in the sub-
continent, water can be a source of
cooperation and development….
• For Indians and Pakistanis and
• For Sindhis and Punjabis….